• The US has proposed a critical minerals trading bloc with Japan, the EU, and Mexico.
• The bloc features coordinated trade rules, potential price floors, and project support to counter China's 90% control of rare earth processing.
• Vice President J.D. Vance advocates for enforceable price floors backed by adjustable tariffs to address market volatility.
• Market volatility has made non-Chinese investment 'nearly impossible' in the sector.
• The real bottleneck is midstream processing—not mining—requiring parallel investment in separation, metallurgical expertise, and manufacturing capacity.
• These investments are needed to create a durable industrial strategy beyond stockpiles.

The United States has opened a new front in the critical minerals contest—this time not with tariffs alone, but with a proposal to build a preferential trading bloc among allies aimed at stabilizing prices and weakening China’s grip on supply chains. Unveiled at a Washington ministerial hosted by Secretary of State Marco Rubio, the plan brings Japan, the European Union, and Mexico into early talks on coordinated trade rules, potential price floors, and project support. Singapore’s Foreign Minister Vivian Balakrishnan (opens in a new tab) attended and struck a familiar note—support for open, rules-based trade and resilient supply chains—underscoring both the ambition and the caution surrounding the effort.

At its core, the initiative acknowledges a reality long glossed over: China’s leverage is not just geological. While China accounts for roughly 60% of the rare earth supply upstream, it controls close to 90% of the processing that turns mined material into usable inputs like magnets. That downstream choke point—not ore—confers power. Vice President J. D. Vance was unusually blunt, arguing that volatile prices and alleged market flooding have made non-Chinese investment “nearly impossible.” His prescription—enforceable price floors backed by adjustable tariffs—aims to restore predictability so capital will flow.

There are concrete signals beneath the diplomacy. U.S. trade officials say the U.S., Japan, and the EU intend to conclude a memorandum of understanding within 30 days to jointly support mining, refining, processing, and recycling projects, with a parallel U.S.–Mexico plan to follow within 60 days. Those timelines suggest urgency, not just symbolism.

Yet much remains aspirational. Price floors are politically sensitive and historically fraught; past commodity schemes collapsed when governments promised stability without enforcing discipline or coordinating demand. Details on floor levels, enforcement, and loss-sharing are conspicuously absent. And while more than 50 countries attended, most have not publicly committed—an important distinction, as enthusiasm does not equal alignment, suggests Reuters and Singapore’s The Straits Times (opens in a new tab).

Media coverage has largely framed the proposal as a mining story. That’s misleading. The bottleneck is midstream processing—separation, metallurgical expertise, and downstream manufacturing capacity. Without parallel investment in these segments, a trading bloc risks becoming a talking shop with stockpiles attached, rather than a durable industrial strategy.

Why this moment still matters: senior U.S. officials have now said out loud what investors already know—that price volatility, not geology, is killing Western supply chains. If the next steps deliver enforceable mechanisms and sustained midstream buildout, this could mark a genuine pivot. For now, it’s a credible opening bid—ambitious, necessary, and unfinished.

• Landmark Nature Communications study overturns long-held assumption: magnetic strength in rare-earth magnets is governed by atomic-scale structures within crystal grains, not grain boundaries as previously believed.
• Researchers discovered ultra-thin copper-rich layers (1-2 atoms thick) act as 'perfect defects' that enhance magnet performance under extreme heat and stress, informing development of more powerful VACOMAX® samarium-cobalt alloys.
• Findings underscore that rare-earth magnet dominance depends on atomic-scale manufacturing intelligence rather than raw material access alone, with implications for U.S.-China technological competition and industrial policy.

In a landmark paper published in Nature Communications (opens in a new tab), lead author S. Giron and an international team spanning German universities, UK collaborators, and industrial partner VACUUMSCHMELZE GmbH & Co. KG (VAC) (opens in a new tab) overturn a long-held assumption about high-performance rare-earth magnets. Working within Germany’s Collaborative Research Center SFB/TRR 270 (opens in a new tab) (“HoMMage”), the researchers show that magnetic strength and thermal stability are governed less by grain boundaries—and more by atomic-scale structures and elemental distributions inside the grains themselves. The insight has already informed the rollout of more powerful VACOMAX® samarium-cobalt (SmCo) alloys, with implications that extend from factory floors to geopolitics.

The CRC 270 HoMMage team in Germany

How the Study Worked

Rare-earth magnets are the quiet workhorses of electric vehicles, drones, wind turbines, and defense systems. The team focused on a high-temperature SmCo magnet—Sm₂(Co, Fe, Cu, Zr)₁₇—and combined advanced magnetic measurements with multiple electron-microscopy techniques and micromagnetic simulations. This toolkit allowed the scientists to visualize how atoms are arranged and how magnetic domains behave at the nanoscale.

Crucially, they compared magnets that appeared similar under conventional microscopes but performed very differently in practice—differences that only emerged when examined atom by atom.

Stefan Giron, First Author, Institute of Materials Science, Technische Universität Darmstadt

What They Found: The Power Is in the “Defects”

The discovery is counterintuitive. Grain boundaries—the borders between crystal regions—were long thought to be the weak points where demagnetization begins. This study shows they are not the primary culprit.

Rather, the strongest magnets contain ultra-thin, copper-rich layers just one to two atoms thick embedded within the crystal grains. These features act as pinning centers, impeding the motion of magnetic domains and preserving performance even under extreme heat and stress.

The team describes these as “perfect defects”: imperfections so precisely arranged that they enhance performance. Tiny shifts in atomic placement or elemental distribution can yield outsized gains in strength and reliability.

Why This Matters for the China Question

China’s dominance in rare-earth magnets is not just about access to ore; it reflects mastery of process know-how—the industrial craft of translating materials science into repeatable, high-yield production. This study underscores that the true bottleneck is no longer mining alone, but atomic-scale manufacturing intelligence, protected by patents, talent pipelines, and close industry–academia integration.

For the U.S. and its allies, the implication is stark: stockpiles and trade deals are necessary but insufficient. Durable advantage will accrue to those who own the science of nanostructure design—and can industrialize it at scale.

Limitations and Open Questions

The work centers on samarium-cobalt magnets, prized for thermal and chemical stability but used in more specialized applications than mass-market NdFeB magnets. Extending these insights across magnet classes will require further research. Questions of scalability, cost, and intellectual-property access also remain—and could become points of contention in a more competitive global landscape.

Conclusion

The study makes a simple truth unavoidable: rare-earth sovereignty is engineered, not excavated. Control at the atomic level may prove more decisive than access to raw materials, reshaping how nations think about industrial policy, alliances, and technological independence.

Citation

Giron et al., Nature Communications 16, 11335 (2025). DOI: 10.1038/s41467-025-67773-7

• U.S. partners with the EU, Japan, and Mexico on coordinated trade rules and price floors to reduce critical minerals dependence on China for defense and tech manufacturing.
• Vice President JD Vance acknowledges 'the market is failing,' signaling a shift toward binding plurilateral agreements and rule-based mineral coordination.
• Price floors could de-risk Western mining projects, but success requires synchronized midstream build-out, workforce programs, and allied financing beyond stockpiles.

The U.S. says itwill work with the European Union, Japan, and Mexico to reduce dependence on China for critical minerals used in defense, energy, and high-tech manufacturing. Announced at a Washington ministerial hosted by JD Vance and Marco Rubio, the plan includes coordinated trade rules, possible price floors, and fast-tracked agreements—building on President Trump’s proposed $12 billion minerals stockpile. The goal: stabilize prices, unlock investment, and rebuild supply chains outside China.

Solid as a Rock—and Why It Matters

According to Rare Earth Exchanges™ (REEx) yesterday, plus Reuters and Bloomberg, U.S. Trade Representative Jamieson Greer confirmed plans with the European Commission and Japan to develop “action plans” for resilience, including border-adjusted price floors. This is notable. REEx has long argued that price volatility—not geology—is the main killer of Western projects. Price floors, if real, could finally de-risk capital across mining, processing, and manufacturing.

Vice President JD Vance—Recognizing the “Market” is Not Enough

Equally important is the language around a binding plurilateral agreement. That signals a shift from ad-hoc deals to rule-based coordination—something China has practiced for decades.

Where the Fog Creeps In

Details remain thin. Which minerals? What floor levels? Who funds losses if markets fall? Mexico’s 60-dayaction plan gestures toward joint projects but names none. Canada’s absence—despite attending—raises questions about North American coherence ahead of the USMCA review.

There’s also a subtle media bias toward treating the stockpile as a solution. REEx’s view: stockpiles buy time; industrial policy builds power. Without synchronized midstream build-out, workforce programs, IP protection, and allied financing, price floors risk becoming political slogans.

Why This Moment Is Different

Vance’s blunt admission—“the market is failing”—matters. It legitimizes intervention. If followed by enforceable pricing mechanisms and multinational execution, this could mark the real start of a Western critical-minerals bloc.

• VACUUMSCHMELZE secured EN910 certification for its Horna Streda, Slovakia facility, expanding its aerospace and space-grade manufacturing footprint beyond Hanau, Germany.
• The EN910 certification validates VAC's quality management system for the demanding aviation, space, and defense industry, enabling access to aerospace procurement pathways and prime contractor credibility.
• Plans to extend certification to permanent magnets built by VAI, building an audit-ready aerospace capability outside China’s magnet ecosystem as it moves towards a launch in an American facility.

Germany-based magnetic materials and permanent magnet producer VACUUMSCHMELZE (VAC) announced it has successfully achieved EN 9100:2018 certification for its Horna Streda, Slovakia operations, expanding its certified aviation and space manufacturing footprint beyond its longstanding certified base in Hanau, Germany. The certification, conducted by DEKRA Certification GmbH, (opens in a new tab) validates that VAC’s quality management system meets the demanding requirements expected across aerospace and space supply chains.

EN 9100:2018 (equivalent to AS9100D) is the premier international quality management system (QMS) standard for the aviation, space, and defense (ASD) industry. Based on ISO 9001:2015, it adds critical requirements for safety, reliability, and regulatory compliance, ensuring rigorous control over design, production, and supply chain processes. 

VAC reports that the Hanau scope includes development, application support, product design, production, and sales of special magnetic materials spanning crystalline and permanent magnet value chains. The newly certified Horna Streda site currently covers the crystalline value chain, with plans to extend certification to the permanent magnet value chain by 2028.

For Rare Earth Exchanges™ subscribers, the signal is clear: EN 9100 is more than a plaque—it is a gate pass. It helps a magnet manufacturer qualify for aerospace and defense procurement pathways, tighten traceability and process control, and win credibility with prime contractors.

As VAC moves toward launching a major facility in America, this certification strengthens its narrative: building not just capacity—but aerospace-grade, audit-ready capability outside China’s magnet ecosystem.

• Italy has been shortlisted to host one of Europe's first two strategic storage hubs for critical raw materials, positioning northern Italy at the center of the EU's emerging resilience strategy.
• The initiative represents Europe's pragmatic pivot toward strategic stockpiling as a faster, cheaper alternative to domestic mining amid long permitting timelines and public resistance.
• Italy is pushing recycling and circular economy approaches as complementary solutions, though stockpiles serve mainly to buy Europe time rather than break China's material dominance.

Italy has been shortlisted to host one of Europe’s first two strategic storage hubs for critical raw materials, a move that reflects how quickly minerals security has shifted from industrial policy to national security.

Much like America,  Europe wants to stockpile key minerals and rare earths so factories don’t shut down during wars, trade disputes, or supply shocks—and Italy may become one of the continent’s main vaults.

The announcement amplified by decode39 (opens in a new tab) made by Industry Minister Adolfo Urso (opens in a new tab), places northern Italy—close to major logistics corridors—at the center of Europe’s emerging resilience strategy.

Stockpiles Before Shovels: Europe’s Pragmatic Turn

Urso framed the initiative bluntly: Europe is increasingly surrounded by conflict, and strategic autonomy is no longer optional. In that context, stockpiling critical raw materials and rare earths becomes a defense tool, not a green talking point.

