• Geographer Julie Klinger argues the U.S. could meet rare earth demand through recycling mine waste and electronics rather than opening new mines.
• Her case overlooks critical scale and timing challenges.
• Recycling rates remain below 1% globally, and recovered materials still require the same processing infrastructure dominated by China.
• Recycling is a complement to, not a replacement for, domestic refining capacity.
• The real solution requires unglamorous capital investment in processing capacity first.
• This should be paired with recycling and selective mining.
• Waste recovery should not be treated as a shortcut past the supply chain’s hardest step.

In a February 6 opinion essay (opens in a new tab) in The New York Times, geographer Julie Michelle Klinger (opens in a new tab) contends that fears of China’s rare-earth dominance are exaggerated. She argues that the United States could meet most of its demand by recovering rare earths from mine waste, industrial scrap, and discarded electronics, rather than opening new mines. Mining, she suggests, is slow, environmentally risky, and often unnecessary; recycling and domestic processing should take priority.

Where the Essay Is Solid

Several core points are accurate. Rare earths are not geologically scarce. China’s dominance is concentrated in processing, not in exclusive access to ore. Western nations did, over decades, outsource hazardous and capital-intensive refining to China, eroding domestic expertise. And recycling rates for rare earths remain below 1% globally, an undeniable inefficiency.

Klinger is also right to puncture repeated mining hype—from Greenland to the deep seabed—that has produced headlines rather than durable supply.

Where the Case Breaks Down

The problem is scale and timing. Recycling and waste recovery are necessary—but nowhere near sufficient in the near-to-medium term. Rare earths are used in tiny quantities, embedded in complex products, and locked into magnets and alloys that are expensive and chemically intensive to separate. The U.S. lacks industrial-scale collection, disassembly, and solvent-extraction infrastructure to turn theory into tonnage.

Claims that the U.S. could meet “most” of its needs through waste recovery rest on theoretical resource estimates, not operating systems. “Recoverable” does not mean recoverable economically, at purity, at scale, and on schedule—especially for heavy rare earths such as dysprosium and terbium, which are essential for defense systems and EV drivetrains.

The Missing Middle Everyone Avoids

Ironically, the essay concedes the key truth and then glides past it. Processing is the bottleneck—and recycling does not bypass it. Scrap still must be separated, refined, metallized, and qualified. Without domestic solvent extraction, metal-making, and magnet manufacturing, recycling simply feeds the same choke point China already dominates.

REEx Take

Recycling is a pillar, not a panacea. Treating it as an alternative to mining and processing risks repeating the very mistake that created today’s dependency: confusing material abundance with supply security. The real solution is unglamorous and capital-intensive—processing capacity first, paired with recycling and selective mining.

The New York Times is right to challenge mining mythology. It is wrong to suggest the hardest step can be skipped.

Source: The New York Times, Opinion

• MST Access reports Energy Fuels' acquisition of Australian Strategic Materials could create one of the most complete ex-China rare earth supply chains by combining U.S. separation assets with proven metallization capabilities.
• The deal addresses China's downstream dominance in rare earth processing—separation, metallisation, and alloying—rather than upstream mining, creating a credible 'mine-to-metals' Western alternative.
• Expansion plans target 6,000 tonnes per year of NdPr by 2028-2029, though execution risks include high capital intensity, regulatory approvals, and China's continued market influence through pricing controls.

In a detailed February 2026 research report (opens in a new tab), analyst Chris Drew of MST Access examines Energy Fuels’ agreement to acquire Australian Strategic Materials (ASM (opens in a new tab))—a transaction the author argues could create one of the most complete ex-China rare earth supply chains in the Western world. The deal, structured as a Scheme of Arrangement and expected to close by mid-2026, combines Energy Fuels’ U.S. feedstock and separation assets with ASM’s proven metallization and alloying capabilities, directly targeting China’s long-standing dominance in rare earth processing

How the Study Was Conducted

MST Access’s report is an equity research analysis rather than a laboratory study. It synthesizes company disclosures, feasibility studies, balance-sheet data, and project timelines to assess the strategic logic and risks of the acquisition. The analysis tracks assets across the full rare earth value chain—mining, separation, metallisation, and alloying—and evaluates whether the combined entity can realistically deliver at scale outside China.

Key Findings: Where the Leverage Really Lies

The report’s central conclusion is straightforward: China’s advantage is downstream, not upstream. While rare earth ores exist globally, China controls the most difficult stages—separation, metallisation, and alloy production. Energy Fuels provides feedstock supply and separation capacity at its White Mesa Mill in Utah, which currently produces light rare earths and is piloting heavy rare earth separation. ASM contributes something far rarer in the West: commercial-scale metallization and alloying, already operating at its Korean Metals Plant and planned for duplication in the United States.

According to MST, this combination creates a “mine-to-metals” platform capable of delivering rare earth metals and alloys without relying on Chinese processors—an industrial configuration few Western firms can currently match.

Implications for the China Monopoly

For policymakers and investors, the implication is not that China’s monopoly is broken—but that a credible alternative pathway is emerging. The report highlights planned expansions at White Mesa, including a Phase 2 project targeting up to 6,000 tonnes per year of NdPr and meaningful quantities of dysprosium and terbium, contingent on financing and construction timelines. If executed, this would materially reduce Western exposure at the most sensitive processing stages.

Limitations and Open Risks

The analysis is candid about constraints. Most expansion plans extend to 2028–2029, underscoring that rare earth processing capacity cannot be built overnight. Capital intensity is high, regulatory approvals remain pending, and China retains the ability to influence markets through pricing and export controls. The report also notes that the successful integration of ASM’s assets and the completion of the acquisition are critical execution risks.

Conclusion

MST Access’s study does not claim a silver bullet. Instead, it documents a structural response to China’s dominance in rare earths: vertical integration across feedstock, separation, and alloying within allied jurisdictions. If delivered as outlined, the Energy Fuels–ASM combination would mark one of the most tangible Western efforts yet to compete where China has been strongest for decades.

Source: MST Access, “Fueling Up: Energy Fuels to Acquire ASM,” February 4, 2026

• The US launched a 54-nation summit excluding China.
• Aim: Reduce dependence on Chinese critical mineral processing.
• Methods: Preferred trading blocs, reference pricing, and new resource agreements.
• China currently holds 90% dominance in refining.
• Policy framework acknowledges urgent need for rebuilding Western processing capacity.
• Risk: Enforcing price floors across fragmented democracies may lead to higher input costs.
• Higher costs could potentially strengthen China's competitive advantage.
• Investors should focus on monitoring processing plants, magnet factories, and binding offtake agreements.
• Political announcements are less significant compared to the real indicators.
• Supply security is incomplete without engaging the dominant processor.

By February 4, 2026, the United States unveiled a sweeping plan to reduce dependence on China for critical minerals by forming a preferred trading bloc with allies, introducing reference prices and potential price floors, and signing new resource agreements. The goal: protect Western supply chains from low-cost competition and improve long-term security. The idea is bold—but execution remains uncertain, especially given China’s near-total dominance in mineral processing.

At the Washington summit—attended by representatives from 54 countries and the EU—China was absent. That absence may be symbolic, but it is also the plan’s central vulnerability.

Where Reality Backs the Rhetoric

The factual core is solid. China dominates roughly 60% of global rare earth mining and close to 90% of separation, refining, and downstream processing. This is not merely a mining issue; it is an industrial one. Western nations, particularly in Europe, have allowed processing capacity to atrophy—an erosion explicitly flagged by the European Court of Auditors.

Matthias Rüth, Managing Director of TRADIUM GmbH (opens in a new tab)

In this context, comments from Matthias Rüth, Managing Director of TRADIUM GmbH (opens in a new tab), align with industry reality: processing expertise accumulated over decades cannot be rebuilt on a political timetable.

Where Policy Starts Floating Free of Hardware

Minimum price mechanisms and reference pricing sound orderly, but commodity markets are neither static nor obedient. Enforcing price floors across multiple value-chain stages would require sustained coordination, compliance, and enforcement—historically rare in fragmented democracies.

Tariffs as an enforcement backstop risk collateral damage. Higher input costs for downstream manufacturers may undermine the very industries the policy aims to protect, inadvertently reinforcing China’s competitive advantage in finished goods.

The Narrative Tilt No One Mentions

The proposal frames China primarily as a distortion to be countered, not a system to be reckoned with. This is a strategic choice—but also a bias. China’s absence from the summit does not reduce its leverage; it highlights it. Any near-term supply security strategy that excludes the dominant processor is, by definition, incomplete.

Why This Actually Matters

What’s notable is not the elegance of the framework—it’s the admission of urgency. Western governments are finally acknowledging that rare earth security requires industrial policy, capital discipline, and downstream rebuilding, not just new mines and friendly communiqués.

For investors, the signal is clear: watch processing plants, magnet factories, and binding offtake agreements—not speeches.

Source: TRADIUM Market Insight, February 6, 2026

• U.S. proposes multilateral price floors for critical minerals to keep non-Chinese producers viable after China's 2024 export restrictions exposed supply chain vulnerabilities across defense, automotive, and semiconductor sectors.
• China controls over 90% of global rare earth processing capacity, with refining infrastructure requiring 5-7 years to build—making price defenses a time-buying measure rather than a structural solution.
• A temporary accommodation between U.S. and China on rare earth access is approaching expiration, with uncertain prospects for extension as Washington pushes allies like South Korea toward a more binding commercial framework.

After China temporarily restricted rare earth exports last year—jolting U.S. defense, automotive, semiconductor, and battery supply chains—Washington is proposing a multilateral trade bloc to blunt Beijing’s leverage. At a February 4 ministerial hosted by Secretary of State Marco Rubio, U.S. officials outlined a plan to defend minimum prices for critical minerals among allies, using tariffs or other measures if China undercuts markets. The objective is straightforward: keep non-Chinese producers economically viable long enough to scale.

What’s Firm—and What’s Still Vapor

Vice President J. D. Vance was unusually direct, arguing that volatile prices and alleged predatory underselling have made Western investment uneconomic. The proposal envisions price floors across production stages, triggered when market prices fall below agreed thresholds. Rubio linked the idea to complementary tools—strategic stockpiles such as Project Vault and coordinated public finance—to give the concept institutional weight.

These signals are real. So is the motivation: China’s export controls exposed how dependent the U.S. remains on rare earth inputs. What remains undefined are the mechanics—specific floor levels, enforcement rules, loss-sharing, and timelines aligned with industrial reality.

The Choke Point Everyone Knows—but Few Can Fix

Hankyoreh gets the central constraint right: refining and separation, not mining. China controls over 90% of global rare earth processing, built on decades of solvent-extraction expertise, precise temperature control, and skilled labor. The reporting notes that building refineries and achieving consistent yields typically takes five to seven years, making hopes for rapid stabilization optimistic at best. Price defenses can buy time; they cannot substitute for chemistry, engineers, and IP.

Allies in the Middle

South Korea’s position (opens in a new tab) captures the dilemma. Closer alignment with a U.S.-led bloc could reduce dependence on China and add resilience, but it carries economic and diplomatic trade-offs. Rubio praised Seoul’s leadership in the Minerals Security Partnership (MSP)—now potentially giving way to a more binding commercial framework—signaling Washington’s intent to move from coordination to enforcement.

About the Source

Hankyoreh is a major South Korean daily newspaper known for detailed foreign policy reporting and a progressive editorial stance. Its coverage often reflects allied concerns while scrutinizing U.S. strategy—useful context for readers weighing tone and emphasis.

REEx Take

This initiative is a credible counterpunch—but it risks overestimating what pricing policy can achieve without midstream muscle. Price floors buy time; processing capability wins markets. Until the West closes the refining gap, China’s dominance remains structural, not tactical.

At present, the United States and China are operating under a temporary accommodation on rare earths, following a limited reprieve granted by Beijing after last year’s export controls disrupted global supply chains. This arrangement has eased immediate pressure on select U.S. industries, but it is explicitly time-bound. As the deadline on this reprieve approaches, the path forward remains uncertain. Whether China extends, modifies, or withdraws this accommodation will have significant implications for pricing, availability, and downstream manufacturing resilience. Rare Earth Exchanges™ will monitor developments closely as the expiration window narrows and strategic signals from both governments emerge.

