• Ministers from the US, EU, UK, Japan, Australia, and nearly 20 allied nations convene in Washington to discuss a critical minerals alliance, addressing China's dominance in rare earth mining, refining, and permanent magnet manufacturing as a national security liability.
• Australia establishes a A$1.2 billion strategic critical minerals reserve while uncertainty persists over US price guarantees, with investors demanding pricing certainty to scale non-China refining capacity.
• The summit marks an emerging acceptance of a security premium for rare earth refining, requiring coordinated industrial policy across mining, refining, magnets, finance, and defense procurement at a scale not seen since WWII-era mobilization.

Ministers from the US, EU, UK, Japan, Australia, and nearly 20 allied nations will convene in Washington this week to discuss a critical minerals alliance, with rare earths and permanent magnets at the center. The meeting reflects a growing consensus: dependence on China for mining, refining, and magnet manufacturing is now a national-security liability—not a trade inconvenience

This moment did not arrive suddenly. Rare Earth Exchanges™ has argued since its launch in late 2024 that only a coordinated, multinational industrial alliance—not fragmented national strategies—could realistically rebalance rare earth supply chains. This week’s summit suggests policymakers are finally converging on that conclusion.

So now such topics have gone mainstream, as cited (opens in a new tab) today by The Guardian’s Lisa O’Carroll.

Yes, the Risk Is Real—and Quantified

The Guardian’s core facts hold: Europe consumes roughly 20,000 tonnes of permanent magnets annually, sourcing 17,000–18,000 tonnes from China. Domestic EU production is marginal. Similar vulnerabilities exist across the US and allied economies, as the Rare Earth Exchanges community well knows.  China’s repeated willingness to impose export controls—on rare earths, gallium, antimony, and related materials—has transformed abstract risk into lived experience.

This is not speculative framing. It is the empirical baseline, at this point, pragmatic survival driving alliance talks.

Australia Moves First—Others Watch

Australia’s decision to establish a A$1.2 billion strategic critical minerals reserve is among the most concrete policy actions cited. This mirrors Japan’s long-standing stockpiling model and signals a shift from market faith to resilience planning. Importantly, Canberra is acting even as uncertainty persists around US price guarantees—suggesting that allies are no longer waiting for Washington to lead every lever.  The Trump administration, to its credit, has done more than any other administration on critical minerals and the rare-earth element supply chain. But more is needed.

The Price Floor Question: Where Policy Meets Physics

One unresolved fault line is whether the US will guarantee minimum prices for critical minerals and rare earths. Reports via Reuters that Washington may have stepped back triggered equity sell-offs—an investor verdict that price certainty matters. Without it, capital hesitates; without capital, refineries and magnet plants do not get built.

The Guardian accurately frames this as a debate. What deserves sharper emphasis is consequence: pricing mechanisms are not optional if non-China refining—especially heavy rare earth separation—is to scale.

Where Optimism Outruns Engineering

The article leans into alliance symbolism and diplomatic repair. What remains absent are specifics: volumes, timelines, binding commitments, and industrial coordination mechanism targets. “De-risking” is invoked frequently, but chemistry, permitting, and workforce realities do not bend to communiqués.

Why This Moment Still Matters

What is truly notable is the emerging acceptance of a security premium for rare earth refining—an _idea Rare Earth Exchanges_™ has consistently advanced. Delivering this alliance will require synergies across mining, refining, magnets, finance, and defense procurement—an industrial policy effort not seen at this scale since perhaps World War II–era mobilization.

Whether this summit marks a turning point—or another missed opportunity—will depend on execution.

Source: The Guardian, Lisa O’Carroll, February 1, 2026.

• The Trump administration is expected to urge allies to consider tariffs on Chinese rare earths as an alternative to price floors, signaling a preference for trade measures over direct subsidies.
• Tariffs alone won't build the 'missing middle' - China's dominance lies in chemical separation and processing, not mining, requiring synchronized investment in infrastructure, permits, and skilled operators.
• For investors, the real signal is execution:
  • Permitting reform
  • Committed capital for separation plants
  • Experienced operators
  • Bankable offtake agreements
• Without these, tariffs remain symbolic.

The Australian Financial Review reports (opens in a new tab) that the Trump administration may urge allies to consider tariffs on Chinese rare earths—marketed as a cleaner alternative to price floors or direct government guarantees. The idea is expected to surface at a Washington meeting attended by Australia’s resources minister Madeleine King. It’s a sharp political soundbite. The supply-chain arithmetic, however, remains stubbornly physical—and far less forgiving.

The Parts That Hold Water

There is an active debate in Washington over how to de-risk rare earth supply without writing open-ended checks. Tariffs are politically legitimate and align with Donald Trump’s preference for pressure over subsidies. It’s also fair to note that bespoke price floors can be clumsy, distort incentives, and invite moral hazard. Allies—especially Australia—are indispensable to any credible diversification away from China.

The Chemistry Everyone Skips

What the narrative sidesteps is the “missing middle.” Tariffs don’t build separation plants. China’s dominance is strongest midstream—chemical separation, metallization, alloying—not at the mine mouth. Raising prices via tariffs may nudge margins, but without synchronized investment in solvent extraction, tailings management, power, reagents, and skilled operators, projects stall. Capital follows bankable offtake and permitting certainty, not press releases. Timelines are measured in years, not headlines.

Optics vs. Plumbing

The framing implies tariffs could substitute for price guarantees. That’s speculative at best. Tariffs are blunt instruments: they raise costs for downstream users (EVs, wind, defense) without ensuring Western processors reach scale before customers balk. History suggests tariffs can potentially delay buildouts by injecting volatility and demand risk. The lean here is toward optics over execution—policy signaling mistaken for industrial plumbing.

Why This Matters Now

If pursued, the move would signal Washington’s continued preference for coordination through trade measures rather than the more explicit, durable industrial policy frameworks that Rare Earth Exchanges™ has consistently argued are necessary. That distinction matters. Allies may offer public alignment while, in parallel, advancing grants, concessional financing, and long-dated offtake agreements—the practical tools that translate policy intent into operating capacity.

For investors, the signal to watch is execution: permitting reform across agencies (ideally synchronized among allies), capital firmly committed to separation infrastructure, experienced operators in place, and creditworthy offtake agreements finalized. Without those elements, tariffs risk remaining symbolic gestures—while the chemistry quietly waits.

Citation: Australian Financial Review, Jan. 30, 2026.

• The U.S. Trump administration stepped back from guaranteeing minimum prices for critical minerals projects, causing Australian rare earth stocks like Lynas to drop over 4% as markets repriced policy support risk.
• Australia maintains its A$1.2 billion strategic minerals reserve won't be derailed, though the U.S. price floor was only ever applied to one specific project, not the entire sector as markets had anticipated.
• The episode exposes how fragile non-China rare earth supply chains remain when policy support wavers, with inconsistent signaling raising capital costs and demanding proof through contracts and execution rather than headlines.

While the U.S. has apparently stepped back from guaranteeing minimum prices for critical minerals projects — spooking markets and sending Australian rare-earth stocks lower as a result —Australia says this won’t derail its strategy. That may be true, but the episode exposes how fragile non-China rare earth supply chains still are when policy support hesitates.

What Reuters Reported—and Why Markets Flinched

According to a Reuters entry, the Trump administration has retreated from plans to broadly guarantee minimum prices for U.S. critical minerals projects, citing a lack of congressional funding and the difficulty of setting market prices. The news hit sentiment fast. Shares of Australian rare earth miners slid, with Lynas Rare Earths—the world’s largest producer outside China—down more than 4% at one point.

This reaction wasn’t about fundamentals changing overnight. It was about policy signal risk.

What’s Solid: The Price Floor Was Always Narrow

Here’s where the reporting is accurate and important. Australia’s resources minister correctly noted that the U.S. had applied a price floor to one specific project, not the entire sector. That aligns with what Rare Earth Exchanges™ has flagged repeatedly: talk of “universal” Western price floors has often outpaced legislative reality.

Markets, however, priced in optionality that never fully existed. The pullback didn’t remove a broad support mechanism—it clarified that one never truly materialized.

The Subtle Spin: “Won’t Derail” vs. “Won’t Hurt”

Australia says the U.S. decision won’t derail its A$1.2 billion strategic minerals reserve, slated to include antimony, gallium, and rare earths by late 2026. That’s plausible. Canberra has tools: offtake agreements, targeted stockpiling, and selective pricing support.

But there’s a gentle optimism embedded in the narrative. Price floors likely matter because rare earth markets are thin, volatile, and easily distorted by China’s scale.

Even the possibility of a U.S. floor lowered perceived risk for non-China producers. Removing that expectation raises the cost of capital—quietly but meaningfully. But as Rare Earth Exchanges also reported, given myriad laws, rules, and market norms and mores, a universal price floor in the West is not that easy to accomplish.

Why This Matters for the Rare Earth Supply Chain

This episode underscores a recurring truth: industrial policy credibility is as important as industrial policy itself. Strategic reserves help. Offtakes help. But inconsistent signaling reintroduces the very volatility these policies aim to suppress.

Australia may stay the course. Investors will now demand proof—contracts, cash flow, and execution—definitely not headlines.

Source: Reuters, Jan. 30, 2026.

• Australian rare earth equities, including Lynas and Iluka, fell by double digits after unconfirmed reports suggested the U.S. may abandon its proposed NdPr price floor near $110/kg, though no formal policy rescission has occurred.
• The sell-off reveals markets are conflating price signals with value creation—price floors alone don't resolve rare earth supply chain bottlenecks without critical midstream infrastructure for separation, metal making, and magnet manufacturing.
• Popular rare earth ETFs include Chinese companies, causing indiscriminate capital rotation during volatility and punishing Western miners while China's vertically integrated system remains insulated from policy speculation.

A sharp sell-off in Australian rare earth equities this week reveals less about geology—and more about how fragile sentiment becomes when supply chains hinge on policy interpretation. Shares of Lynas Rare Earths and Iluka Resources fell by double digits following unconfirmed reports that the U.S. government may retreat from a proposed price floor for neodymium–praseodymium (NdPr). Markets reacted fast. Fundamentals did not.

The Signal Beneath the Noise

The reporting is directionally correct: the U.S. Department of Defense outlined a preliminary NdPr price floor near $110/kg in mid-2025, catalyzing a sharp NdPr price rally and a surge in upstream equities. NdPr matters because it anchors the permanent magnet economy. A credible floor would meaningfully de-risk upstream projects long impaired by price volatility.

What’s missing is context. No formal rescission has occurred. More plausibly, as REEx noted yesterday, this looks like a policy adjustment to legal, budgetary, and procurement realities—not an ideological rejection of floors. Designing durable price support inside U.S. acquisition law, WTO exposure, and Congressional appropriations is complex. Iteration is expected. Markets, however, priced rumors as reversals.

Where Valuations Actually Break

The sell-off exposes a deeper flaw in coverage: conflating price signals with value creation. NdPr miners trade on upstream optionality, but price floors alone do not resolve the bottleneck. Separation, metal making, alloying, and magnet manufacturing—the midstream—determine durable margins. REEx rankings consistently show that upstream exposure without midstream leverage is a valuation trap during policy ambiguity.

This explains why Arafura, Hastings, Meteoric, and Lindian moved in sympathy. Capital is reacting to narrative risk, not differentiated supply-chain position.

The ETF Illusion Investors Miss

Passive exposure compounds the volatility. Popular rare earth funds, including the VanEck rare earths ETF, include Chinese companies. These are not ex-China instruments. When sentiment wobbles, capital rotates indiscriminately—punishing Western miners while China’s vertically integrated system absorbs the shock.

The Bias to Watch

The quiet bias is policy determinism: the belief that a single mechanism—price floors—can stabilize a fragmented value chain. It cannot. Floors help. They do not substitute for synchronized midstream build-out. Without that, equities will keep trading on headlines instead of throughput.

Why This Matters

This episode reinforces a core REEx lesson: rare earth valuations must be read through a supply-chain lens, not a press-release one. Adjustments are not abandonment. Until investors separate rumor from structure—and upstream from midstream—markets will keep mistaking policy calibration for strategic retreat.

Source: Sharecafe, January 29, 2026.

• Malaysia's MITI insists the ART agreement with the U.S. maintains sovereignty, allowing partnerships with any nation including China without forcing alignment with U.S. sanctions or technology coercion.
• Despite policy optimism, Malaysia lacks proven separation flowsheets and magnet IP; capital-intensive midstream processing remains the bottleneck that no trade agreement alone can solve.
• Indonesia's nickel export ban serves as a cautionary tale: export restrictions intended to force domestic value-add often backfire through inflated costs, retaliation, and deeper foreign operator dependence.

Malaysia’s government insists its rare earth strategy remains sovereign, open, and commercially pragmatic—even as headlines warn of geopolitical capture and industrial overreach. A newly released FAQ (opens in a new tab) from Malaysia’s Ministry of Investment, Trade and Industry (MITI) on the Malaysia–U.S. Agreement on Reciprocal Trade (ART) pushes back against claims that the deal locks Kuala Lumpur into U.S. orbit or excludes China. The truth, as ever in rare earths, sits in the engineering, capital, and governance details—not the press releases.

The Promise: Neutrality, Optionality, and Value-Add

Malaysia’s official position is clear: cooperation with the United States on critical minerals and rare earth elements does not compel alignment with U.S. sanctions, nor does it prohibit partnerships with other countries, including China. Export controls remain governed by Malaysian law; technology transfer is voluntary, not coerced; and unprocessed REE exports remain restricted to encourage domestic value creation. On paper, this preserves strategic optionality while courting Western capital and know-how.

The Physics: Capital, Chemistry, and Scale Still Rule

Where optimism thins is midstream reality. Separation and refining are capital-intensive, environmentally sensitive, and brutally unforgiving to newcomers. Malaysia lacks proven, scaled separation flowsheets and proprietary magnet IP. No trade agreement changes that. Claims that ART alone can “integrate Malaysia into Western supply chains” gloss over the time, cost, and yield curves that define rare earth processing. Investors know this; chemistry doesn’t negotiate.

The Cautionary Tales We Keep Relearning

Commentary invoking Indonesia’s nickel ban is not alarmist—it’s empirical. Export restrictions meant to force domestic value-add often inflate costs, invite retaliation, and deepen dependence on foreign operators who do have technology. Malaysia’s own history with Lynas’ Gebeng facility shows how social license, waste management, and regulatory clarity can make or break projects—regardless of geopolitics.

Where the Coverage Overreaches

Some analyses imply ART implicitly sidelines Chinese capital or guarantees downstream success. The MITI text does neither. It promises dialogue, not dominance; openness, not outcomes. The bias here is structural optimism—assuming policy alignment can substitute for decades of industrial learning.

Why This Matters Now

Rare earth supply chains are fragmenting. Malaysia could become a credible node—but only if it resists shortcuts, funds midstream rigor, and aligns ESG enforcement with investor certainty. Trade frameworks set the table. Chemistry decides who eats.

Citation: Ministry of Investment, Trade and Industry (MITI), FAQs on the Malaysia–USA Agreement on Reciprocal Trade, updated Nov. 3, 2025.

• China's rare earth dominance stems from integrated ecosystems linking mines to separation, magnets, and manufacturing—not merely resource abundance or geology.
• Western rare earth processing was hollowed out by industrial policy and short-term capitalism, not ESG constraints alone, while China leveraged state capital and long-term vision.
• Korea's call for a rare earths complex is sound but requires decade-long commitment, guaranteed offtake, and allied coordination to avoid collapsing back into Chinese dependency.

The Korea JoongAng Daily column argues that rare earth dominance flows not from geology, but from integration—mines linked to separation, magnets, and end-use manufacturing (opens in a new tab). On this central point, the author is correct as the Rare Earth Exchanges™ community is fully aware. China’s advantage is not merely resource abundance but ecosystem design, exemplified by hubs such as Bayan Obo Mining District and downstream magnet clusters. The Two Rare Earth Bases China paradigm, now on an accelerated trajectory with patients, innovation and monetization across relevant sectors.

The article correctly highlights the chemical difficulty of separating 17 near-identical elements and the industrial importance of solvent-extraction know-how accumulated over decades. This is aligned with global expert consensus and with REEx’s own supply-chain mapping.

The ESG Mirage and the Cost Story

Environmental constraints are portrayed as the West’s primary barrier. That framing is directionally true but incomplete. ESG hurdles matter, as seen in controversies surrounding Lynas Rare Earths operations in Malaysia, but they are not the decisive constraint.

The deeper truth: China’s advantage stems from state-coordinated capital, tolerance for long payback periods, vision to strategy to execution, and the willingness to run loss-leading separation capacity to defend downstream dominance. ESG alone did not hollow out Western processing—industrial policy did. Not to mention the short-termism associated with modern-day capitalism.

Where the Narrative Overreaches

The column leans into a deterministic tone: China’s system is portrayed as effectively unassailable. That crosses from analysis into strategic fatalism. While it is true that China produces roughly 85–90% of rare earth permanent magnets, the suggestion that alternative ecosystems are futile understates recent progress in Australia, the U.S., and Japan—albeit fragmented and underscaled.

Speculation also appears in references to thorium reuse via molten salt reactors. This remains experimental and commercially unproven, not a current cost-offset mechanism.

Korea’s Dilemma: Vision vs. Execution

The call for a “Korea-style integrated rare earths complex” is intellectually sound. Korea sits downstream of rare earth value creation—EV motors, semiconductors, displays—but lacks refining and magnet sovereignty. The article is right to warn that mine-only strategies collapse back into Chinese dependency.

What’s missing is time, capital, and alliance math. Integration requires a decade-long commitment, guaranteed offtake, security-priced inputs, and coordination with allies—not editorial urgency alone.

Why Relevant Now?

A notable topic, reflective of a broader Asian reassessment: rare earths are no longer a procurement issue, but a national industrial architecture problem. Korea is asking the right question. Whether it can execute before the next “valve turn” is the unanswered risk investors must price.

Citation

Lee, C-m. “Building a Korea-style integrated rare earths complex.” Korea JoongAng Daily, Jan 26, 2026.