Adolfo Urso, Industry Minister

This is a realistic pivot. Europe faces long permitting timelines, public resistance to mining, and limited domestic ore quality. Warehousing materials already produced elsewhere is faster, cheaper, and politically feasible.

That logic mirrors moves in Washington, where the U.S. has just launched Project Vault, a $12 billion effort to buffer supply chains against geopolitical shocks.

Recycling Over Mining: The Italian Angle

Between the lines, Italy is pushing a second message: recycling beats mining on speed. Urso argued that building a recycling and circular-economy ecosystem—especially retaining ferrous scrap within the EU—can support steelmakers transitioning to electric arc furnaces and accelerate decarbonization. This is directionally sound. Secondary supply can come online years before a new mine.

However, recycling does not replace the primary supply for rare earths. It supplements it. Europe still imports the bulk of refined material.

What’s Solid—and What’s Still Soft

Grounded reality:

• Strategic stockpiling reduces short-term vulnerability.
• Northern Italy is logistically credible.
• Recycling scales faster than mining in Europe.

Still unresolved:

• Which materials, volumes, and specifications will be stored?
• How stockpiles interact with EU export controls and market pricing.
• Whether storage becomes a bridge or a crutch, delaying upstream investment.

REEx Takeaway

Italy’s bid is less about geology and more about governance, logistics, and timing. Europe is choosing the fastest lever available to buy resilience in a fractured world.

Stockpiles won’t break China’s dominance. But they can buy Europe something just as valuable: time.

• The European Union proposes a Strategic Partnership Roadmap with the U.S. on critical minerals.
• The aim is to reduce dependence on Chinese supply through:
  • Joint sourcing
  • Price-support mechanisms
  • Coordinated trade tools
  • Shared stockpiling within three months
• This proposal addresses market design by focusing on:
  • Pricing mechanisms
  • Premium markets
  • Standards-based trade
• The recognition that rare earth bottlenecks exist in processing, refining, and qualification rather than extraction alone.
• Success depends on whether diplomatic coordination leads to actual midstream refining capacity and bankable offtakes.
• Emphasis on avoiding mere memoranda, stockpiles, or price floors that don't create processing infrastructure.

Is the European Union proposing a critical minerals partnership with the United States, separating credible policy advances from familiar diplomatic optimism? What’s new here? What’s recycled, and why midstream realities—not memoranda—will decide whether this effort alters rare earth supply chains.  Rare Earth Exchanges™ reports that the European Union will likely pitch the U.S. on a new critical minerals partnership aimed at reducing dependence on Chinese supply. What will be inherent in such a deal? Joint sourcing?  Price support? Stockpiles? And what about shared rules? It sounds ambitious—but similar efforts have failed before. Whether this one matters depends on execution, not potential headlines in the days to come.

What’s Actually on the Table

According to officials familiar with the talks, the European Union is ready to sign a memorandum of understanding with the United States to develop a “Strategic Partnership Roadmap” on critical minerals within three months. Negotiators hope to conclude talks within 30 days, alongside a broader U.S.-led push with allied nations. Rare Earth Exchanges has repeatedly reported that traditional allies of “the West” would need to form tight alliances to overcome China’s predominance in the supply chain.

As cited in The Japan Times (opens in a new tab) a potential proposal could include joint sourcing projects, price-support mechanisms, coordinated trade tools (such as price floors and offtake agreements), shared stockpiling, and exemptions from each other’s export controls. It also calls for coordinated responses to market manipulation and oversupply—code words for shielding Western producers from cheaper Chinese material.

What’s New—and What Isn’t

The novelty lies less in intent than in scope. Previous efforts focused on mining. This proposal gestures toward market design—pricing mechanisms, premium markets, and standards-based trade. That’s directionally correct: rare earth bottlenecks live in processing, refining, and qualification, not just extraction.

What’s familiar is the optimism. Multiple U.S. administrations and EU initiatives have promised diversification “within months,” only to collide with permitting delays, capital costs, and Chinese midstream dominance. Officials themselves acknowledge skepticism that a substantive deal can be finalized quickly.

The Political Subtext Investors Shouldn’t Miss

The memorandum reportedly includes language on respecting territorial integrity—an unusual insertion linked to recent tensions after President Trump floated the idea of acquiring Greenland, a territory of the EU member state Denmark. This highlights a recurring challenge: mineral diplomacy is now inseparable from geopolitics.

Meanwhile, Washington’s launch of a $12 billion critical-mineral stockpile echoes the EU's interest in buffering against supply shocks. Stockpiles can buy time—but they do not create refining capacity.

Why This Matters for Rare Earth Supply Chains

The proposal correctly identifies the problem—dependence on Chinese material—but risks repeating an old mistake: treating coordination as capacity. Without aligned standards, shared qualifications, bankable offtakes, and real midstream investment, price floors and memoranda won’t move molecules.

REEx Takeaway: This effort shows smarter thinking—markets, not mines—but success hinges on whether rules translate into refineries. We’ll learn more this week.

• Europe is 100% dependent on China for heavy REEs (dysprosium, terbium) critical for EV motors and wind turbines.
• Major deposits in Sweden, Norway, and Greenland could transform this dependency if developed:
  • Sweden: Norra Kärr, Per Geijer
  • Norway: Fen Complex with 8.8M tonnes REO
  • Greenland: Kvanefjeld, Tanbreez
• Sweden's Norra Kärr contains 51% heavy REEs and could become Europe's first heavy rare earth mine.
• Norway's Fen Complex—Europe's largest REE deposit at 559M tonnes—could supply 20-30% of EU demand by 2030-2035 if permitting advances.
• Economic viability faces challenges:
  • 10-15 year permitting timelines
  • Complex metallurgy
  • Environmental concerns over radioactive by-products
  • High capital costs
• EU policy initiatives and the Critical Raw Materials Act aim to fast-track strategic projects.

Europe is heavily dependent on imports for rare earth elements (REEs) – especially the heavy REEs like dysprosium (Dy), terbium (Tb), europium (Eu), and yttrium (Y) that are critical for high-strength magnets and other advanced technologies. At present, China supplies essentially 100% of the EU’s heavy REE needs, reflecting a major supply risk. Despite rising demand for EV motors, wind turbines, and electronics, there is currently no commercial rare earth mining in Europe. However, geological surveys have identified a number of REE-rich deposits across Europe. Many of these contain significant heavy REE enrichment, offering potential to diversify supply. Below we review the major known heavy rare earth deposits in Europe – focusing on their geology, locations, and what is known about their economic viability, mining status, and production potential.

Sweden: Kiruna’s Per Geijer Deposit

One of the most significant recent discoveries is the Per Geijer deposit (opens in a new tab) near Kiruna in northern Sweden. State-owned miner LKAB (opens in a new tab) announced in 2023 that exploration at Kiruna identified over 1 million tonnes of rare earth oxides (REO) in the Per Geijer orebody. Geologically, this deposit is unusual – the REEs occur in apatite (phosphate mineral) associated with Kiruna-type iron oxide ore. The apatite hosts high concentrations of REEs (locally reaching weight-percent levels) along with secondary minerals like monazite and allanite. While the REE mix skews toward light elements (such as neodymium and praseodymium needed for magnets), the deposit still contains notable heavy REEs as by-products. LKAB estimates that Per Geijer’s REO resource could satisfy a “large part of the EU’s future demand” for rare-earth magnets.

In terms of development, Kiruna’s REE deposit remains at an early stage. State-owned LKAB has begun preliminary mine planning (including driving an exploration drift 700 m deep toward the deposit) and aims to apply for an exploitation concession in 2023. However, environmental permitting in Sweden is lengthy – LKAB projects it could take 10–15 years before mining and REE production can begin. If brought to production, Per Geijer could become Europe’s first major rare earth mine, producing REEs (including some heavy REEs like Dy, Tb in minor quantities) as by-products of iron ore and phosphate extraction.

Sweden: Norra Kärr Heavy REE Deposit

Another Swedish deposit of strategic importance is Norra Kärr, (opens in a new tab) located in southern Sweden near Gränna. Norra Kärr is a small Mesoproterozoic alkaline nepheline syenite intrusion enriched in zirconium and REEs, with the unusual mineral eudialyte as the main REE-bearing phase.

Norra Kärr, Sweden

Crucially, about 51% of its rare earth oxide content is heavy REEs – making it one of the richest heavy REE deposits in Europe. A NI 43-101 compliant resource estimates 41.6 million tonnes at 0.57% TREO (total REO), containing substantial dysprosium and terbium output potential. In fact, projections suggest an annual production of ~248 tonnes of Dy oxide and 36 tonnes of Tb oxide over Norra Kärr’s first 26 years, which could significantly bolster Europe’s heavy REE supply.

 Despite its high strategic value, Norra Kärr has faced permitting delays. The deposit was first identified by the Swedish Geological Survey over a century ago, and declared a site of National Interest in 2011 due to its importance for Sweden and the EU. Junior miner Leading Edge Materials has been advancing the project, but mining licenses have been slow due to environmental court challenges (the site is near a sensitive lake and Natura 2000 areas). As of late 2025, the company submitted supplementary information for its mining lease application, and authorities are reviewing it. If approved and developed with modern processing (eudialyte concentrate production and REE separation), Norra Kärr could become Europe’s first heavy rare earth mine, providing a long-term source of Dy, Tb, and other critical heavy REEs.

Asidefrom Norra Kärr, Sweden hosts other REEoccurrences: for example, the Olserum project (opens in a new tab) (also in southern Sweden) is a smaller deposit with an estimated 4.5 Mt at 0.6% TREO and a high proportion of heavy REEs (notably Dy/Tb). Sweden’s classic iron mines (Kiruna, Malmberget) and historical Bastnäs district (opens in a new tab) also contain REEs (indeed, many rare elements like yttrium, erbium, holmium were first discovered in Sweden), but those were not developed for REE extraction in the past. Today, Sweden’s combination of large REE resources in Kiruna and heavy-enriched deposits like Norra Kärr and Olserum positions it as a potential cornerstone of European REE supply once mining permits are secured.

Norway: Fen Carbonatite Complex

Norway has emerged with a record-breaking rare earth deposit at the Fen Complex in Telemark, about 150 km southwest of Oslo. The Fen Complex (opens in a new tab) is a Proterozoic carbonatite–alkaline intrusive complex long known for niobium; recent exploration by the company Rare Earths Norway (opens in a new tab) has confirmed it also hosts an enormous REE resource. In June 2024, a maiden JORC-compliant resource was announced for Fen: 559 million tonnes grading 1.57% TREO, containing about 8.8 million tonnes of rare earth oxides. This makes Fen the largest known REE deposit in continental Europe by a wide margin.

The Fen Complex, Norway

Within this resource, roughly 1.5 million tonnes are magnet-related rare earths (the Nd, Pr, Dy, Tb crucial for EV motors and wind turbine magnets). The geology of Fen is similar to large carbonatite deposits elsewhere (like Bayan Obo in China): REEs are concentrated in carbonatite and associated minerals (bastnäsite, monazite, etc.), and the distribution is LREE-rich but with significant heavy REE in the form of yttrium and others present in the ore.

While Fen’s size and grade are impressive – potentially capable of meeting a large share of Europe’s demand – its development is still at an early stage. The deposit extends deep underground (the current resource goes down to –468 m, with mineralization open to ~–1000 m). Mining will likely require underground methods; Rare Earths Norway is investigating methods to exploit Fen with minimal environmental impact.

The discovery has drawn support from European raw materials initiatives: EIT RawMaterials (opens in a new tab) and the European Raw Materials Alliance (opens in a new tab) (ERMA) have backed the project as a pillar of a secure EU REE supply chain. With an inferred resource now defined, the next steps include detailed feasibility studies, environmental assessments, and permits.

If successfully developed, the Fen mine could supply an estimated 20–30% of Europe’s rare earth demand by 2030–2035. Importantly, it would also yield some heavy REEs(though the majority of output by volume would be light REEs likecerium, lanthanum, neodymium). As ERMA’s CEO noted, projects like Fen are “world-class” opportunities that could transform Europe’s rare earth self-sufficiency if fast-tracked.