Source: Hankyoreh (South Korea)

• Baogang Group held key meetings signaling intensified Chinese Communist Party control over strategic rare-earth and steel industries through expanded anti-corruption enforcement and political supervision mechanisms.
• Leadership mandated embedding Xi Jinping's financial policies and party ideology across operations, treating discipline inspection as corporate governance rather than mere compliance.
• Western policymakers must recognize Chinese industrial suppliers as extensions of state power, where supply-chain risk is inseparable from CCP governance and national strategy execution.

China’s state-owned steel and rare-earth conglomerate Baogang Group has convened two senior leadership meetings that—taken together—signal a renewed push to tighten Chinese Communist Party (CCP) (opens in a new tab) control over a strategically important industrial platform with direct relevance to global rare-earth and heavy industry supply chains.

Anti-Corruption as a Governance Mechanism—Not Just Compliance

On February 5, Baogang held the 4th plenary session of its 9th Discipline Inspection Commission, combined with a 2026 party discipline, “clean governance,” anti-corruption work meeting, and a warning/education conference. The company’s messaging framed anti-corruption as an operational necessity for “high-quality development,” but the language and structure reflect something broader: discipline inspection as corporate governance and political command.

Baogang’s Party Secretary and Chairman Meng Fanying emphasized raising “political standing,” aligning thought and action with the central leadership’s assessment of conditions and priorities, and “putting power into the cage of a system of governance”—a well-known CCP governance phrase meaning tighter institutional constraint and control over decision-making. She also stressed advancing (full strict governance of the Party) as the condition for meeting the company’s goals in the “15th Five-Year” era.

The internal watchdog—Baogang’s Discipline Commission leadership—signaled that 2026 will bring deeper political supervision, expanded inspection mechanisms, and sustained “high-pressure” anti-corruption posture. In practice, that language typically denotes more enforcement leverage, more internal oversight, and less managerial autonomy in politically sensitive enterprises.

Ideology Moves Into Finance and Operations

A separate Baogang Party Standing Committee meeting the same day focused on implementing Xi Jinping’s recent speeches and policy guidance, including the “Chinese-style path to financial development” and building a “financial powerhouse.” Baogang’s leadership was directed to embed financial thinking into corporate management, while keeping CCP leadership “comprehensively” present across the business.

The meeting also reiterated priorities that look like ordinary modernization—intelligent manufacturing, digital transformation, and “new quality productive forces”—but anchored them in political compliance and centralized policy execution. The agenda also included strict emphasis on safety management and cadre selection, reinforcing that personnel, risk, and operational discipline remain inseparable from party control.

Why This Matters to the West

These meetings do not announce a new rare-earth export rule or a new quota. What they signal is arguably more important: China’s strategic suppliers are being further fused into the Party-state command structure. And this should be noted in the West and in America.

For U.S. and allied investors and policymakers, the implications are clear:

• Key Chinese industrial actors should be treated as extensions of state power, not purely commercial firms.
• “Anti-corruption” functions as control architecture—not merely transparency reform.
• Industrial upgrading, finance, safety, and personnel decisions are increasingly executed as policy instruments tied to national strategy.

As Western economies attempt to de-risk rare-earth dependence, Baogang’s messaging reinforces a hard reality: supply-chain risk is inseparable from CCP governance.

Disclosure / Disclaimer: This news item is derived from media published by a Chinese state-owned enterprise. All claims, priorities, and implications should be independently verified using non-state, third-party sources before being relied upon for investment, policy, or national-security analysis.

• In 2025, Baogang Electric delivered over 1,700 rare-earth permanent-magnet motors, marking China's shift from pilot programs to scaled industrial production in high-efficiency electric machinery.
• The company completed 39 motor models across seven product families.
• A new assembly workshop was opened, enabling standardized, professionalized manufacturing with full Chinese certifications for regulated markets.
• China demonstrates end-to-end rare-earth integration—from upstream resources through midstream materials to scaled downstream motor manufacturing—while Western nations still focus on rebuilding mines and processing.

China’s state-owned Baogang Group says its electrical equipment subsidiary, Baogang Electric (Sendi), delivered more than 1,700 rare-earth permanent-magnet motors in 2025, a clear sign that China is moving beyond pilot programs to scaled, repeatable industrial production in high-efficiency electric machinery.

The company frames the milestone as new momentum for China’s “two rare-earth bases” strategy—policy shorthand for locking in leadership not only in rare-earth materials, but in downstream manufacturing and deployment. For business audiences, the key takeaway is operational: this is not R&D hype, but a step-change in output.

What Changed—and Why It Matters

During China’s 14th Five-Year Plan, Baogang Electric aligned with national “dual-carbon” targets (carbon peaking and neutrality), forming a new-energy division focused on wind, solar, hydrogen, energy storage, and permanent-magnet motor systems. The company reports completing seven product families spanning 39 motor models, alongside small-batch production of wind-power generators.

The inflection point came in 2025, when a new permanent-magnet motor assembly workshop reached full operation, enabling standardized, professionalized, and scalable manufacturing. That facility underpinned the jump to 1,700 annual deliveries—an output level that typically requires stable customers, supply reliability, and quality controls.

Technology, Certification, and Market Access

Rare-earth permanent-magnet motors are prized for high efficiency, energy savings, and reliability, making them central to industrial decarbonization. Baogang Electric reports obtaining multiple Chinese certifications for high- and low-voltage three-phase permanent-magnet synchronous motors, with at least one product line passing China’s mandatory 3C certification. This opens regulated markets including coal mining, petrochemicals, metallurgy, and heavy industry.

Commercial deployments include crushers, mixers, rolling-mill hydraulic systems, fans, and pumps—use cases where energy efficiency translates directly into operating-cost savings.

Why the West Should Pay Attention

The significance is less about the headline number than the integration it represents. Baogang sits atop upstream rare-earth resources, feeds midstream magnet materials, and now demonstrates scaled downstream motor manufacturing. That end-to-end capability is precisely what the U.S. and Europe are attempting—slowly—to rebuild.

As Western policy focuses on mines and processing, China is already turning rare earths into finished industrial machines, tightening its competitive grip in electrification and clean-industry equipment.

What’s Next

Baogang Electric says it will expand regionally, promote a “manufacture–remanufacture–reuse” green model, and push permanent-magnet motors from targeted applications toward broader industrial adoption.

Disclosure / Disclaimer: This news item originates from media affiliated with a Chinese state-owned enterprise. All production figures, certifications, and market claims should be independently verified using non-state and third-party sources before being relied upon for investment, policy, or strategic decisions.

• China's National IP Administration has designated Baogang Group Mining Research Institute as a National IP Demonstration Enterprise, placing it into a three-year program focused on strengthening patent creation, protection, and commercialization in strategic mining technologies.
• The institute controls patents across mineral separation, rare earth processing, industrial waste recycling, and environmental compliance—signaling China's strategy to dominate not just mineral supply but the IP infrastructure governing future materials processing.
• This designation reflects China's integration of mining R&D with IP ownership and standards-setting, potentially creating patent density and licensing barriers for Western firms pursuing alternative processing pathways.

China’s National Intellectual Property Administration (opens in a new tab) has named the Baogang Group Mining Research Institute a National Intellectual Property Demonstration Enterprise (Cultivation Track)—a designation reserved for organizations Beijing considers strategically important to its innovation-led industrial policy.

The designation places Baogang’s mining research arm into a three-year national development program focused on strengthening intellectual property creation, protection, management, and commercialization across the full innovation lifecycle. In Chinese policy terms, this signals entry into a nationally prioritized technology cohort, typically associated with regulatory support, preferential policy treatment, and elevated visibility within state-backed industrial and standards-setting initiatives.

What Baogang Is Being Recognized For

The institute serves as the core research engine supporting Baogang Group’s mining and materials operations, including work linked to Bayan Obo, the world’s largest known rareearth deposit. According to the announcement, the institute has built aconcentrated intellectual property portfolio covering:

• Mineral separation and beneficiation technologies
• Integrated utilization of complex and polymetallic ores
• Industrial solid-waste recycling and secondary resource recovery
• Environmental protection and pollution-control processes

Beyond patent ownership, the institute plays a more strategic role in China’s IP system. Its researchers have participated in drafting national guidelines and standards for patent pools, patent valuation, and IP commercialization frameworks. Several so-called “high-value patents” have reportedly been transferred from the lab into operational industrial use—an outcome Beijing increasingly prioritizes over headline patent counts.

The Strategic Signal to the West

This designation is not merely symbolic. It reflects China’s continued effort to embed intellectual property control into upstream and midstream mining and materials technologies, including processing, waste recovery, and environmental compliance.

For the United States and allied economies, the signal is clear:

• China is tightly integrating mining R&D, IP ownership, standards participation, and industrial deployment.
• Competitive advantage is shifting toward how minerals are processed, not just where they are mined.
• Western firms pursuing alternative rare-earth processing or recycling pathways may increasingly encounter patent density, licensing complexity, or standards-based barriers linked to Chinese institutions.

What Comes Next

The institute will now enter a formal three-year construction and evaluation phase, during which it is expected to expand its patent portfolio, strengthen IP governance, improve protection mechanisms, and accelerate commercialization. Successful completion would qualify it for full National Intellectual Property Demonstration Enterprise status following government review.

Bottom line: China is reinforcing leadership not only in critical mineral supply, but in the intellectual property infrastructure that governs future materials processing and industrial standards.

Disclosure / Disclaimer: This news item originates from Chinese media affiliated with a state-owned enterprise. All claims, achievements, and strategic implications should be independently verified using non-state and third-party sources before being relied upon for investment, policy, or national-security analysis.

• Chinese researchers built a 2,000-sample database and used AI-assisted machine learning to optimize sintered NdFeB permanent magnet production, aiming to reduce iteration costs and development time.
• The team developed an 'intelligent' process framework bridging industry's focus on cost-stability and academia's pursuit of peak performance, including quantum kernel methods for data-efficient modeling.
• This advancement signals China's strengthening manufacturing advantage in magnet processing know-how— a strategic capability as important as raw material access for Western supply chains.

Researchers from the Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS) Computer Network Information Center (opens in a new tab), working with the CAS Ganjiang Innovation Research Institute (opens in a new tab), report progress on using data and artificial intelligence to accelerate process optimization for sintered neodymium-iron-boron (NdFeB) permanent magnets. According to the release, the team built an “industry–academia dual-domain” database containing nearly 2,000 samples and used high-performance computing (HPC)–assisted machine learning to systematically evaluate data-selection strategies in a virtual experimental environment—an approach aimed at reducing the cost and time required for iterative process improvement.

Chinese Academy of Sciences: Computer Network Information Center

The team further claims it quantified a fundamental design tension: industry tends to prioritize cost and stability, while academia tends to optimize for peak performance. To bridge that gap, the researchers propose a continuous, “intelligent” process-iteration framework linking composition–process–performance relationships. They also describe a methodological blueprint for integrating quantum kernel methods into a more data-efficient modeling workflow—an advanced technique that, if validated, could improve prediction performance when high-quality labeled data are limited.

The work was published in npj Computational Materials and supported by major Chinese funding streams, including national key R&D programs, the National Natural Science Foundation of China, and CAS strategic initiatives.

Why this matters as business news

This is not a headline about new mines or new rare earth deposits. It is a signal about manufacturing advantage—the downstream capability that turns materials into magnets at scale. Two updates make the item noteworthy:

1. a structured dataset designed to connect factory constraints with academic optimization, and
2. a clear focus on data efficiency—the practical lever that can reduce scrap, shorten development cycles, and raise yields.

Implications for the U.S. and allies

If these methods translate from “virtual experiments” into real production lines, the impact could be meaningful: faster iteration on sintering and processing parameters can improve consistency, yield, and performance per dollar—the exact operational edge that reinforces China’s dominance in magnet manufacturing know-how. For Western supply chains, the competitive lesson is blunt: processing and process IP can be as strategically important as access to ore.

Limitations and what to watch

This is a progress report, not a full independent validation. The release does not specify the database’s sourcing, representativeness across factories, or whether results were demonstrated in live production. “Quantum kernel” integration is also a methodological claim that can sound bigger than it proves in practice; performance gains and deployment complexity should be assessed in the published paper and, ideally, replicated by third parties.

Disclaimer: This news originates from Chinese state-affiliated institutions/media. The technical claims and any implied manufacturing or performance impacts should be verified through independent sources, replication studies, or corroborating industry disclosures before being treated as established fact.