• Turkey's Beylikova rare earth deposit contains 694 million tons of ore, but the complex, low-grade polymetallic system faces major processing challenges without proven separation technology—the critical step China dominates.
• Eti Maden's 1,200-ton pilot plant produces mixed concentrate, not separated oxides; scaling plans to 570,000 tons by 2027 remain aspirational without solving midstream separation and magnet-grade refinement.
• Turkey's rare earth ambitions underscore a key investor lesson: geological abundance doesn't equal supply security—dominance requires control of separation, metals, and magnets, not just ore.

A report circulated by Nordic Monitor (opens in a new tab) and amplified across regional media casts Turkey as a rising rare earth contender stalled by foreign technology controls.  The core facts are solid. Turkey does host a very large, complex rare earth–bearing deposit in Beylikova, Eskişehir, anchored by state-owned Eti Maden (opens in a new tab) as Rare Earth Exchanges™ has reported.  Exploration totals—hundreds of drill holes, tens of thousands of samples, and an estimated 694 million tons of ore—are not in dispute. What matters for investors, however, is what kind of ore this is and what comes next.

Beylikova is not a clean bastnäsite or monazite story. It is a polymetallic, low-grade system intertwined with barite, fluorite, and thorium. That complexity raises costs, regulatory hurdles, and—most critically—processing risk.

See Rare Earth Exchanges’ “_Turkey’s Rare Earth Ambition—Promise and Projection._”

Pilot Plants Are Not Supply Chains

Turkey’s 1,200-ton-per-year pilot plant produces a mixed rare earth concentrate. That is an early milestone, not a commercial breakthrough. The hardest, most valuable step—individual oxide separation—remains unresolved. This is where the recent account is most accurate: separation chemistry, solvent extraction cascades, and magnet-grade refinement are closely guarded capabilities dominated by China and a small ex-China club (e.g. Lynas Rare Earths, MP Materials).

Plans to scale Beylikova to 570,000 tons of ore per year by 2027 should be read as aspirational engineering timelines, not bankable supply. Without proven separation, metal-making, and magnet integration, tonnage targets are political signals, not market ones.

Sovereignty Talk Meets Physics

Yes, Ankara’s insistence on “national control” over rare earths, echoed by Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Energy Minister Alparslan Bayraktar, raises the level of interest. That rhetoric resonates domestically but collides with reality. Rare earth supply chains are not plug-and-play. Technology transfer is slow,conditional, and often incomplete—even amongallies.

Opposition claims that Turkey is preparing to “hand over” its rare earths to the United States appear overstated and political. No binding offtake or technology agreements are disclosed. At the same time, the government’s narrative understates how dependent Turkey remains on external know-how if it wants magnets, not just ore.

Why This Matters for the Global REE Market

Turkey’s situation reinforces a core lesson investors should internalize: geological abundance does not equal supply security. China’s dominance persists not because of ore alone, but because it controls separation, metals, and magnets, all the result of deliberate industrial policy over the last couple of decades.  Turkey may eventually join the producer map—but only if it cracks midstream processing and downstream manufacturing.

Until then, Beylikova is best understood as a long-dated option, not an imminent disruptor.

Profile: Eti Maden

Eti Maden (Eti Maden İşletmeleri Genel Müdürlüğü) is a Turkish state-owned mining and chemicals company and the undisputed global leader in boron. Founded in 1935 as Etibank and restructured in 2004, Eti Maden is headquartered in Ankara and owned by the Turkey Wealth Fund (opens in a new tab). It holds a government monopoly over borate mining in Turkey, which containsroughly 73% of the world’s known boron reserves, giving thecompany an estimated 60–61% share of the global boron market. Its core products include borax pentahydrate and decahydrate, boric acid, boron oxide, zinc borate, and ground colemanite, serving industrial markets ranging from glass and ceramics to agriculture and energy.

Eti Maden operates at a large industrial scale, employing around 6,000 people and producing more than 2.5 million tons of refined boron products annually across major facilities in Bandırma, Kırka, Emet, Bigadiç, and Kestelek. The company supplies over 10,000 customers in more than 100 countries across six continents.

Financially, it posted record revenue of approximately $1.32 billion in 2024, following reported 2023 revenues between roughly $1.0–1.8 billion depending on accounting scope, with operating income of ₺16.27 billion. Strategically, Eti Maden is leveraging its boron dominance to diversify into lithium recovery from boron-processing waste streams while shifting toward higher value-added boron products to reinforce Turkey’s position in advanced materials and energy-related supply chains.

Source: Nordic Monitor, Jan. 21, 2026

• Lynas Rare Earths reported a 74% price increase to A$85.60/kg in Q2 FY26 driven by benchmark pricing gains and growing off-index contract share, signaling measurable movement away from China-dominated pricing mechanisms.
• Heavy rare earth production reached 26 tonnes of Dy/Tb, but operations faced setbacks from Kalgoorlie power disruptions and Malaysian maintenance, raising execution risk concerns until energy reliability is secured.
• U.S. Seadrift facility remains uncertain with ongoing DoD contract negotiations and no confirmed offtake agreement, leaving critical questions about project timeline, capex, and go/no-go milestones unanswered.

A rare earth price break from China’s grip? Lynas Rare Earths’ quarterly report (opens in a new tab) for the period ended 31 December 2025 (dated 21 January 2026) shows a sharp uplift in realized pricing and a notable shift toward contracts “independent of the market index.” The company reports an average selling price of A$85.60/kg in Q2 FY26, versus A$49.2/kg in Q2 FY25, alongside commentary that pricing improved due to “increased benchmark pricing” and a growing share of sales priced off-index.

REEx investor takeaway: this does not prove full “decoupling” from China—but it does document a measurable increase in non-index-linked pricing.

Heavy Rare Earths: Real Output, Still Small

Lynas reports “Ready for Sale” Dy & Tb production of 26 tonnes in Q2 FY26.

The company also discloses that this number includes drawdown of all work-in-progress (WIP) from the prior quarter, alongside new production.

Disclosure gap to flag: the report does not clearly state whether “Dy & Tb” is reported strictly as oxide, a blended product stream, or another basis material for pricing and margin interpretation.

Operations Red Flag: Power Reliability

The report attributes lower quarter production to Kalgoorlie power disruptions and major maintenance in Malaysia, noting increased outage frequency/duration in November and stating supply “stabilised from December onwards,” while the company evaluates off-grid solutions to ensure energy stability.

REEx view: repeated power interruptions at a critical processing node are a legitimate execution risk until permanently engineered out.

U.S. Strategy: Seadrift Still Unsettled

Lynas states it has an expenditure-based contract with the “U.S. Department of War (DoW)” for a Heavy Rare Earth processing facility at Seadrift, Texas, and adds that “significant uncertainty remains” on whether the project proceeds and in what form; it also notes ongoing negotiations toward an offtake agreement.

Critical Questions for Investors

• What is the exact product basis for Dy/Tb (oxide grade, purity, and pricing mechanism)?
• What is the timeline and capex for Kalgoorlie off-grid reliability—months or years?
• What are the go/no-go milestones for Seadrift, and what off-take terms unlock it?

Comments from experts in REEx: Off-index pricing is emerging, but infrastructure reliability and U.S. project clarity remain the gating factors, and the Chinese are not sitting still.

Source: Lynas Rare Earths Ltd., Quarterly Report for the period ended 31 December 2025 (21 January 2026).

• Japan allocated ¥39 billion (~$250M) via JOGMEC to diversify rare earth supply chains.
• This allocation is a response to China's export controls.
• Japan's allocation is modest compared to:
  • U.S.: $2B+ initially in Australia deal alone
  • Australia: $1.3-2.6B+
  • EU: investments running into billions
• Funding targets overseas mining and smelting co-investments.
• Japan's strategy echoes the post-2010 diversification playbook.
• Japan's efforts lack midstream ambition (separation, metals, magnets).
• This approach is needed to address global supply bottlenecks.
• Japan's move indicates diversification intent amid geopolitical pressure.
• The scale of the investment underwhelms—real resilience requires capital flowing beyond upstream equity into processing and manufacturing capacity.

Tokyo is moving again on rare earth security—but the scale matters. On January 20, Japan announced (opens in a new tab) it will allocate ¥39 billion to diversify rare earth supply chains in response to China’s tightening export controls on dual-use goods, potentially including rare earth elements. The funding will flow through Japan Organization for Metals and Energy Security (JOGMEC), which will co-invest with Japanese companies in overseas mining and smelting projects. An additional ¥2 billion will support Japan’s fishing industry amid China’s import suspension.

The Numbers, in Context

• ¥39 billion ≈ USD ~$250 million
• ¥2 billion ≈ USD ~$13 million (fisheries support; not minerals).

For investors and policymakers, the headline isn’t just the yen figure—it’s how modest this commitment looks when benchmarked against peers.

How Japan Compares

United States

Since 2020, U.S. federal commitments tied to rare earths and critical minerals—across DoD Title III awards, DOE processing grants, and Inflation Reduction Act programs—run into the low single-digit billions of USD. Individual tranches (e.g., separation, magnet manufacturing, processing pilots) often exceed $100–300 million per award cycle, with cumulative support well north of Japan’s $260M for rare earths alone. The U.S. and Australia signed an $8.5 billion critical minerals deal in October 2025, committing at least $1 billion each (totaling $2 billion initially) to fast-track mining and processing projects, aiming to diversify supply chains away from China for minerals vital to defense and tech, including rare earths, by accelerating development and establishing price floors. The agreement creates a significant investment pipeline for resources valued at $53 billion, boosting U.S. access to Australia's strategic minerals through joint ventures and streamlined permits, with a focus on Alcoa's gallium project as a key priority. 

Australia

Canberra has paired A$2–4 billion+ (USD ~$1.3–2.6B) in financing, loans, and equity-style support (via agencies like Export Finance Australia and the Critical Minerals Facility) with state-level backing. Australia’s approach emphasizes mine-to-midstream capability and anchor offtake agreements—again, multiples of Japan’s new allocation.

Europe (EU)

Through the Critical Raw Materials Act (CRMA), EIB financing, and national co-funding, Europe’s mobilization is fragmented but larger in aggregate, spanning several billion euros across mining, refining, recycling, and magnet projects. Execution remains uneven, but the headline capacity exceeds Japan’s latest move.

What’s Notable—and What’s Missing

What’s notable: Japan’s strategy is targeted and pragmatic—co-investing via JOGMEC to secure overseas mines and smelting, echoing the playbook that once anchored Japan’s post-2010 rare earth recovery (e.g., diversification away from sole reliance on China). Note also that Japan secures a considerable supply from Lynas Rare Earth (Australia/Malaysia).

What’s missing: Scale and midstream ambition. $250M is meaningful for pilots and minority stakes, but insufficient to materially shift global dysprosium/terbium or NdPr bottlenecks without parallel investments in separation, metals, and magnets.

Bottom Line

Japan’s ¥39B is a signal, not a solution. It reinforces diversification intent amid China’s trade pressure, but—relative to U.S., Australian, and European efforts—it underwhelms on scale. For real resilience, capital must follow the chemistry: midstream capacity, not just upstream equity.

Source: Jiji Press (Jan. 20, 2026).

• Noveon Magnetics raises $215M Series C led by One Investment Management to expand U.S. sintered NdFeB magnet capacity.
• Positioning itself as the only operational American manufacturer in a China-dominated market controlling over 90% of global production.
• The financing targets strategic redundancy for defense, EVs, and grid infrastructure rather than challenging Chinese dominance.
• Multi-year agreements already secured with General Motors and ABB.
• Critical execution questions remain around:
  • Cost parity
  • Margin dynamics versus Chinese producers
  • Recycling scale
  • Whether Noveon can compete without sustained policy support or long-term offtake agreements

Noveon Magnetics (opens in a new tab) announced a $215 million Series C financing, anchored by a $200 million investment from One Investment Management (opens in a new tab) (PRNewswire, Jan. 19, 2026). The stated goal—expand U.S. sintered NdFeB magnet capacity—lands squarely at the most fragile point of America’s rare earth supply chain. This is not a mining story. It is a manufacturing bottleneck story, and the capital size reflects that reality.

Where the Steel Meets the Spindle

One point deserves emphasis: Noveon is currently one of, if not the only operational U.S. manufacturer of sintered NdFeB magnets. That is not marketing flourish; it is an industrial reality with strategic weight. The company’s disclosed multi-year agreements with General Motors and ABB, alongside partnerships with Lynas and Solvay, align with the broader Western push to rebuild magnet capability outside China. From an REEx ranking perspective, Noveon already sits near the top of U.S. magnet makers—this financing reinforces that position.

Some other key players in North America rare earth-related magnet manufacturing space include Permag (opens in a new tab), Arnold Magnetic Technologies (opens in a new tab), Vacuumschmelze (opens in a new tab) and up in Canada Neon Performance Material (opens in a new tab) and other entrants and upstarts such as Vulcan Elements (opens in a new tab).

The Bottleneck the Market Keeps Missing

China still controls over 90% of global rare earth magnet production. Even if Noveon scales beyond its stated 2,000 tons per year, this does not threaten Chinese dominance. That is not the point. Strategic redundancy—for defense platforms, EV drivetrains, grid infrastructure, and advanced manufacturing—is the objective. On that metric, this raise is among the most credible downstream moves in years.

TheQuestions Serious Investors Should Still Ask

Supportive does not mean uncritical. Several issues remain opaque for this privately held venture:

• Cost parity: Can Noveon compete without long-term policy or offtake support?
• Economics: What are the margin dynamics versus Chinese producers under volatile NdPr pricing?
• Secondary sales: Do they reflect routine liquidity—or early investor impatience?
• Recycling scale: Can closed-loop feedstock meaningfully reduce upstream exposure at industrial volumes?

REEx Take: Execution Is the Moat

This is real capital aimed at a real chokepoint, led by a sophisticated investor. Noveon matters—strategically and industrially. And at the same time, magnet manufacturing is unforgiving. The next phase will be judged not by press releases, but by throughput, yield, cost curves, and customer lock-in.

Investor Profile

One Investment Management (OneIM) is a rapidly scaled global alternative investment manager founded in 2022, with offices in Abu Dhabi, London, New York, and Tokyo, positioning it close to the world’s major pools of institutional capital. The firm invests flexibly across thecapital structure and asset classes—including private credit,structured equity and debt, and special situations—with a stated focus on long-term value creation and active risk management. As of late 2025, OneIM manages approximately $7–10 billion in assets and is led by UK-based investment banking professional Rajeev Misra, CEO (opens in a new tab) and co-founder, formerly of SoftBank Investment Advisers. OneIM raises capital globally from sovereign wealth funds, pensions, institutional allocators, and private wealth, supported by a regulated presence in the Abu Dhabi Global Market (ADGM), while also leveraging its London, New York, and Tokyo platforms to access European, North American, and Asia-Pacific investors—making it a distinctly cross-border, institutionally oriented capital provider rather than a region-constrained fund manager.

Source: PRNewswire, Noveon Magnetics completes $215M Series C, Jan. 19, 2026.

• Saudi Arabia's Ma'aden unveils a $110 billion decade-long minerals investment plan.
• The plan includes moving beyond traditional dig-and-ship mining to build a vertically integrated processing system.
• This strategy challenges China's rare earth dominance.
• The Kingdom is positioning itself as a strategic bridge between China's processing monopoly and Western supply chain rebuilding.
• Efforts involve partnerships, domestic refining capacity, and policy reforms.
• Policy reforms include tax cuts from 45% to 20%.
• Ma'aden's market cap surged to $73.8 billion.
• This growth included a 24.4% revenue increase and 127% earnings growth year-over-year.
• The company is backed by 63.9% ownership from Saudi's Public Investment Fund.
• Minerals are now treated as strategic infrastructure rather than commodity exports.

Saudi Arabia’s state-backed mining champion, Ma’aden (opens in a new tab), has unveiled an $110 billion, decade-long minerals investment plan. But describing it as “mining investment” misses the deeper story. What is unfolding in the Kingdom is not a resource boom—it is the construction of a vertically integrated minerals operating system, deliberately designed to capture value across exploration, processing, policy, and geopolitics.  Saudi Arabia wants to be able to take on China as a rare earth element and critical mineral processing hub.

For rare earths and critical minerals investors, this matters far beyond the Arabian Peninsula.

From Dig-and-Ship to Strategic Infrastructure

The familiar mining model—discover, extract, export—still dominates much of the world. It works, but it caps value at the port. Saudi Arabia is explicitly rejecting that ceiling. Instead, it is treating minerals as strategic infrastructure, not a standalone sector.

Recent partnerships illustrate the shift:

• Rare earth refining joint venture aligned with U.S. defense supply chains, structured so Ma’aden holds majority ownership.
• Exploration alliances importing Australian geological expertise at scale.
• Equity stakes in global base metals platforms, securing long-duration exposure to nickel, copper, and cobalt across top-tier jurisdictions.

This is not opportunistic dealmaking. It is system design—coordinating discovery, processing, capital, and offtake under one national framework.

What Holds Up Under Scrutiny

Several claims withstand close inspection. Saudi Arabia has materially improved market access through a new mining law, slashing headline tax rates from 45% to 20%. Exploration activity has surged. The state has clearly designated Ma’aden as a national champion, with multiple large-scale projects in the pipeline.

Saudi Public Investment Fund—Majority Shareholder

Most importantly, the emphasis on domestic processing and refining reflects a hard-earned lesson the West is still absorbing: in rare earths, separation, refining and seamless integration to magnet, assembly and component manufacturing—not mining—defines power. China’s leverage comes from chemistry and scale, not just ore.

Where Enthusiasm Outruns Evidence

That said, some assumptions deserve caution. Scaling processing—especially rare earth separation—is technically complex, capital-intensive, and environmentally sensitive. Partnerships alone do not guarantee execution. Nor does lots of capital and policy alignment eliminate market risk. Saudi Arabia is assembling the pieces, but industrial integration takes time, and rare earths are among the hardest materials to master.

There is also an implicit geopolitical bet: that allied supply chains will prioritize Saudi-based processing. That remains a strategic aspiration, not a settled outcome. Afterall companies in the U.S. are also working furiously to offer refining capacity from MP Materials and Energy Fuels to ReElement Technologies and USA Rare Earths, not to mention Lynas Rare Earths (Australia/Malaysia) and others.

Why Rare Earth Investors Should Pay Attention

What’s notable is not the $110B figure—it’s the intent. Saudi Arabia is positioning itself between China’s processing dominance and Western industrial rebuilding, offering capital, policy coherence, and geopolitical alignment.  Given the nation’s deep pockets and commitment to a diversified economy, strong, organized government and pedigree with petroleum, they should be taken seriously.  But the timeline will very likely be substantial.