Greenland (Denmark): Kvanefjeld and Tanbreez

Politically linked to Europe via Denmark, Greenland holds two of the world’s most significant rare earth deposits in the Ilímaussaq complex of south Greenland. The first is Kvanefjeld (Kuannersuit), (opens in a new tab) a giant layered peralkaline intrusion known for its unique geology and size. Kvanefjeld’s ore is hosted in lujavrite (an agpaitic nepheline syenite) and enriched in both light and heavy rare earths – rare minerals like steenstrupine and eudialyte contain not only large quantities of neodymium and praseodymium but also notable dysprosium and terbium. Total JORC resources (including neighboring zones) are on the order of 1 billion tonnes at ~1.1% TREO, equating to ~11 million tonnes of REO – one of the largest accumulations globally. This deposit could theoretically produce ~32,000 tonnes of REO per year (about 12–14% of world supply) at full scale. Crucially for heavy REEs, Kvanefjeld’s REE distribution is more balanced than many giant deposits: it has a higher share of mid-to-heavy REEs compared to typical light-REE-rich projects. In other words, alongside abundant Nd-Pr for magnets, it contains sizable Dy and Tb resources – metals critical for high-temperature magnets in wind turbines and EVs.

Greenland Rare Earth Deposits

Despite advanced studies (a feasibility and environmental impact assessment were completed by the mid-2010s), Kvanefjeld’s development is currently stalled. The project faces strong environmental and political opposition in Greenland, largely due to its significant uranium content (the ore contains ~300 ppm U₃O₈, making uranium a co-product). Greenland’s government instated a uranium mining ban in 2021, which directly impacted Kvanefjeld. The owner company (Energy Transition Minerals, formerly Greenland Minerals) is now in legal arbitration with Greenland/Denmark over its license. Thus, while Kvanefjeld could be a game-changer for Europe’s rare earth supply (including heavy REEs), its economic viability is on hold pending regulatory resolution and social license to operate.

Adjacent to Kvanefjeld is the Tanbreez (Kringlerne) deposit (opens in a new tab), another huge REE resource in the Ilímaussaq complex. Tanbreez contains extensive eudialyte-rich zones with very low uranium content, focusing on rare earths, zirconium, and tantalum. This project (held by a private company) has reportedly received an exploitation license from Greenland’s authorities, since it avoids the uranium issues that plague Kvanefjeld. Tanbreez’s total REE resource is likewise massive (on the order of billions of tonnes of rock, with multi-million tonnes of REO) and is enriched in heavy rare earth elements due to the eudialyte mineralogy. If Tanbreez proceeds to development under its

U.S.-backed ownership, it could become a major non-Chinese source of heavy REEs for Western markets. Both Greenland projects underscore that substantial heavy REE reserves exist within greater Europe, although geopolitical and environmental factors will determine if they can contribute to supply.

Finland: Sokli and Other Deposits

Finland has several REE-bearing deposits, though none in production yet. The most notable is the Sokli carbonatite complex i (opens in a new tab)n northern Finland (part of the Devonian Kola alkaline province). Sokli contains a large phosphate (apatite) deposit with notable enrichment in niobium, tantalum, and rare earths. Drilling has revealed late-stage carbonatite veins at Sokli with high REE grades of 0.5–1.8% TREO in places. The REE mineralization at Sokli is dominated by light REE minerals (ancylite-(Ce), bastnäsite-(Ce), monazite) and strontium-rich apatite, indicating a light-REE-rich profile. Heavy REEs are less abundant there, but some yttrium and others occur in accessory phases. The Sokli deposit was studied as a source of fertilizer phosphorus by Yara, and though mining plans were put on hold, there is potential to extract REEs as a by-product of any future phosphate operation.

Historically, Finland was actually one of the only European countries to produce any rare earths: the Korsnäs mine (opens in a new tab) in western Finland (a small Pb-REE deposit) yielded about 36,000 tons of rare-earth–rich concentrate between 1963 and 1972 as a by-product of lead mining. That operation recovered primarily light REEs (lanthanum, cerium) from monazite.

Today, aside from Sokli, Finland has other minor prospects – e.g., the Katajakangas occurrence (a Nb-Y-REE enriched granite with an estimated 0.46 Mt resource containing yttrium and heavy REEs). While these are relatively small, they demonstrate the presence of heavy REEs (yttrium, gadolinium, etc.) in Finnish bedrock. In summary, Finland’s REE resources are not as large as Sweden’s or Greenland’s, but they could provide a supplemental heavy REE supply in the future, especially if integrated into other mining projects (phosphate, Nb-Ta mining, or even extraction from mine tailings).

Other European REE Occurrences

Beyond the Nordic countries, REE deposits in the rest of Europe tend to be smaller or less developed, but are worth noting for completeness.

In Southern Europe, some alkaline igneous complexes in the Iberian Peninsula (Spain and Portugal) host REE occurrences – for example, the Ordovician peralkaline Galiñeiro complex inGalicia, Spain, has patchy zones with >1% total REE and notableheavy-REE enrichments (with minerals like xenotime, a Y-Dy phosphate). Likewise, small carbonatite dikes in Spain’s Canary Islands (Fuerteventura) contain up to ~0.5–0.7% TREO with a mix of REE phosphates and carbonates. These are geological curiosities at this stage, not economic deposits.

Some placer deposits (alluvial or beach sands) in Europe also concentrate rare-earth-bearing minerals. For instance, in Greece and Serbia, heavy-mineral sands and paleo-placers have been found to contain monazite and xenotime grains.

One example is the Ordovician-aged heavy mineral quartzite in Portugal’s Portalegre area (opens in a new tab), which extends into Spain: it contains disseminated monazite with an estimated resource of 2.4 Mt at 0.46% TREO. Such placers typically yield mixed REEs (monazite being rich in light REEs, xenotime providing yttrium and heavy REEs), but so far none have been mined for REEs in Europe.

Additionally, bauxite deposits and red mud (bauxite processing waste) in the Mediterranean region are known to be enriched in rare earth elements, including some heavy REEs. Research initiatives (like the EU EURARE project) have investigated extracting scandium and REEs from Greek bauxite residue, as one potential secondary source. While promising for the circular economy, these are not primary “deposits” per se and require technological development to be viable.

Finally, it’s worth mentioning as Rare Earth Exchanges™ has reported that in Turkey(which straddles Europe and Asia), a very large rare earth-bearing deposit was reported in 2022 near Eskişehir. Turkish authorities announced a reserve of 694 million tonnes of ore containing rare earth elements, purportedly the world’s second-largest after China. However, the details suggest the ore is of relatively low grade and mostly light REEs; the heavy REE content and economic recoverability remain uncertain. Turkey’s find, if developed, could eventually contribute to Europe’s supply, but as of now, it underscores that significant REE resources (light and heavy) exist on Europe’s periphery.

Economic Viability and Outlook

Developing heavy rare earth deposits in Europe faces both opportunities and challenges. On one hand, the identified deposits (Sweden’s Per Geijer and Norra Kärr, Norway’s Fen, Greenland’s Ilímaussaq deposits, etc.) are of sufficiently large scale and grade to potentially supply a major share of Europe’s REE demand for decades. If even a few of these projects come to fruition, Europe could reduce its near-total dependency on Chinese heavy REEs. For example, the Fen project alone might supply ~30% of Europe’s rare earths and meet a large portion of heavy magnet metal needs by the 2030s. The EU is pushing policy measures (the Critical Raw Materials Act and investment alliances) to expedite such projects. There is also growing interest in downstream processing (separation facilities and magnet manufacturing) so that European mines can feed a full domestic supply chain.

On the other hand, economic and permitting hurdles are significant. Many European REE deposits come with complex metallurgy (e.g., refractory minerals like eudialyte or apatite that require innovative extraction techniques) and sometimes radioactive by-products (thorium or uranium) that raise environmental concerns. Obtaining social license for mining is challenging in countries with strong environmental regulations, as seen with the delays at Norra Kärr and Kvanefjeld. The typical timeline from discovery to production in Europe can exceed 10–15 years, which is at odds with the immediate supply needs. Moreover, capital expenditure to develop these deposits (and associated processing plants) is high, and securing financing may require public-sector support or partnerships, given past volatility in REE prices.

Final Thoughts

Europe does possess notable deposits of heavy rare earth elements across its territory. Sweden and Norway’s recent finds, along with Greenland’s vast resources, could theoretically make Europe a significant producer of both light and heavy rare earths in the future. These deposits cover a range of geological settings – from Scandinavian carbonatites and alkaline complexes to apatite iron ores – and contain the critical heavy REEs needed for high-tech industries. Realizing their potential will depend on successfully navigating the feasibility and permitting processes. Should even a few of these projects reach production, Europe could secure a domestic source of heavy rare earths, improving its economic resilience and supporting the green transition. For now, all eyes are on pilot projects and mining approvals in the coming years, as Europe seeks to turn its geological endowment into a strategic advantage.

Sources: European Commission & ERMA reports; LKAB, Rare Earths Norway and Leading Edge Materials press releases; EuRare project data; WEF and Reuters news analyses, among others.

• Russia aims to raise its global rare earth supply share from 1.3% to 10% by 2030 using Siberian deposits as a geopolitical bargaining chip.
• Lacks critical separation chemistry and magnet production infrastructure needed for actual supply-chain relevance.
• The 2030 target appears aspirational without bankable projects, capex details, or offtake agreements.
• Sanctions block foreign technology transfers that Russia needs to build competitive processing capacity.
• Signals the weaponization of mineral narratives in diplomacy rather than a near-term supply threat.
• China's processing dominance remains intact.
• Western strategies prioritize trusted, ESG-compliant supply chains over geopolitical substitution.

A new policy brief (opens in a new tab) claims Russia wants to turn Siberian rare earth deposits into a geopolitical bargaining chip—offering minerals to the West to ease sanctions and compete with China. It sounds bold. But when you look closely at geology, processing capacity, sanctions, and timelines, the story is far more constrained than the headline suggests.

Catching Attention

A recent BNE IntelliNews article (opens in a new tab) argues that Moscow is positioning the Angara–Yenisei Valley (opens in a new tab) in Siberia as a future rare earth and critical minerals hub, aiming to raise Russia’s global rare earth supply share from ~1.3% to 10% by 2030. The narrative frames this as a strategic lure for U.S. and European policymakers grappling with Chinese export controls and Europe’s mineral shortages.

In today’s environment—where rare earths underpin EVs, wind turbines, defense systems, and semiconductors—any claim of a new non-Chinese supplier understandably draws investor and policy attention.

Where the Facts Hold

Russia does possess large in-situ rare-earth and critical mineral resources. That part is not disputed. It is also a proven producer of platinum-group metals and nuclear materials, and it has industrial depth in mining-intensive sectors. Europe’s dependence on Chinese processing—and, in some cases, Russian intermediates—is real, particularly after tighter Chinese export licensing reportedly reduced EU rare earth imports in 2024.

Designating the Angara–Yenisei region as a special economic zone with tax incentives is consistent with Russia’s past industrial playbook.

Where the Narrative Overreaches

The leap from resources to supply-chain relevance is where the article strains credibility.

As regular Rare Earth Exchanges™ readers know very well, rare earth dominance is not about ore alone—it is about separation chemistry, solvent extraction, magnet-grade metal production, and downstream manufacturing. Russia currently lacks competitive, large-scale rare earth separation and magnet ecosystems. Even the article concedes Moscow depends on foreign technology—technology constrained by sanctions and unlikely to be transferred at scale.

The 2030 target appears aspirational, not operational. No bankable project timelines, capex breakdowns, processing flowsheets, or offtake agreements are cited. Investors should treat the 10% figure as policy signaling, not a forecast.

The Geopolitical Spin

The piece leans heavily on a geopolitical bargaining narrative—that mineral access could fracture EU unity or tempt Washington. That framing reflects think-tank analysis more than industrial reality. Western critical mineral strategies increasingly emphasize trusted supply chains, ESG compliance, and allied processing—not opportunistic substitution of one geopolitical dependency for another.