• Hallgarten's 2026 report argues the U.S. has lost its mining empire, remaining structurally dependent on foreign capital and processing capacity despite political rhetoric around reshoring critical minerals.
• The analysis reveals that owning raw minerals means nothing without control of downstream processing—China's true advantage lies in refining and metallurgical capabilities, not just mining.
• Strategic stockpiles may buy time, but without deep investment in midstream processing, workforce skills, and sustained capital, the West risks confusing symbolic activity with actual supply-chain sovereignty.

In a forceful January 2026 market review, veteran mining analyst Christopher Ecclestone, editor of Hallgarten & Company (opens in a new tab), argues that the United States has quietly lost its mining “empire”—and may be mistaking noise for progress in critical minerals. In The End of Empire (opens in a new tab), Ecclestone contends that despite political rhetoric around reshoring, stockpiling, and strategic minerals, the U.S. remains structurally dependent on foreign capital, foreign operators, and—most critically—foreign processing capacity, particularly in rare earths and specialty metals.

What Hallgarten Examined—and How

Hallgarten’s report is not a laboratory study but a market strategy analysis, blending commodity price data, historical case studies, capital-market behavior, and geopolitical context. Across more than a dozen pages, the review surveys metals markets (tin, tungsten, precious metals), U.S. mining capacity, and recent government initiatives such as strategic stockpiles and proposed price supports. Charts and tables—such as tin prices exceeding $50,000/tonne (page 6) and a breakdown of the proposed $12 billion U.S. “Project Vault” stockpile (page 10)—anchor the argument in observable market data.

Key Findings

Hallgarten’s core claim is blunt: the West confuses ownership of minerals with control of supply chains. According to the report, most meaningful mining and processing activity in the U.S. is carried out by Canadian, Australian, or UK-listed firms, while rare earth ventures touted as “national champions” remain financially fragile and operationally immature.

On stockpiling, Ecclestone is cautiously supportive but skeptical of public theatrics. He argues that strategic reserves work best when built quietly—citing Japan’s long-standing model—rather than when broadcast to markets, which can inflate prices and reward speculative projects over resilient supply chains.

Crucially for rare earths, the report underscores that China’s advantage lies downstream. Mining alone does not confer power; processing, refining, and metallurgical know-how do. Without rebuilding these capabilities, Western stockpiles risk becoming symbolic buffers rather than strategic leverage.

Implications for the China Monopoly

The takeaway is simple: you cannot break a monopoly by buying raw materials if your rival controls the factories that turn them into usable products. Hallgarten’s analysis implies that U.S. and allied policy remains fragmented—focused on upstream mining while neglecting midstream processing, workforce skills, and capital markets capable of sustaining cyclical commodity businesses.

Limitations and Controversial Notes

The report is intentionally provocative and openly opinionated. Some characterizations—particularly of U.S. rare earth companies and political figures—reflect Ecclestone’s long-held skepticism rather than neutral consensus. The analysis also downplays emerging industrial-policy tools (e.g., EXIM and DFC financing) that may yet alter outcomes. Readers should treat the work as a strategic critique, not a forecast certainty.

Conclusion

Hallgarten’s End of Empire is less an obituary than a warning. Strategic stockpiles may buy time, but without deep investment in processing, pricing discipline, and talent, the West risks confusing activity with capability. As Rare Earth Exchanges has repeatedly argued, supply-chain sovereignty is built—slowly, expensively, and unglamorously—not declared.

Source

Ecclestone, C. Monthly Resources Review: The End of Empire (Hallgarten & Company, Feb. 5, 2026)

Portfolio_January2026

• Tokyo Chemical Industry bridges a critical gap between industrial rare earth production and life sciences research by providing ultra-pure, research-grade lanthanide compounds that scientists need to study bacterial rare earth metabolism and develop bio-extraction technologies.
• Founded in 1894, TCI manufactures over 30,000 specialized research chemicals with exclusive rare earth reagents unavailable elsewhere, serving researchers developing lanthanide-dependent enzymes, biosensors, and pharmaceutical applications.
• TCI's custom synthesis capabilities and global distribution infrastructure make them indispensable to the emerging rare earth biotechnology field, enabling innovations that could transform sustainable rare earth extraction and recovery.

A Critical Bridge Between Mining and Life Sciences

In the rapidly evolving landscape of rare earth elements, where massive mining operations and industrial-scale production dominate headlines, one Japanese company quietly occupies an irreplaceable niche that makes cutting-edge biotechnology research possible. Tokyo Chemical Industry (opens in a new tab) (TCI) doesn't mine rare earths, refine ores, or manufacture magnets, yet without their specialized products, the revolution in rare earth biochemistry simply couldn't happen.

TCI transforms raw, rare-earth materials into the ultra-pure, research-grade reagents that scientists need to unlock the biological secrets of these elements. While others move tons of material for industrial applications, TCI moves grams and kilograms with precision: serving the researchers who are discovering how bacteria harness lanthanides for metabolism, developing enzymes that can selectively extract specific rare earths, and pioneering biotechnological solutions to mining's environmental challenges.

The Company: 130 Years of Chemical Excellence

Founded in 1894 as Asakawa Shoten, TCI has evolved from a pharmaceutical wholesaler into a global manufacturer specializing in research chemicals. Headquartered in Tokyo with operations spanning Asia, Europe, and North America, the company manufactures over 30,000 research chemical products and provides custom synthesis services.

What sets TCI apart is not scale, but specificity. Their facilities in Portland, Oregon; Shanghai, China; and throughout Japan are optimized for producing chemicals that meet the exacting standards of academic research and pharmaceutical development. When a biochemist needs a lanthanide compound with 99.99% purity, documented provenance, and consistent batch-to-batch quality, TCI delivers.

The Gap That TCI Fills

The rare earth supply chain has always been optimized for industrial applications. Mining companies extract mixed ores. Refineries separate elements for use in permanent magnets, catalytic converters, and phosphors. These operations handle thousands of metric tons annually, with specifications tailored to manufacturing tolerances.

But life sciences research operates in a completely different world. A biochemist studying lanthanide-dependent enzymes doesn't need a ton of neodymium oxide, they need 50 grams of neodymium chloride with analytical-grade purity, proper documentation, and a molecular structure suitable for dissolving in aqueous solutions. A pharmaceutical researcher developing lanthanide-based diagnostics needs cerium compounds in specific oxidation states, not bulk industrial material.

TCI bridges this critical gap. They take rare earth materials and transform them into the specialized chemical forms that researchers can actually use: halides, acetates, nitrates, specialized chelates, and custom derivatives. Each batch is tested, documented, and packaged for laboratory use.

The Rare Earth Life Sciences Revolution

Until 2011, rare earth elements were considered biologically inert, interesting for materials science, but irrelevant to living systems. That changed dramatically with the discovery that certain bacteria use lanthanides as essential cofactors in metabolic enzymes.

Researchers found that methylotrophic bacteria possess specialized methanol dehydrogenase enzymes (XoxF) that require lanthanides like cerium, lanthanum, or neodymium rather than calcium. These bacteria actively scavenge rare earths from their environment, incorporating them into enzymes that oxidize methanol, a critical step in the global carbon cycle.

This discovery opened a new frontier. Scientists identified bacterial proteins, such as lanmodulin, that bind lanthanides with extraordinary selectivity. They found enzyme cofactors, such as pyrroloquinoline quinone (PQQ), that preferentially extract specific rare earths from mixed solutions. Researchers began engineering designer enzymes that use lanthanide catalysis for pharmaceutical synthesis.

Every one of these breakthroughs required high-purity lanthanide compounds for laboratory experiments. And for many researchers worldwide, TCI was the supplier that made their work possible.

What Makes TCI Irreplaceable

1. Specialized Product Portfolio

TCI manufactures rare earth reagents in forms specifically designed for biochemical research. Their catalog includes lanthanide salts, coordination complexes, and specialized derivatives that simply aren't available from industrial suppliers. Many of these compounds are exclusive to TCI: if you need them, there's no alternative source.

They also produce TODGA (tetraoctyl diglycolamide), a specialized extractant compound effective for separating rare earths used both in nuclear waste processing and in research on selective lanthanide recovery.

2. Research-Grade Purity Standards

Life science research demands reproducibility, which requires reagents of consistent, documented purity. Industrial-grade rare earth oxides may be 95% pure, which is adequate for magnet manufacturing, but catastrophic for enzyme studies where trace contaminants can confound results. TCI's rare earth compounds meet analytical-grade standards, with detailed certificates of analysis for each batch.

3. Custom Synthesis Capabilities

With over 60 years of synthesis experience, TCI can produce rare earth compounds that don't exist in its catalog. When researchers need a novel lanthanide complex for a specific application, TCI's chemists can design and synthesize it. This custom capability is crucial for cutting-edge research where off-the-shelf chemicals don't exist.

4. Global Distribution Infrastructure

TCI operates strategically located distribution centers in Japan, the United States, Europe, China, and India. This infrastructure ensures that researchers worldwide can obtain rare earth reagents quickly and reliably. This proves critical when experiments are time-sensitive or when establishing new research programs.

5. Integration with Life Sciences Ecosystem

TCI's rare earth products sit within a comprehensive life sciences catalog, including enzymes, nucleotides, amino acids, and biochemicals. Researchers can source lanthanide compounds alongside all their other laboratory chemicals, simplifying procurement and ensuring quality consistency across their supply chain.

Market Position and Strategic Importance

TCI occupies a unique position in the rare earth value chain. They're not competing with mining giants or industrial processors. They're enabling a completely different market segment that those players can't efficiently serve.

The biotechnology applications of rare earths represent a small but scientifically critical market. Researchers developing lanthanide-based biosensors, engineering bacteria for selective rare earth extraction, creating PQQ-based separation technologies, or designing novel pharmaceutical catalysts all depend on suppliers like TCI.

As the rare earth biotechnology field matures, potentially offering solutions to mining's environmental challenges through bio-extraction and selective recovery, TCI's role becomes even more strategic. They're not just supplying today's research; they're enabling the innovations that could transform tomorrow's rare earth supply chain.

The Path Forward

Several trends suggest TCI's importance will continue growing:

Expanding biotechnology research: Government agencies like DARPA are funding projects to develop bacterial systems for rare earth extraction. Academic institutions worldwide are establishing programs in lanthanide biochemistry. Each new research group needs reliable suppliers of specialized compounds.

Pharmaceutical applications: TCI's original lanthanide fluorescent labeling reagents for biochemical research point toward broader pharmaceutical applications. As drug developers discover new uses for lanthanide chemistry, demand for specialized compounds will increase.

Bio-extraction technologies: If bacterial or enzymatic methods for rare earth extraction prove commercially viable, the development phase will require massive amounts of research-grade lanthanide compounds for optimization and validation.

Academic-industrial collaboration: As rare earth biochemistry moves from pure research toward applied technology, companies will need the same specialized reagents that academic labs use. TCI's dual capability in catalog products and custom synthesis positions them perfectly for this transition.

Conclusion: The Indispensable Specialist

Tokyo Chemical Industry exemplifies a principle often overlooked in commodity markets: sometimes the most valuable companies aren't the biggest, but the most specialized. While rare earth mining and processing grab headlines with their scale and geopolitical importance, TCI quietly serves a niche that makes scientific progress possible.

They've built their position through decades of expertise in synthesis, a commitment to quality, and an understanding of what researchers actually need. For scientists exploring the biological roles of rare earths, developing biotechnological extraction methods, or engineering lanthanide-based pharmaceuticals, TCI isn't just a supplier: they're an essential partner without whom the work simply couldn't proceed.

In an industry often dominated by discussions of mine development, refining capacity, and supply security, TCI reminds us that value chains have many critical nodes. The company that enables research leading to breakthrough technologies may be just as important as the one that extracts the raw material.

As rare earth biotechnology evolves from laboratory curiosity to potential industrial solution, TCI's role will only become more vital. They've already proven indispensable to the researchers making today's discoveries. Tomorrow's innovations in sustainable rare earth extraction and recovery will likely depend on them as well.