Minerals have crossed a threshold. They are no longer inputs. They are constraints. And Saudi Arabia is acting accordingly.

Profile

Saudi Arabian Mining Company (Ma'aden) is showing clear signs that scale-up is translating into financial momentum. Market capitalization has risen to approximately SAR 277B (≈ $73.8B), up from about SAR 176B (≈ $46.9B) less than a year earlier, reflecting growing investor confidence in Ma’aden’s expansion strategy and its role in Saudi Arabia’s minerals agenda.

Operating performance is strong: trailing twelve-month revenue reached SAR 37.9B (≈ $10.1B) with 24.4% year-over-year revenue growth, while earnings growth has accelerated sharply, with quarterly earnings up 127% YoY. Operating fundamentals are solid for a capital-intensive miner—operating margins near 29% and EBITDA of ~SAR 14.2B (≈ $3.8B) point to improving efficiency as new assets ramp. The stock’s low beta of 0.32 and +45% 52-week performance suggest Ma’aden is increasingly viewed as a strategic infrastructure platform rather than a purely cyclical commodity producer.

That confidence comes with elevated expectations. Valuation metrics are rich: a trailing P/E of ~46x and EV/EBITDA above 21x place Ma’aden at a premium to traditional mining peers, implying that investors are pricing in long-duration growth, downstream processing value, and geopolitical relevance rather than near-term yield. Leverage is notable but manageable, with total debt of ~SAR 35B (≈ $9.3B) versus operating cash flow of ~SAR 11.4B (≈ $3.0B), a current ratio of 1.59, and positive levered free cash flow of ~SAR 3.9B (≈ $1.0B) supporting continued expansion without immediate liquidity stress.

The absence of a dividend reinforces the reinvestment thesis: capital is being recycled into growth and capacity build-out. Taken together, the financial profile depicts a company evolving from a conventional miner into a state-backed growth and processing champion, where valuation hinges less on today’s multiples and more on execution of Saudi Arabia’s long-term minerals strategy.

The largest shareholder of Ma'aden is the Public Investment Fund (opens in a new tab) (PIF), the Saudi sovereign wealth fund, holding a significant majority, around 63.9%, with other major institutional holders including The Vanguard Group, BlackRock, and Geode Capital Management, though their stakes are considerably smaller.

• Yttrium is a critical rare earth element essential for jet engines, semiconductors, and clean energy.
• As of January 2026, severe supply constraints exist due to China's export controls, which collapsed U.S. imports and caused European prices to surge dramatically.
• China dominates over 90% of global yttrium production and processing, primarily from ion-adsorption clay deposits.
• The U.S. relies entirely on imports for yttrium, with minimal production elsewhere, exposing fragile supply chains for defense and technology applications.
• New yttrium sources in Australia, the U.S., South Africa, and the Nordics show promise but are not expected to materially impact supply until the late 2020s.
• This situation leaves a critical 3-year gap, necessitating strategic stockpiling, recycling innovation, and accelerated processing capacity development.

Yttrium (Y, atomic number 39) is a silvery metal few people recognize by name, yet it underpins some of the most advanced technologies in modern life. From jet engines and missile guidance systems to semiconductors and clean-energy infrastructure, yttrium plays a role that is both essential and hard to replace. As of January 2026, it is also one of the most supply-constrained critical minerals in the world.

What Is Yttrium — and Is It a Rare Earth?

Yes. Yttrium is classified as a rare earth element, grouped with the 15 lanthanides along with scandium. Chemically, yttrium behaves like the “heavy” rare earths, even though it sits slightly apart on the periodic table. Despite the name, yttrium is not geologically rare—it is more abundant in Earth’s crust than silver—but it is economically rare because it is difficult to extract and refine.

Yttrium is almost never mined on its own. Instead, it is produced as a byproduct of heavy rare earth mining, typically recovered as yttrium oxide (Y₂O₃), also known as yttria.

Where Is Yttrium Mined Today?

The global yttrium supply is overwhelmingly concentrated in China, with a secondary contribution from Myanmar. Most yttrium comes from ion-adsorption clay deposits in southern China—geologically unusual ores that are rich in yttrium and other heavy rare earths such as dysprosium and terbium.

Outside of China and Myanmar, production is minimal:

• Small byproduct volumes from monazite sands in India and Brazil
• Pilot-scale or early-stage output in Australia
• No meaningful production in the United States

The U.S. currently relies on imports for 100% of its yttrium supply, and until recently, more than 90% of that material originated in China.

Why Yttrium Is So Important

Yttrium earns its “critical mineral” status because it enables technologies that cannot easily function without it.

Defense & Aerospace

• Essential to thermal barrier coatings for jet engines and military aircraft (yttria-stabilized zirconia)
• Core component of high-power lasers (e.g., YAG lasers) used in targeting, range-finding, and missile defense
• Used in radar, microwave filters, and secure communications

Semiconductors & Electronics

• Yttrium oxide is used as a protective ceramic coating in semiconductor fabrication equipment, resisting corrosive plasmas
• Critical in high-frequency electronics, microwave components, and specialized optical devices
• Semiconductor manufacturers have ranked yttrium shortages among their most severe materials risks

Clean Energy & Industrial Systems

• Key material in gas turbines for power generation
• Used in solid oxide fuel cells and oxygen sensors
• Improves high-temperature ceramics, superconductors, and specialty alloys

In many of these applications, substitutes either do not exist or result in worse performance, shorter lifetimes, or higher costs.

Who Dominates Processing?

China not only mines most of the world’s yttrium—it also dominates processing and separation, which is the true choke point. Rare earth refining is chemically complex, environmentally sensitive, and capital-intensive. Over decades, China built a vertically integrated system that includes mining, separation, metalmaking, and downstream manufacturing.

Today, most Chinese yttrium production is consolidated under large, state-directed rare earth groups. Outside China, commercial-scale heavy rare earth separation remains extremely limited, though this is beginning to change.

Promising Deposits Outside China

Several non-Chinese sources show real potential but are not yet fully online:

• Australia: Ionic-clay and heavy rare earth projects with unusually high yttriumcontent
• South Africa: Recovery of yttrium and other rare earths from historic mine tailings
• United States (Texas): Large polymetallic deposits containing yttrium alongside lithium and heavy rare earths
• Nordics (Sweden, Norway): Newly identified rare earth resources that include yttrium

These deposits demonstrate that geology is not the problem; time, permitting, capital, and processing capacity are.

So to summarize promising non-Chinese yttrium sources from Japan's significant deep-sea rare earth deposits near Minami Torishima to Western Australia's North Stanmore project (Victory Metals) to Kazakhstan's new large find in the Karaganda region to the established players like Australia's Mount Weld (Lynas) and the US's Mountain Pass (MP Materials) involving heavies, with efforts in India and Greenland (Tanbreez) also showing potential for future supply diversification. 

Why Is There a Shortage in January 2026?

The current shortage traces back to China’s 2025 export controls, which included yttrium among several restricted rare earths. While Chinese domestic prices remained relatively stable, exports slowed sharply, licenses became harder to obtain, and overseas buyers were effectively cut off.

The result:

• Exports to the U.S. collapsed
• European spot prices surged dramatically, in some cases by orders of magnitude

compared with early 2025

• Manufacturers began hoarding inventory
• Aerospace, semiconductor, and energy firms flagged yttrium as a potential production bottleneck

This was not a demand shock—it was a policy-driven supply shock, exposing how little buffer exists outside China. A key point Rare Earth Exchanges™ has been declaring since this platform’s launch in October 2024.

What Can Be Done About It?

The yttrium shortage has triggered a rapid response across governments and industry:

1. Build Processing Capacity Outside China
   New separation facilities in the U.S., Europe, and Australia are under development, including projects capable of handling heavy rare earths like yttrium.
2. Accelerate Non-Chinese Mining Projects
   Governments are fast-tracking permits, offering financing support, and treating rare earth projects as strategic infrastructure.
3. Recycling and Secondary Recovery
   Historically negligible, yttrium recycling is gaining interest due to high prices—particularly from industrial waste streams and end-of-life electronics.
4. Strategic Stockpiling
   Defense agencies and manufacturers are reconsidering “just-in-time” supply models for critical minerals.
5. Efficiency, Not Substitution
   True substitutes are rare, so innovation is focused on using less yttrium per unit, not eliminating it.

The Bigger Picture

Yttrium’s story mirrors a broader truth about critical minerals: modern technology depends on obscure materials with fragile supply chains. The world is not running out of yttrium in the ground—but it is running short on secure, diversified access.

As of early 2026, yttrium remains tight, expensive, and geopolitically sensitive. But the crisis has forced long-overdue action. New supply chains are forming, processing capacity is expanding, and policymakers now understand that rare earth security is industrial security. Even under accelerated timelines, most non-Chinese yttrium projects will not materially impact supply until the late 2020s. So a big question given today’s date is January 18, 2026, where does supply come from say in the next three years?

Yttrium may never be famous—but it is indispensable. And ensuring its availability will shape defense readiness, technological leadership, and clean-energy deployment for the rest of this decade.

• Greenland holds significant rare earth deposits capable of supplying up to 25% of global demand.
• Projects like Kvanefjeld remain stalled due to political, environmental, and regulatory challenges, including concerns about uranium co-occurrence.
• Europe's delayed engagement with Greenland exposes a critical weakness: without downstream processing capacity for separation, metallization, and magnet production, new mines risk becoming stranded assets.
• The real bottleneck isn't geology but execution—resource abundance without industrial infrastructure and coordinated policy is merely strategic theater, not supply chain security.

A recent analysis (opens in a new tab) by POLITICO Europe delivers an uncomfortable truth for the Continent: Greenland’s rare earth potential has been well known for years, yet largely left idle. Now, as geopolitics harden and Washington’s rhetoric sharpens, that long neglect looks less like caution and more like strategic drift.

Beneath Greenland’s ice sit meaningful deposits of neodymium and praseodymium—magnet metals critical to wind turbines, electric vehicles, and defense systems. The headline claim that Greenland could supply up to 25% of global rare earth demand is directionally plausible in resource terms, but misleading if read as a near-term supply reality. As Rare Earth Exchanges™ often cites, resources are not production. Ore is not a magnet.

The Mine That Became a Mirror

The stalled Kvanefjeld project illustrates the bind. Backed by Energy Transition Minerals, the deposit is real, the geology proven. What stopped it was not ignorance, but politics: uranium co-occurrence, environmental opposition, legal challenges, and regulatory uncertainty after Greenland assumed control of its resources.

POLITICO is accurate in diagnosing the bottleneck. Even strategically vital projects fail without aligned governance, capital patience, and social license. Europe did not “miss” Greenland so much as fail to build the institutional machinery required to develop it.

Where the Narrative Overreaches

The piece leans counterfactual urgency: If only Europe had acted sooner. That framing flattens reality. Mining in Greenland is among the most complex undertakings on earth—remote geography, tiny population, minimal infrastructure, and strict environmental rules, including a uranium ban that directly complicates rare earth extraction.

Invoking U.S. threats to “take Greenland by force” heightens drama but drifts into speculative geopolitics. It serves the story’s tension, not supply-chain clarity. Investors should separate strategic anxiety from operational feasibility.

What’s Actually Notable for the Rare Earth Chain

The real signal is not Greenland’s size—it is Europe’s timing. Only after 2023 did Brussels begin formal engagement through MOUs and the Critical Raw Materials Act. That delay matters because rare earth power sits downstream: separation chemistry, metallization, and magnets.

Greenland, if developed, would still require processing pathways largely absent in Europe today. Without midstream capacity, new mines risk becoming stranded assets or feeding someone else’s supply chain.

The Rare Earth Exchanges View

Greenland exposes a broader lesson: resource abundance without industrial follow-through is strategic theater. Europe’s challenge is not geology. It is execution, coordination, and time.

The ice is melting. The window is not.

• Malaysia holds over 16 million tonnes of rare earth potential.
• Hosts Lynas's critical Pahang refinery accounting for 5% of global output.
• Strategically positioned in midstream processing.
• Government's ambitious target of a 30,000-tonne annual output by 2030.
• Faces structural barriers such as:
  • Reagent access
  • Environmental licensing
  • Downstream partnerships
  • Decades-long development timelines
• Balances deep operational ties with China against diversification ambitions toward America.
• Navigates environmental opposition while demonstrating the challenges of true supply chain independence.

Malaysia wants a larger seat at the global rare earth table. Demand is rising, geopolitics are sharpening, and policymakers see opportunity. A recent report (opens in a new tab) by CNA captures the tension well: ambition is real, but so are theconstraints. For investors and policymakers, this is not a hype story—it is a systems story.

What the Ground Truth Supports

Malaysia does hold meaningful rare earth potential. Estimates of over 16 million tonnes beneath Peninsular Malaysia are plausible, particularly ionic adsorption clay (IAC) deposits similar in geology—though not scale—to southern China.  Southern Alliance Mining represents one of the notable assets in the Southeast Asian nation. The country also hosts one of the world’s most important non-Chinese processing assets: Lynas Rare Earths’s Pahang refinery, which already accounts for more than 5% of global rare earth output.

Those facts matter. Processing—not mining—is the choke point in the rare earth supply chain. Malaysia already participates in the midstream, a position far more valuable than raw resource ownership alone.

Visions and Realities

The government’s target of 30,000 tonnes of annual rare earth output by 2030 certainly is an assertive target. Industry veterans quoted by CNA are correct to push back. China took decades to build itsecosystem. Lynas itself required more than ten years to reachscale.

Scaling IAC mining is not simply a matter of political will. It requires:

• Multiple new processing facilities
• Secure access to chemical reagents
• Environmental licensing at both the state and federal levels
• Downstream customers are willing to commit long-term

None of these is trivial. The target reads more like policy signaling than an execution-ready forecast.

The China Shadow That Never Leaves the Room

Despite talk of diversification, China remains embedded in Malaysia’s rare earth story. One local producer (SAM) exports all of its output to China, and partnerships with Chinese state-owned firms persist. That is not hypocrisy—it is supply-chain gravity.

Malaysia’s neutrality may be an advantage diplomatically, but supply-chain control is operational, not ideological. As industry sources note, without control over reagents, separation know-how, and buyers, scaling becomes risky fast.

Yet as Rare Earth Exchanges™ has chronicled over the past year, Malaysia wants to grow and prosper in heretofore new ways.  This includes doing deals with America.

Malaysia sits squarely in the middle of the rare earth chessboard. On one side, its industry is deeply interlinked with China—through offtake arrangements, technical partnerships, reagent supply, and decades of gravitational pull from the world’s dominant rare earth ecosystem. Those ties are not incidental; they are structural, and in many cases economically rational.

On the other side, Malaysia is clearly signaling a desire for a more prosperous, diversified future—one less defined by raw material dependency and more by domestic value creation, industrial capability, and strategic relevance.

As Rare Earth Exchanges has chronicled over the past year, Kuala Lumpur is exploring new pathways: strengthening midstream processing, encouraging downstream participation, tightening regulatory oversight, and positioning itself as a neutral but indispensable node in a fragmenting global supply chain---and this includes a look toward America.

This is not a clean pivot away from China, nor is it a rejection of existing relationships. It is a careful, pragmatic attempt to evolve—balancing legacy dependence with the ambition to prosper in new, more resilient ways.

Environmental Fault Lines, Not Footnotes

Any media must give appropriate weight to environmental concerns surrounding in-situ leaching. While often marketed as “less harmful,” the method still involves chemical injection into sensitive ecosystems. Opposition from activists and local fishermen is not noise—it is a material permitting risk that could slow or halt projects. And local Malaysian state land offices are watching.

Why This Matters for the Global Supply Chain

Malaysia’s story is notable because it shows how hard diversification really is. The country has geology, processing experience, and geopolitical relevance—yet still faces structural barriers. That is the lesson.

Rare earth dominance is not broken by declarations. It is rebuilt, painstakingly, layer by layer.

• G7 finance ministers met in Washington on January 12 to address rare earth supply-chain vulnerabilities, elevating the issue from niche materials concern to macroeconomic priority amid China's tightening export controls.
• While political alignment was achieved with producer nations like Australia present, the meeting produced no concrete commitments—no joint stockpiles, binding frameworks, or timelines for reducing Chinese dependency.
• Rebuilding rare earth supply chains requires years of capital-intensive investment in separation capacity and magnet manufacturing, yet non-Chinese projects still depend on Chinese processing at multiple stages.

Yes a familiar alarm, and this time it grows louder. Finance ministers from the Group of Seven met in Washington on January 12 and agreed to “swiftly” address rare earth supply-chain vulnerabilities. Hosted by U.S. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent, the meeting brought together the U.S., Japan, the EU, and other G7 economies amid renewed concern over China’s tightening rare earth export controls—particularly toward Japan. Officials from producing nations, including Australia, were also present.

The signal was political clarity, not yet policy clarity. The statement reflects growing anxiety that export restrictions—already selective and strategic—could ripple across advanced manufacturing, defense, and energy systems worldwide.

What Holds Up Under Scrutiny

The core facts are sound. China remains the dominant force across rare earth mining, separation, and magnet manufacturing. Export controls, even when narrowly applied, inject uncertainty into downstream industries. Japan’s warning—and its call to reduce dependence on China—aligns with long-standing industrial policy goals in Tokyo, Washington, and Brussels.

The presence of producer nations suggests awareness that supply diversification cannot happen without upstream cooperation.

Notably absent, however, were concrete commitments: no joint stockpiles, no price floors, no binding offtake frameworks, no timelines. This was coordination at the level of intent.

Where Rhetoric Runs Ahead of Reality

“Swiftly” is doing heavy lifting here. Rebuilding rare earth supply chains takes years, not months—especially for separation capacity, heavy rare earth processing, and magnet-scale manufacturing. The meeting communiqué does not address capital intensity, permitting timelines, or the uncomfortable truth that non-Chinese projects still rely on Chinese processing at multiple stages. Speed is promised; structure is not.

The Subtle Tilt in the Narrative

This coverage frames China’s actions as the catalyst, which is fair—but incomplete. Western underinvestment, fragmented industrial policy, and inconsistent demand signals helped create today’s dependency. Blame is easy; execution is harder. Investors should treat G7 alignment as a necessary condition, not a sufficient one.