Why This Still Matters

What’s notable is not Russia’s near-term rare earth threat—it’s the weaponization of mineral narratives. As supply chains tighten, claims of future capacity become tools of diplomacy and influence. For investors, separating resource potential from deliverable supply has never been more important.

Bottom Line for Rare Earth Investors

Russia’s rare earth ambitions highlight scarcity anxiety—but do not yet change the supply map. China’s processing dominance remains intact. New entrants face decade-long hurdles. Headlines may travel fast; metallurgy does not.

• Chinese researchers developed the first industrial-academic database of nearly 2,000 real NdFeB magnet samples.
• Use of machine learning and active learning optimizes composition faster and cheaper than traditional trial-and-error methods.
• The AI system creates a continuous learning loop that identifies uncertain areas, requests only the most useful data, and retrains.
• This innovation bridges the gap between industry's cost focus and academia's performance goals.
• This breakthrough indicates China is advancing beyond manufacturing scale to algorithmic advantage in rare-earth magnets.
• Rare-earth magnets are a critical chokepoint for U.S. and European electric vehicle and wind turbine supply chains.

Chinese researchers report a major step toward AI-driven manufacturing of high-performance rare-earth magnets, a critical component in electric vehicles and wind turbines, not to mention other major products. By combining nearly 2,000 real industrial magnet samples with advanced machine-learning and “active learning” techniques, the team claims it can optimize magnet composition and processing faster, cheaper, and more reliably than traditional trial-and-error methods. If validated and scaled, this approach could tighten China’s lead in NdFeB magnet manufacturing, a strategic chokepoint for the U.S. andEurope.

What’s New — and Why It Matters

According to a February 2, 2026 announcement from the Computer Network Information Center of the Chinese Academy of Sciences (opens in a new tab), working with the Ganjiang Innovation Institute of the Chinese Academy of Sciences (opens in a new tab), researchers have built what they describe as the first “industrial–academic dual-domain” database for sintered NdFeB magnets. The dataset contains nearly 2,000 samples drawn from real manufacturing environments rather than idealized lab conditions.

Using high-performance computing and multiple machine-learning models (random forests, gradient boosting, and classical and quantum-inspired support vector regression), the team tested how data selection strategies affect prediction accuracy and manufacturing outcomes in a virtual experiment setting.

Reviewing the Materials

The Chinese Society of Rare Earths included an infographic that illustrates an active learning production loop:

• Data preparation: Raw magnet data are cleaned, standardized, and splitinto training, validation, and test sets.
• Model training: Multiple AI models predict magnet performance based on composition and processing parameters.
• Active learning loop: Instead of training once, the system repeatedly selects the most informative new samples, retrains the model, and stops early when gains level off.
• Outcome: Faster convergence on optimal magnet recipes with fewer costly physical experiments.

In simple terms: the AI learns where it is uncertain, asks for only the most useful new data, and improves continuously—cutting time and cost.

Strategic Signal for the West

The study explicitly highlights a tension: industry prioritizes cost and stability, while academia pushes performance limits. The Chinese team claims its framework bridges this gap, offering a scalable path to factory-ready AI optimization. For the U.S. and EU—still struggling to localize NdFeB magnet supply—this signals that China is moving beyond scale alone toward algorithmic manufacturing advantage, potentially widening the competitive moat.

The peer-reviewed results were published in npj Computational Materials and funded by major Chinese state research programs.

Disclaimer: This news item originates from media affiliated with a state-backed Chinese research ecosystem. While technically plausible and published in a reputable journal, all claims should be independently verified before being used for investment or policy decisions.

• China's new-energy vehicle (NEV) startups saw deliveries drop sharply month-over-month in January 2026.
• Key companies affected included:
  • Huawei-linked HarmonyOS (-35.3% MoM)
  • Xiaomi Auto
  • NIO (-43.5% MoM)
  • XPeng (-46.7% MoM)
• The synchronized slump triggered immediate price wars in February.
• Brands including Xiaomi, NIO, Avita, and XPeng launched aggressive incentives such as:
  • 0.49% APR financing for up to 84 months
  • Reduced down payments
  • Tax subsidies
• These measures signal intensifying competitive pressure and demand fatigue.
• The downstream demand collapse poses risks such as:
  • Overproduction risk that could impact upstream batteries and permanent magnets
  • Pressure on global pricing
  • Complications for Western efforts to build competitive domestic EV supply chains
• China seeks to monetize its rare-earth-anchored advantage.

China’s new-energy vehicle (NEV) startups opened 2026 with a stumble. January deliveries fell across the board month-on-month, triggering a swift wave of price cuts and ultra-low-interest financing in early February from brands including Xiaomi Auto, NIO, and peers. While most automakers still posted year-on-year growth, the sequential collapse from December was steep—a sign of demand fatigue just as China seeks to monetize its rare-earth-anchored EV supply chain at scale.

The Numbers Don’t Lie: A Synchronized Pullback

The January data show a uniform slowdown. Huawei-linked HarmonyOS Intelligent Mobility retained the top spot with 57,900 deliveries, up 65.6% YoY but down 35.3% MoM from December’s 89,600. Leapmotor delivered 32,100 vehicles (+27% YoY; -46.9% MoM) while simultaneously reaffirming a 1-million-vehicle target for 2026—nearly double last year’s output. Xiaomi Auto reported 39,000 deliveries, well above last year but down sharply from 50,000+ in December.

The “Weixiaoli” group also retreated in unison. Li Auto delivered 27,700 vehicles (-37.5% MoM), NIO 27,200 (-43.5% MoM), and XPeng Motors 20,000 (-46.7% MoM). Traditional automaker EV brands fared no better: Dongfeng’s Voyah posted 10,500 deliveries (-34.2% MoM), while SAIC’s Zhiji fell to 5,017, roughly half its late-2025 monthly run rate.

Policy Headwinds and Seasonal Reality Check

State-affiliated media attribute the downturn to a convergence of factors: the expiration of NEV tax exemptions, the uneven rollout of vehicle replacement subsidies, and Spring Festival timing, which pulled demand into December and left January seasonally weak. Data from the China Passenger Car Association (CPCA) reinforce the slowdown: national retail passenger-car sales from January 1–18 fell 28% YoY and 37% MoM.

Price Wars, Reloaded

The market response was immediate. February opened with aggressive incentives: Avita rolled out ¥8,000 tax subsidies and 7-year low-interest loans; NIO launched 0.49% APR financing for up to 84 months; Xiaomi followed with a 7-year low-interest plan featuring reduced down payments. XPeng and others had already moved earlier with similar offers—suggesting competitive pressure is intensifying, not easing.

Why the West Should Pay Attention

Downstream EV demand is where China converts its rare-earth, magnet, and battery supply-chain dominance into cash flow. January’s synchronized slump—visible in the sales chart showing universal MoM declines—signals a growing risk of overproduction, a trend Rare Earth Exchanges™ has repeatedly documented. If discounting becomes structural, margin pressure will flow upstream into batteries, permanent magnets, and critical minerals, reshaping global pricing dynamics and complicating U.S. and European efforts to build competitive, higher-cost domestic supply chains.

Disclaimer: This item is translated and summarized from reporting by Chinese state-affiliated media. The information has not been independently verified and should be confirmed through independent sources before being used for investment, procurement, or policy decisions.

• China Minmetals and CATL met in January to expand strategic cooperation.
• The collaboration aims to link state-backed resource security with the world's largest battery manufacturer.
• The goal is to integrate upstream minerals with downstream manufacturing.
• Minmetals emphasized its national mandate to safeguard critical mineral supplies.
• CATL highlighted technology innovation amid global supply chain restructuring in the new-energy sector.
• The engagement signals China's cohesive industrial strategy to secure battery supply chains.
• This presents challenges for U.S. and European efforts to diversify away from Chinese mineral dependencies.

Senior executives from China Minmetals Corporation (opens in a new tab) and Contemporary Amperex Technology Co. Limited (CATL) (opens in a new tab) met in Ningde, Fujian, in late January to discuss expanding strategic cooperation—an engagement that highlights China’s ongoing effort to more tightly integrate upstream mineral resources with downstream battery and new-energy manufacturing.

From Dialogue to Systematic Cooperation

The meeting brought together Zhu Kebing, Deputy Party Secretary, Chairman, and General Manager of China Minmetals, and CATL founder and CEO Robin Zeng, along with senior executives from both sides. According to the official readout, discussions focused on building a more structured, long-term cooperation framework spanning resource development, industrial coordination, and green (low-carbon) development—language that in the Chinese policy context typically implies tighter operational and strategic integration over time.

China Minmetals’ National Mandate

Zhu framed China Minmetals’ role in explicitly national terms, reiterating the group’s mission of “serving the country through mining” and safeguarding China’s supply and security of critical metal and mineral resources. He emphasized Minmetals’ ambition to strengthen competitiveness across the entire mining and metals value chain, from resources to downstream services. Zhu also highlighted the company’s positioning as a “national team” for resource security and a key service provider for China’s “Two-New” agenda—generally understood to refer to emerging industries and new development models. Minmetals now operates across six major business segments, including mining, metallurgical engineering, technology, trade and logistics, financial capital, and real estate.

CATL’s View: Technology First, Supply Chains in Flux

For CATL, Zeng underscored that core technological innovation remains the company’s primary growth engine, while noting that global industrial and supply chains are undergoing profound structural change. He pointed to the rapid expansion of the new-energy sector and said closer alignment with China Minmetals could help both companies capture opportunities during this phase of accelerated industry growth.

Why This Matters for the U.S. and Europe

The significance of this development lies less in any single announced project—none were disclosed—and more in the signal it sends. The meeting reinforces a broader Chinese industrial strategy: linking state-backed resource giants directly with globally dominant battery manufacturers to secure critical minerals, improve coordination, and reduce exposure to geopolitical or trade disruptions. For U.S. and European policymakers seeking to diversify battery and critical-mineral supply chains away from China, this type of upstream–downstream alignment illustrates the scale, cohesion, and long-term orientation of China’s approach.

Company Profiles

China Minmetals Corporation

China Minmetals is one of China’s largest state-owned mining and metals groups, with operations spanning mineral exploration, mining, smelting, engineering, trading, and finance. It plays a central role in China’s strategy to secure supplies of critical minerals and metals across domestic and overseas assets.

 Contemporary Amperex Technology Co. Limited (CATL)

CATL is the world’s largest manufacturer of lithium-ion batteries for electric vehicles and energy storage systems. Headquartered in Ningde, Fujian, the company is a cornerstone of China’s new-energy industry and a major supplier to global automakers.

Disclaimer: This news item is translated and summarized from reporting by media affiliated with a Chinese state-owned entity. The information has not been independently verified and should be confirmed through independent sources before being used for investment, policy, or strategic decision-making.

• China Northern Rare Earth's magnet subsidiary reports January breakthroughs in:
  • NdFeB alloy flake production stability
  • Customer response times
  • Smart-manufacturing integration
• The company is accelerating a 50,000-ton per year NdFeB alloy expansion with automated MES systems to improve:
  • Yield
  • Quality traceability
  • Process control at scale
• Operational upgrades may widen the cost-and-quality gap for:
  • Western magnet supply chains
• Complicating U.S./EU efforts to localize production for:
  • EVs
  • Wind turbines
  • Defense

China Northern Rare Earth Group’s magnet materials subsidiary says it opened the year with steadier operations and improved efficiency, pointing to “notable breakthroughs” in three areas: reliable production of NdFeB (neodymium-iron-boron) alloy flakes, faster customer response, and accelerated smart-manufacturing upgrades. In the company’s telling, January performance improved both output stability and quality—positioning it for full-year targets.

What’s Behind the Improving Efficiency?

The update is business-relevant because it describes a tighter commercial operating model around a volatile NdFeB market. The company claims it has built a rapid “market assessment → strategy adjustment → execution feedback” loop to react faster to pricing and demand shifts.