COMPANY SNAPSHOT

Founded: 1894 (as Asakawa Shoten)

Headquarters: Tokyo, Japan

Product Portfolio: Over 30,000 research chemicals

Global Presence: Operations in Japan, USA, China, India, and Europe

Specialty: Research-grade chemicals for synthetic chemistry, life sciences, materials science, and analytical chemistry

Key Differentiator: Custom synthesis capabilities and exclusive reagents available nowhere else

Sources for TCI Rare Earth Elements Assessment

TCI Company Information

1. TCI Rare Earth Elements Product Category https://www.tcichemicals.com/US/en/c/12477 (opens in a new tab)
2. TCI TODGA Extractant Information https://www.tcichemicals.com/OP/en/support-download/tcimail/application/182-17b (opens in a new tab)
3. TCI Homepage https://www.tcichemicals.com/US/en/ (opens in a new tab)
4. Tokyo Chemical Industry - Wikipedia https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tokyo_Chemical_Industry (opens in a new tab)
5. TCI - LinkedIn https://www.linkedin.com/company/tci-tokyo-chemical-industry (opens in a new tab)
6. Tokyo Chemical Industry (TCI) - Fisher Scientific https://www.fishersci.com/us/en/brands/JID7VMYA/tokyo-chemical-industry-tci.html (opens in a new tab)
7. TCI (Tokyo Chemical Industry) - PubChem Data Sourcehttps://pubchem.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/source/TCI%20(Tokyo%20Chemical%20Industry) (opens in a new tab)

Rare Earth Biotechnology & Scientific Background

8. Role of rare earth elements in methanol oxidation - ScienceDirecthttps://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1367593118300954 (opens in a new tab)
9. Role of rare earth elements in methanol oxidation - PubMed https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/30308436/ (opens in a new tab)
10. The Chemistry of Lanthanides in Biology - ACS Central Sciencehttps://pubs.acs.org/doi/10.1021/acscentsci.9b00642 (opens in a new tab)
11. Rare earth element alcohol dehydrogenases widely occur - PMChttps://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC6775964/ (opens in a new tab)
12. Rare earth element alcohol dehydrogenases - PubMed https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/30952993/ (opens in a new tab)
13. Lanthanides: New life metals? - PubMed https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/27357406/ (opens in a new tab)
14. The Chemistry of Lanthanides in Biology - PubMed https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/31572776/ (opens in a new tab)
15. Bacteria: Radioactive elements replace essential rare earth metals - ScienceDailyhttps://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2023/05/230511164542.htm (opens in a new tab)
16. Perspective: Roles of rareearth elements in Bacteria - ScienceDirecthttps://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2950155525000242 (opens in a new tab)
17. Essential and Ubiquitous: The Emergence of Lanthanide Metallobiochemistry - Wileyhttps://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/anie.201904090 (opens in a new tab)

Additional Technical Reference

18. Determination of the Kinetic Rate Law of Rare-Earth Solvent Extraction - Journal of Physical Chemistry Chttps://pubs.acs.org/doi/10.1021/acs.jpcc.5c06366 (opens in a new tab) (References TCI as supplier of PC88A extractant compound)

• EXIM approved $10 in long-term loans to launch Project Vault, a public-private partnership creating a U.S. Strategic Critical Minerals Reserve with early participants including GE Vernova, Boeing, Clarios, and Western Digital.
• Project Vault provides strategic insurance against supply shocks but stockpiles alone cannot solve chronic supply deficit without comprehensive industrial policy addressing upstream mining, mid-separation/refining, and downstream manufacturing.
• REE advocates that true sovereignty requires a full-spectrum strategy: pricing support, midstream buildout, downstream IP, workforce development, regulatory reform, and allied financing—not storage alone.

The Export-Import Bank of the United States has approved up to $10 billion in direct lending to launch Project Vault, establishing a U.S. Strategic Critical Minerals Reserve through a public-private partnership. Announced alongside President Trump, the initiative aims to buffer U.S. manufacturers from supply shocks, reduce dependence on foreign-controlled supply chains, and anchor domestic production and processing. Early OEM participants include GE Vernova, Boeing, Clarios, and Western Digital, with suppliers such as Traxys, Mercuria Americas, and Hartree Partners. EXIM says the structure targets taxpayer-positive returns while strengthening U.S. manufacturing jobs and national security.

Project Vault — Q&A

Why A Stockpile is not Enough

A stockpile like Project Vault is necessary—but on its own, it is strategic insurance, not strategic power. Rare Earth Exchanges has argued consistently that without a comprehensive industrial policy, a reserve risks becoming a static warehouse in a dynamic geopolitical war.

First, stockpiles do not create supply. They smooth shocks, but they don’t solvechronic upstream deficits. Without aligned incentives for mining—price floors, offtake guarantees, or risk-sharing capital—new projects won’t reach FID. Capital flees volatility, and critical minerals remain among the most volatile commodities on Earth.

Second, midstream is the real choke point. Separation, refining, alloying, and magnet-making are where China dominates. A stockpile of oxides is useless if the U.S. and allies lack scalable, cost-competitive processing. That requires long-term pricing support and coordinated demand signals across OEMs—not one-off loans. If not, nascent magnet makers will fall prey to market forces within a couple of years---and this could be disastrous—they essentially can’t keep up with Chinese pricing, go out of business, and/or become acquired by the Chinese.

Third, downstreammanufacturing and IP matter as much as tonnage. Without sustainedR&D, patent protection, and allied standard-setting, the West risks subsidizing inputs while China captures value in finished components. China now focuses on Two Ear Earth Base China and owning the future of the industry downstream.  Industrial policy must reward innovation, not just extraction.

Fourth, talent and workforce are missing links. Processing engineers, metallurgists, magnet designers, and industrial chemists cannot be conjured overnight. REEx has stressed the need for allied training pipelines—U.S., EU, Japan, Australia, Canada—treated as a shared strategic asset.

Fifth, fragmented permitting and funding kill momentum. The U.S. still runs critical minerals through a maze of agencies, timelines, and mismatched programs. Without rationalized permitting, synchronized DoD–DOE–EXIM–DFC financing, and multinational co-investment platforms, even well-funded projects stall.

Finally, this is a coalition problem, not a national one. China’s advantage is scale across borders—mines, refineries, factories, banks, and diplomacy moving in lockstep. A stockpile without a tight, rules-based multinational alliance merely delays dependence; it does not end it.

Bottom line: Project Vault buys time. Only a full-spectrum industrial strategy—pricing support, midstream buildout, downstream IP, workforce development, regulatory reform, and allied financing—converts time into sovereignty. Rare Earth Exchanges has been clear: resilience is engineered, not stored or a series of reactions.

• Chengdu Ascend Magnetic Technology has suspended SmCo magnet production due to China's tightening export controls on rare earths, including samarium, which has required government export permission since April 2025.
• SmCo magnets are critical for aerospace, defense, and high-temperature applications due to their exceptional thermal stability (300-550°C) and corrosion resistance.
• There is far more limited global capacity for SmCo magnets compared to NdFeB magnets.
• The production halt highlights the urgent need for Western defense and aerospace industries to:
  • Diversify suppliers
  • Develop non-China SmCo capacity
  • Establish long-term offtake strategies outside China's dominance

Chengdu Ascend Magnetic Technology & Products Co., Ltd., a specialized producer of samarium cobalt (SmCo) permanent magnets, has halted its SmCo operations, according to industry sources, including Asian Metal and regional rare-earth market trackers. The suspension, reported February 5, 2025, comes amid a broader tightening of China’s export controls on rare earths—including samarium, which has required government permission for export since April 2025.

Chengdu, China

Chengdu Ascend focuses on the R&D, production, and sales of SmCo magnets, a niche but strategically important class of magnets prized for exceptional thermal stability (typically 300–550°C), corrosion resistance, and performance in harsh environments. These characteristics make SmCo magnets indispensable for aerospace, defense, oil & gas, and high-reliability industrial applications, where neodymium magnets often fall short.

Industry sources indicate the production halt aligns with wider adjustments across China’s magnet and new-energy sectors, where export licensing, compliance costs, and policy uncertainty have reshaped operating decisions. SmCo production is capital-intensive and relies on specialized furnaces and processing equipment, amplifying sensitivity to regulatory friction.

Why this matters: SmCo capacity is far more limited globally than NdFeB. Any disruption—especially from China, which dominates rare-earth processing—can tighten supply, extend lead times, and raise prices for Western buyers already navigating export controls.

Implications: Does this purported halt reinforce the case for non-China SmCo capacity, recycling, and long-term offtake strategies in allied markets? We think so. For defense and aerospace primes, it underscores the urgency of supplier diversification and qualification outside China.

Company Profile

Headquarters:                 Chengdu, Sichuan Province, China
Founded:                          Estimated 2015 (exact year not publicly disclosed)
Ownership:                      Privately held Chinese company (not publicly traded)
Corporate                        Structure: Independent operating company (not a listed subsidiary of a major SOE)

Core Business & Specialization

Chengdu Ascend Magnetic Technology & Products Co., Ltd. (often referred to as CAM-Magnet) is a specialist manufacturer of high-performance rare earth permanent magnets, with a particular focus on Samarium Cobalt (SmCo) materials. The company positions itself as a dedicated factory serving technically demanding applications that require high thermal stability, corrosion resistance, and long service life.

SmCo magnets produced by CAM-Magnet are typically used in aerospace, defense-related components, high-temperature industrial motors, oil & gas tools, and precision instrumentation, where NdFeB magnets are unsuitable due to heat or environmental constraints.

Products & Capabilities

• Primary products:
  • SmCo 1:5 and SmCo 2:17 permanent magnets
  • Custom-shaped and application-specific magnet assemblies
• Key performance attributes:
  • Operating temperatures commonly 300–550°C (grade dependent)
  • Strong resistance to oxidation and corrosion
• Manufacturing scope:
  • Powder metallurgy, sintering, machining, and magnetization
  • Small-batch, high-spec production rather than mass-volume output

Sources: Asian Metal; regional rare-earth industry trackers (Feb. 2025).

• China's strategic leverage over semiconductors stems from its control of rare earth processing, refining, and magnet production—not just mining—making midstream capabilities the real geopolitical choke point.
• India possesses significant rare earth resources but remains dependent on Chinese derivatives due to limited industrial capacity, regulatory constraints, and an underdeveloped downstream processing infrastructure.
• Allied partnerships like iCET can diversify supply chains only when paired with credible domestic industrial policy, institutional reform, and investment in processing, alloys, and recycling capabilities.

Researchers Ratnadeep Maitra, Department of International Relations and Governance Studies, Shiv Nadar University, Delhi-NCR, and Tapas Das, Kandi RajCollege, University of Kalyani, India argue in a January 2026 UNISCIJournal analysis that rare earth elements have shifted from “just minerals” into instruments of national security and geo-economic power—and that China’s near-monopoly over rare earth processing and refining, more than its mining output, is the real choke point shaping semiconductor and advanced-technology supply chains. Their core message for lay readers: countries can have rare earths in the ground and still be dependent—because the “power” lives in the refineries, separation chemistry, magnet-making, and know-how.

Overview

This is a strategic policy analysis, not a lab experiment. The authors use two well-known international-relations frameworks—“complex interdependence” (Keohane & Nye) and “multi-dimensional security” (Buzan)—to interpret how supply chains became security assets after COVID-era disruptions and amid U.S.–China technology rivalry. They then apply that lens to semiconductors and critical minerals, positioning rare earths as a prime example of “weaponizable” dependency.

Key Findings

1. Processing is the monopoly that matters. The paper emphasizes that China’s leverage stems from control of midstream and downstream nodes—separation, refining, and magnet production—allowing export restrictions to function as a strategic tool.
2. India’s bottleneck is not geology—it’s industrialcapacity. Despite significant resource potential (notably coastal mineral sands), India is described as constrained by limited private participation, environmental and waste-management complexity, and thin downstream capabilities—leading to continued dependence on Chinese rare-earth derivatives.
3. Allied frameworks help, but don’t substitute for domestic buildout. The authors argue initiatives like the Initiative on Critical and Emerging Technology (iCET) and broader partnerships can diversify supply only if paired with credible domestic institutional reform and industrial sequencing.

Implications for markets and policy

For investors, the paper reinforces a hard truth: rare earth resilience is an industrial policy project, not a mining project. India’s opportunity—like America’s—is to move from upstream extraction to processing, alloys, magnets, and recycling, where margins and leverage are higher.

Limitations and controversies

Because the article is theory-forward, it does not provide new production data, cost curves, or project-level feasibility. Some readers may view its “weaponization” framing as geopolitically loaded; others will argue it understates the practical barriers (capital, permitting, waste) to replicating China’s decades-long processing base quickly. Those debates are real—and they are precisely where policy can drift into rhetoric.

Citation: Maitra, R., & Das, T. (2026). India and the Rare Earth Conundrum: Navigating Security, Geoeconomics and Global Supply Chains. UNISCI Journal 70–71. DOI: 10.31439/UNISCI-256.