Why This Matters Now

The notable shift is in tone. Rare earths are no longer treated as a niche materials issue but as a macroeconomic and financial stability concern discussed at the finance minister level. That elevation matters. It suggests future tools may extend beyond trade policy into financing, guarantees, and coordinated industrial strategy.

But until talk hardens into contracts, facilities, and molecules separated outside China, markets should discount declarations—and watch for delivery.

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• Amanda Lacaze to retire as Lynas Rare Earths CEO after 12 years.
• During her tenure, Lacaze transformed the company from financial distress to a A$15 billion market cap and global leadership outside China.
• The leadership transition follows completion of the 'Lynas 2025' investment program and launch of the 'Towards 2030' strategy.
• A global search is underway for her successor.
• Lynas remains central to Western rare earth security strategies as the #1 ex-China upstream light rare earth producer.
• The company faces execution risks around sustained expansion and processing goals.

Lynas Rare Earths Ltd has announced (opens in a new tab) that Chief Executive Officer and Managing Director Amanda Lacaze will retire after 12 years in the role, marking a significant leadership transition for the world’s largest rare earths producer outside China. Ms. Lacaze will remain with the company until the end of the current financial year to support an orderly handover while the Board conducts a global search for her successor, considering both internal and external candidates.

Ms. Lacaze assumed the CEO role in 2014 when Lynas was under financial and operational stress. Over her tenure, the company stabilized its balance sheet, expanded production capacity, and built an integrated mining and processing footprint spanning Mt Weld, Kalgoorlie, and Malaysia. Lynas’ market capitalization increased from approximately A$400 million in 2014 to nearly A$15 billion by early 2026, reflecting its emergence as a strategically important supplier to global manufacturers and governments seeking diversified rare earth supply chains.

The company recently concluded its “Lynas 2025” capital investment program and launched its “Towards 2030” growth strategy, which management has framed as the natural inflection point for leadership transition. Board Chair John Humphrey credited Ms. Lacaze with transforming Lynas into a globally relevant producer with operational scale and technical capability. The company is #1 on the Rare Earth Exchanges ex-China upstream light rare earth producer ranking.

Market reaction was modestly positive, with Lynas shares rising in line with broader sector gains following the announcement, according to reporting by Reuters. Analysts and investors cited continuity of strategy and the planned transition period as stabilizing factors.

From a Rare Earth Exchanges™ perspective, the CEO transition comes at a time when Lynas remains central to Western rare earth security strategies. Execution risk now shifts toward leadership selection and sustained delivery on expansion, processing optimization, and downstream integration goals as global competition intensifies.

• China controls approximately 91% of global rare earth separation capacity, which is the critical refining step that transforms ore into high-purity materials for electric vehicles (EVs), defense, and electronics.
• Separating actinides (thorium, uranium) from lanthanides is extremely difficult due to nearly identical chemistry, requiring specialized expertise that remains concentrated in few hands.
• Outside of China, only Lynas and MP Materials operate at a meaningful scale today, while firms like Ucore, Phoenix Tailings, and REEtec are racing to build Western separation capacity.

Rare earth elements (REEs) power modern life—EV motors, wind turbines, precision missiles, and the tiny components inside everyday electronics. Yet the supply chain’s most consequential step isn’t mining. It’s separation chemistry—the messy, high-skill work of turning mixed concentrates into high-purity oxides and metals.

When actinides (including thorium/uranium in some ore streams, and minor actinides like americium/curium in spent nuclear fuel) ride along with rare earths, the stakes rise fast: contamination becomes a regulatory and reputational problem, and the chemistry becomes harder.

This is also why China’s dominance matters. China doesn’t just mine; it dominates separation and refining, with the IEA estimating about 91% of global separation/refining capacity. That concentration means pricing power, leverage, and a vulnerability for everyone else.

Why are actinides hard to peel away

Actinides and lanthanides (the REE family) are chemical look-alikes. Many exist in the same charge state (often +3) and have similar ionic radii. In practical terms, they behave similarly in acids, in extractants, and on many sorbents. Separating them isn’t like filtering sand from gravel. It’s more like separating two nearly identical dyes dissolved in the same glass of water—possible, but only with a lot of stages, careful conditions, and hard-earned expertise.

In nuclear fuel recycling, that difficulty becomes famous: separating “minor actinides” from lanthanides is a long-running technical challenge that still lives largely in national labs and pilot-scale demonstrations rather than routine commercial deployment.

Outside of China, this remains a challenge to do at scale, and even in China, only a few players operate at scale.

Why investors and policymakers should care

1) Electronics and magnet-grade purity.

Rare earth ores such as monazite can contain thorium/uranium. If you can’t remove them reliably, you can’t produce consistently“clean” product streams—especially in tightly regulated jurisdictions.

2) Nuclear back-end strategy.

In spent fuel, lanthanides and actinides get entangled. Pulling them apart is a prerequisite for advanced recycling and transmutation concepts, and it shapes long-term waste burdens.

3) Geopolitics and industrial resilience.

If one country controls the “refinery brain”—the plants, the solvent-extraction know-how, the reagent supply chain, the environmental tolerance—then everyone else is exposed. Reuters and other reporting continue to highlight the G7's urgency to reduce reliance on China for critical mineral processing.

The core toolbox: how separation actually happens

Solvent extraction (SX): the industrial workhorse.

This is the backbone of rare earth separation globally. An aqueous solution is contacted with an organic solvent containing selective extractants. Metals partition back and forth through repeated contacts. For actinide/lanthanide splits, classical and emerging flowsheets (e.g., TALSPEAK-type concepts and ALSEP-type concepts in nuclear R&D) use subtle differences in complexation to push actinides into one stream and lanthanides into another. The catch: selectivity per stage can be modest, so scale often means many stages.

Ion exchange/chromatography: selective “columns” instead of tank farms.

Resins can preferentially bind one family of ions under the right chemistry. This approach is attractive because it can reduce footprint and potentially improve control, and it’s also increasingly relevant in next-gen rare earth refining strategies.

Solid-phase adsorbents: engineered “sponges.”

Functionalized materials (silica gels, nanocomposites, ligand-coated sorbents) can bind actinides more strongly—especially when tuned to pH and anion conditions. Most of this remains earlier-stage, but it points toward modularity.

Pyro / molten-salt electrochemistry: a different path.

High-temperature molten salts and electrolysis can separate metals by electrochemical potential. In nuclear circles, pyroprocessing is a known concept; in rare earth circles, firms are exploring electro-metallization routes to get to metals with fewer conventional SX steps.

Who claims scale—or is building it?

Outside China, the “at-scale” club is still small, but it’s growing:

• MP Materials (U.S.): Mountain Pass has restarted U.S. midstream production; MP reported ~1,300 metric tons of NdPr oxide in 2024.
• Lynas (Australia/Malaysia; expanding): Lynas remains the largest non-China separator and is pursuing expanded heavy-REE separation capacity in Malaysia—reported as up to 5,000 tpa of heavy rare earth feedstock for the new facility.
• Ucore (U.S./Canada): Ucore positions RapidSX as a faster, smaller-footprint SX variant and describes staged Louisiana output, scaling from 2,000 tpa to 5,000 tpa, with potential expansion.
• REEtec (Norway; Nordic chain with LKAB): REEtec promotes a more sustainable separation approach and has an announced industrial partnership pathway with LKAB to build a Nordic value chain.
• Phoenix Tailings (U.S.): Phoenix describes a route that includes molten-salt electrochemistry to produce rare earth metals, supported by public-facing technical narratives (including ARPA-E).  Phoenix is an early mover with a credible federal R&D signal.
• ReElement Technologies (U.S.): focuses on recovering/refining REEs from recycled electronics and other feeds, positioning modular processing as part of the answer.  The group recently secured a significant private equity deal.
• Mkango Resources (Canada) is actively developing refining capabilities as part of its integrated "mine, refine, recycle" strategy for rare earths, with plans for a separation plant in Poland (Puławy) and recycling operations in the UK/Germany, alongside its Songwe Hill mine in Malawi.
• Energy Fuels, given their expertise in uranium processing, gives them some advantage at least today.

Rare Earth Exchanges maintains the rare earth element processing rankings, which include the players above and others such as Carester (likely will emerge as European leader) in France, Solvay in Belgium, Saskatchewan Research Council (Canada), Iluka Resources (Australia), and  Australia's Nuclear Science and Technology Organization recently announced the building out of a processing facility.

Outside China, only a small number operate at a meaningful scale today—Lynas clearly is on its way, and MP is developing U.S. separation capacity—while several others are in commissioning or scale-up mode. Again, specifically for Actinides Energy Fuels, at the present moment, it could be most proficient based on its background.

The real strategic goal: democratize capability

Investors often talk about “mine-to-magnet.” But the hard moat is frequently separation methods and talent, not ore bodies (although finding a reliable, sustained heavy feedstock is no trivial task). Resilience improves when separation know-how, equipment, and permitting pathways spread across multiple allied jurisdictions—so markets aren’t hostage to a single refining system.

That’s why policy should target more than mines: build midstream capacity, train specialized chemists and operators, secure reagent supply chains, and create permitting frameworks that can handle radioactive byproducts responsibly. If the West wants a real rare earth “exchange”that functions like a market—not a dependency—then separation must become widely replicable, not artisanal.

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• U.S. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent is convening G7 nations and key partners representing 60% of global demand to urgently diversify away from China's 70% control of 19 out of 20 strategic minerals.
• The U.S.-Australia critical minerals pact pledges $2 billion in six months with price floor protections, building on Japan's successful post-2010 strategy that cut Chinese import dependence from 90% to 58%.
• Experts warn that breaking China's stranglehold requires comprehensive industrial policy across the entire value chain—mining, refining, manufacturing, recycling, and stockpiles—not just opening new mines.

The United States is rallying allies to curb over-reliance on China’s rare earth and critical minerals. U.S. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent has convened finance ministers from the G7 nations and key partners – including Australia, India, South Korea, Mexico and the EU – representing roughly 60% of global critical mineral demand. “Urgency is the theme of the day… we really just need to move faster,” a U.S. official stressed ahead of meetings in Washington.

Bessent has pushed for this dedicated gathering since the G7 summit in mid-2025, where leaders agreed to secure supply chains but have made frustratingly slow progress. He plans to press counterparts for swifter action to diversify sources of rare earth elements, vital for defense systems, electric vehicles, wind turbines, and semiconductors. This is the right direction.

China’s Dominance and Export Leverage

Concern is rising because China still dominates the rare earths supply chain, from mining to refinement. The International Energy Agency notes that China refines between 47% and 87% of the world’s lithium, cobalt, graphite, copper and rare earths. In practice, Beijing holds an average 70% share of production for 19 of the 20 most strategic minerals, and an even tighter grip on processed rare earth magnets. Western nations remain heavily dependent on Chinese supply – a strategic vulnerability China has not hesitated to exploit.

In 2010, China abruptly cut off rare earth exports to Japan during a diplomatic dispute, spiking global prices and jolting Tokyo into action. More recently, Beijing has threatened strict export controls on critical minerals and reportedly started restricting shipments of rare earth oxides and high-strength magnets to Japan’s industry, even banning certain tech exports to Japan’s military. Aside from Japan – which took aggressive steps after 2010 – most G7 countries still import the bulk of their rare earths from China. This leverage is exactly what the new U.S.-led coalition aims to defuse.

Allies Respond: Investment and Supply Chain Initiatives

American and allied leaders are moving to fortify alternative supply lines. Japan’s response to the 2010 embargo offered at least a blueprint: within a decade it slashed China’s share of Japan’s rare earth imports from 90% down to 58% by investing in overseas mines, new materials, and recycling. A landmark deal in 2011 saw a Japanese consortium rescue Australia’s Lynas Corp with a $250 million lifeline in exchange for long-term supply – an investment that saved Lynas from collapse and now provides over one-third of Japan’s rare earths supply.

The United States is also forging partnerships. In October 2025, Washington and Canberra signed a critical minerals pact, each pledging at least $1 billion in the next six months to jump-start new rare earth mines and processing plants – and even agreeing to establish a price floor to prevent China from undercutting Western producers. The U.S. Export-Import Bank followed up with letters of interest totaling more than $2.2 billion to finance Australian rare earth and battery metal projects. This U.S.-Australia initiative includes an $8.5 billion project pipeline tapping Australia’s proposed strategic reserve of rare earths and lithium. Early results are promising: Canberra reports surging interest from Europe, Japan, and others in collaborating on these supply chains. Still, Bessent cautions that far more work is needed to truly solve the dependency problem. The coalition’s mantra, he says, is to “move with those who feel a similar level of urgency … and others can join as they realize how serious this is”.

Beyond Mining: Toward a Comprehensive Rare Earth Strategy

Analysts emphasize that breaking China’s stranglehold will require more than opening new mines – it demands building an entire end-to-end supply ecosystem. As Rare Earth Exchanges™ has repeatedly argued, market forces alone cannot surmount China’s decades-built structural advantages in mining, refining, and manufacturing. Beijing’s state-backed strategy – from cheap exports to targeted export bans – has driven almost all competitors out of business over the past 30 years.

Without coordinated public support across the value chain, Western rare earth projects face bleak odds: new mines risk failure if there’s no domestic processing plant or magnet factory to take their output, or if China floods the market to undercut prices. That’s why experts call for a comprehensive industrial policy. A resilient strategy would invest in every link: mining exploration, faster permitting, local separation facilities, magnet manufacturing, recycling programs, and even stockpiles and R&D into substitute materials.

Such measures echo the very tactics China employed to achieve its near-monopoly. The hoped-for global coalition can coordinate these efforts – sharing financing, technology, and offtake agreements – so that a diverse rare earth supply chain can flourish beyond China’s control. In short, breaking free of Beijing’s rare earth dominance will require an urgent, realistic, and unified policy push on a scale unprecedented in the critical minerals sector. And this means the pairing of allied cooperation with a comprehensive industrial strategy to ensure these indispensable materials remain available, securing the industries of tomorrow. 

Unilateral or coercive actions against long-standing allies risk fracturing the very coalitions Rare Earth Exchanges argues must be reinforced. Such divisions would not constrain China’s advance; they would accelerate it, weakening collective leverage precisely when coordination matters most.

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• In early 2026, Western rare earth projects progressed from ambition to execution, marked by:
  • MP Materials securing a $400 million investment from the Department of Defense (DoD) and evaluating a $1.2 billion magnet campus in Texas.
  • Lynas projecting a 53% production growth despite power disruptions in Kalgoorlie.
• Strategic capital is actively flowing through the sector:
  • Gina Rinehart increased her stakes in Arafura (~15.7%) and MP Materials.
  • Government backing intensified with Australia's $1.65 billion loan to Iluka and growing U.S. defense commitments across various players.
• Midstream capacity is expanding, yet remains fragile:
  • Energy Fuels operates commercial NdPr refining at White Mesa.
  • Neo opened Europe's first mass-production magnet facility in Estonia.
  • France's Carester targets late-2026 commissioning, yet the non-Chinese ecosystem is still in transition and not entirely secure.

The first full trading week of 2026 underscored a decisive shift in the global rare earth and magnet supply chain: capital is flowing (although not at the velocity we would like), governments are intervening directly, and Western projects are moving—sometimes unevenly—from ambition toward execution.

From Lynas grappling with commissioning realities even as heavy rare earth production expands, to MP Materials leveraging unprecedented U.S. defense backing for magnet manufacturing, the week highlighted both progress and fragility across the non-Chinese ecosystem.

Key developers including Iluka, Arafura, Hastings, and Vital advanced financing, partnerships, or technology pivots, while midstream players such as Neo, Ucore, Energy Fuels, and ASM reinforced the strategic importance of processing and magnet capacity. Collectively, the developments as we move into 2026 illustrate a supply chain still in transition—no longer theoretical, but not yet secure.

Rare Earth Exchanges™ provides selected updates on key companies operating across the upstream (mining)and midstream (processing) segments of the rare earth supply chain.While not all companies included in the Rare Earth Exchanges rankings are covered here, the objective is to give investors in rare earth elements (REE) upstream, midstream and downstream a clear, objective snapshot of a representative cross-section of the market and its current state of development.

MP Materials (opens in a new tab) (USA) (NYSE: MP) $62.38 ytd +22.72%, market cap $10.9b*

MP Materials, America’s rare earth treasure trove,  is accelerating downstream magnet ambitions with unusually direct U.S. government backing. The company’s Mountain Pass ranks #2 worldwide ex-China via Rare Earth Exchanges. In July 2025, MP announced a DoD partnership including a $400m investment, a 10-year price floor for Neodymium-praseodymium (NdPr), and long-term purchase commitments tied to a new “10X” facility. In the Jan 5–10, 2026 window, the key “deal watch” item is North Texas: MP is evaluating Northlake, Texas for a $1.2b magnet campus (opens in a new tab); local officials are considering incentives. Note: MP’s Fort Worth site is often described locally as “opened in 2023,” but MP’s own disclosures indicate the facility’s ramp has been staged (precursors first, finished magnets later). Mountain Pass remains America’s only active rare earth mining and processing operation of scale, and MP reported >45,000 metric tons REO contained in concentrate in 2024.  As Rare Earth Exchanges has reported, MP must find ways to produce heavy rare earth elements, and while public disclosures suggestfeasible, private chatter implies a steep climb in the short term atleast.  Rare Earth Exchanges monitors carefully. MP Materials' biggest shareholders include Gina Rinehart's Hancock Prospecting, Vanguard, BlackRock, State Street, and CEO James Litinsky, with Rinehart becoming the largest individual investor as of late 2025; the U.S. Department of Defense also agreed to become a significant shareholder through a preferred stock investment in mid-2025, aligning with national interests in domestic rare earth supply.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     * While MP Materials’ valuation multiple may appear elevated on conventional metrics, the company sits at the apex of the U.S. response to China’s rare earth element dominance. As a result, the market is likely to continue assigning a strategic security premium, with a credible case that MP Materials is effectively “too strategic to fail.” At the same time, that positioning raises the bar: expectations to execute across multiple fronts—scaling domestic refining capacity, including heavy rare earths, and delivering commercial magnet production—are intensifying rather than easing.