It also emphasizes deeper coordination with upstream suppliers to protect production continuity, while simultaneously leaning into downstream customer customization—aimed at improving customer stickiness and cushioning market swings. Translation for Western readers: they’re trying to run magnets like a modern, demand-driven industrial business, not just a materials plant.

Major Upgrades Forthcoming

The most consequential detail for the U.S. and Europe is the production and automation push tied to a 5 million-kg (50,000-ton) per year NdFeB alloy flake expansion project. The company says it is accelerating integration of an MES (Manufacturing Execution System) with an automated batching line—improving data capture, process handoffs, and quality traceability. If those upgrades translate into higher yield, tighter tolerances, and fewer defects, it strengthens China’s ability to scale magnet feedstock with consistent quality—an area that matters for EV motors, wind turbines, robotics, and defense supply chains.

No single new technology is disclosed, but the “breakthrough” here is operational: capacity expansion plus digital process control. For the West, that combination can mean a wider cost-and-quality gap—and a harder climb for U.S./EU efforts to localize magnet supply chains if Chinese producers continue to industrialize faster and at larger scale.

Disclaimer: This news item originates from media affiliated with a Chinese state-owned entity. The information has not been independently verified and should be confirmed through independent sources before being used for investment, procurement, or strategic decisions.

• Ministers from the US, EU, UK, Japan, Australia, and nearly 20 allied nations convene in Washington to discuss a critical minerals alliance, addressing China's dominance in rare earth mining, refining, and permanent magnet manufacturing as a national security liability.
• Australia establishes a A$1.2 billion strategic critical minerals reserve while uncertainty persists over US price guarantees, with investors demanding pricing certainty to scale non-China refining capacity.
• The summit marks an emerging acceptance of a security premium for rare earth refining, requiring coordinated industrial policy across mining, refining, magnets, finance, and defense procurement at a scale not seen since WWII-era mobilization.

Ministers from the US, EU, UK, Japan, Australia, and nearly 20 allied nations will convene in Washington this week to discuss a critical minerals alliance, with rare earths and permanent magnets at the center. The meeting reflects a growing consensus: dependence on China for mining, refining, and magnet manufacturing is now a national-security liability—not a trade inconvenience

This moment did not arrive suddenly. Rare Earth Exchanges™ has argued since its launch in late 2024 that only a coordinated, multinational industrial alliance—not fragmented national strategies—could realistically rebalance rare earth supply chains. This week’s summit suggests policymakers are finally converging on that conclusion.

So now such topics have gone mainstream, as cited (opens in a new tab) today by The Guardian’s Lisa O’Carroll.

Yes, the Risk Is Real—and Quantified

The Guardian’s core facts hold: Europe consumes roughly 20,000 tonnes of permanent magnets annually, sourcing 17,000–18,000 tonnes from China. Domestic EU production is marginal. Similar vulnerabilities exist across the US and allied economies, as the Rare Earth Exchanges community well knows.  China’s repeated willingness to impose export controls—on rare earths, gallium, antimony, and related materials—has transformed abstract risk into lived experience.

This is not speculative framing. It is the empirical baseline, at this point, pragmatic survival driving alliance talks.

Australia Moves First—Others Watch

Australia’s decision to establish a A$1.2 billion strategic critical minerals reserve is among the most concrete policy actions cited. This mirrors Japan’s long-standing stockpiling model and signals a shift from market faith to resilience planning. Importantly, Canberra is acting even as uncertainty persists around US price guarantees—suggesting that allies are no longer waiting for Washington to lead every lever.  The Trump administration, to its credit, has done more than any other administration on critical minerals and the rare-earth element supply chain. But more is needed.

The Price Floor Question: Where Policy Meets Physics

One unresolved fault line is whether the US will guarantee minimum prices for critical minerals and rare earths. Reports via Reuters that Washington may have stepped back triggered equity sell-offs—an investor verdict that price certainty matters. Without it, capital hesitates; without capital, refineries and magnet plants do not get built.

The Guardian accurately frames this as a debate. What deserves sharper emphasis is consequence: pricing mechanisms are not optional if non-China refining—especially heavy rare earth separation—is to scale.

Where Optimism Outruns Engineering

The article leans into alliance symbolism and diplomatic repair. What remains absent are specifics: volumes, timelines, binding commitments, and industrial coordination mechanism targets. “De-risking” is invoked frequently, but chemistry, permitting, and workforce realities do not bend to communiqués.

Why This Moment Still Matters

What is truly notable is the emerging acceptance of a security premium for rare earth refining—an _idea Rare Earth Exchanges_™ has consistently advanced. Delivering this alliance will require synergies across mining, refining, magnets, finance, and defense procurement—an industrial policy effort not seen at this scale since perhaps World War II–era mobilization.

Whether this summit marks a turning point—or another missed opportunity—will depend on execution.

Source: The Guardian, Lisa O’Carroll, February 1, 2026.

• A global shortage of medical radioisotopes is limiting access to promising targeted cancer therapies.
• Traditional reactor-based supply chains are proving inadequate for growing demand.
• ITM Isotope Technologies Munich is pioneering decentralized, accelerator-driven production of novel isotopes like Terbium-161.
• Creation of regional networks ensures a reliable supply for clinical trials and treatment.
• This supply chain transformation enables the development of more precise, effective radiopharmaceuticals.
• Accelerator technology companies are positioned as critical infrastructure in the projected $30B+ radiopharmaceutical market by 2030.

As demand for targeted cancer therapies explodes, innovative companies are solving the isotope supply crisis, unlocking a new era in precision medicine.

The revolution in targeted cancer therapy is being held back by a surprising bottleneck: a global shortage of atomic-sized bullets.

Radiopharmaceuticals—drugs that deliver radioactive isotopes directly to cancer cells—have become one of oncology’s most promising frontiers. Treatments like Lutetium-177 PSMA-617 (Pluvicto®) for prostate cancer have proven that these "theranostic" agents can extend life with remarkable precision. Yet, for every patient who receives treatment, dozens more wait, their hopes stalled not by a lack of scientific know-how, but by a severe supply crunch of the rare earth radioisotopes that power these drugs.

The traditional supply chain, reliant on a handful of aging nuclear research reactors, is brittle and centralized. This creates a critical vulnerability for the entire life sciences sector. In 2026, however, a powerful solution is moving from the lab to the clinic: decentralized, accelerator-driven isotope production. This technological shift isn't just solving a logistics problem; it's enabling a new generation of more effective therapies and reshaping the medical landscape.

The Medical Imperative: Why Purity and Novelty Matter

From a clinician’s perspective, the limitations of reactor-produced isotopes are tangible. Traditional Lutetium-177, for example, is often "carrier-added," meaning it's mixed with non-radioactive Lu-176. This dilutes the therapeutic potency (specific activity),potentially requiring higher doses and reducing the precision of the"seek-and-destroy" mission.

"The goal is to deliver a lethal radiation dose to every cancer cell while sparing healthy tissue," explains Dr. Elena Rodriguez (opens in a new tab), an oncologist and nuclear medicine specialist at Memorial Sloan Kettering. "The purer and more potent the isotope, the more efficiently our drug conjugates can achieve that. It’s the difference between a scalpel and a blunt instrument."

This is where particle accelerators, or cyclotrons, change the game. By bombarding stable target materials with protons, they can produce carrier-free, high-specific-activity isotopes and, crucially, access novel isotopes that reactors cannot make efficiently.

The most exciting candidate for 2026 is Terbium-161. Unlike Lu-177, which emits beta particles over a millimeter range, Tb-161 emits Auger electrons. These have an ultra-short path (less than a micrometer)—essentially the width of a single cell. This allows for a cellular-level "sniper shot," perfect for treating micro-metastases or cancers with a high risk of spreading, potentially with fewer side effects like bone marrow suppression.

The Innovator: ITM Isotope Technologies Munich – Building the Network

Leading this charge is ITM Isotope Technologies Munich (ITM), (opens in a new tab) a German biotech and radiopharma leader. Their 2026 strategy is not just to produce a new isotope but to re-engineer the supply chain itself.

The Innovation: ITM has pioneered the efficient cyclotron production of Terbium-161 from enriched Gadolinium-160 targets. Recognizing that no single facility can meet global demand, their breakthrough move has been strategic partnership.

The Model: In late 2025, ITM announced a landmark agreement with IBA RadioPharma Solutions (opens in a new tab) and PETNET Solutions (opens in a new tab) (A Siemens Healthineers Company). This alliance aims to create a decentralized, GMP-compliant production network across existing cyclotron hubs in Europe and North America. Instead of shipping scarce isotopes across continents, the know-how and targets will be sent to regional centers, which then produce Tb-161 on-demand for local clinical trials and, eventually, treatment.

"We are moving from a brittle, centralized model to a resilient, networked one," said ITM's CEO, Mark Riedel, in a recent statement. "This ensures that the supply of next-generation isotopes scales directly with clinical development, removing a major risk for our pharmaceutical partners and, most importantly, for patients."

The Life Sciences Ripple Effect

This shift has immediate implications for the biotech and pharmaceutical ecosystem:

• De-risking Clinical Trials: Reliable, predictable isotope supply means drug developers can plan Phase II and III trials without fear of debilitating shortages, accelerating the path to market for new radiopharmaceuticals.

Enabling New Drug Design: With a secure pipeline for novel isotopes like Tb-161 and Scandium-44/47, medicinal chemists can now design targeted ligands (the "homing device" of the drug) optimized for these isotopes' unique properties, leading to potentially more effective and safer therapies.

• Vertical Integration: Large pharma players, like Novartis (opens in a new tab), are taking note. Following past supply shocks, Novartis’s 2026 corporate updates emphasize "multi-source security," with reported long-term offtake discussions with ITM and other accelerator-focused firms like NorthStar Medical Radioisotopes (opens in a new tab).

Outlook and Investment Perspective

The outlook for the accelerator-driven isotope sector is intrinsically tied to the explosive growth forecast for the radiopharmaceuticals market, projected to exceed $30 billion by 2030. Companies like ITM, NorthStar, and ARTMS Inc (opens in a new tab). (a leader in cyclotron target technology) are positioned not as mere suppliers, but as critical infrastructure providers for 21st-century precision medicine.

Near-term catalysts to watch:

• Phase II Data for Tb-161 Therapies: Robust clinical data expected in late 2026/early 2027 could validate the medical superiority of accelerator-produced isotopes, triggering further investment.
• Regulatory Tailwinds: Government initiatives like the U.S. DOE’s Isotope Program (opens in a new tab) are actively funding domestic alpha-emitter production, reducing geopolitical risk.
• M&A Activity: The sector is ripe for consolidation, with large-cap pharma and medtech firms likely to acquire key technology and production assets to secure their pipelines.

Conclusion

The story of rare earths in life sciences is evolving from one of simple material supply to one of sophisticated atomic engineering. The pivot to accelerator-produced medical isotopes is more than a supply chain fix; it is a foundational enabler for the next leap in cancer care. By providing purer, more potent, and novel atomic tools, companies like ITM are not just filling a production gap—they are helping to write the next chapter of targeted therapy, where treatment is limited only by scientific imagination, not by material scarcity.

For RareEarthExchanges™, this represents a critical juncture: the value of rare earth elements is being dramatically amplified by their transformation into guaranteed, clinically viable isotopes. The innovation is no longer just in the ground or the reactor, but in the networked cyclotron, making this an essential sector for investors tracking the convergence of advanced materials and biotechnology.

References & Further Reading

Corporate Press Releases & Strategic Announcements (Primary Sources)

• ITM Isotope Technologies Munich. (2025, November). 
• NorthStar Medical Radioisotopes. (2026, January). NorthStar Announces Commissioning of New Electron Beam Line for Increased Production of Alpha-Emitter Candidates. 
• ARTMS Inc. (2025, December). *ARTMS and Canadian Light Source Achieve Milestone in High-Yield Scandium-44 Production Using QUANTM Technology.
• BWXT Medical. (2026, February). *BWXT Medical Secures DOE Funding to Scale Accelerator-Driven Actinium-225 Production.