• Commerce Secretary Howard Lutnick says China is weaponizing control over rare earths and critical minerals.
• The Trump administration plans to counter through tariffs, stockpiles, and industrial policy, but execution risk and capacity gaps remain substantial.
• China's dominance in rare earth processing and magnet manufacturing accounts for 85-90% of global capacity, creating real chokepoints not at mines but in refining, metallurgy, and component manufacturing.
• U.S. policy still underweights investment in these areas.
• Despite renewed urgency, the administration lacks the industrial policy depth needed for supply-chain resilience within five years.
• Missing elements include price floors, downstream enforcement, workforce development, and a unified allied approach with Canada and traditional partners.

Commerce Secretary Howard Lutnick says China is “weaponizing” its control over rare earths and other strategic materials—and that the Trump administration intends to fight back with tariffs, pricing power, and industrial policy. Speaking at a Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) forum, Lutnick tied rare earths, semiconductors, and advanced manufacturing into a single national-security narrative. Put simply, the U.S. believes China can choke off key materials, and Washington wants domestic and allied supply chains fast.

Howard Lutnick, Secretary of Commerce

That framing resonates because it reflects real vulnerabilities as Rare Earth Exchanges™ has chronicled since our launch in late 2024. China has repeatedly tightened export controls on rare earth elements and permanent magnets, materials essential for EVs, wind turbines, missiles, and AI infrastructure. When Beijing restricts supply, prices spike, projects stall, and Western manufacturers scramble.

The Part That Rings True: Chokepoints Are Real

China’s dominance in rare earth separation and magnet manufacturing is not theoretical. It controls roughly 85–90% of global magnet processing capacity and has proven willing to use administrative tools—licenses, quotas, inspections—as leverage. Lutnick’s emphasis on “chokepoints” aligns with how supply chains actually break: not at the mine, but in refining, metallurgy, and component manufacturing.

His reference to gallium and yttrium is also directionally correct. Advanced semiconductors and defense systems depend on a complex bill of materials. Mining without processing is strategy theater, not security.

The Leap of Faith: From Rhetoric to Capacity

Where the story via The Washington Times (opens in a new tab) stretches is scale and speed. Achieving a 40% share of leading-edge semiconductor production within three years is an ambition, not a forecast. Similarly, a “business-focused” critical mineral stockpile sounds decisive but raises unanswered questions: volumes, pricing discipline, domestic processing requirements, and governance.

Stockpiles stabilize shocks; they do not replace mines, refineries, or trained metallurgists. Without parallel investment in separation plants and magnet factories, stockpiling risks becoming an expensive pause button. While the administration has demonstrated a commitment to the rare earth element and critical mineral supply chain in America, we are not doing nearly enough.

Reading Between the Lines

The Washington Times piece takes a clear national-security lens and largely accepts the administration's claims at face value. What it underplays is execution risk—and the history of U.S. critical minerals policy announcing urgency faster than it builds capacity.

Despite renewed urgency—signaled by this week’s critical minerals meeting in Washington—the Trump administration has not yet assembled the level of industrial policy required to achieve rare earth and critical mineral supply-chain resilience within five years, let alone several. The strategy still overweights mine permitting and approvals, mistaking mining speed for supply-chain speed, while the real chokepoints (despite the sustained need for myriad feedstock) remain midstream processing, magnet manufacturing, pricing discipline, and skilled labor—areas where China retains dominance.

Price signals that would unlock capital, such as standardized price floors or long-term offtake guarantees, remain politically uncomfortable and inconsistently applied. Stockpiles are being positioned as sa trategy rather than insurance, buying time but not building capacity.

Downstream requirements are weakly enforced, allowing value and know-how to leak offshore. And workforce realities—chemical engineers, metallurgists, and plant operators—are largely absent from policy design. Most critically, while the administration has begun convening discussions, it has not yet forged the unified trading-bloc approach necessary for success: traditional allies, especially the likes of Canada, must be joined at the hip in a coordinated industrial policy spanning mining, processing, pricing, and manufacturing. Without that allied alignment, three-year resilience remains an aspiration—not an executable supply chain.

What’s notable: Rare earths are no longer a niche mining story. They are now spoken of in the same breath as chips, tariffs, and GDP. That rhetorical elevation matters—but investors should track concrete assets, not speeches, and we must collectively understand the need for a profound shift in our approach.  President Trump, to his credit, is starting to get it.  But we have a steep climb ahead and few dare utter this publicly in Washington DC.

Source: The Washington Times, Feb. 5, 2026

• Chinese researchers have solved manufacturing bottlenecks in rare-earth weathering steel production.
• This enables stable large-scale incorporation of rare earths to create longer-lasting, corrosion-resistant steel for harsh industrial environments at lower lifecycle costs.
• The material is already deployed commercially in:
  • 5G towers
  • solar mounts
  • highway guardrails
  • bridges across multiple Chinese provinces
• This development exemplifies China's broader strategy of leveraging rare-earth dominance to industrialize performance improvements across foundational materials.
• China combines resource control with R&D and standards-setting to shape future industrial ecosystems.

Chinese industry groups and researchers convened a technical exchange in eastern China to promote the expanded industrial use of rare-earth-enhanced weathering steel, positioning it as a lower-cost, longer-life solution for harsh environments such as coal storage, conveyor systems, trestle structures, and other open-air industrial facilities.

The meeting, hosted by the Shanghai University (Zhejiang) Institute for High-End Equipment Materials (opens in a new tab) and Shanghai Shuyuan Technology (opens in a new tab), focused on applying rare-earth-alloyed weathering steel to infrastructure exposed to high humidity, corrosion, abrasion, and pollution—conditions that rapidly degrade conventional carbon steel.

Downtown Shanghai

REEx Reflections Downstream

Rare earth innovation in steel makes everyday industrial structures stronger, longer-lasting, and cheaper to maintain. By adding small amounts of rare earth elements to steel, engineers can help it resist rust, cracking, and wear in harsh conditions like heat, moisture, pollution, and heavy use. This means things like bridges, conveyor belts, power towers, solar mounts, and industrial buildings can last much longer without frequent repairs or repainting.

Over time, this lowers maintenance costs, reduces downtime, improves safety, and saves money for companies and governments. Because these steels perform better over their full lifetime—not just on day one—they can replace more expensive alloys and give manufacturers a competitive edge in industries that depend on durable infrastructure.

What’s New Technically

Presenters reported that after more than a decade of development, Chinese researchers have addressed a longstanding manufacturing bottleneck: the low yield and poor controllability of rare-earth additions in steelmaking. According to technical briefings, rare-earth elements can now be stably incorporated at scale, enabling consistent batch production suitable for industrial deployment.

The material improvements cited include:

• Modified inclusion morphology
• Increased grain-boundary energy
• Formation of denser, more protective oxide layers

Together, these changes are reported to improve pitting corrosion resistance, durability, and mechanical performance, extending service life while reducing lifecycle maintenance costs.

From Pilot to Practice

Speakers said rare-earth weathering steel is already deployed in:

• 5G telecommunications towers
• Solar mounting systems
• Highway guardrails
• Bridges
• Industrial steel structures

Field applications in Hebei, Shandong, and Xinjiang suggest the material has moved beyond laboratory validation into early commercial use according to the Chinese Society of Rare Earths.

Why This Matters Beyond Coal

While the immediate focus is coal logistics, the broader implication is materials substitution at scale. Rare-earth-enhanced steels could increasingly displace conventional corrosion-resistant alloys across infrastructure, utilities, transport, and energy systems—particularly where lifecycle economics, rather than upfront material cost, drive procurement decisions.

For Western manufacturers and policymakers, the significance lies less in novelty than in execution. China is not inventing corrosion-resistant steel; it is industrializing incremental metallurgical gains through coordinated R&D, standards development, and deployment. Over time, this approach can translate into cost advantages, export competitiveness, and standards lock-in.

The Bigger Pattern: Owning the Future, Not Just the Mine

Consistent with _Rare Earth Exchanges’_™ reporting, this development reflects a broader strategic shift. China is increasingly leveraging its dominant position across rare-earth supply chains—from mining and separation to downstream processing—coupled with sustained R&D, to drive cross-sector innovation. The objective is not simply to supply inputs, but to shape entire industrial ecosystems.

That strategy now spans defense and advanced materials, electronics and power systems, life sciences instrumentation, and emerging platforms such as humanoid robotics, autonomous systems, and drones—all of which depend on high-performance materials whose properties are tuned at the atomic and nano scale.

Standards First,Markets Follow

Participants acknowledged adoption barriers, including conservative engineering norms and incomplete application standards. The meeting concluded with agreement to accelerate industry standards drafting, full-lifecycle evaluation, and industry–academia collaboration—a familiar sequence in China, where standard-setting often precedes rapid market expansion.

Bottom Line

China is using rare earths not only to dominate magnets and electronics, but to upgrade foundational materials across heavy industry. Rare-earth weathering steel is a small but telling example of a larger playbook: combine resource leverage, applied science, and standards to own future industrial performance, not just today’s supply. Rare Earth Exchanges suggest this is certainly a trend that policymakers in the West should be monitoring.

Disclaimer: This item is translated from reporting by Shanghai University (Zhejiang) Institute for High-End Equipment Materials and affiliated Chinese outlets. As the sources are linked to state-supported institutions, technical claims, performance metrics, and adoption timelines should be independently verified before being relied upon for investment or policy decisions.

• China's combined wind and solar installed capacity is projected to exceed 1.8 TW by the end of 2025.
• Renewables are expected to represent 47.3% of the total capacity, surpassing thermal power by approximately 300 GW.
• Solar accounts for 30.8% of the installed capacity, but its actual electricity generation share is lower (~14%) due to intermittency and capacity factors.
• China's massive renewable deployment creates competitive advantages through:
  • Lower costs
  • Industrial learning
  • Supplier clustering
  • Export potential for manufacturers

China’s renewable buildout hit another milestone (opens in a new tab): combined wind and solar installed capacity exceeded 1.8 terawatts (1,840 GW) for the first time, according to China’s National Energy Administration and reporting by People’s Daily. By end-2025, China’s total installed generation capacity reached 3.89 TW (+16.1% YoY), with solar at 1.20 TW (+35.4%) and wind at 0.64 TW (+22.9%). Wind+solar now represent 47.3% of installed capacity, and the report says they exceed thermal capacity by roughly 300 GW—a symbolic threshold, even if it does not translate one-for-one into electricity output.

Solar’s Real Share of “Powering China”

Installed capacity is not the same as electricity produced. Solar’s capacity share is about 30.8% (1.20/3.89), but solar’s generation share is materially lower because sunlight is intermittent and capacity factors are lower than those of dispatchable plants.

Independent generation datasets suggest solar’s share of electricity has nonetheless surged—Ember analysis indicates solar reached roughly 14% of China’s electricity mix in June 2025, and wind+solar hit record monthly levels.

Why This Could Become a Competitive Advantage

Scale becomes an advantage when it turns into lower unit costs, faster iteration, and industrial learning. China’s massive deployment fuels demand for turbines, inverters, grid equipment, storage, and upstream inputs—including rare earth permanent magnets used in many wind turbines.

Over time, this can produce compounding benefits: denser supplier clusters, more standardized components, greater EPC experience, and a larger home market that absorbs early production runs. That “learning laboratory” effect can eventually translate into cheaper, faster, more bankable projects—and a tougher competitive environment for Western manufacturers, developers, and even grid technology vendors.

Disclaimer: This news item originates from People’s Daily, a Chinese state-affiliated outlet. Figures and framing should be verified independently and interpreted alongside power-generation data, grid integration, curtailment, and regional dispatch realities.

• China's Baotou Rare Earth Research Institute has deployed the country's first fully domestic high-temperature vibrating sample magnetometer (VSM).
• The VSM is capable of measuring permanent-magnet performance up to 800°C and 6 tesla.
• The deployment aims to reduce dependence on Western and Japanese suppliers.
• The new instrument enables higher-fidelity testing of NdFeB and SmCo magnets under extreme conditions.
• This move potentially strengthens China's dominant position in rare-earth magnet manufacturing by improving R&D cycles and quality control.
• Better metrology tools for magnetic materials have direct commercial implications for aerospace, EV motors, wind turbines, and emerging magnetocaloric applications.
• Performance claims from Chinese domestic media should be independently verified.