Lynas Rare Earths (opens in a new tab) (Australia/Malaysia) (LYC.AX) 14.10, ytd +13.34%, market cap $9.51b

Lynas, #1 on the light rare earth Rare Earth Exchanges ex-China list is positioned for a stronger FY2026 as new capacity ramps. Visible Alpha consensus cited by S&P Global projects total rare earth oxide production rising ~53% YoY to ~16.1k tonnes in 2026. Lynas is also broadening its product mix: it expects to start samarium production in 1H 2026, tied to expansion work on its heavy rare earth separation circuit in Malaysia. To fund growth, Lynas completed a A$750m equity raise in late Aug 2025. A near-term operational headwind remains reliability at its Kalgoorlie facility: repeated power disruptions in 2025 (notably November) led Lynas to warn of a shortfall equating to about one month’s worth of production in the quarter, with downstream impacts expected for Malaysia; Lynas said it is evaluating off-grid power and working with the WA government and Western Power.  The shareholder register is led by large, long-term institutional and strategic investors, indicating strong mainstream and strategic backing. AustralianSuper is the largest holder with about 94.3 million shares (9.37%, ~$895 million), followed by mining billionaire Georgina Rinehart with 76.8 million shares (7.63%, ~$728 million). Other major positions are held by Australian fund managers Ausbil Investment Management, Greencape Capital, and Challenger Ltd., each owning around 4–5%. Strategic and global exposure is reinforced by Japan Australia Rare Earth BV and major index managers BlackRock and State Street Global Advisors, together underscoring a diversified, institutionally anchored ownership base.

USA Rare Earth (USA) (NasdaqGM. USAR), $17.28, ytd 45.21%, market cap $2.4b

USA Rare Earth is pursuing a vertically integrated mine-to-magnet strategy designed to establish a fully domestic U.S. rare earth permanent magnet supply chain independent of China, and by the end of 2025 the company had moved from concept to early execution. Upstream, USA Rare Earth controls the Round Top project in Texas, a large, polymetallic deposit rich in heavy rare earth elements (including dysprosium and terbium) as well as lithium, gallium, and other critical materials, positioning it as a long-life strategic resource pending further development and permitting. The project has faced delays due to technical hurdles in extraction/processing, complex environmental regulations (NEPA), financial challenges, and earlier struggles with outdated magnet production equipment, though USAR recently announced plans to accelerate production to 2028 by integrating parallel processing at their Coloradofacility. The project's multi-decade development involves complex stepsfrom mining to magnet production, battling issues like extracting valuable elements from complex ores and managing co-located uranium, plus investor scrutiny over past performance. Downstream, the company has made its most tangible progress, commissioning and scaling a sintered NdFeB magnet manufacturing facility in Stillwater, Oklahoma, which by late 2025 was producing magnets and qualifying materials for defense, automotive, and industrial customers. The firm acquired Less Common Metals, producer and supplier of rare-earth metals, specialty alloys (like NdFeB for magnets), and advanced materials, acting as a crucial midstream link in the supply chain for electric vehicles, defense, aerospace, and clean energy tech, offering custom alloy development, recycling, and research support, with a focus on sustainable, non-China production. While Round Top remains a longer-dated asset, by the end of 2025 USA Rare Earth had established itself as one of the few U.S. companies with credible, operational magnet-making capability and a clear pathway toward full vertical integration as domestic separation and mining advance.

Iluka Resources – Eneabba Rare Earth Refinery (Australia) (ILU.AX); 6.18, ytd 6.74%, market cap $1.82b

Iluka is building Australia’s first fully integrated rare earth refinery at Eneabba. Iluka states it has a $1.65b non-recourse loan under the Australian Government’s Critical Minerals Facility. The additional funding package announced in Dec 2024 (bringing the total to $1.65b) was explicitly conditional on securing offtake agreements consistent with community benefits principles. The refinery remains publicly described as on track for commissioning in 2027.  The firm’s biggest shareholders are primarily large investment firms, with Cooper Investors, Norges Bank Investment Management, Aware Super, Vanguard, and Van Eck.

Arafura Rare Earths – Nolans Project (Australia) (ARU.AX) 0.2950 ytd 9.26%, market cap $903.6m

Arafura has signaled FID in early 2026 for Nolans, with market attention high around that milestone. The company raised A$475m (plus an additional A$50m SPP) in late 2025; Gina Hancock’s firm Hancock Prospecting committed A$125m, lifting its stake to ~15.7%.  Arafura has strong potential due to its Nolans Project, Australia's first integrated mine-to-oxide rare earth facility, offering a secure, non-Chinese supply of critical NdPr for EVs/wind turbines, backed by government funding, major offtake agreements (Hyundai, Siemens Gamesa), strong ESG alignment, a large resource, and its unique ability to bypass China's processing dominance by producing separated oxides directly. Its strategic positioning addresses global supply chain vulnerabilities, attracting significant government interest and industry confidence. REEx suggests investors to watch this one carefully. The Australian company’s largest shareholders include Hancock Prospecting (Gina Rinehart) significantly increasing its stake, alongside major institutional holders like Vanguard Group, Sprott, and Dimensional Fund Advisors, with large index funds holding significant portions, though precise percentages fluctuate with placements. As cited above, Hancock Prospecting, following recent capital raises, holds a substantial interest, with figures around 8.6% to 15.7% cited, while Vanguard funds hold millions of shares. 

Brazilian Rare Earth (BRE.XA) 4.17, ytd 5.53%, market cap $760m

Brazilian Rare Earths is advancing its strategy to become a significant rare earth producer by developing Brazil’s high-grade rare earth assets (including heavies) and building downstream processing capacity. In 2025 the company struck a strategic 10-year partnership with Carester SAS, under which it will supply up to 150 tonnes per year of heavy rare earth feedstock (notably dysprosium and terbium) to Carester’s planned European separation and recycling complex, while Carester will also provide engineering and technical support for Brazilian Rare Earths’ own integrated rare earth separation plant at theCamaçari Petrochemical Complex in Bahia, Brazil. This long-termofftake and collaboration is designed to accelerate BRE’s refinery development, connect Brazil into global rare earth supply chains, and help address the strategic shortage of heavy rare earths used in high-performance permanent magnets.

The biggest shareholders in Brazilian Rare Earths include Kuda Huraa Mining Ventures & Global Investments Corp as the largest, followed by Whitehaven Coal, and key figures like Chairman Todd Hannigan, while mining magnate Gina Rinehart's Hancock Prospecting also holds a substantial stake, reflecting strong insider and strategic resource investor backing. 

Ucore Rare Metals (USA/Canada) (UURAF), 5.16 ytd 29.32%, market cap $571.74m

Ucore continues to position RapidSX for commercialization in Louisiana. In Dec 2025, Ucore stated it had completed ~5,700 hours of processing at its Kingston, Ontario demonstration facility in a simulated 24/7 environment, producing multiple REE product groups.  Big question—how does RapidSX perform at scale? Ucore acquired Innovation Metals Corp. (IMC), the developer of the RapidSX technology, for approximately C$5.8 million (about $4.1 million USD at the time) in 2020, paying with a combination of shares and cash, with funding also coming from a concurrent debenture. This acquisition brought the critical metals separation technology into Ucore's portfolio, supporting their strategy for a US supply chain.  Ucore Rare Metals' biggest shareholders are primarily insiders, with Randy Johnson (Director) and Orca Holdings, LLC being significant holders, both holding around 9-10% each, alongside CEO Patrick Ryan, though overall institutional ownership is very low, with Org Partners LLC holding a small portion, reflecting a mix of individual insiders and significant private company/entity ownership.

Neo Performance Materials (Canada, Europe) (NEO.TO) 18.78, ytd 20.77%, market cap $563.3m

Neo reported a notable legal/financial update right in the window: on Jan 2, 2026, Neo announced (opens in a new tab) a settlement in European patent litigation with Rhodia (Solvay), including a €7.1m payment in Q1 2026 and mutual release/withdrawal of proceedings. Neo also opened its Estonia permanent magnet facility in Sept 2025; Mining.com described it as Europe’s first to mass produce rare earth magnets.  Revenue generating and profits at EBITDA Neo remains an important player. NEO set up Europe's largest rare earth permanent magnet manufacturing facility in Narva, Estonia, to supply magnets for electric vehicles (EVs), wind turbines, and other clean energy tech, aiming to reduce Europe's reliance on China for these critical materials, with production just starting. The plant, a crucial part of Europe's supply chain for the green transition, features sintered NdFeB magnet production and Europe's first dysprosium/terbium oxide line, becoming operational in less than 500 days They continue to manage a couple magnet plants in China and are traded on Canada exchange. NEO’s largest shareholders include Canada and Singapore-based Mawer Investment Management Ltd. (around 9-12%), Hastings Technology Metals (via Wyloo/HTM, ~20%), and significant holdings by retail/individual investors, with Mackenzie Financial Corp and others like RobecoSAM AG also holding notable stakes, though the single largest is often cited as Hastings/Wyloo or general public investors depending on the report date.

Aclara Resources (Chile & Canada) (ARA.TO) 2.61, ytd 21.96%, market cap $412.4m

Aclara Resources made steady, credibility-building progress over the pastmonth, centered on permitting de-risking, stakeholder engagement, anddownstream positioning, with no negative surprises in early January 2026. In Chile, Aclara advanced the Penco Module by formally relinquishing all water rights—an important step to strengthen its Environmental Impact Assessment and community acceptance—while hosting a high-profile visit from European Union ambassadors, underscoring strategic Western interest in its rare earth supply. In Brazil, pilot-scale work at the Carina Module continued, supporting the company’s ionic clay processing model and longer-term separation plans. No material new disclosures were released during Jan 5–10, 2026, but December developments remain operative. Strategically, Aclara benefits from two anchor corporate mining investors: CAP S.A., which provides domestic industrial credibility, local operating expertise, and alignment with Chilean regulators; and Hochschild Mining, which brings mine-building, permitting, and capital-markets discipline. Together, these partners materially reduce execution risk as Aclara pushes toward development decisions in 2026. Company is ambitious, thinking big with separation/refining pilot at Virginia tech and targeted production refining in Louisiana. Still early days but lots of potential.

Pensana Rare Earths PLC – Longonjo (UK, Angola) & Refinery Strategy (PRE.L) 88.80, ytd 0.45%, market cap $405.3m

Pensana Rare Earths PLC (Pensana) trades on multiple markets using different instruments. The company’s primary listing is on the London Stock Exchange (LSE) under the symbol PRE.L, where the shares trade in pence sterling (GBX) and represent the company’s ordinary shares. The OTC Markets ticker (OTCMKTS: PNSPF) is a secondary, unsponsored U.S. over-the-counter quotation that allows U.S. investors to trade Pensana without accessing the LSE directly. OTC shares typically reflect the same underlying equity but are priced in U.S. dollars, adjusted for FX rates, liquidity, market depth, and timing differences. Because OTC trading is usually much less liquid, prices can diverge from the LSE listing due to wider bid–ask spreads, delayed arbitrage, currency conversion effects, and lower trading volumes. In short, PRE.L is the price-setting market, while PNSPF is a convenience mirror for U.S. investors—so the two prices are linked economically but rarely identical at any given moment/

Pensana pivoted from the Saltend (Hull) refinery plan in Oct 2025 and publicly redirected its focus to the U.S., explicitly citing the funding environment; The company intended to pivot toward U.S. support. Multiple outlets also reported the UK government offer was £5m, far below the overall capex need.  Rare Earth Exchanges has pointed to the localization model in South America and focus on North American partnerships. Management is savvy, comprehensive strategy and the usual risks—seeking connectivity downstream for monetization. Pensana has a diversified but clearly institutional-anchored shareholder base, led by nominee and custody accounts alongside a mix of specialist investors and high-net-worth individuals. The largest holder is HSBC Custody Nominees (Australia) with approximately 16.5 million units (10.8%), reflecting broad custodial and institutional participation. This is followed by Selection Capital Limited (8.7 million units, 5.7%) and Richard Arthur Lockwood (5.2 million units, 3.4%), indicating meaningful cornerstone and insider-style support. Other notable holders include JP Morgan Nominees Australia, Ashanti Investment Fund, Ponderosa Investments, and Citicorp Nominees, underscoring strong representation from funds, superannuation vehicles, and nominee structures. Collectively, the top 20 holders control about 45.4% of Pensana’s CHESS Depositary Interests, suggesting a balanced register with sufficient liquidity alongside a solid long-term ownership core.

Australian Strategic Materials (ASM.AX) 0.75, ytd 7.91% market cap: $201.04m

Australian Strategic Materials (ASM) is an integrated critical-minerals company focused on building a secure, non-Chinese supply chain for rare earths and specialty metals. Its flagship Dubbo Project in New South Wales hosts a long-life, polymetallic resource (including rare earths, zirconium, niobium, and hafnium), while itsKorean Metals Plant (KMP) in South Korea represents a strategicdownstream asset producing high-purity oxides and metals closer to end-users. ASM’s strategy emphasizes vertical integration, advanced metallurgical processing, and partnerships with Western governments and manufacturers seeking resilient supply chains for clean energy, defense, and advanced manufacturing applications. Last July the company reported the first commercial sales of 2 kg Tb metal and 2 kg Dy metal (to Neo’s Magnequench) from its Korean metallization plant, plus 10 tonnes NdPr metal.  The biggest shareholders of Australian Strategic Materials Ltd (ASM.AX) include the Gandel Family (commercial real estate) (around 13.6%), with other significant holdings by Fidelity International Ltd, and entities like Magnabay Pty Ltd, Lilycreek Pty Ltd, and Auburnvalley Pty Ltd, alongside various Dimensional Fund Advisors (DFA) institutional funds holding smaller but notable percentages, with insiders holding around 16.4% of the company. 

Rainbow Rare Earths – Phalaborwa (South Africa, Guernsey) (RBWRF) 0.2102, ytd 4.51%, market cap $160.23m

Rainbow continues advancing the Phalaborwa phosphogypsum reprocessing project; a key correction here is timing specificity: Rainbow’s LSE filing (Oct 2025 results) guided to the DFS being completed in Q1 2026, after a quarter of pilot testing to confirm the proposed flowsheet. The company’s share register is anchored by a small group of strategic and insider-aligned holders, providing a relatively stable ownership base. Adonis Pouroulis (seasoned mining entrepreneur, investor, and qualified mining engineer) is the largest shareholder with approximately 89.5 million shares, representing 13.9% of issued capital, followed by critical mineral investor TechMet Limited with 75.2 million shares (11.7%), underscoring strong institutional and strategic interest. George Bennett, CEO holds 40.5 million shares (6.3%), while Caden Holdings controls nearly 37.0 million shares (5.7%). Collectively, these four shareholders control roughly 38% of the company, indicating meaningful concentrated ownership and potential long-term strategic alignment.

Hastings Technology Metals – Yangibana Project (Australia) (HAS.AX) 0.59 ytd 14.56%, market cap $87.62m

Last February Hastings executed binding documentation (opens in a new tab) to sell 60% of Yangibana to Wyloo and form a JV, materially de-risking funding requirements. Company has a two-stage plan including a mine, beneficiation plant, and hydrometallurgical facility. The restructure included cancellation/offset of ~A$135m in Hastings exchangeable notes via a related arrangement (reported by Wyloo and market coverage).  Major holders, as of early 2024 reports, included CITICORP NOMINEES PTY LIMITED (around 13.95%), EQUATOR CAPITAL MANAGEMENT LTD (around 12.59%), and BNP PARIBAS NOMINEES PTY LTD (around 12.36%), with these top shareholders controlling a significant majority (around 77.90%) of the company's capital, alongside significant individual investors like Foon Lew and institutional players like L1 Capital. 

Vital Metals – Nechalacho/Tardiff Project (Canada) (VML.AX) 0.19, ytd -11.76%, market cap $52.3m

Vital is pivoting from its earlier Nechalacho pilot history toward the larger Tardiff opportunity and testing Dry Field Force Extraction (DFFE). In Aug 2025, Vital announced a A$6.8m strategic placement backed by Strategic Resources LLC to fund a PFS and expand DFFE testing.  The biggest shareholders of Vital Metals (include Strategic Resources, LLC, holding around 20% through Director David Dikken, and Cany Capital Fund Llc, also with roughly 20%, alongside key strategic investor Shenghe Resources (a major Chinese rare earth player) with nearly 10%, though recent filings and strategic investments suggest a mix of significant insiders and funds own large chunks.

MidStream

Midstream in the REE supply chain is the crucial, complex stage of separating and refining mined REE concentrate into individual, high-purity oxides or metals, making them usable for high-tech applications like magnets, electronics, and defense systems; it's a significant choke point dominated by China, requiring substantial investment for new domestic facilities in the West to achieve supply chain independence

Notably, Lynas Rare Earths, MP Materials, and USA Rare Earth are each pursuing—at different stages and with differing levels of maturity—integrated mine-to-magnet strategies, positioning them among the limited group of Western companies seeking end-to-end control from resource extraction through rare earth separation and permanent magnet manufacturing. Other refining players cited above include Iluka Resources.

Energy Fuels (USA) (UUUU) $18.25 ytd +27.80%, market cap $4.31b

On Jan 8, 2026, Energy Fuels, a uranium processor, issued an updated feasibility study for its Madagascar mineral sands/rare earth project (branded Vara Mada / Toliara), highlighting $1.8b NPV (10% discount) and large-scale projected output including ~24,000 tpa monazite alongside ilmenite/zircon.  Rare Earth Exchanges suggests potential for Energy Fuels as significant American refining player in future but consistent feedstock and the poof at scale is yet to come. Just over 16% of investors have short positions.

As of theend of 2025, Energy Fuels has commercial rare earth oxide refiningcapacity at its White Mesa Mill in Utah, primarily producing separated NdPr oxide at scale with an annual design capacity of approximately 850–1,000 tonnes per year, making it one of the few U.S. domestic producers of separated rare earth oxides. Additionally, the company has moved into pilot-scale production of heavy rare earth oxides, notably dysprosium (Dy) oxide at high purity (99.9%), producing quantities on the order of kilograms per week as part of initial test runs, with plans to expand to terbium and other heavy elements. Full commercial heavy rare earth production is being targeted with expanded infrastructure by late 2026, but as of 2025 the focus remains on commercial NdPr output and pilot heavy rare earth volumes.