Clinical Trial Registrations & Data (Medical Evidence)

• ClinicalTrials.gov (opens in a new tab). (Identifier: NCT058**). *A Phase I/II Study of [161Tb]-PSMA-I&T in Patients with Metastatic Castration-Resistant Prostate Cancer (mCRPC).* U.S. National Institutes of Health. (
• Hofman, M. S., et al. (2025, October). *Long-term Outcomes and Updated Analysis of the Phase III VISION Trial of [177Lu]Lu-PSMA-617 in mCRPC.* The New England Journal of Medicine.
• ClinicalTrials.gov (opens in a new tab). (Identifier: NCT055**). *Phase I Study of [44Sc]Sc-Pentixather for Imaging of CXCR4 Expression in Hematologic Malignancies.

Peer-Reviewed Research (Scientific Foundation)

• Müller, C., et al. (2024). *Terbium-161 for PSMA-Targeted Radionuclide Therapy of Prostate Cancer.* European Journal of Nuclear Medicine and Molecular Imaging, 51(2), 321-334.
• Robertson, A. K. H., et al. (2025). *Overcoming the No-Carrier-Added Lutetium-177 Supply Challenge: A Review of Generator-Based and Accelerator-Driven Production Pathways.* Pharmaceuticals, 18(1), 45.
• Zoller, F., & Eder, M. (2025). Auger Electron Emitters in Radiotheranostics: Physics to Clinical Translation. The Quarterly Journal of Nuclear Medicine and Molecular Imaging, 69(3), 221-233.

6. Professional Society Guidelines & Reports

• Society of Nuclear Medicine and Molecular Imaging (SNMMI). (2025). SNMMI Position Statement on the Domestic Production of Medical Radioisotopes. 
• European Association of Nuclear Medicine (EAMN). (2025). EANM White Paper: The Future of Theranostics – Infrastructure and Education.

• A 2024 UN report confirms that refining, processing, and recycling—not mining—are the real bottlenecks in critical minerals supply, with China dominating midstream control of lithium, cobalt, and rare earths.
• The Guidebook acknowledges that recycling won't scale until the 2030s and new mining remains essential, despite circular economy advocacy and governance frameworks like UNFC.
• While the report proposes global standards and cooperation, it quietly confirms there are no quick fixes—building diversified supply chains takes decades, not frameworks.

A United Nations report (opens in a new tab) in 2024 explains why minerals like rare earths, lithium, and cobalt are essential for clean energy—and why shortages, geopolitics, and pollution risks make the transition harder than headlines suggest. The report correctly shows that mining alone won’t solve the problem: refining, processing, and recycling are the real bottlenecks, most of which are still dominated by China. While the UN proposes better global standards and cooperation, the report also quietly confirms a harsher truth: there are no quick fixes, and building real supply chains takes decades, not frameworks.

A Youth-Driven UN Intervention

The United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE) published Critical Minerals for the Sustainable Energy Transition: A Guidebook to Support Intergenerational Action, coordinated by Jodi-Ann Wang and Vadim Kuznetsov with contributions from the Resource Management Young Member Group. The report aims to educate a broad audience on the full critical-minerals lifecycle while embedding environmental protection, social equity, and long-term stewardship into energy-transition planning.

The tone is accessible and unusually candid for a UN publication.

Where the Report Is Firmly Grounded

The Guidebook appears accurate and well-sourced on several core points:

• Supply concentration is real and extreme. The report correctly documents that lithium, cobalt, and rare earth supply chains—especially refining—are highly concentrated geographically, with China controlling a dominant share of midstream and downstream processing.
• Midstream matters more than mines. The authors explicitly note that extraction alone does not ensure supply security; chemical separation, refining, and manufacturing capacity are the true chokepoints.
• Recycling will not scale fast enough. The report accurately states that large-scale recycling of EV batteries and clean-energy hardware will not materially relieve supply pressure until the 2030s, due to long product lifespans and thermodynamic losses.
• Primary mining remains unavoidable. Despite strong circular-economy advocacy, the Guidebook acknowledges that metals cannot be recycled indefinitely and that new mining will remain essential.

These conclusions align with IEA, USGS, and independent industry data.

The Subtle Bias: Governance Over Gravity

The report’s main limitation is not factual error, but institutional optimism. Frameworks such as UNFC and UNRMS are presented as enabling tools for transparency, ESG alignment, and capital allocation. That is directionally correct—but the report sometimes implies that standardization can meaningfully accelerate supply diversification on its own.

What it does not claim—but risks being read as implying—is that governance frameworks substitute for capital intensity, permitting timelines, chemical complexity, or China’s multi-decade industrial head start. They do not.

Why This Report Still Matters

What makes this Guidebook notable is its implicit admission: the clean-energy transition is mineral-intensive, slow to rebalance, and constrained by physical realities. For investors and policymakers, that quiet realism is more important than the aspirational language.

Citation

United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE). Critical Minerals for the Sustainable Energy Transition: A Guidebook to Support Intergenerational Action. Geneva, April 2024.

Critical Minerals Guidebook

• Arafura's Nolans Rare Earths Project FID delayed from early 2025 to the first half of 2026, awaiting German government investment confirmation despite hundreds of millions in public funding and the Trump-Albanese critical minerals agreement.
• Repeated delays expose structural challenges in Western rare earth strategy: breaking China's dominance requires synchronized capital across the entire supply chain—from mining through separation, metals, alloying, to magnet manufacturing—not just upstream funding.
• Nolans case study reveals financing complexity persists due to thin markets, volatile pricing influenced by China's integrated system, and unresolved downstream integration with firm offtake agreements.

Australia’s Arafura Rare Earths has once again pushed back the long-promised final investment decision (FID) for its Nolans Rare Earths Project in the Northern Territory—despite hundreds of millions in public funding and its starring role in a Trump–Albanese critical minerals agreement. The delay is not trivial according to some accounts. Does it expose the widening gap between political ambition and the hard mechanics of building a non-Chinese rare earth supply chain?

Arafura is ranked near the top of the Rare Earth Exchanges™ light rare earth rankings.

Promises, Timelines, and the Gravity of Capital

The reporting from ABC (opens in a new tab) is accurate on the facts: Nolans has been discussed for roughly two decades; it has attracted significant taxpayer support; and its FID has slipped from early 2025 to early 2026, and now to a less precise “first half of 2026.” The company cites ongoing negotiations—most recently, pending confirmation of German government investment. Management emphasizes certainty over speed, a rational stance for a capital-intensive project operating in volatile markets.

What’s notable is not the delay itself, but the reason it persists: financing complexity in a market where prices are thin, policy signals are noisy, and downstream integration remains unresolved.

Where the Narrative Overreaches

Political framing has repeatedly cast Nolans as a near-term counterweight to China’s dominance. That is optimistic at best. Mining is only the first link. Value—and leverage—reside downstream in separation, metals, alloying, and magnet manufacturing. Without firm offtake into these layers, upstream projects struggle to clear financing hurdles, regardless of geopolitical importance.

The ABC quotes analysts noting price volatility and “manipulated” markets. That is directionally true: China’s integrated system can dampen prices to deter competition. But it’s incomplete to imply that price alone explains Nolan’s delay. The deeper issue is alignment—between mine timelines, processing capacity, and end-market demand.

What This Says About Western Strategy

Nolan’s repeated delays underscore a structural lesson: announcing strategic intent is easier than synchronizing capital across the supply chain. Even with U.S. and Australian political backing—and high-profile investors—the project must still satisfy lenders, equity partners, and offtake customers who prioritize returns, not rhetoric.

This does not mean Nolans won’t proceed. As Rare Earth Exchanges™ has reported, the company is poised to advance.  It likely will. But its stop-start cadence highlights why Western rare earth strategies must be judged by throughput and integration, not press conferences.

Why This Matters

For investors and policymakers, Nolans is a case study. Breaking China’s dominance requires more than upstream funding; it requires bankable pathways to magnets. Until those pathways are locked, delays are not anomalies—they’re signals.

Source: ABC News (Matt Garrick), January 2026

• U.S. allies are cautiously reopening trade channels with China due to tariff threats and diplomatic unpredictability under Trump, seeking optionality over allegiance.
• China's control over rare earth processing, magnet production, and critical mineral supply chains gives Beijing structural leverage over EVs, defense, and electronics manufacturing.
• This represents transactional détente in the Great Powers Era 2.0, where allies tolerate China exposure to navigate supply-chain bottlenecks Washington hasn't resolved.

Wall Street Journal yesterday reported (opens in a new tab) that U.S. allies—stung by tariff threats and diplomatic volatility under President Donald Trump—are cautiously reopening channels with China. Canada trims EV tariffs. Britain restarts trade talks. Europe toys with price floors over punitive duties. On the surface, this is a trade diversification story. Underneath, it is a supply-chain anxiety story—one where rare earths quietly matter.

On the Money

The article accurately captures the hedging behavior of middle powers. Faced with an unpredictable Washington, allies are seeking optionality, not allegiance. China’s economic gravity—despite geopolitical risk—makes it unavoidable. The piece also correctly notes Beijing’s willingness to use trade as leverage, including last year’s rare earth export restrictions. That detail is not incidental; it is the sharpest reminder that trade realignment collides with material reality.

Where the Story Skims the Surface

What goes underplayed is why China retains leverage even as trust erodes. It isn’t just market size—it’s control over critical inputs. Rare earth separation, magnet production, and processing depth give China a veto-like influence over EVs, wind turbines, defense systems, and electronics. Allies flirting with Beijing are not chasing cheap goods alone; they are navigating bottlenecks Washington has yet to resolve.

The article frames rare earths as one pressure tool among many. In practice, they are the pressure point—low-visibility, high-impact, and hard to substitute quickly.

The Investor Reality Check

This is not a return to pre-2012 globalization. It is a transactional détente shaped by fear of being squeezed between two giants. Part of the emergence of the Great Powers Era 2.0. 

For investors, the implication is blunt: expect more hedging, more bilateral deals, and more tolerance for China exposure—until rare earth chokepoints tighten again. When they do, trade diplomacy will snap back to industrial reality.

Bottom Line

China doesn’t need allies to admire it—it only needs them to depend on it. As long as rare earth midstream capacity, critical-mineral chokepoints, and a disproportionate share of global manufacturing remain concentrated inside China, Beijing’s leverage is structural and enduring—no matter how often Western capitals invoke the language of “de-risking.” Rare Earth Exchanges™ has repeatedly cautioned that China is moving to control the innovation downstream.

Citation: Wall Street Journal, Jan. 26–27, 2026

• China's Ministry of Civil Affairs released revised Administrative Measures for Social Organizations evaluation, effective March 1, 2026.
• Tightening standards for trade associations, chambers of commerce, and foundations that serve as policy intermediaries for Western companies.
• The measures introduce expanded post-rating supervision with follow-up evaluations for 4A-rated organizations.
• Consolidate oversight authority by abolishing the separate review committee.
• Allow simplified re-evaluations within two years.
• For Western firms, ratings increasingly function as regulatory trust signals affecting government access, policy consultation, and influence within China's policy ecosystem.
• Require closer monitoring of Chinese industry partners' regulatory status.

China has released newly revised Administrative Measures for the Evaluation of Social Organizations, strengthening how trade associations, chambers of commerce, foundations, and other nonprofit entities are evaluated and supervised. The rules were published on January 26 by the Ministry of Civil Affairs of China, according to Xinhua News Agency, and will take effect on March 1, 2026.

For business audiences

This matters because many influential industry bodies—including those representing rare earths, semiconductors, energy, advanced manufacturing, and emerging technologies—fall under China’s legal definition of “social organizations.” These entities often serve as policy intermediaries, standards coordinators, and official counterparts for Western companies operating in or with China.

What Changed—and Why It Matters

The revised measures reaffirm that evaluations are formally voluntary but administered by civil affairs authorities, which organize approved third-party institutions and experts to conduct comprehensive assessments and assign official ratings. The framework spans six chapters and 36 articles, tightening standards around evaluation scope, procedures, and ongoing supervision.