China’s Baotou Rare Earth Research Institute has put into service what it calls the country’s first high-temperature vibrating sample magnetometer (VSM) built entirely from domestically produced modules. According to the report, the system can precisely measure permanent-magnet performance under extreme conditions—up to 800°C and 6 tesla—and is being positioned as a step toward breaking foreign “monopolies” in high-end magnetic measurement tools.

Note the Chinese refer to a small cluster of Western and Japanese suppliers that dominate high-field, high-precision magnetic measurement systems, especially VSMs, SQUID magnetometers, and PPMS platforms.

The Claims

In a demonstration, an NdFeB sample reportedly showed stable magnetic performance at 150°C, with clear test curves produced by the new equipment.

Technically, the institute says the instrument is designed primarily for NdFeB and SmCo magnets, using superconducting excitation to reach 6T and to operate over a wide temperature range (up to 800°C). The narrative draws a contrast with older domestic “closed-loop” systems that typically rely on conventional electromagnets and top out around 3 tesla, and with imported high-end systems that often emphasize ultra-low-temperature measurements and are costly.

The claimed breakthrough is not a new magnet chemistry, but higher-fidelity testing capability—capturing subtle performance changes of rare-earth magnets under high-temperature/strong-field conditions and enabling more precise characterization across temperature- and field-sweep experiments.

Implications

For Western and U.S. readers, the commercial implication is straightforward: metrology is industrial power. Better measurement tools shorten R&D cycles, improve quality control, and accelerate iteration in magnets used in aerospace, EV traction motors, wind turbines, and emerging applications such as magnetocaloric (“magnetic refrigeration”) materials.

If the performance and reliability claims hold up, the new system could strengthen China’s already dominant position in rare-earth magnet manufacturing by improving upstream validation and downstream product qualification, making it easier for Chinese producers to deliver magnets with tighter specifications for high-heat-duty cycles.

The institute also emphasizes spillover benefits to nearby magnet manufacturers, suggesting the instrument will serve as a regional testing hub that improves data quality for industrial customers.

Disclaimer: This item is translated from Baotou News Network, a Chinese outlet. As the report originates from Chinese domestic media, key claims (performance specifications, “first in China” status, and comparative statements about foreign systems) should be verified independently before being relied upon for technical or investment decisions.

• China signals measured opposition to EU-U.S. critical minerals partnership while maintaining 'market principles' rhetoric, avoiding direct threats or escalation despite tracking Western diversification efforts closely.
• The one-year reprieve on rare earth export restrictions China granted the U.S. in 2025 is nearing its end, with American supply chains still years away from achieving resilience in separation, metals, and magnet manufacturing.
• Beijing's calm diplomatic tone may reflect confidence rather than concession, as it holds leverage over critical minerals while the U.S. and allies race to accelerate midstream capacity before potential supply disruptions.

China’s Foreign Ministry signaled (opens in a new tab) firm but measured opposition on Tuesday to reported discussions between the European Union and the United States over a proposed critical minerals partnership aimed at reducing reliance on Chinese supply chains. And of course, the USA on Wednesday, February 4th, hosted the 2026 Critical Mineral Ministerial (opens in a new tab) involving many dozens of nations.

Speaking at a regular press briefing, Foreign Ministry spokesperson Lin Jian was asked by a Bloomberg reporter to comment on news that several foreign ministers were meeting in Washington to consider an also the EU-backed framework for cooperation on critical minerals.

Lin responded that China’s position “has not changed,” emphasizing that all countries share responsibility for maintaining the stability and security of global critical-mineral supply and industrial chains. He added that China believes parties should play a “constructive role” in safeguarding those systems.

Addressing references to a possible EU–U.S. memorandum of understanding, Lin reiterated Beijing’s long-standing stance: countries should adhere to market-economy principles and international trade rules, strengthen communication and dialogue, and work together to keep global industrial and supply chains “stable and unimpeded,” in order to support steady global economic growth.

Notably, Lin did not directly criticize the EU or the United States, nor did he threaten retaliation or name China explicitly as the target of diversification efforts—an omission that appears deliberate.

Why This Matters for Business and the West

The significance here is not what China said—but how it said it.

• Acknowledgment without endorsement: Beijing implicitly confirms it is tracking—and taking seriously—EU–U.S. coordination on critical minerals.
• Rules-based framing: By invoking “market principles” and “international trade rules,” China positions itself as a defender of the existing trade order, even as Western policymakers argue that the current system is structurally distorted by state-directed capacity.
• No escalation—for now: The absence of threats or new export measures suggests Beijing is observing first, not reacting publicly.

For U.S. and European firms, this reinforces that supply-chain diversification is being interpreted as a geopolitical signal, not a neutral industrial policy.

The One-Year Reprieve: A Quiet Clock Is Ticking

What went unsaid at the podium—but looms large for industry—is that China effectively granted the United States a one-year reprieve on rare earth access following the tightening of export licensing and controls in 2025. While never branded as a formal exemption, licensing flexibility and continuity of shipments functioned as a temporary pressure release valve, allowing U.S. defense (at least partially), automotive, and advanced-manufacturing supply chains to avoid immediate disruption.

That window is now nearing its end.

Despite unprecedented policy activity in Washington and allied capitals, the U.S. is not close to resilience across the rare earth value chain—particularly in separation, metals, alloys, and magnet manufacturing. New projects remain years from scale. Recycling helps at the margin. Stockpiles buy time—but do not replace production.

The Strategic Question No One Wants to Answer—Yet

As the reprieve winds down, a set of uncomfortable questions emerges:

• Will China quietly tighten licensing again, using “market rules” rather than bans?
• Will pricing, delays, or compliance frictions become the preferred pressure tools?
• Can the U.S. and its allies accelerate midstream capacity fast enough to avoid a supply shock?

Beijing’s calm tone may signal confidence—notconcession.

Bottom Line

China is publicly urging cooperation and market discipline while privately holding the most powerful lever in the system. As EU–U.S. coordination accelerates, Beijing is signaling it intends to contest the mechanics of diversification without triggering an immediate confrontation.

Time, however, is not neutral—and the grace period is almost over.

Disclaimer: This news item originates from reporting by Sina Finance, a media outlet in China owned by New Wave Holdings Limited (controlled by Charles Chao (Cao Guowei)). The information and official statements cited should be independently verified and interpreted within the broader context of trade, export-control, and diplomatic developments.

• The UK hosts rare earth mineral deposits but remains functionally dependent on Chinese midstream processing—a vulnerability confirmed by both the British Geological Survey and a government-commissioned Frazer-Nash study.
• In January 2026, the UK government offered £12 million to support Ionic Technologies' Belfast facility, designed to produce 400 tonnes annually of separated magnet rare earth oxides using recycling technology.
• This marks Britain's shift from geological surveys to industrial midstream capability—demonstrating that control over separation, metals, and magnet production, not mineral deposits, determines supply-chain sovereignty.

This updated Rare Earth Exchanges™ analysis revisits the United Kingdom’s rare earth dilemma by integrating two authoritative assessments—the British Geological Survey’s geology-first review and a UK government–commissioned paper on recycling and midstream processing—alongside newly announced government-backed magnet-recycling capacity. We separate enduring structural constraints from genuine progress and explain why midstream capability, not mineral occurrence, defines supply-chain sovereignty.  Thanks to community members for sending updated information as well.

Britain Has Rocks—Now It’s Building Circuits: The Rare Earth Bottleneck Revisited

British Geological Survey (BGS) study delivered an uncomfortable truth: while the UK hosts rare earth occurrences, it lacks commercial-scale separation and refining, leaving it functionally dependent on foreign—predominantly Chinese—midstream supply. That diagnosis remains correct. What has changed in 2025–2026 is the policy response—and, finally, industrial assets moving beyond the laboratory.

Authored by David Currie and Holly Elliott, The Potential for Rare Earth Elements in the UK dismantles a persistent illusion: geology alone does not equal security. Leverage accrues to those who control separation circuits, metals and alloys, and magnet production—not to those who merely extract rock.

That conclusion is now reinforced by a second, policy-driven analysis.

Two Studies, One Verdict: The Midstream Decides

A UK government–commissioned paper, UK Critical Minerals Recycling and Midstream Processing (opens in a new tab), authored by Frazer-Nash Consultancy (for the Department for Business and Trade), reaches the same destination from a different route. Rather than geology, it interrogates processing, recycling, skills, scale-up timelines, and market readiness—and finds the UK’s principal exposure sits squarely in the midstream.

Together, the BGS and Frazer-Nash papers converge on a single conclusion: without domestic separation, metal-making, and magnet-grade pathways, mineral endowment offers little strategic insulation.

What the Geology Gives—and Withholds

The BGS mapped REE-bearing formations in Wales, northwest Scotland, and parts of England. Localized samples can approach ~2% total rare earth oxides, but deposits are small, discontinuous, and uneconomic under current conditions. The UK has never produced rare earths at a commercial scale. On this point, the evidence is settled.

Downstream vulnerability persists. Even as China’s mining share trends toward ~65%, its dominance in separation, metals, and permanent magnets continues to anchor global leverage.

From Reports to Reality: Processing and Magnets Arrive

Here is the material update. In January 2026, the UK government issued an Offer in Principle for a £12 million capital (opens in a new tab) grant to support a commercial rare earth permanent-magnet recycling facility in Belfast, led by Ionic Technologies, a wholly owned subsidiary of Ionic Rare Earths. The proposed plant is designed to produce ~400 tonnes per annum of ≥99.5%-purity separated magnet rare earth oxides (Nd, Pr, Dy, Tb) using patented long-loop recycling technology, with targeted first production within ~two years, subject to final investment decision and due diligence

Ionic.

This isnot mining—and that is precisely the point. It is midstreamcapability, directly aligned with the UK’s Critical Minerals Strategy target of 10% domestic supply and 20% via recycling by 2035. Demonstration-scale operations have already produced separated dysprosium and terbium oxides, validating magnet-grade pathways beyond proof-of-concept.

Progress, With Proportions

Scale still matters. Recycling is additive, not substitutive. Volumes remain modest relative to national demand, and the UK still lacks primary separation from mixed concentrates. Yet Belfast breaks a long-standing binary: it demonstrates that Britain can host industrial REO separation for magnets, not just studies and strategy papers.

REEx Verdict

The diagnosis from both the BGS and Frazer-Nash stands: rocks alone do not confer power. But Britain is finally addressing the correct bottleneck. If Belfast reaches FID and ramps as planned, the UK moves from pure dependency to partial agency—not independence, but momentum. In rare earths, momentum is how leverage is rebuilt.

Sources: Currie & Elliott (2024), The Potential for Rare Earth Elements in the UK, British Geological Survey; Frazer-Nash Consultancy, UK Critical Minerals Recycling and Midstream Processing (UK Government-commissioned); Ionic Rare Earths ASX Announcement (27 Jan 2026).

• Secretary Rubio signals US interest in Argentina as a critical minerals partner to reduce China dependence, though the country has no operational rare earth production capacity yet.
• Argentina offers $14 billion in verified copper mining investments under RIGI incentives, but rare earth separation capabilities remain unproven despite diplomatic rhetoric.
• Argentina's $14.5B trade relationship with China versus $8.6B with the US complicates its strategic positioning as a non-exclusive rare earth supply chain alternative.

At the inaugural U.S. Critical Minerals Ministerial, Secretary of State Marco Rubio delivered a message designed to resonate well beyond Washington: Argentina, he said, “has the capacity in terms of natural resources … not just for the United States, but for the world.”

Meaning?  The takeaway is simple: the U.S. is looking for partners to reduce dependence on China for minerals critical to technology, defense, and advanced manufacturing—and Argentina is being publicly welcomed into that conversation.

Trump Administration Goal—Tighten Critical Mineral Collaboration

But in rare earths, words are cheap; separations are not.

What Argentina Actually Has—and What It Doesn’t (Yet)

Argentina is unquestionably a heavyweight in lithium, copper, and base metals, with growing institutional credibility under President Javier Milei’s market-oriented reforms. However, commercial rare earth production is another matter.

There are no producing rare earth mines, no established separation plants, and limited publicly disclosed resource data meeting Western reporting standards.

Rubio’s statement, captured by the Buenos Aires Times (opens in a new tab), that Argentina has “expertise in processing” is accurate in mining and metallurgy broadly, but not yet proven at scale for rare earth separations, the true choke point in the supply chain.