By late last year, the shareholder base is dominated by large global asset managers and ETF sponsors, signaling strong institutional conviction. Alps Advisors is the largest holder with 13.47 million shares (5.67%, ~$245 million), followed closely by BlackRock (12.75 million shares,5.37%, ~$232 million), Mirae Asset Global ETFs (12.25 million shares,5.16%, ~$222 million), and Vanguard (11.88 million shares, 5.01%, ~$216 million). VanEck also holds a significant position with 10.19 million shares (4.30%, ~$185 million), reinforcing the ETF-driven ownership profile. Active managers and financial institutions—including T. Rowe Price, Susquehanna, State Street, Bank of America, and BNP Paribas—collectively add further depth, bringing broad-based institutional ownership well beyond 30% of outstanding shares, a structure typically associated with liquidity, benchmark inclusion, and sustained market attention.

ReElement Technologies (USA)(privately held but up to $80m loan from U.S. government and $200 million private equity investment).

n 2025, ReElement Technologies advanced its effort to establish a domestic U.S. rare earth and critical-minerals refining platform, making progress across partnerships, infrastructure, technology validation, and government engagement. The company deepened collaboration with Vulcan Elements toward a long-term U.S. NdFeB magnet supply chain and entered strategic offtake and cooperation agreements with POSCO International America for phased deliveries of separated rare earth oxides. ReElement also expanded its recycling pipeline through a partnership with Electronic Recyclers International, enabling recovery of rare earths from e-waste and end-of-life magnets, and completed a demonstration run producing 99.9%-pure neodymium, praseodymium, and dysprosium from recycled wind-turbine magnets.

Operationally, ReElement continued scaling its modular refining platform in Indiana, moving from pilot toward early commercial throughput measured in the low hundreds of tonnes per year while retaining flexibility across feedstocks including magnets, batteries, and mineral concentrates. The company expanded international cooperation, including work related to tungsten processing in Uzbekistan, joined the defense-focused CREATE consortium, and secured amix of private capital and early U.S. Department of Defense support. Itspatented, chromatography-based separation technology—licensed from Purdue University—is positioned as a lower-waste, lower-water alternative to conventional solvent extraction. The year concluded with multiple patent filings and formal recognition from the Krach Institute for Tech Diplomacy, underscoring ReElement’s growing strategic relevance.

By year-end 2025, ReElement was actively producing high-purity rare earth and specialty oxides at its expanded Noblesville, Indiana facility, demonstrating separations of elements including Nd, Pr, Dy, and Y at purities of roughly 99.9% to 99.999%, though it had not yet reached sustained large-scale commercial capacity. In parallel, the company was developing its larger Marion, Indiana “Supersite,” with Phase 1 designed to support approximately 2,500–3,500 metric tons per year of magnet-grade rare earths, battery materials, and antimony once installation and staged commissioning are completed. Together, the Noblesville and Marion sites reflect ReElement’s incremental, modular scale-up strategy, bridging demonstrated refining capability with near-termexpansion rather than relying on long-dated, fully financed scale-outassumptions.

Saskatchewan Research Council (SRC) (Canada)—government-owned entity

As of today SRC is operating its Rare Earth Processing Facility in Saskatoon, but it has not yet reached its full planned commercial capacity; it continues to ramp up production with further commissioning and expansion planned through 2026–2027. The facility previously demonstrated output at commercial scale — producing about 10 tonnes per month of NdPr metal, with plans to increase toward roughly 40 tonnes per month as machinery and separation technologies come online, which would equate to around 400 tonnes per year of NdPr metals once fully operational. Initial construction delays have slowed progress, and the facility expects to reach its full design output — including significant quantities of NdPr metal plus dysprosium (Dy) and terbium (Tb) oxides — by late 2026 into early 2027.

Carester SAS (France) (privately held)

Carester SAS is a France-based rare earth processing, refining, and recycling specialist focused on establishing non-Chinese industrial capacity across both light and heavy rare earth elements. Headquartered near Lyon, Carester combines separation technology and engineering services with recycling know-how, operating through its industrial arm. The team consists of experts previously at Solvay.

Its flagship project is the Caremag separation and recycling facility in Lacq, southwest France, supported by French state funding and Japanese partners (about €216 million in total). As of January 2026, the Lacq plant remains under construction with no commercial production yet; initial commissioning and test runs are expected late in 2026.

Publicly stated capacities—subject to ramp-up risk—include processing up to ~5,000 tonnes per year of rare earth concentrate, recycling ~2,000 tonnes per year of NdFeB magnets, and producing on the order of ~800 tpa of NdPr oxides and several hundred tonnes per year of heavy rare earth oxides (primarily dysprosium and terbium) once stabilized.

Carester’s near-term strategy is deliberately phased. In 2026, priorities center on commissioning, early deliveries, and qualifying output with industrial customers rather than achieving nameplate volumes. In 2027, management has indicated an intention to scale operations progressively toward steady-state throughput, expand magnet recycling inputs, and deepen technical services for integrated supply chains.

A key pillar is its October 2025 binding 10-year partnership with Brazilian Rare Earths Limited, under which Carester will purchase up to ~150 tonnes per year of contained Dy/Tb oxides from BRE’s planned Bahia separation plant and provide engineering and commissioning support. The arrangement offers Carester a credible, non-Chinese heavy-REE feedstock pathway while linking Brazilian upstream resources to European midstream capacity. In a global context where China still dominates rare earth processing (especially heavies), Carester is positioning Caremag as a strategically important—but still emerging—Western refining and recycling node, with execution and ramp-up over the next two years determining its ultimate impact.

SolvaySA (Belgium) (SOLB.BR), 27.00, ytd -1.17%, market cap $2.83b

Solvay is a Belgian multinational chemical group with roots dating back to 1863, specializing in essential chemistry across a range of industrial sectors including: chemicals, materials, and performance products, and is listed on Euronext Brussels. In the rare earth element arena, Solvay is one of the few non-Chinese companies with advanced rare earth separation and purification capabilities, leveraging more than 75 years of expertise to serve markets such as automotive, electronics, medical technologies, and hydrogen applications.

Its historic La Rochelle, France facility—once a major global processor—has been reinvigorated to produce and expand commercial rare earth oxide outputs, especially NdPr and other materials for permanent magnets, with capacity currently scaled for early commercial deliveries and further ramp-up planned toward meeting a significant share of European demand.

Solvay has also entered supply agreements with U.S. magnet makers (e.g., Noveon) and partners for recycled feedstocks, and is exploring the possibility of a U.S. processing facility to complement its European base. This strategic rare earth position aligns with broader goals of reducing dependence on Chinese processing and strengthening Western supply chains for critical materials.

Initial operations in 2025 are producing a few hundred tonnes of rare earth oxides for magnets, marking the start of output for this material class. Looking ahead, Solvay has indicated that its expanded rare earth refining capacity could ultimately range from about 2,000 to 5,000 metric tons per year of rare earth oxides at full commercial scale — focusing on NdPr and related oxides — conditional on market demand and further investment decisions.

The company also aims to supply a meaningful portion of European demand for permanent-magnet rare earths (20–30 %) by 2030, which implies continued capacity growth beyond these initial projections.

Koch Modular Process Systems (USA) privately held

Koch Modular Process Systems was created as a joint venture with Koch-Glitsch, and Koch-Glitsch’s parent company is Koch Industries, one of the largest privately held corporations in the U.S.

Koch Modular itself operates as a separate entity formed through that joint venture rather than a standard Koch Industries subsidiary.  They are a U.S.-based engineering and modular construction firm with decades of experience in chemical process design, pilot testing, and modular plant delivery, now applying its expertise to REE refining and critical mineral separations. The company’s core capability lies in advanced liquid-liquid extraction and solvent extraction technologies (e.g., SCHEIBEL® and KARR® columns) that efficiently separate targeted rare earths and critical metals from aqueous solutions, replacing traditional mixer-settlers with more compact, cost-effective, and controllable modular systems. These technologies can be validated at Koch Modular’s expanded pilot plant in Houston, Texas, where bench- and pilot-scale testing generates the data required to scale to commercial operations with performance guarantees.

Koch Modular’s rare earth development offering spans pilot-to-plant programs that validate extraction performance, optimize throughput, and de-risk investment prior to full-scale deployment, enabling clients to accelerate time to market and reduce capital and operating costs. While Koch Modular does not itself produce refined rare earth oxides, its modular extraction systems and engineering support are positioned to enable domestic and international rare earth processing facilities, including mining and recycling projects, by supplying tested and scalable separation technology crucial for commercial REE refining.

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• Investment analyst Amanda van Dyke argues that China's rare earth export controls no longer intimidate Japan or the West, citing diversification since 2010, yet this confidence may be premature.
• Japan has reduced exposure to rare earths through substitution and recycling.
• China retains critical leverage in heavy rare earths processing, refining, and magnet manufacturing, where alternatives remain years away.
• Van Dyke's thesis confuses trajectory with arrival—China's rare earth weapon is no longer decisive but remains disruptive.
• Leverage only fades when substitutes are operating, not just promised.

An investment analyst’s recent thesis (opens in a new tab) is compelling—here’s where it holds, and where it overreaches. In the widely shared Substack essay, Amanda van Dyke—a seasoned mining investor analyst, founder of the Critical Minerals Hub, and board advisor across commodity-focused funds—argues that China’s renewed use of rare earth export controls no longer intimidates Japan or the West. The claim is confident, elegantly argued, and grounded in history. It also warrants a closer look. Remember, for investors, confidence is not evidence.

Van Dyke’s credentials matter. With experience spanning junior mining, capital markets, and policy advocacy, she is no armchair analyst. Her thesis draws a straight line from China’s 2010 rare earth squeeze on Japan to Tokyo’s subsequent diversification—and concludes that Beijing’s favorite lever now delivers diminishing returns. There is real substance here. But there is also narrative compression that markets should unpack.

What She Gets Right—And Why It Matters

Van Dyke is right about how coercion works today. China rarely announces blunt embargoes. Instead, it tightens supply via licensing delays, regulatory ambiguity, and expansive “dual-use” definitions that quietly constrict flows. This is modern tradecraft, not theater.

She is also right that Japan learned the 2010 lesson. Tokyo invested in substitution, recycling, selective stockpiling, and niche processing. The strategy emphasized control and resilience over scale—and that has meaningfully reduced exposure compared with a decade ago. Historically, China’s 2010 move did backfire by accelerating diversification rather than securing capitulation.

Where Confidence Outruns Reality

The assertion that rare earth leverage “no longer scares Japan, or the West” is directionally optimistic but strategically premature. Japan is less exposed—but not immune. Its processing footprint is advanced yet narrow. Heavy rare earth separation, high-performance magnet manufacturing, and scalable non-Chinese alternatives remain globally constrained despite recent Lynas Rare Earth shipments via Sumitomo.

The essay leans heavily on future optionality—deep-sea mining near Minamitorishima, allied supply chains, and Western industrial policy momentum. These are real and important. They are not, however, commercial buffers today, and as we have attempted to educate at _Rare Earth Exchanges_™, not sufficiently comprehensive nor enduring. Markets price what operates, not what is announced, or what’s in the works years from today.

China’s leverage may be weakening over time—but it persists precisely where it matters most: heavy rare earths sourcing, refining, and magnets, not bulk oxides. And alternatives, while promising, are years away as we have chronicled.

The Rare Earth Exchanges Takeaway

Van Dyke’s thesis (opens in a new tab) is directionally credible but chronologically aggressive. China’s rare earth “weapon” is no longer completely decisive—but it remains disruptive to say the least. Japan is better prepared than in 2010. The West is more serious than ever. Declaring victory now, however, confuses trajectory with arrival. It also serves to bolster overconfidence, which, when turning to hubris, becomes dangerous.

In critical minerals, leverage fades only when substitutes are operating—not when they are promised.

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• China's escalating export controls on rare earth elements in 2025 have created unprecedented vulnerabilities in global healthcare supply chains.
• These controls threaten critical medical technologies from MRI scanners to cancer therapies that millions of patients depend on daily.
• Ten transformative trends are reshaping medical innovation through rare earth applications, including:
  • Multimodal imaging
  • Precision drug delivery
  • Ultra-sensitive biosensors
  • Targeted radiopharmaceuticals
• Despite innovation advancements, clinical translation faces existential supply chain risks.
• Life sciences must:
  • Diversify rare earth supply chains
  • Establish strategic stockpiles
  • Implement circular economy recycling
  • Harmonize international regulations
  • Advocate for healthcare-specific policies
• The above measures are crucial to securing the materials powering tomorrow's medical breakthroughs.

In the sterile corridors of hospitals worldwide, millions of patients depend on technologies that share an invisible vulnerability. The MRI scanner revealing a brain tumor, the pacemaker regulating a failing heart, the diagnostic test detecting early-stage cancer: all rely on a group of seventeen chemical elements so critical yet so precarious that their disruption could fundamentally alter modern healthcare delivery. These are the rare earth elements (REEs), and as we enter 2026, their role in the life sciences has evolved from a supporting component to a strategic necessity.

Recent geopolitical developments have thrown the fragility of rare earth supply chains into sharp relief.

China's escalation of export controls in 2025, first on seven heavy rare earth elements in April, then expanded to twelve elements by November, has created unprecedented challenges for healthcare innovators. The inclusion of europium, erbium, and ytterbium in these restrictions directly impacts medical imaging, biosensing, and therapeutic applications that millions of patients rely upon daily.

Against this backdrop of supply uncertainty and geopolitical tension, the life sciences sector is experiencing a remarkable acceleration in rare earth applications. From AI-powered multimodal imaging systems to precision drug delivery platforms, from revolutionary cancer therapies to advanced biosensors, REE-based innovations are redefining what's possible in healthcare.

This article explores ten transformative trends reshaping the intersection of rare earth elements and life sciences in 2026, and examines the critical infrastructure, governance, and strategic imperatives that will determine whether these advances reach the patients who need them most.

1. Advanced Multimodal Imaging and Theranostics: Convergence of Diagnosis and Treatment

The traditional boundary between diagnosis and treatment is dissolving as rare earth elements enable unprecedented integration of imaging and therapeutic capabilities. REE-based nanoparticles, particularly those containing gadolinium and ytterbium, now serve as multimodal contrast agents that can be visualized through computed tomography, magnetic resonance imaging, and photoacoustic imaging simultaneously. This convergence represents more than technical sophistication: it fundamentally transforms how clinicians approach disease management.

The implications for cancer treatment are particularly profound. Multifunctional nanotherapeutics can now integrate real-time imaging with therapy delivery, allowing clinicians to visualize tumor boundaries with unprecedented precision while simultaneously delivering targeted treatments. This theranostic approach, combining therapy and diagnostics in a single platform, enables truly personalized medicine where treatment can be monitored and adjusted in real time based on visual feedback.

However, this sophistication comes with a price. Medical-grade rare earth elements must exceed 99.99 percent purity, far beyond requirements for consumer electronics or military applications. This pharmaceutical-grade processing occurs in fewer than a dozen facilities worldwide, creating bottlenecks that compound an already fragile supply chain. The recent Chinese export controls on gadolinium precursors and ytterbium compounds threaten to delay the clinical translation of these revolutionary imaging platforms by 12 to 24 months.

2. Precision Drug Delivery: Navigating the Body with Molecular GPS

Rare earth nanoparticles are revolutionizing drug delivery by functioning as molecular guidance systems that can navigate the complex terrain of the human body. These particles leverage magnetic or optical properties to enable non-invasive tracking and controlled release of medications directly at disease sites, transforming systemic chemotherapy into targeted interventions with dramatically reduced side effects.

Terbium-based nanoparticles have emerged as particularly promising vehicles for targeted cancer therapy. Through receptor-mediated targeting, these platforms can recognize and bind to specific molecular signatures on cancer cells, delivering therapeutic payloads with unprecedented precision. The ability to track these nanocarriers in real time using their inherent luminescent properties provides clinicians with visibility into drug distribution that was previously impossible.

The pharmaceutical industry's adoption of these technologies, however, remains constrained by supply chain vulnerabilities. Terbium, classified as a heavy rare earth element, faces some of the most severe export restrictions from China. With Chinese sources accounting for over 90 percent of global heavy rare earth processing, pharmaceutical companies developing terbium-based delivery systems face existential supply risks that could terminate entire research programs overnight.

3. Ultra-Sensitive Biosensing: Detection at the Molecular Frontier

The quest for earlier disease detection has driven extraordinary advances in biosensing technology, with rare earth oxides emerging as crucial enablers of unprecedented sensitivity. These materials enhance electrochemical biosensors through superior electrical conductivity, chemical stability, and biocompatibility, pushing detection limits toward single-molecule resolution.

Europium-based nanoparticles serve as highly sensitive fluorescent probes capable of detecting disease markers and pathogens at concentrations previously considered unmeasurable. This sensitivity is revolutionizing early cancer detection, infectious disease diagnosis, and therapeutic drug monitoring. The ability to detect biomarkers at attomolar concentrations (quintillionths of a mole per liter) opens possibilities for identifying diseases years before conventional symptoms emerge.

The commercialization of these ultra-sensitive platforms faces dual challenges. First, the fabrication of rare-earth oxide electrodes requires specialized cleanroom facilities and precision deposition equipment concentrated in Asia. Second, the recent expansion of export controls to include europium compounds essential for the most sensitive fluorescent probes threatens to fragment global biosensor supply chains just as point-of-care diagnostic markets are experiencing explosive growth.

4. Photodynamic and Photothermal Therapies: Light as Medicine

Rare earth element nanoprobes are enabling a renaissance in light-based cancer therapies by converting photons into therapeutic action. These platforms facilitate chemotherapy, radiotherapy, and photothermal therapy through fluorescence-guided treatment protocols that combine imaging precision with therapeutic efficacy. The ability to visualize tumors in real time while simultaneously treating them represents a fundamental shift in oncological practice.

The mechanism is elegant: rare earth nanoparticles can generate reactive oxygen species or convert absorbed light to localized heat, creating conditions that destroy cancer cells while sparing surrounding healthy tissue. For oral and other accessible cancers, this approach offers minimally invasive alternatives to traditional surgery with reduced recovery times and improved cosmetic outcomes.

Clinical translation of these therapies, however, requires navigating complex regulatory pathways that treat combination products, those integrating device and drug characteristics, with particular scrutiny. The U.S. Food and Drug Administration's evolving guidance on nanotechnology and photodynamic therapy creates regulatory uncertainty that compounds supply chain risks. Companies developing these platforms must simultaneously manage rare earth procurement challenges and regulatory compliance requirements that may shift as national critical minerals policies evolve.