Procedurally, China has streamlined oversight by abolishing a separate review committee and consolidating its functions into a single evaluation committee. This centralizes authority and simplifies governance. The rules also allow organizations seeking re-evaluation within two years of a prior rating to undergo simplified on-site inspections—an efficiency gain that still preserves regulatory continuity.

A Shift Toward Continuous Monitoring

The most consequential update is expanded post-rating supervision. Civil affairs authorities are now explicitly empowered to conduct follow-up evaluations on a sampled basis for organizations rated 4A or higher—China’s top performance tier. If an organization experiences developments that could affect its rating, regulators must initiate a verification review and may adjust or downgrade the rating based on findings.

For Western firms, this signals a tighter and more dynamic compliance environment around Chinese trade associations and nonprofit partners. Ratings increasingly function as a regulatory trust signal, shaping access to government engagement, funding eligibility, policy consultation, and reputational standing. Quiet changes in an association’s rating could materially alter who has influence—and who does not—inside China’s policy ecosystem.

Why This Is Business News

While framed as administrative reform, the update reflects Beijing’s broader push for disciplined governance, administrative accountability, and standardized oversight across civil-society-linked institutions. For U.S. and European companies that rely on Chinese industry groups for market intelligence, advocacy, or partnership, closer monitoring of regulatory status, leadership stability, and government relationships is becoming essential.

Disclaimer: This news item originates from Chinese state-affiliated media and industry organizations. All information should be independently verified through non-state or international sources before being relied upon for business, legal, or investment decisions.

• India and EU finalized a landmark free trade agreement slashing tariffs on nearly all goods.
• The agreement affects 96.6% of EU exports and 99.5% of Indian goods.
• EU firms are expected to save €4 billion annually.
• Exports are projected to double by 2032.
• The deal dramatically reduces Indian auto tariffs from 110% to 10% over time.
• Europe will open to Indian textiles, gems, and chemicals.
• The agreement is praised as the 'mother of all deals' by Modi and von der Leyen.
• The agreement contains no binding framework for rare earth minerals or critical supply chains.
• While it serves as a macro trade tailwind, it is not a catalyst for breaking China's rare earth dominance.

Is this a tariff earthquake, by the numbers? Is the India and European Union deal a Trump stunner as spin goes in European and India media? India and the EU have finalized a long-delayed free trade agreement that slashes tariffs on nearly all traded goods. According to Reuters, India will reduce tariffs on 96.6% of EU exports, while the EU will cut duties on 99.5% of Indian goods over seven years. European firms are projected to save roughly €4 billion annually in duties, with EU exports to India forecast to double by 2032.

The deal sharply lowers Indian tariffs on EU autos—from as high as 110% to 10% over time—while opening Europe to Indian textiles, gems, chemicals, leather, and marine products. Leaders including India’s Prime Minister Narendra Modi and European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen have branded it the “mother of all deals.”

What the Coverage Gets Right

Reporting from BBC (opens in a new tab) and Reuters (opens in a new tab) is largely accurate on mechanics and scale. This is India’s largest trade agreement to date, driven in part by U.S. tariffs that pushed both sides to diversify trade exposure. The pact meaningfully improves EU access to a historically protected Indian market and cushions India’s labor-intensive exporters hit by 50% U.S. duties.

Claims of job creation and export booms, however, remain projections. They assume frictionless implementation, regulatory alignment, and demand growth—conditions that rarely arrive all at once.

The Strategic Omission Investors Should Notice

For rare-earth and critical minerals observers, the silence is deafening. Despite parallel talks on security and defense cooperation, the trade text offers no binding framework on rare earth extraction, separation, magnet manufacturing, or stockpiling. At a moment when both India and Europe publicly frame rare earths as strategic vulnerabilities, this agreement liberalizes finished goods while leaving mineral chokepoints untouched.

That matters. Tariff relief does not weaken China’s dominance in rare earth midstream processing. It simply reroutes trade around tariffs, not around dependency.

Bottom Line

This is a major trade deal—real, consequential, and politically timely. It is not an industrial strategy for critical minerals. Investors should treat it as a macro trade tailwind, not a rare earth catalyst.

• Russia's proposed $9.2 billion Angara-Yenisei Valley hub aims to increase its global rare earth share from 1.3% to 10% by 2030.
• The project positions minerals as leverage in Ukraine negotiations.
• Critical gaps exist in separation chemistry, refining technology, and magnet manufacturing capabilities that China dominates.
• The real bottleneck is not mining reserves but downstream processing, with China controlling 85-90% of refining capacity.
• Russia lacks modern, cost-competitive separation and metallization infrastructure at scale.
• Sanctions block Russia's access to essential equipment, reagents, and Western technology transfers.
• Europe's rare earth vulnerability cannot be solved by swapping Chinese dependence for Russian exposure.
• True supply chain autonomy requires building domestic separation, metallization, and magnet production capacity with trusted allies.
• This is a slow, expensive process with realistic timelines extending into the next decade.

Europe’s renewed whispers of diplomacy with Moscow have revived a familiar claim: that Russia can help loosen the West’s dependence on China for rare earths. A recent analysis (opens in a new tab) by the European Council on Foreign Relations argues that Moscow is positioning its minerals sector—centered on a planned Siberian processing hub—as leverage in any future Ukraine talks. The story is provocative. The reality is more constrained.

The Claim: A Siberian Hub as Strategic Leverage

At the center of Russia’s pitch is the Angara–Yenisei Valley, a proposed $9.2 billion industrial zone intended to raise Russia’s global rare earth share from ~1.3% to 10% by 2030. Politically, the project carries weight: it is overseen by senior figures close to Vladimir Putin. Economically, it is framed as a European alternative to China’s dominance in mining and, crucially, refining.

On the Money

China does dominate—~60% of mining and ~85–90% of refining. Europe’s import exposure is real, and China’s licensing regime has increased transparency demands on Western buyers. Europe has felt the volatility.

But what’s missing? How about scale, timelines, and technology?

The Choke Point Everyone Skips

Rare earth leverage is not about reserves; it’s about separation chemistry, metallization, and magnet-grade manufacturing. Russia has large geological resources, but lacks modern, cost-competitive refining and downstream capabilities at scale. Sanctions complicate equipment, reagents, finance, and insurance. Chinese partners are unlikely to transfer crown-jewel know-how; Western partners face legal and reputational barriers.

The article cites Estonia’s Narva processing plant as evidence that Europe is already turning to Russia. True—but Narva processes feedstock, not end-to-end magnets, and relies on fragile cross-border flows. That is not autonomy; it is exposure.

Timelines vs. Reality

Utilitiesby 2026 and first plants by 2028 sound neat. Investors know better. Even under ideal conditions, permitting, EPC, commissioning, yield optimization, and customer qualification push meaningful output into the next decade—especially for high-purity oxides and magnet alloys. A “10% by 2030” target reads aspirational, not bankable.

What’s Notable for the Supply Chain

The real signal isn’t Russian leverage—as Rare Earth Exchanges™ continues to point out, it’s European vulnerability. The West’s problem remains refining and magnets, not diplomacy. Betting on Moscow as a shortcut risks swapping one chokepoint for another.

Bottom Line

Russia’s plan may consolidate domestic elites and headline a negotiating posture. It does not, on current facts, solve Europe’s rare earth bottleneck. Autonomy comes from building separation, metallization, and magnet capacity at home and with trusted allies—slow, expensive, and unavoidable.                         

Source: ECFR analysis, January 27, 2026.

• China published the world's first strategic roadmap for high-temperature superconducting (HTS) REBCO tapes.
• The roadmap identifies ten critical bottlenecks for large-scale deployment in energy, defense, and manufacturing.
• REBCO superconductors operate above liquid nitrogen temperature (-196°C), reducing cooling costs significantly.
• This technology enables applications in fusion reactors, power grids, MRI systems, and high-field magnets.
• The roadmap signals China's coordinated push to industrialize superconducting technology.
• This initiative could accelerate China's position in fusion energy hardware and advanced grid infrastructure.
• China's efforts contrast with fragmented Western efforts in the same field.

China has released what it calls the world’s first strategic roadmap focused specifically on high-temperature superconducting (HTS) tape development, a move that signals growing ambition to industrialize a technology with potentially transformative implications for energy, defense, and advanced manufacturing.

On January 26, researchers at the Institute of Physics, Chinese Academy of Sciences (opens in a new tab) published (opens in a new tab) the 2025 Strategic Research Report on REBCO High-Temperature Superconducting Tapes. The report surveys global R&D, manufacturing readiness, and application status for rare-earth barium copper oxide (REBCO) superconducting tapes and, for the first time, distills ten critical scientific and engineering bottlenecks that must be solved to enable large-scale deployment.

Superconductors—materials with zero electrical resistance and perfect diamagnetism—are widely viewed as strategically important for next-generation power grids, fusion energy, medical imaging, high-field magnets, and advanced motors. Historically, their adoption has been limited because conventional superconductors require cooling to near absolute zero using liquid helium, a costly and scarce resource.

REBCO materials change that equation. They operate above (−196°C), dramatically reducing cooling costs, while maintaining strong current-carrying capacity under intense magnetic fields. Since commercial production began in 2006, REBCO tapes have shown promise in fusion reactors, MRI systems, scientific research magnets, superconducting power cables, fault-current limiters, and high-performance electric motors.

The report emphasizes two primary application domains:

• Power systems, where superconducting cables enable high-capacity, low-loss transmission in dense urban grids, and fault-current limiters improve grid stability.

• Magnet systems, including fusion devices and high-field MRI, which demand exceptional mechanical strength, fatigue resistance, and long-term operational stability.

EarlyDays Still

Despite early commercialization, the authors argue that REBCO technology remains far from mature. The tapes are complex multilayer composites, and progress now depends on coordinated advances in materials science, manufacturing processes, and application-specific design. Key challenges include improving current performance in magnetic fields, balancing strength and flexibility, strengthening layer-to-layer interfaces, and developing low-cost, high-consistency, scalable manufacturing methods.

Why this matters for the U.S. and Europe

This is not a product launch, but a strategic signaling document. By formally mapping the path from “usable” to “reliably scalable,” China is aligning national research priorities with long-term industrial and infrastructure goals—areas where Western HTS development remains fragmented across labs, startups, and pilot projects.

If executed effectively, the roadmap could accelerate China’s position in fusion energy hardware, advanced grid infrastructure, and superconducting machinery, with downstream implications for energy security and high-end manufacturing competitiveness.

Disclaimer: This news item originates from media affiliated with Chinese state-owned institutions. Technical claims, strategic interpretations, and development timelines should be independently verified through peer-reviewed publications, international benchmarks, and third-party industrial disclosures before being relied upon for investment, policy, or procurement decisions.

• Europe's strategic push for minerals independence is real but overstates speed—rare earth supply chains require long lead times, technical expertise, and capital discipline that the continent has historically struggled to deliver.
• While EU enlargement and partnerships with Ukraine and Greenland offer strategic mineral access, execution remains uncertain as political unity doesn't automatically translate into industrial capability or bankable production.
• Until Europe proves it can permit, finance, and operate rare earth projects at scale without relying on China, 'strategic autonomy' remains aspirational rhetoric rather than supply chain reality.

When geopolitical ambition meets the unforgiving physics of supply chains in the era of Great Powers Era 2.0. Europe’s renewed push to become a unified geopolitical heavyweight makes for muscular reading. Emergency summits, talk of “European sovereignty,” accelerated enlargement, and sharper trade tools all signal intent. But beneath the rhetoric, the rare earth and critical minerals story reveals a stubborn truth: power is not declared—it is built, molecule by molecule, mine by mine.

The Parts That Hold Up Under Scrutiny

There is nothing fanciful about the EU’s strategic anxiety. Dependence on China for rare earth elements used in EVs, wind turbines, and defense electronics is real and well-documented. Efforts to diversify—partnerships with Ukraine, Greenland, and internal projects such as a rare-earth processing facility in Estonia—reflect genuine policy shifts. The logic is sound: without secure access to NdPr, Dy, Tb, and separation capacity, “strategic autonomy” remains a slogan.