This distinction matters. Rare earths are not scarce rocks—they are chemistry problems.

Diplomacy Meets Investment Incentives

Argentina’s Foreign Minister Pablo Quirno (opens in a new tab) struck a more grounded note, emphasizing “clear rules and long-term predictability.” That phrasing aligns closely with investor concerns: permitting, currency stability, capital controls, and contract enforcement—not just geology—determine whether projects get built.

Pablo Quirno, Foreign Minister

Quirno’sannouncement of ~US$14 billion in incoming mining investment underArgentina’s RIGI incentive framework—largely tied to copper projects like El Pachón and MARA—is concrete and verifiable. These are real assets moving toward construction, unlike speculative rare earth narratives.

The China Question, Quietly Loud

China’s dominance in rare earth processing is the unspoken subtext. Argentina’s close economic ties with Beijing complicate the story, even as Buenos Aires signals alignment with Washington. Balancing both powers may be politically rational—but for rare earth supply chains, alignment without exclusivity limits strategic value.

Note Argentina trades significantly more with China than the United States, with China serving as a top import source and major buyer of agricultural goods, while the U.S. remains a key, albeit smaller, partner. In 2023, Argentina's tradevolume with China was roughly $14.5 billion, compared to $8.6 billionwith the U.S.

What’s Notable—and What’s Premature

Notable:

• The U.S. is broadening its critical minerals diplomacy beyond the usual suspects.
• Argentina is positioning itself as a rules-based, investment-friendly jurisdiction.

Premature:

• Treating Argentina as a near-term rare earth supplier without proven resources, separation capacity, or offtake pathways.

REEx Takeaway

Argentina may become important in the rare earth ecosystem—but today it is aspirational, not operational. Investors should separate copper-scale reality from rare-earth rhetoric. Rubio’s remarks are best read as strategic signaling, not a geological verdict.

The story to watch is not what Argentina could supply, but whether it chooses to build the hardest part of the chain. Only time, deal-making, and delivery will tell.

• Trump administration unveils FORGE (Forum on Resource Geostrategic Engagement) framework at Critical Minerals Ministerial, proposing reference prices and preferential trade zone to prevent market whiplash that kills long-cycle mining projects.
• 55 countries representing two-thirds of global GDP attended, with Japan emphasizing need for multinational coordination across mining, refining, and processing to reduce China's supply chain dominance.
• Initiative pairs with Project Vault's $12 billion strategic stockpile and targets identifying priority projects within six months.
• Blending diplomacy, trade alignment, and development finance to build allied minerals resilience.

The Trump administration used today’s inaugural Critical Minerals Ministerial at the U.S. Department of State to push the conversation markets have been demanding: less diagnosis, more design—a pro-allies, pro-investment effort aimed at reducing single-point dependencies across mining, processing, and downstream manufacturing.

Marco Rubio, U.S. Secretary of State

In opening remarks, Secretary of State Marco Rubio cast critical minerals as a pillar of both economic security and national security, underscoring that concentrated supply has become a geopolitical lever. Vice President JD Vance sharpened the message: in a world of AI, electrification, and defense modernization, economies still run on “real things,” and critical minerals are now as foundational as energy.

A “FORGE” Moment: From Shared Concern to Shared Market Design

The headline proposal—covered by Reuters and E&E News/Politico as well as Rare Earth Exchanges™ earlier—is a U.S.-led framework dubbed FORGE (Forum on Resource Geostrategic Engagement) paired with a preferential trade zone concept for critical minerals. The mechanism at the center of the plan: reference prices at each stage of production that would function as a price floor, maintained through adjustable tariffs to uphold “pricing integrity” inside the zone.

The intent is straightforward: reduce the market whiplash that repeatedly kills long-cycle projects right at the financing gate—when a sudden supply surge collapses prices, capital evaporates, and projects “die on the vine.” As reported, the administration is also seeking a nonbinding agreement that calls on signatories to identify and support priority projects within six months.

Investor lens: this is a policy attempting to underwrite predictability, not by replacing markets, but by making it harder for strategic oversupply to detonate Western investment cycles. It’s a meaningful evolution from broad partnership language toward explicit market structure—and that shift matters.

Allies Signal Alignment—Japan Sets the Tone

The room itself was a signal: With 55 countries attending, participants represented close to two-thirds of global GDP. Japan’s State Minister for Foreign Affairs Horii Iwao reinforced the cooperative posture, stressing that no single country can solve concentration risk alone—and highlighting the need to diversify not only mining, but also refining and processing, where bottlenecks are most acute.  Rare Earth Exchanges has been reporting since our launch in 2024 the need for multinational orchestration and alignment.

The administration’s senior supply-chain messaging kept returning to a single thesis: demand growth is structural, not cyclical—an AI-era expansion pulling everything from copper and cobalt to rare earths deeper into national strategy. The pie is expanding; coordination determines who captures value across the stack.

Project Vault and the “Finance + Diplomacy” Flywheel

Today’s Ministerial also landed in the slipstream of Project Vault, the administration’s newly announced $12 billion strategic stockpile initiative—reported as backed by $10 billion from the U.S. Export-Import Bank and $2 billion in private funding. The broader push now blends diplomacy, trade alignment, development finance, and stockpiling—an unusually muscular toolkit in modern U.S. industrial policy, calibrated to an unusually concentrated dependency problem.

Big Ambition, Real Execution Questions

Coverage was broadly positive on intent—and candid about the hard parts. From E&E News/Politico to Reuters’ reporting, the administration’s call for more than 50 countries to engage, while noting pockets of ally skepticism and the challenge of translating a trade-zone concept into durable rules. Media are emphasizing both the scale of the ambition and the market sensitivity: shares of several mineral-linked companies fell on the news, a reminder that even pro-investment policy signals can introduce near-term uncertainty when pricing mechanics are in play.

Industry Applause: ReElement Technologies Backs the Direction

In a statement provided to Rare Earth Exchanges, ReElement Technologies (opens in a new tab) applauded the Trump administration and Secretary Rubio for convening the Ministerial and endorsed the State Department’s view that strengthening supply chains with international partners is vital for U.S. economic security, technological leadership, and resilience.

ReElement represents a vital midstream refiner and recycler bridging feedstocks and high-purity end users across defense, magnets, batteries, and energy technologies—emphasizing a multi-sourced strategy spanning virgin ore and recycled content, and citing expanding domestic production plans.

Other key midstream players include Energy Fuels (opens in a new tab) and MP Materials’ (opens in a new tab) effort to ramp up and scale the entire supply chain. USA Rare Earth (opens in a new tab) just secured an unprecedented financing package. Disruptive players such as Ionic Minerals Technologies, (opens in a new tab) based in Rare Earth Exchanges’ home state of Utah, are also rampingup critical mineral refining capacity.

 REEx notes these are company statements and forward-looking claims, but they align with what policymakers are trying to catalyze: scalable, qualification-grade capacity in the “missing middle” between mines and manufacturing. 

So ReElement’s mission to become a mid-market and defense refinery, along with MP and the others, represent a major national security interest. Failure is not an option.

REEx Takeaway

Todayfelt less like a panel and more like a platform launch: a bid to align allies around rules, financing pathways, and price stability so projects can actually clear investment committees—and survive the inevitable cycles.

Rare Earth Exchanges remains objective and cautiously optimistic.

At the end of the day implementation details will decide outcomes: definitions, enforcement, membership terms, and how “reference pricing” interacts with trade law and domestic politics. But as a strategic signal, today was unmistakable: the administration is aiming to build an allied minerals system designed to reward production, resilience, and long-term investment—not fragility.

Rare Earth Exchanges reminds all that China only gave the USA a one-year reprieve with access to key critical rare earth elements. And time is ticking. So the move by the Trump administration is overall an important one.

• The Trump administration announced a preferential critical minerals trade bloc featuring reference prices, enforceable price floors, and adjustable tariffs to counter China's dominance and stabilize volatile commodity cycles that prevent Western projects from securing financing.
• Vice President JD Vance and Secretary of State Marco Rubio framed the initiative as essential infrastructure for the AI economy and national security, positioning it as a new trade architecture era rather than just subsidies or permits.
• Project Vault, backed by a $10 billion Export-Import Bank loan with participation from major OEMs like Boeing and GE Vernova, aims to create demand scaffolding that derisks refineries and processing capacity, though implementation challenges around rules of origin, pricing complexity, and enforcement remain unresolved.

On February 4, 2026, the State Department’s inaugural Critical Minerals Ministerial began with a deliberately cinematic pairing: Vice President JD Vance as the keynote “closer,” and Secretary of State Marco Rubio as the host framing the room’s mission—treating critical minerals not as a niche commodity story, but as the material base layer of industrial power, defense readiness, and the AI economy. Reuters and AP both reported the same core reveal: the Trump administration is pushing a preferential critical-minerals trade bloc featuring reference prices and enforceable price floors—backstopped by adjustable tariffs—as a counterweight to China’s dominance and to the whiplash price cycles that keep Western projects from reaching financeable final investment decisions.

Rare Earth Exchanges™ reports on this important event organized by the Trump administration. Note, we will follow up later today with articles inclusive of statements by U.S. supply chain players.

Vance’s opening move was to shift the audience from abstraction to gravity. He tied critical minerals to the “real economy”—the idea that data centers and software still depend on mined and refined inputs—then pivoted to a market diagnosis: supply chains “brittle and exceptionally concentrated,” asset prices “persistently depressed, and an investment pattern where projects die “on the vine” after sudden supply surges collapse prices. In other words, the market isn’t merely volatile; it is strategically gameable, and the West keeps losing the financing cycle.

That framing matters because it sets up the administration’s most aggressive claim: this isn’t a “more permits” or “more subsidies” era. It’s a new trade architecture era.

Vance’s Core Pitch: A Minerals “Trade Zone” With a Price Floor—Industrial Policy in Tariff Form

Vance described an alliance-scale mechanism: members would trade critical minerals inside a preferential zone with reference prices acting as a floor, enforced by adjustable tariffs to prevent undercutting by low-priced imports. This represents an effort to stabilize prices and incentivize private investment—accepting that the cost of stability may be higher near-term prices, but arguing that the cost of instability is no mines, no refineries, no magnets.

If you’re an investor or operator, you can hear the subtext: this is an attempt to manufacture bankability. In mining and processing, “great geology” is not enough; what matters is whether a project can clear long-duration capital under commodity cycles. A credible floor turns a fragile pro forma into something lenders can underwrite.

Vance then stitched the pitch to recent actions: Project Vault, branded as a domestic critical-minerals stockpile initiative, was presented as the parallel backbone—demand signal + inventory strategy—while the trade zone would be the price-and-flow discipline. Reuters and AP both linked the ministerial messaging directly to Project Vault’s scale.

Rubio’s Frame: “Economic Security Is National Security”—And the Mountain Pass Parable

Rubio’s remarks—less mechanistic, more historical—worked like a guided tour through America’s industrial amnesia. He argued the U.S. once mined and produced critical mineral derivatives (including rare earth magnets), cited Mountain Pass as emblematic, and told the story many advanced economies know too well: outsource the “unfashionable” steps, celebrate design, then wake up dependent.

His most strategic analogy was the overt callback to the Washington Energy Conference of the 1970s and the creation of the International Energy Agency—a signal that the administration wants a minerals-era equivalent of coordinated energy security: shared rules, shared stockpiles, shared resilience. (That comparison is conceptually powerful—though operationally harder—because minerals are multi-material, multi-stage, and far less fungible than crude oil.).

Rubio also anchored the summit in a broader diplomatic scaffolding that already exists: Pax Silica, a State Department-led initiative launched in December 2025, focused on securing a silicon supply chain and the upstream inputs the AI era runs on.

The Money Signal: Project Vault and the Question of “Who Actually Buys?”

Project Vault is not just a stockpile headline; it is being sold as a market-making device. The U.S. Export-Import Bank said its board approved a direct loan of up to $10 billion to Project Vault and listed early “indications of participation” from major OEMs (including names such as Boeing and GE Vernova) along with commodity suppliers and traders.

That detail—OEM participation—may be the most important line in the whole rollout. Stockpiles without offtake logic can become political warehouses. Stockpiles tied to industrial procurement can become demand scaffolding that derisks refineries, alloying, and magnet capacity.

The Geopolitical Backdrop: China Leverage, Market Power—and a Freshly Hardened U.S. Posture

The summit’s urgency sits inside a wider escalation cycle. This ministerial, frankly, is part of Washington’s effort to weaken China’s grip on critical minerals and reduce supply-chain vulnerability.