5. Radiopharmaceuticals: Nuclear Medicine's Precision Revolution

Lutetium-177 isotopes are transforming nuclear medicine by enabling targeted radiotherapy that seeks out and destroys cancer cells throughout the body. Clinical evaluations demonstrate significant tumor reduction in prostate and hepatocellular carcinoma treatments, with dramatically fewer side effects than conventional radiation therapy. The specificity of these radiopharmaceuticals, delivering radiation doses directly to tumor cells while sparing healthy tissue, represents one of oncology's most significant recent advances.

Beyond lutetium, various rare earth isotopes are expanding applications in positron emission tomography imaging and targeted radiotherapy. The nuclear properties of certain rare earth elements enable the creation of therapeutic isotopes with ideal half-lives and emission spectra for medical applications. This expanding toolkit provides radiation oncologists with unprecedented flexibility in matching isotope characteristics to specific tumor types and treatment protocols.

The production of medical isotopes, however, represents one of the most complex and regulated supply chains in healthcare. Creating therapeutic rare earth isotopes requires specialized nuclear reactors or cyclotrons, radiochemistry facilities with extensive shielding and contamination controls, and cold chain logistics for time-sensitive radioactive materials. The concentration of these capabilities in a handful of global facilities creates single points of failure that recent export controls have dramatically exposed.

6. Dental and Stomatological Applications: Precision Meets Oral Healthcare

Rare earth elements are also transforming oral healthcare through applications ranging from advanced restorative materials to fluorescence-guided surgery. The incorporation of REEs into dental ceramics enhances mechanical properties and aesthetic characteristics, while their use in surgical navigation systems enables unprecedented precision in complex oral and maxillofacial procedures.

Fluorescence tracing applications in oral surgery leverage the unique optical properties of rare earth compounds to delineate tumor margins during cancer resection procedures. This real-time visualization reduces the risk of incomplete tumor removal while minimizing damage to healthy tissue. Targeted drug delivery systems incorporating rare earth nanoparticles are enabling localized treatment of periodontal disease and oral cancers with reduced systemic exposure to therapeutic agents.

 The dental materials industry's integration of rare earth elements creates supply chain dependencies that extend far beyond traditional medical device manufacturers. Dental laboratories and material suppliers, typically small businesses without sophisticated procurement operations, now find themselves navigating the same geopolitical supply risks as major medical device manufacturers. This democratization of supply chain vulnerability presents unique challenges for industry associations and regulators.

7. Antimicrobial Properties and Regenerative Medicine: Beyond Treatment to Healing

Rare earth element nanoparticles demonstrate remarkable antimicrobial properties through reactive oxygen species generation, offering new weapons against drug-resistant infections. Simultaneously, these materials exhibit antioxidant and regenerative capabilities that promote tissue engineering and wound healing, creating multifunctional platforms that both prevent infection and accelerate recovery.

Terbium nanoparticles specifically promote angiogenesis and cell proliferation essential for tissue regeneration. In wound healing applications, these particles create microenvironments conducive to rapid tissue repair while simultaneously preventing bacterial colonization. The dual antimicrobial and pro-regenerative properties position rare earth materials as ideal candidates for advanced wound dressings, surgical implant coatings, and tissue engineering scaffolds.

The regulatory pathway for regenerative medicine products incorporating rare earth elements remains evolving and jurisdiction-dependent. Products that combine material science innovations with biological activity often face classification challenges that delay market entry. The U.S. FDA's recent establishment of a regenerative medicine advanced therapy designation provides expedited pathways for breakthrough products, but navigating these processes requires specialized regulatory expertise that many innovators lack.

8. Bioextraction and Recycling Technologies: Closing the Loop

As supply constraints intensify, biological systems for rare earth extraction and recycling have transitioned from academic curiosities to strategic imperatives. Technologies using lanmodulin protein and methylotrophic bacteria are being developed to extract and reclaim REEs from medical waste, including gadolinium from spent MRI contrast agents, and from electronics waste containing medical-grade rare earth components.

These bioextraction platforms offer multiple advantages over traditional chemical extraction methods. They operate at ambient temperature and pressure, consume less energy, and generate fewer toxic byproducts. The selectivity of biological systems can recover specific rare earth elements from complex mixtures, enabling targeted extraction of high-value medical-grade materials from waste streams previously considered uneconomical to process.

Leading medical device manufacturers are embracing circular economy principles with strategic urgency. Companies like Siemens Healthineers have implemented comprehensive device refurbishment programs that recover 85 percent (goal) of rare earth content from returned equipment. Their closed-loop recycling systems for MRI magnets transform waste streams into strategic resources, recognizing rare earth elements as assets too valuable to discard. These initiatives represent hard-nosed business strategies born from supply chain necessity rather than sustainability marketing.

9. Point-of-Care and Portable Diagnostics: Bringing the Laboratory to the Patient

The unique electrochemical properties of rare-earth oxides enable the fabrication of miniaturized electrodes suitable for portable and point-of-care devices. This technological capability is driving a fundamental shift in diagnostic medicine, moving sophisticated laboratory analyses from centralized facilities to clinical sites, pharmacies, and even patients' homes.

Point-of-care diagnostics incorporating rare earth biosensors advance on-site analysis and rapid diagnostics in resource-limited settings where traditional laboratory infrastructure is unavailable or impractical. For infectious disease diagnosis in developing regions, chronic disease monitoring in rural areas, and emergency triage situations, these portable platforms can deliver laboratory-quality results in minutes rather than the hours or days required for centralized testing.

The democratization of diagnostic capabilities through point-of-care devices creates new supply chain challenges. Unlike centralized laboratories that can maintain strategic stockpiles and sophisticated procurement operations, distributed point-of-care systems require a stable, high-volume supply of standardized components. Any disruption in rare earth availability cascades rapidly through thousands of healthcare facilities, potentially leaving entire populations without access to essential diagnostic services.

10. Near-Infrared II Window Imaging: Seeing Deeper into Living Tissue

Lanthanide nanoparticles exhibit extraordinary bright emission in the near-infrared II imaging window—wavelengths between 1,000 and 1,700 nanometers- enabling deeper tissue penetration than traditional fluorescent imaging. This capability is revolutionizing image-guided surgery by allowing surgeons to visualize anatomical structures and pathological tissues beneath the surface with reduced photobleaching and improved photostability.

The clinical advantages are transformative. Surgeons performing cancer resections can now identify tumor margins buried several centimeters below the surface, lymph nodes requiring removal, and critical structures to preserve—all in real time during surgery. This visibility reduces the need for frozen section analysis, which extends operative time and improves outcomes by ensuring complete tumor removal while minimizing damage to healthy tissue.

The optical properties enabling NIR-II imaging depend on precise rare earth element compositions and crystalline structures achievable only through sophisticated nanofabrication. The specialized equipment and expertise required to manufacture these nanoprobes, including laser ablation systems, high-temperature furnaces, and analytical instruments for quality control, exist in limited facilities globally. Recent export controls on rare earth processing equipment compound these manufacturing bottlenecks, threatening to constrain the supply of imaging agents just as clinical demand accelerates.

Strategic Imperatives: What Life Sciences Must Do to Manage These Trends

The convergence of revolutionary rare earth applications with unprecedented supply chain vulnerability creates existential challenges for life sciences innovation. Successfully navigating this landscape requires coordinated action across multiple dimensions: global supply chain restructuring, international regulatory harmonization, strategic material management, and policy advocacy. The following sections outline critical imperatives that will determine whether the transformative trends described above reach clinical fruition or remain laboratory curiosities.

Supply Chain Diversification and Resilience

The rare earth supply chain resembles a house of cards built on a foundation of geopolitical uncertainty. China's control of approximately 70 percent of global mining and 90 percent of processing capacity creates strategic dependence on a single nation for materials that keep hospitals running and patients alive. The implications became starkly apparent during the 2010-2011 rare earth crisis when Chinese export restrictions sent prices soaring tenfold almost overnight. For the life sciences industry in 2026, such a disruption would be catastrophic.

Diversification must occur at every stage of the supply chain. Life sciences companies should establish strategic partnerships with rare earth producers in Australia, Canada, and emerging mining jurisdictions to reduce dependence on Chinese sources. Australia's Lynas achieving commercial production of dysprosium oxide in 2025 (the first company outside China to do so) demonstrates that alternatives exist, but building resilient supply networks requires long-term commitments and significant capital investment.

The processing bottleneck presents even greater challenges than mining. Establishing medical-grade rare earth processing facilities requires decade-long timelines, billions in capital investment, and specialized expertise currently concentrated in China. Western nations bound by environmental regulations face permitting processes that can extend beyond ten years. The U.S. Department of Energy's recent announcement of $134 million in funding to enhance domestic rare earth supply chains represents a start, but the scale of investment required to achieve processing independence measures in the tens of billions of dollars.

Life sciences companies must also invest in supply chain transparency and traceability. Understanding the full provenance of rare earth materials from mine to medical device enables risk assessment and strategic planning. Technologies such as blockchain-enabled tracking and material fingerprinting can verify rare earth origins and processing locations, helping companies anticipate and mitigate geopolitical risks before they materialize as supply disruptions.

Strategic Stockpiling and Material Security

Government and industry must collaborate to establish strategic stockpiles of critical rare earth elements for medical applications. Unlike consumer electronics, where supply disruptions create inconvenience, healthcare supply interruptions can literally mean life or death for patients dependent on rare earth-enabled medical devices and therapies. The precedent exists as many nations maintain strategic petroleum reserves to ensure energy security. Rare earth stockpiles for medical applications deserve similar priority.

These stockpiles should focus on medical-grade rare earths with limited alternative sources and critical healthcare applications. Heavy rare earth elements like dysprosium, terbium, and europium, which are subject to the most restrictive export controls, should receive priority. The stockpiling strategy must account not only for raw materials but also for processed compounds ready for medical device manufacturing, given the processing bottlenecks described earlier.

The January 2025 enactment of the Recognizing the Importance of Critical Minerals in Healthcare Act, which includes the Secretary of Health and Human Services among authorities consulted in designating critical minerals, represents recognition that rare earth security is a healthcare security issue. This legislative framework should be expanded to authorize federal stockpiling specifically for medical applications, with industry cost-sharing to ensure sustainable funding.

Circular Economy and Advanced Recycling

The transition from linear to circular rare earth supply chains represents both an environmental imperative and an economic necessity. As virgin rare earth supplies become more constrained and expensive, recycling transforms from a sustainability initiative to a competitive advantage. The life sciences industry must embrace circular economy principles with the same urgency that has driven environmental compliance in other domains.

Medical device manufacturers should implement comprehensive take-back programs for rare earth-containing equipment. MRI machines, X-ray tubes, and other capital equipment contain substantial rare earth content that can be recovered and reprocessed. The 85 percent recovery rates achieved by leading manufacturers demonstrate technical feasibility; scaling these programs across the industry requires regulatory frameworks that incentivize participation and potentially mandate device recycling.

Bioextraction technologies using lanmodulin proteins and specialized bacteria offer environmentally benign alternatives to harsh chemical recycling processes. These biological systems can selectively extract rare earths from complex waste streams (including spent MRI contrast agents containing gadolinium) at lower cost and with reduced environmental impact compared to traditional methods. Government research funding should prioritize scaling these technologies from laboratory demonstration to industrial implementation.

The development of design-for-recycling principles specifically for medical devices incorporating rare earths will facilitate future recovery efforts. Devices should be engineered for disassembly with rare earth-containing components clearly marked and easily separable from other materials. While this adds complexity to initial device design, the long-term benefits in material security and cost reduction justify the investment.

International Regulatory Harmonization

The global nature of rare earth supply chains demands internationally coordinated regulatory approaches. Current fragmentation, where medical devices incorporating identical rare earth components face different approval requirements in the United States, European Union, Japan, and other jurisdictions, creates inefficiencies that compound supply chain challenges. Harmonization efforts must accelerate.

The FDA's February 2024 Quality Management System Regulation, aligning U.S. requirements with ISO 13485:2016, represents meaningful progress toward global harmonization. The regulation, effective February 2026, will streamline manufacturing processes and regulatory submissions for companies operating across multiple markets. This alignment should extend to specific guidance for rare earth-containing medical devices, addressing unique challenges around material traceability, purity requirements, and supply chain documentation.

Mutual recognition agreements between major regulatory authorities would dramatically reduce duplicative testing and approval timelines for rare earth-based medical technologies. If a device receives approval from the FDA after rigorous review of rare earth component quality and safety, reciprocal recognition by European and Asian regulators would accelerate global market access without compromising patient safety. These agreements should include provisions for supply chain transparency, ensuring that rare earth provenance and processing meet international standards regardless of approval jurisdiction.

Emerging regulatory frameworks for nanotechnology and advanced therapeutics must specifically address rare earth applications. As biosensors, drug delivery systems, and imaging agents incorporating rare earth nanoparticles progress toward clinical use, regulatory authorities need specialized expertise to evaluate their unique characteristics. International collaborative efforts, such as the International Council for Harmonisation of Technical Requirements for Pharmaceuticals for Human Use, should establish working groups focused specifically on rare earth medical applications.

Material Substitution and Alternative Technologies

While rare earth elements offer unmatched performance in many applications, strategic investment in alternative materials and technologies can reduce dependence where substitutes are viable. This dual-track approach of optimizing rare earth use, which is irreplaceable while developing alternatives where possible, provides both short-term resilience and long-term sustainability.

For permanent magnets in medical devices, research into rare-earth-free alternatives has intensified. Iron-nitride magnets and manganese-based compounds show promise for certain applications, though they currently cannot match the energy density of neodymium-iron-boron magnets in demanding uses like MRI systems. Government and industry research consortia should accelerate development of these alternatives, recognizing that even partial substitution in less critical applications frees scarce rare earth supplies for medical uses where no alternative exists.

In imaging and diagnostics, quantum dots and organic fluorophores offer alternatives to rare-earth-based luminescent probes for some applications. While these materials lack the exceptional photostability and narrow emission spectra of rare earth compounds, they may suffice for applications not requiring the ultimate performance. Technology assessment frameworks should systematically evaluate where alternative materials meet clinical requirements, guiding research investment toward areas with the greatest potential for successful substitution.

Companies should also invest in rare earth minimization by engineering devices to achieve the required performance with reduced rare earth content. Advances in magnet design, for instance, can maintain magnetic field strength while reducing rare earth usage through optimized geometries and hybrid compositions combining rare earth and conventional magnetic materials. These efficiency improvements stretch limited supplies without compromising device functionality.

International Cooperation and Allied Partnerships

Securing rare earth supplies for life sciences requires unprecedented international cooperation among like-minded democracies. The concentration of rare earth resources and processing capabilities across multiple continents means no single nation can achieve supply independence. Strategic partnerships leveraging complementary capabilities offer the most viable path to collective resilience.

Australia's rare earth resources, Japanese processing technology, American medical device innovation, and European regulatory sophistication create natural complementarity. Formal frameworks for cooperation, such as the Australia-Japan rare earth initiative, launched after the 2010 Chinese export restrictions, should be expanded to explicitly include medical applications. These partnerships should address the full value chain from mining through processing to device manufacturing, with guaranteed allocations for medical uses during supply constraints.

Japan's ambitious deep-sea mining program near Minamitori Island, scheduled to begin test operations in January 2026, could provide access to rare earth deposits outside traditional geopolitical pressure points. International investment in such projects would diversify supply sources while distributing financial risk. Medical applications should receive priority access to any production from such internationally funded projects.

Research collaboration represents another critical dimension of international cooperation. Rare earth processing technologies, bioextraction methods, and device manufacturing innovations should be shared among allied nations to accelerate collective capability development. Joint research centers focused on medical applications of rare earths would pool expertise and resources while avoiding duplicative efforts.

Environmental Sustainability and Responsible Sourcing

Rare earth mining and processing generate significant environmental impacts that cannot be ignored, even as supply security dominates headlines. Extracting these elements from ore produces radioactive waste containing thorium and uranium, consumes enormous quantities of water (up to 30,000 kilograms per kilogram of certain elements), and can devastate local ecosystems if improperly managed. China's State Council acknowledged in 2010 that rare earth mining inflicted severe ecological harm, including vegetation loss, water contamination, landslides, and river blockages.

Western nations seeking to develop domestic rare earth capacity must do so responsibly, implementing environmental safeguards that have prevented such operations historically but now create competitive disadvantages against jurisdictions with laxer standards. This tension between environmental protection and supply security requires innovative solutions. Advanced processing technologies that minimize waste, water recycling systems that dramatically reduce consumption, and comprehensive site restoration plans should be mandatory for any rare earth operations receiving government support.

Life sciences companies must implement traceability systems that document the environmental and social conditions under which rare earths were extracted and processed. Blockchain-based provenance tracking can provide transparency from mine to medical device, enabling companies to make informed sourcing decisions and consumers to understand the full lifecycle impacts of healthcare technologies. Industry coalitions should establish environmental and social governance standards specifically for medical-grade rare earth supply chains, creating market incentives for responsible production.

The transition to circular economy models described earlier provides environmental benefits that extend beyond supply security. Recycling rare earths from end-of-life medical devices avoids the environmental damage of primary extraction while reducing energy consumption. Bioextraction technologies operating at ambient temperature and pressure offer dramatic improvements over energy-intensive chemical processing. These environmental advantages should be quantified and incorporated into procurement decisions, creating business cases for sustainability that align with supply security objectives.

Workforce Development and Technical Expertise

The specialized knowledge required to work with rare earth elements, from geological surveying and mining engineering through separation chemistry and device manufacturing to quality control and regulatory compliance, is concentrated in aging workforces primarily located in China. Rebuilding rare earth expertise in Western nations requires sustained investment in education and training that will take decades to fully materialize.

Universities should expand programs in extractive metallurgy, separation science, and rare earth chemistry that have atrophied during decades when Western rare earth industries contracted. These programs must be supported by industry partnerships providing internships, equipment, and research funding that give students practical experience with rare earth technologies. Government scholarship programs could incentivize students to pursue rare earth specializations, addressing workforce shortages in critical areas.

Technical training for medical device manufacturing personnel must address the unique characteristics of rare earth materials. Quality control procedures for medical-grade rare earths differ fundamentally from those for consumer electronics or industrial applications. Regulatory compliance requires understanding not only device regulations but also critical minerals policies, export controls, and conflict minerals provisions. Professional development programs should be developed specifically for medical device professionals working with rare earth materials.