The recent British media’s account (opens in a new tab) is also correct that enlargement matters economically. A larger single market does increase regulatory gravity and negotiating leverage. From a minerals perspective, Ukraine’s titanium, graphite, and potential rare earth resources are strategically relevant, even if underdeveloped.

Where the Narrative Starts to Float

What the piece overstates is speed and cohesion. Europe is portrayed as if it can simply will a minerals-industrial base into existence. In reality, rare earth supply chains require long lead times, environmental permitting, technical separation expertise, and capital discipline—areas where Europe has historically struggled. Opening a factory is not the same as mastering solvent extraction at scale or securing feedstock outside China’s orbit.

Greenland is treated as a geopolitical prize without sufficient attention to the commercial, environmental, and social constraints that have stalled projects there for years. The minerals exist; bankable production is another matter entirely—frankly, a decade plus away, all things being equal.

The Quiet Bias: Power by Declaration

There is an unmistakable Brussels-centric bias toward institutional solutions—more members, more rules, more coordination—while underplaying execution risk. The assumption that political unity translates cleanly into industrial capability ignores past failures in both defense and materials policy.

Notably absent is any hard comparison to China’s vertically integrated model or the United States’ growing use of price floors, offtake guarantees, and defense-backed financing. Strategy without industrial incentives is aspiration, not competition.

Why This Matters for Rare Earth Investors

The EU’s ambitions are real, but the minerals clock is unforgiving. Until Europe proves it can permit, finance, and operate rare earth projects at scale—without outsourcing risk back to China—“Super Europe” remains a geopolitical concept, not a supply chain reality. And as Rare Earth Exchanges™ recently chronicled with funding totals, the European Continent remains at a distinct disadvantage due to the politics and administrative weight. This could change, but it will take a Sputnik moment followed by vision, strategy, industrial policy, and relentless execution.

Source: reporting by James Crisp and Joe Barnes, The Telegraph, January 26, 2026.

• A new study shows circular server design—featuring longer life, modular repair, and easier recycling—reduces environmental impact by ~29% over 16 years and lowers demand for critical raw materials including rare earths.
• Life cycle assessment reveals electronics assemblies drive most embodied impacts, and life extension paired with design for disassembly delivers immediate gains even when recycling infrastructure lags.
• Circular design offers a faster geopolitical lever than new mines: it reduces material throughput, slows replacement cycles, and lowers vulnerability to concentrated rare earth processing—one modular upgrade at a time.

A new open-access paper by Deborah Andrews (opens in a new tab) and Kristina Kerwin (opens in a new tab) of London South Bank University (opens in a new tab), published in Mineral Economics, makes a practical point with geopolitical weight: if the world wants to reduce vulnerability to highly concentrated rare earth and critical mineral processing, it should not focus only on new mines.

It should also redesign the machines that consume these materials. Using a detailed life-cycle case study, the authors show that designing servers for circularity—longer life, modular repair, easier refurbishment, and better end-of-life recovery—can materially reduce environmental impacts and curb demand for virgin critical raw materials (including rare earths widely used across electronics and magnets).

Design Beats Digging: What They Actually Tested

The study compares a prototype “circular” server against a standard enterprise server. Across multiple modeled life-cycle scenarios, the circular server shows consistently lower environmental impacts, with the largest headline advantage appearing over a 16-year service period: the prototype circular server’s overall impact is ~29% lower on average than a standard approach that effectively requires two standard servers over the same 16 years (given typical refresh and replacement patterns).

This does not “solve” rare earth concentration risk by itself. But it reduces exposure by lowering total material throughput and slowing replacement cycles—two levers that matter when supply chains are brittle.

Methods: Full Life Cycle Assessment, Not Marketing Claims

The authors use a comprehensive Life Cycle Assessment (LCA) rather than corporate sustainability reporting. They built a baseline model by reverse-engineering widely used servers (including those from major OEMs) and then modeled the prototype circular server using primary data where possible, supported by established databases for secondary inputs. They ran scenarios covering product life extension (refurbishment/upgrade) and two recycling pathways: a business-as-usual (BAU) recovery case (focused on a limited set of widely recycled metals) and a more advanced multi-material recovery case.

They also emphasize that many server components contain Critical Raw Materials (CRMs); even when CRM mass fractions are small, supply risk can be high. The paper cites low recycling input rates for several CRMs—often around 0–1%—which is central to the “circularity gap” argument.

Key Findings: Why Circularity Matters for CriticalMinerals

1. Electronics dominate the embodied burden. Impacts are heavily driven by electronics assemblies (motherboards/PCBs and associated components). This is where many CRMs—including certain rare earths—hide in plain sight.
2. Life extension delivers immediate gains. Refurbishment and reuse scenarios lower impacts materially; the study reports that life-extension strategies (paired with recycling) reduce impacts versus “replace quickly” strategies.
3. Recycling helps—but design enables recycling. Even improved recovery pathways deliver limited benefit if products are hard to disassemble, components are non-modular, or materials are locked into complex assemblies. Circular design increases the chance that better recycling infrastructure can actually translate into higher recovery.
4. Circularity is a near-term lever. New mining and processing capacity can take many years. Design changes (modularity, reduced fasteners, standardized parts, reduced plastics, chassis reuse) are implementable sooner—especially if procurement and standards push in that direction.

What’s Controversial or Easily Misread

• This paper is not a China-specific processing study. It does not quantify China’s share of rare earth processing or model export controls. The geopolitics enter as an implication: when upstream processing is concentrated globally, reducing throughput and extending product life lowers downstream vulnerability.
• Circular electronics are hard. The authors are candid: many electronic components are intrinsically difficult to reclaim economically. The strongest lever today may be life extension, not “perfect recycling.”

Limitations

The prototype is a non-AI server; future AI-optimized hardware could change material intensity and refresh dynamics. Results are modeled using a European-average electricity mix and recycling assumptions, so impacts vary by region and grid. The authors also note uncertainty from reliance on some secondary datasets and recommend sensitivity analyses and further work (including circular AI servers and broader social/economic assessment).

REEx Takeaway

Rare earth security is usually framed as a mine-and-refinery contest. Andrews and Kerwin show a quieter truth: design choices that are upstream of e-waste determine downstream dependence. Circular servers won’t replace the need for diversified processing. But they can buy time, reduce demand pressure, and shrink the strategic penalty of concentrated supply chains—one chassis, one fastener, one modular upgrade at a time.

Citation: Andrews, D., & Kerwin, K. (2026). Design for circularity – a data centre equipment case study. Mineral Economics. https://doi.org/10.1007/s13563-025-00587-7 (opens in a new tab)

• BYD aims to sell 1.3 million vehicles outside China in 2026, representing approximately 24% growth from 2025's 1.05 million overseas deliveries and approaching Tesla's total global volume of 1.64 million.
• Accelerating Chinese EV exports amplify demand for critical materials—NdPr magnets, power electronics, and Dy/Tb inputs—while China maintains dominance across separation, alloying, and magnet manufacturing.
• Nation-states must enforce coordinated industrial policy and ex-China capacity buildout to avoid being simultaneously flooded with Chinese products yet captive to Chinese material supply chains.

BYD’s plan to sell 1.3 million vehicles outside China in 2026 is a clean data point in a bigger REEx theme: China’s industrial system is managing overproduction by pushing harder into export markets while trying to stimulate domestic demand through “digitization,” ongoing “greenification,” and ambitious urban upgrade programs. Theinvestor implication is not limited to autos. More exported EVs meanmore traction motors, power electronics, and NdFeB magnets—and because China dominates key downstream steps, export volume can translate into pricing and supply leverage unless nation-states deliberately diversify and secure mine-to-magnet capacity.

What’s new

At a Shanghai media briefing, BYD’s Li Yunfei said the company aims to sell 1.3 million cars outside China in 2026, compared with 1.05 million overseas deliveries last year (roughly ~24% growth).

That target is below what Citigroup said it understood from management discussions: 1.5–1.6 million overseas sales in 2026.

Export scale comparison: BYD vs Tesla

To understand the scale: BYD’s overseas volume in 2025 (1.05 million) is already approaching the magnitude of Tesla’s total global 2025 deliveries (about 1.64 million).

This comparison matters because it illustrates how Chinese exports can reshape pricing and competitive dynamics across open markets (Europe, ASEAN, Latin America) even where tariffs exist—especially when exports help relieve domestic margin pressure tied to overcapacity.

REEx supply-chain lens: magnets and power electronics are the multiplier

More EV exports generally pull forward demand for:

• NdPr-based permanent magnets (traction motors and auxiliaries)
• Power electronics (inverters, onboard chargers, DC-DC converters)
• Dy/Tbinputs in higher-temperature motor designs

REEx’s core warning remains: if China’s export engine accelerates while it maintains dominance in separation, alloying, and magnet manufacturing, global markets can be “flooded” on the product side while staying “captive” on the materials side—unless nation-states collectively enforce industrial policy, offtake security, and ex-China capacity buildout. The recent Canada— China deal is not optimal from a USA-centric lens, for example. The tension between the USA and NATO over Greenland may not be optimal.  More tight collaboration and coordination among NATO members (traditionally allies economically, politically, and culturally) is likely a net positive, given the severity of the unfolding situation.

• Trump announced a framework with NATO on Greenland and the Arctic.
• Suspending tariffs on eight European countries while claiming the U.S. got everything it wanted regarding defense and mineral development.
• The framework reportedly includes:
  • Expanded U.S. military presence in Greenland.
  • Potential mineral development rights for:
    • Rare earths
    • Graphite
    • Copper
    • Nickel
• Denmark firmly rejected any sovereignty compromise, with leaders stating:
  • Greenland remains Danish territory.
  • NATO's secretary general lacks the mandate to negotiate on their behalf.

According to a January 23, 2026, report by China’s state-run Xinhua News Agency, U.S. President Donald Trump announced that he and NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte have agreed on a framework for a future arrangement involving Greenland and the broader Arctic region. Trump described the discussions as “productive,” claimed the United States “got everything it wanted,” and linked the framework to both defensecooperation and mineral development. He also said planned U.S. tariffson eight European countries, previously scheduled for February 1, would be suspended as a result.

While no formal agreement text has been released, Xinhua reported from China that U.S. and European media expect the framework not to involve a transfer of sovereignty over Greenland, but to include expanded U.S. military deployments, possible upgrades to the 1951 U.S.–Denmark defense agreement (opens in a new tab), and increased NATO activity across the Arctic. One proposal reportedly discussed would allow the United States to build additional military facilities in Greenland, building on its existing permanent presence.

Yet the strategic subtext is minerals.

Greenland holds rare-earth elements, graphite, copper, and nickel—materials critical toclean energy technologies, semiconductors, and defense systems. Could it be that mineral development rights may be part of the emerging framework, underscoring Greenland’s rising importance in the global competition over critical mineral supply chains?

NATO officials emphasized that discussions are ongoing. Rutte told U.S. media there would be “more dialogue to come” and said the talks focused on Arctic security across land, sea, and air domains. A NATO spokesperson stressed that no compromises on Greenland’s sovereignty were made.

Danish leaders pushed back strongly.

Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen said Rutte has no mandate to negotiate on behalf of Denmark or Greenland, and reiterated that Greenland remains part of the Kingdom of Denmark. Foreign Minister Lars Løkke Rasmussen stated bluntly that the U.S. “will not obtain Greenland,” calling sovereignty a red line.

Why this matters to business and the West

For U.S. and European policymakers, the report highlights how Arctic security and critical minerals are becoming increasingly intertwined. From a U.S. perspective, deeper military access and potential mineral cooperation would strengthen strategic positioning against Russia and China while supporting supply-chain resilience.

But from a European viewpoint, especially Denmark’s, the priority is preserving sovereignty and alliance unity while managing U.S. pressure and Arctic militarization.

Even if no formal “Greenland deal” emerges, the episode signals that critical minerals and Arctic infrastructure are now central bargaining chips in transatlantic geopolitics, with implications for defense contractors, mining firms, and clean-tech supply chains.