This is not a minor point: the administration is narrating minerals policy as a national-security instrument, not merely an economic development program. That framing will attract allies who share threat perceptions—and repel partners wary of being drafted into a new bloc logic.

What’s Real, What’s Rhetoric, What’s Missing

What emerges as broadly credible is the administration’s core diagnosis of market failure. The pattern in which promising mining or processing projects collapse when prices suddenly crater is well documented across lithium, rare earths, and other strategic materials, and it remains one of the central reasons Western efforts to diversify supply chains have repeatedly stalled. In that light, the idea of pairing a price floor with tariff-based enforcement is not radical so much as corrective: in theory, it could stabilize investment conditions and make long-duration capital viable again—if enforcement is airtight and participation is deep enough to prevent arbitrage.

What remains unresolved, however, is where theory meets operational reality. Which minerals will qualify, at which stages of the value chain, and under what reference prices? Vance spoke of floors “at each stage of production,” but the complexity is immense: concentrates, oxides, metals, and finished products like magnets are distinct markets with different bottlenecks and pricing dynamics.

Equally thorny is the risk of “China-in-the-middle” laundering—an issue even sympathetic observers have flagged—where low-cost Chinese material could be rerouted through third countries unless rules of origin, traceability, and enforcement are exceptionally strict. And finally, there is the political test: while U.S. officials say roughly 30 countries have expressed interest in joining a critical minerals club, interest is not the same as accession.

Signing on means accepting pricing discipline and tariff guardrails, a step that many allies may hesitate to take once domestic politics and trade sensitivities come into play.

The investor takeaway

This summit wasn’t a ribbon-cutting. It was a declaration that the administration wants to replace commodity fatalism with engineered stability—a deliberate attempt to turn critical minerals into an allied, rules-based industrial commons. And it’s about time.  If they can execute on enforcement and procurement and avoid excessive government entanglement (e.g., nepotism), especially via Project Vault, this could re-rate the financeability of midstream and downstream assets. If they can’t, it becomes another grand doctrine that breaks on the rocks of implementation.

• Shenghe Resources completed full acquisition of Peak Rare Earths, gaining control of Tanzania's Ngualla rare earth project, while advancing African zirconium-titanium assets as part of an overseas expansion strategy.
• The company launched an upgraded compliance framework and export control training, signaling adaptation to heightened global scrutiny of Chinese critical mineral operations.
• Shenghe positions zirconium-titanium projects as a 'second growth curve' alongside rare earths, broadening critical minerals portfolio to hedge price cycles and leverage shared infrastructure.

On January 29–30, Shenghe Resources held its 2025 Annual Meeting in Chengdu under the theme “Shared Prosperity, Global Reach.” The meeting reviewed the 2025 performance of all business segments and subsidiaries and examined the annual work report delivered by the company’s General Manager.

The meeting provided a comprehensive summary of the company’s performance in 2025. It noted that Shenghe closely tracked market trends, seized opportunities, and achieved major progress in operating results, institutional development, and overseas business expansion. The company highlighted achievements in technological innovation, optimization of internal and external operating environments, and deeper integration of business units and organizational structures.

Following a smooth leadership transition last year, Shenghe focused on improving governance and accelerating overseas project development. The company completed the full acquisition of Peak Rare Earths, thereby gaining control of the Ngualla rare earth project in Tanzania, while making steady progress on African zirconium–titanium projects. Internally, Shenghe promoted organizational integration, increased internal talent mobility, strengthened regional coordination mechanisms, and enhanced talent support systems.

The company emphasized continued reinforcement of compliance and risk management, establishing a comprehensive compliance framework. It also advanced digitalization and information systems to support intelligent command and scientific decision-making. Shenghe further stressed the importance of market capitalization management and proactive engagement with capital markets.

Chairman Xie Bing stated that the company must fully recognize both opportunities and challenges, rigorously assess strengths and weaknesses, strictly adhere to national industrial policy, and strengthen policy research and on-the-ground assessments. He emphasized addressing management and talent-development gaps, maintaining steady progress in rare earths, accelerating zirconium–titanium projects, rapidly advancing overseas assets, and opening a “second growth curve.”

The meeting also set out key priorities for 2026 and included the launch of an upgraded compliance management system, export control compliance training, and a ceremony recognizing outstanding teams, managers, and employees for 2025. Senior management, including Chairman Xie Bing, Vice Chairman and CEO Huang Ping, and Overseas Division Chairman Wang Quangen, attended.

REEx: What The Update Informs Investors

Three signals matter for rare earth watchers outside China:

1. Overseas Control Is Now Central, Not Peripheral. The explicit emphasis on Peak Rare Earths and control of Tanzania’s Ngualla project confirms Shenghe’s strategy of locking in upstream optionality offshore—especially in jurisdictions Western firms also view as diversification targets.
2. Compliance Language Is Not Accidental. The repeated references to export-control training and compliance frameworks reflect real pressure. Chinese rare earth firms now operate under tighter global scrutiny, and Shenghe is signaling readiness to operate within—and influence—those rules.
3. Zirconium–Titanium as a Second Growth Curve. Shenghe is openly positioning zirconium–titanium projects alongside rare earths, indicating a broader critical-minerals portfolio that could hedge rare earth price cycles while leveraging shared processing and logistics.

REEx Takeaway

This is not just an annual pep rally. Shenghe is consolidating overseas assets, professionalizing compliance, and broadening its mineral base—moves that reinforce China-linked influence across multiple critical mineral chains.

Disclosure & Verification Notice

This material includes a translation of company-issued content distributed via WeChat and state-affiliated channels. Statements reflect Shenghe Resources’ own reporting and should be independently verified.

• ICIJ investigation found that Chinese state-linked firms quietly assumed majority control of a rare-earth-rich mining concession in Malawi through two ownership transfers (2023-2025) without legally required government approval, prompting an official probe.
• The case illustrates how governance gaps, offshore structures, and weak regulatory oversight in frontier jurisdictions allow strategic rare earth assets to change hands before production begins—creating long-term supply chain leverage.
• For investors, ownership risk and regulatory transparency can matter more than geology: opaque control shifts threaten social license, stall projects, and concentrate downstream processing power even further.

Rare Earth Exchanges reviews an International Consortium of Investigative Journalists (ICIJ)-backed investigation (opens in a new tab) into ownership changes at a rare-earth–rich mining concession in Malawi. We separate verified facts from unresolved claims, assess governance risks, and explain why opaque control shifts in frontier jurisdictions matter for the global rare earth supply chain.

An investigation found that a major rare-earth mineral project in Malawi quietly changed hands, ending up under control of companies linked to the Chinese state—without the government’s required approval. Malawi is now investigating. For investors, the story is less about geology and more about governance, ownership risk, and who really controls future rare earth supply.

What the Investigation Found

Reporting by ICIJ partners (PIJ Malawi, Finance Uncovered, The Continent) alleges that entities linked to the Chinese state assumed majority control of Mawei Mining Company Ltd., holder of a heavy mineral sands concession near Lake Malawi. The deposit is believed to contain zircon, titanium, and monazite—an important source of rare earth elements.

The probe documents two ownership changes (2023–2025) at Mawei’s parent, Xinjin International Company Ltd. (BVI), culminating in majority control by Shandong Zhaojin Ruining Mining Industries and Hainan International Resources. Malawian officials acknowledged they were unaware of these changes, despite laws requiring notification and approval of beneficial ownership transfers.

Certified

Malawi law requires disclosure and approval of ownership changes; officials say they did not receive it. The government has launched a fact-finding exercise that could lead to fines or administrative action.

Unproven

Commercial viability, grades, timelines, and whether the ownership shift violated law remain to be determined by Malawi’s investigation. Claims of “350+ million tonnes” reflect estimates, not proven reserves.

REEx Investigates

Last month REEx reported the Malawi case is less about immediate rare earth supply and more about long-term control through governance gaps: Mawei Mining’s rare-earth-bearing heavy mineral sands deposit near Lake Malawi is geologically real but commercially dormant, with promised production timelines missed and no current output.

As the journalist consortia found, what did move was ownership—two quiet transfers between 2023 and 2025 consolidated control under Chinese state-linked firms without the legally required notification to Malawian authorities, prompting a belated government probe. REEx cautions against overstating this as instant “supply-chain capture”—there is no operating mine, no separation, no exports—but stresses the deeper pattern: weak registries, offshore structures, and under-resourced regulators enable governance arbitrage, allowing patient, state-backed capital to accumulate strategic optionality over decades. The takeaway for investors is clear: in rare earths, geology plus opacity can translate into leverage long before a single tonne is produced.

The Quiet Risk Investors Should Notice

As stated above, this is a governance story with supply-chain consequences. Rare earth projects in frontier jurisdictions often hinge on social license, regulatory clarity, and transparent ownership. When control shifts through offshore structures without oversight, projects stall, communities sour, and capital risk rises. The investigation also underscores how control of monazite-bearing sands—critical to downstream magnets—can change hands long before production begins.

Why This Matters for the Rare Earth Supply Chain

Global rare earth supply is already concentrated at the processing stage. If upstream assets are acquired through opaque pathways, downstream leverage only tightens. For Western manufacturers seeking diversification, ownership risk can be as decisive as geology.

REEx Takeaway: In rare earths, who owns the asset—and how—can matter more than what’s in the ground.

Source: Fergus Shiel, ICIJ partners (opens in a new tab), Feb. 3, 2026; Rare Earth Exchanges, Jan 24, 2026

• Investors are pouring capital into AI and data centers while dramatically underfunding the mines and processing plants that supply the critical minerals these technologies require, creating a dangerous mismatch.
• Mining investment has grown only marginally since 2015 despite soaring AI valuations, and with 10-20 year development timelines, today's underinvestment raises material supply shortage risks in the 2030s.
• Rare earths represent the bottleneck within the bottleneck—essential for EVs, wind turbines, data centers, and defense—yet processing remains highly concentrated as capital favors software over supply chains.

This Rare Earth Exchanges (REEx) analysis reviews “The Paradox of Visibility,” a 2026 white paper from Resource Capital Funds (opens in a new tab), which argues that capital markets are misallocating investment—overfunding artificial intelligence and digital infrastructure while underfunding the critical minerals those systems physically require. We assess what is well supported, where assumptions deserve caution, and why this imbalance matters for rare earth and critical mineral investors.

Overview

A new analysis argues investors are pouring money into AI and data centers while ignoring the mines and processing plants that supply the metals making those technologies work. This mismatch could create shortages, higher prices, and geopolitical risk—especially for rare earth elements.

What the Paper Gets Right

The paper’s central insight is hard to dispute: the digital economy is not abstract—it is material-intensive. AI, hyperscale data centers, electrification, and advanced manufacturing all depend on copper, rare earth elements, lithium, nickel, graphite, aluminum, and silver. These inputs are dictated by physics, not preference.

Resource Capital Funds documents how electricity demand from AI workloads and data centers could more than double by the early 2030s, driving unavoidable demand for copper-heavy grids, rare-earth-based motors, and battery systems—while global mining investment remains well below levels consistent with that growth.

Where the Evidence Is Strongest

The most persuasive section compares financial valuation versus physical investment. While leading AI and compute platforms have seen rapid valuation growth since 2015, capital spending by the world’s largest miners has grown only marginally over the same period.

Given 10–20-year mine development timelines, today’s underinvestment materially raises the risk of supply tightness in the 2030s.

The paper is also clear-eyed about alternatives: recycling, substitution, and efficiency gains help—but cannot resolve near-term deficits within policy-relevant timelines.

Where Investors Should Apply Judgment

The analysis leans toward a structural scarcity narrative. Directionally, that risk is real—but outcomes will vary by commodity, jurisdiction, and project stage. Policy reform, permitting acceleration, or price shocks could change timelines. Investors should read the paper as a risk framework, not a deterministic forecast.

Why This Matters for Rare Earths

Rare earths are the bottleneck within the bottleneck. High-performance magnets underpin EVs, wind turbines, data-center cooling, and defense systems, yet processing and separation remain highly concentrated. If capital continues to favor software over supply, rare earth scarcity will assert itself through price, policy, and geopolitics.

REEx Takeaway: The digital economy may feel weightless—but it runs on metal. A capital that ignores that reality risks funding the future while starving its foundation.

Source: Resource Capital Funds, The Paradox of Visibility (2026)