International exchange programs can accelerate knowledge transfer. Short-term placements of Western engineers and scientists in Australian processing facilities, Japanese research centers, and other allied nations' rare earth operations would build expertise more rapidly than purely domestic training programs. Reciprocal arrangements would strengthen international partnerships while developing the distributed expertise necessary for resilient supply chains.

Policy Advocacy and Government Engagement

Life sciences companies must engage proactively with policymakers to ensure that rare earth policies account for healthcare needs. The stakes are too high to leave medical applications as afterthoughts in policies primarily focused on defense, energy, or consumer electronics. Industry associations should establish specialized working groups focused on rare earth policy, bringing technical expertise to legislative and regulatory processes.

The inclusion of the Secretary of Health and Human Services in critical minerals designation processes, mandated by the Recognizing the Importance of Critical Minerals in Healthcare Act of 2023, provides a mechanism for healthcare perspectives to influence federal rare earth policy. Industry should actively support HHS participation in these processes through data sharing, technical consultation, and policy recommendations that articulate medical needs and vulnerabilities.

Tax incentives for rare earth recycling, grants for processing infrastructure development, and guaranteed purchase agreements for medical-grade materials could accelerate domestic capability building. Life sciences companies should advocate for these policy tools while providing the technical and economic data policymakers need to design effective programs. Public-private partnerships modeled on successful defense industrial base initiatives could mobilize the capital required to rebuild rare earth processing capacity.

International trade policy must balance multiple objectives: securing reliable rare earth supplies, maintaining diplomatic relationships with China and other producing nations, protecting domestic industries, and ensuring healthcare access. Life sciences voices should advocate for nuanced approaches that recognize medical applications as distinct from other rare earth uses. Export controls, tariffs, and trade agreements all affect rare earth availability and cost; healthcare implications should be explicitly considered in these policy decisions.

Navigating Complexity Toward Healthcare Security

The ten transformative trends in rare earth applications for life sciences described here  represent extraordinary opportunities to advance human health. From multimodal imaging systems that combine diagnosis and treatment to biosensors detecting diseases at the molecular level, from precision drug delivery platforms to revolutionary light-based cancer therapies, these innovations promise to reshape medical practice and improve patient outcomes in ways barely imaginable a generation ago.

Yet realizing these promises requires confronting a hard reality: the rare earth supply chains enabling these medical advances are fundamentally vulnerable. China's escalating export controls, concentrated processing capacity, limited recycling infrastructure, and geopolitical tensions create an unstable foundation for technologies that millions of patients may soon depend upon for their lives and health.

The strategic imperatives outlined here represent a comprehensive response to these challenges. No single action will suffice; only coordinated efforts across all these dimensions can build the resilient rare earth supply chains that modern healthcare requires.

The window for action is closing. Each month of delay allows supply chain vulnerabilities to deepen, alternative sources to remain undeveloped, and dependencies on concentrated suppliers to strengthen. The 2010-2011 rare earth crisis provided a warning that the world largely ignored; the 2025 export control escalations offer a second chance to act before the crisis becomes a catastrophe.

Life sciences leaders, from pharmaceutical executives and medical device manufacturers to hospital administrators and healthcare policymakers, must recognize rare earth security as a strategic imperative equivalent to drug development, clinical trial design, or regulatory compliance. The rare earth elements enabling tomorrow's medical breakthroughs require the same attention and investment as the technologies they enable.

The stakes could not be higher. Millions of cancer patients who might benefit from rare earth-enabled targeted therapies, countless individuals whose diseases could be detected early through ultra-sensitive biosensors, and patients awaiting rare earth-dependent medical devices: all depend on decisions made today about supply chain security and international cooperation.

The convergence of technological promise and supply chain peril creates both challenge and opportunity. By acting decisively on the imperatives outlined here, the life sciences community can transform vulnerability into resilience, ensuring that rare earth elements remain tools for healing rather than weapons of geopolitical leverage. The future of healthcare innovation depends on the actions taken in 2026 to secure the materials that will power medicine for decades to come.

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• Export Finance Australia offers up to $100M in conditional support for two Brazilian rare earth projects, but private lenders remain skeptical due to lack of proven commercial-scale processing capabilities.
• Banks require demonstration plants and price floor guarantees before committing capital, as China continues to dominate rare earth refining and poses competitive pricing risks.
• Development banks from multiple countries are stepping in as stopgap financiers, bridging a risk gap that private markets won't yet cross—signaling conditional progress rather than solved supply-chain challenges.

Australia is helping two Australian companies explore rare earth projects in Brazil, but the support is limited and conditional. Government-backed lenders are stepping in because private banks still see the sector as risky. This is progress—but it is not proof that Brazil has solved its rare earth supply-chain challenge.

A Vote of Confidence—Not a Blank Check

A recent report from BNamericas highlights a notable move: Export Finance Australia (EFA) has issued letters of support signaling up to US$100 million in potential financing for Brazilian rare earth projects owned by Meteoric Resources and Viridis Mining and Minerals.

At first glance, this suggests growing momentum for Brazil’s long-discussed rare earth ambitions. Look closer, and the message is more cautious: private banks are still largely on the sidelines, and export credit agencies are being asked to absorb early risk.

What’s Real—and What’s Still Missing

Brazil holds the world’s second-largest rare earth resource base after China. What it lacks is far more important: a proven, commercial-scale processing and separation industry. Meteoric’s Caldeira project and Viridis’ Poços de Caldas project are among the most advanced attempts to close that gap. Together, they carry estimated capital costs of roughly US$660 million, well beyond what junior miners can fund alone.

EFA’s proposed support—up to US$50 million per project—is meaningful but limited. These are letters of support, not binding commitments, and they function primarily as credit signaling to other lenders, not full project finance.

Why Banks Are Still Hesitant

Viridis CEO Rafael Moreno was direct about lender concerns. Banks want two things before committing capital:

1. Proof of process, via a demonstration or pilot plant that shows the metallurgy works at scale; and
2. A price floor, to protect against market volatility and the risk of Chinese price pressure.

This caution reflects market reality. China continues to dominate rare earth refining and magnet production, and until Brazil proves it can process competitively—not just mine—capital discipline will prevail.

Development Banks as the Stopgap

EFA is not acting alone. France’s Bpifrance, Canada’s Export Development Canada, the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation, and Brazil’s BNDES are all active around Brazilian rare earths. The pattern is clear: policy-backed capital is bridging a gap the private market is not yet willing to cross.

The Bottom Line for Investors

This is not a breakthrough—it is a stress test. Australia is using export finance to seed an ex-China rare earth pathway in Brazil, but the hardest work still lies ahead: processing scale, cost control, and true bankability. Investors should read this as conditional progress, not inevitability. Development banks can open doors; markets decide who walks through them.

Source: BNamericas, January 8, 2026

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• China controls 63% of dysprosium reserves and separation capacity, creating a strategic bottleneck that new mining alone cannot overcome, making recycling a security imperative.
• Spent NdFeB magnets from EVs and wind turbines offer 90-99% recovery rates and are the only viable high-grade secondary source for dysprosium oxide production.
• Western recycling rates remain under 1% while China recovers 8-12% of supply from scrap, underscoring the urgent need for domestic separation and recycling infrastructure.

A new January 2026review by Ewa Rudnik (opens in a new tab) of AGH University of Krakow (opens in a new tab), published in the open-access journal Molecules, reaches a stark conclusion: China’s dominance over dysprosium—especially in processing and separation—is unlikely to be challenged by new mining projects alone. Recycling dysprosium from secondary sources is emerging as a strategic necessity for supply security.

The review synthesizes more than a decade of global research on recovering dysprosium, a critical heavy rare earth essential to high-performance permanent magnets used in electric vehicles, wind turbines, robotics, and defense systems. The stakes are high. China controls roughly 63% of global dysprosium reserves and the overwhelming majority of chemical separation capacity, exposing the U.S. and allies to export controls, price volatility, and geopolitical risk.

Why Dysprosium Is a Strategic Bottleneck

Dysprosium is added in small quantities to neodymium-iron-boron (NdFeB) magnets to maintain magnetic strength at high operating temperatures. Without it, EV drivetrains, wind turbines, and advanced weapons systems lose reliability.

While dysprosium is not ultra-rare geologically, it is difficult to separate, environmentally costly to extract, and unevenly distributed. China dominates not only mining—primarily from ion-adsorption clays—but also the downstream separation steps that convert concentrates into dysprosium oxide, the true choke point in the rare earth supply chain.

Study Scope and Methods

Rudnik’s paper is a comprehensive review, not an experimental study. It evaluates three broad recovery pathways across dozens of peer-reviewed studies:

• Hydrometallurgical methods (acid leaching and solvent extraction)
• Biohydrometallurgical methods (microbial and enzymatic leaching)
• Solvometallurgical methods (ionic liquids, deep eutectic solvents, hybrid systems)

The analysis compares recovery yields, selectivity, scalability, cost, and environmental trade-offs, with a practical focus on which secondary sources can realistically supply dysprosium at scale.

Key Findings: Where Recycling Actually Works

1. Spent NdFeB Magnets Are the Only High-Value Secondary Source

End-of-life permanent magnets from electronics, motors, and wind turbines often contain several percent dysprosium, far richer than most primary ores. Laboratory and pilot-scale studies report 90–99% recovery and high-purity dysprosium oxide, making magnet recycling the most credible non-Chinese supply pathway.

2. Coal Ash and Phosphogypsum Are Abundant—but Low-Grade

Coal fly ash and phosphogypsum are produced in massive volumes in the U.S. and globally, but dysprosium concentrations are typically only a few parts per million. The element is often locked in inert mineral phases, requiring energy-intensive pretreatment and aggressive chemistry, raising cost and environmental concerns.

3. Advanced Chemistries Show Promise—but Are Not Yet Commercial

Ionic liquids, deep eutectic solvents, and bioleaching often show better dysprosium selectivity than conventional acids. However, most approaches remain laboratory-scale, expensive, or operationally complex, with limited industrial deployment.

4. Recycling Rates Outside China Remain Minimal

Less than 1% of rare earths are recycled in the EU, with similarly low rates in the U.S. By contrast, China already recovers 8–12% of its dysprosium supply from magnet scrap, reinforcing its dominance even in secondary sourcing.

Implications for the U.S. and Allies

The review reinforces a hard reality: there is no credible dysprosium supply-security strategy without magnet recycling and domestic separation capacity. New mines in Australia, Canada, Greenland, or Africa do not solve the processing bottleneck.

Notably, the paper highlights that initial dysprosium oxide production outside China began in 2025, including early output from Lynas Rare Earths (Malaysia) and Energy Fuels (Utah). These volumes remain small but represent important proof-of-capability milestones.

Limitations and Open Questions

As a review, the paper does not demonstrate commercial readiness. Many studies rely on idealized conditions, synthetic leachates, or small sample sizes. Environmental risks—especially solvent toxicity, waste streams, and lifecycle impacts—remain underexplored. Recycling volumes may also lag accelerating EV and wind demand for years.

Bottom Line: Dysprosium Is Now a Recycling Problem

Rudnik’s review makes one point unmistakable: China’s dominance in heavy rare earths is structural, not accidental—and breaking it requires industrial-scale recycling and separation, not just new mines. For policymakers, investors, and manufacturers, dysprosium recycling has shifted from a sustainability concept to a supply-chain security imperative.

Source: Rudnik, E. Advances in Dysprosium Recovery from Secondary Sources: A Review of Hydrometallurgical, Biohydrometallurgical and Solvometallurgical Approaches. Molecules (2026), 31(1), 176. https://doi.org/10.3390/molecules31010176 (opens in a new tab)

© 2025 Rare Earth Exchanges™ – Accelerating Transparency, Accuracy, and Insight Across the Rare Earth & Critical Minerals Supply Chain.

• Lynas Rare Earths (ASX:LYC) surged 10% on January 7, 2026, rebounding from recent lows, driven by technical momentum and improving NdPr price sentiment rather than new contracts or operational upgrades.
• As the largest integrated rare earth producer outside China, Lynas benefits from strategic Japan partnerships (Sojitz/JOGMEC) for heavy rare earth offtake, but faces operational challenges including Kalgoorlie power disruptions affecting output and costs.
• Investors should scrutinize realized NdPr pricing versus benchmarks, Kalgoorlie reliability timelines, and whether Malaysia's heavy rare earth expansion can meaningfully improve margins amid structural volatility in rare earth equities.

Lynas Rare Earths Ltd (ASX:LYC) jumped (opens in a new tab) about 10% on Jan. 7, 2026, rebounding sharply from Jan. 2 lows near A$12.15. Is the move due to a technical snap-back and improving sentiment that rare earth prices, particularly NdPr, are stabilizing dynamics?  There was no new contract, discovery, or guidance upgrade. This was momentum—useful, but not the same as fundamentals.

Aaron Teboneras reported on the stock for The Motley Fool Australia.

The Feel-Good Story—and What It Misses

The bullish script is familiar: EV demand returns, NdPr bottoms, geopolitics re-rates non-China supply. That thesis is plausible, but incomplete. NdPr benchmarks have shown recent firmness (methodologies vary), yet realized pricing and margins matter more than spot headlines. Meanwhile, Lynas has navigated operational constraints—including reported Kalgoorlie power disruptions in late 2025—that can ripple into downstream output and costs.

Yet investors should discount exuberance until execution risks are fully de-risked.

Scale, Strategy, and Japan Ties

Lynas remains the largest integrated rare earth producer outside China, with MP Materials among the next most significant non-China players as the U.S. builds capacity. Importantly, Lynas’ Japan relationships are material: long-standing ties with  Sojitz/JOGMEC underpin offtake and financing support, including agreements covering heavy rare earths (Dy/Tb)—a strategic differentiator as magnet makers prioritize high-temperature performance.

Questions Investors Should Ask Now

• What NdPr prices is Lynas actually realizing versus benchmarks, net of contracts and costs?
• How quickly can Kalgoorlie reliability be stabilized, and at what capex/opex impact?
• Will heavy rare earth separation expansion in Malaysia materially improve product mix and margins in volatile price conditions?

StockCheck: Fundamentals vs. Charts

This move looks like a credible technical rebound from oversold levels—not proof of a cycle turn. Rare earth equities remain structurally volatile. Market quotes around the mid-teens AUD range during this period varied by venue and timing.

REEx Takeaway

If the Motley Fool piece is mostly correct, it’s also thin. Supply-chain resilience isn’t a chart pattern. The U.S. rebuild requires separation, metals, alloys, and magnets—or even best-in-class producers like Lynas remain exposed to China-set pricing.

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• Meteoric Resources (ASX:MEI) receives a non-binding Letter of Support from Export Finance Australia for up to US$50M in indicative financing for its Caldeira Rare Earth Project in Brazil, contingent on Australian engineering content.
• Caldeira ranks 11th globally in the HREE project database, strategically critical as China controls ~98% of heavy rare earth processing capacity essential for EV motors, wind turbines, and defense systems.
• While the EFA support and prior US$250M US EXIM letter of interest signal financing momentum, investors must await binding term sheets, completed feasibility studies, and confirmed offtake agreements before treating this as committed capital.

Meteoric Resources NL (opens in a new tab) (ASX:MEI) reports a non-binding, conditional Letter of Support from Export Finance Australia (EFA (opens in a new tab)) for indicative financing up to US$50 million to advance its Caldeira Rare Earth Project in Brazil (opens in a new tab), with the proposed funding linked to using Australian engineering / EPCM / contractor content. The company frames this as supply-chain collaboration between Australia and Brazil—worth noting, but investors should treat the update as process progress, not money in the bank.

An Important Asset

Meteoric’s 11th-place ranking in Rare Earth Exchanges’ Heavy Rare Earth Element (HREE) project database is strategically important because HREEs—not light rare earths—are the true choke point in the global magnet supply chain. Elements such as dysprosium and terbium are essential for high-temperature permanent magnets used in EV drivetrains, wind turbines, defense systems, and advanced electronics, yet China controls an estimated ~98% of global HREE processing capacity, with primary feedstock still concentrated in Southern China and Myanmar.

This geographic and technical concentration exposes Western supply chains to acute geopolitical, environmental, and regulatory risk—illustrated by repeated disruptions from Myanmar border closures, Chinese export controls, and tightening environmental enforcement. As a result, any credible, scalable, non-Chinese HREE feedstock source immediately carries outsized strategic value, even at the development stage.

Meteoric’s ranking signals that Caldeira is not merely another rare earth project, but a potential upstream pressure-release valve in a system where downstream diversification (separation, metal, magnet-making) is structurally constrained by upstream HREE scarcity. For investors and policymakers alike, this is why HREE projects are assessed differently—and why rankings focused on heavy rare earth exposure matter far more than headline TREO grades alone.

Latest Updates

This sits alongside Meteoric’s previously disclosed US$250 million U.S. EXIM “letter of interest” (opens in a new tab) (also non-binding), described by the company as potential cornerstone funding if approved.

What’s Verified

The EFA support is explicitly non-binding and conditional, and therefore not committed capital, but it certainly demonstrates momentum for further financing options. The EXIM item is likewise presented as a letter of interest—a pathway, not a facility.

Meteoric’s effort needs to lead to actual financing, supported by a DFS/BFS, binding term sheets, covenants, and offtake.

Critical Questions Investors Should Ask Now

• What are the conditions precedent for EFA support (Australian content thresholds, permitting milestones, security package)?
• Is the US$50M contemplated as project finance debt, corporate debt, or contractor-tied financing, and where does it rank in seniority?
• What is the downstream plan (separation, product spec, qualification,) and what offtakes are binding versus “discussions”?
• How are Brazil execution risks (permitting sequence, logistics, FX) reflected in capex/opex claims?

Stock Check: Fundamentals + Technicals

As of Jan 7, 2026, MEI traded around A$0.18–0.19 via Yahoo Finance with an intraday market cap shown near A$489M, and a 52-week range ~A$0.057–0.260—high volatility consistent with a pre-revenue development story driven by milestones.

REEx Takeaway

If accurate—and it appears to be—this EFA letter is a credible signal of allied engagement.

For the U.S. and ex-China to rebuild rare earth supply chains, investors demand binding financing, enforceable offtakes, and downstream processing realities.

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