• The US and UAE signed a framework to cooperate on critical minerals and rare earths.
• This partnership leverages American policy tools with Emirati investment capital to reduce dependence on China's dominance in mining and processing.
• China holds 70% of the mining and 90% of the processing control over these resources.
• The agreement is strategic but currently lacks concrete projects, such as named mines, tonnage commitments, or separation plants.
• Realistic timelines for building processing capacity are estimated at 5-7 years, even with funding.
• Gulf capital's speed and flexibility could potentially change the financing landscape for Western rare earth projects.
• However, financial investments alone won't solve the chemical and capacity challenges needed to reduce China's influence.

The United States and the United Arab Emirates have signed a framework to cooperate on critical minerals and rare earths, aiming to reduce reliance on China. Announced during a Washington ministerial hosted by U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio, the deal links U.S. tools, such as stockpiles, to the UAE’s strategic reserves and investment capacity. It builds on Pax Silica, a U.S.-led alliance focused on AI-related supply chains that the UAE joined earlier this year. In short, Washington brings policy, Abu Dhabi brings capital, and both hope to speed up non-Chinese supply chains.

What’s Real—and Worth Noting

This is a framework, not a treaty or project announcement. That matters. The agreement commits the two governments to coordinate policy, align public and private investment, and use existing tools to accelerate supply and processing. There are no named mines, no tonnage commitments, and no new separation plants—yet.

Still, the strategic intent is accurate and significant. China remains dominant—roughly 70% of rare earth mining and about 90% of processing—and U.S.officials now openly frame this as a national security risk. TheUAE’s role is not as a miner but as a financial and logistics hub, capable of deploying large, patient capital where Western projects often stall.

Where Optimism Runs Ahead of Physics

What the coverage gets right—but could emphasize more—is the time problem. Processing and separation capacity cannot be conjured by frameworks. Even with capital, building refineries, training operators, and achieving stable yields typically takes five to seven years. Stockpiles and forums buy time; they do not replace chemistry.

The newly announced FORGE initiative (Forum on Resource Geostrategic Engagement) sounds muscular, but enforcement mechanisms remain undefined. Without downstream buildout, coordination risks becoming declarative.

Why This Matters in Rare Earth Terms

The notable shift is in who shows up with money. Gulf capital—fast, flexible, and comfortable with long-duration bets—could shorten timelines for allied projects if paired with processing assets in the U.S. or friendly jurisdictions. That does not end China’s dominance, but it changes the financing equation, which has quietly been the West’s weakest link.

About the Source

The National is an Abu Dhabi–based English-language daily with strong access to Gulf policy and investment circles. Its reporting is generally pro-development and establishment-aligned—useful for understanding intent, while warranting scrutiny on execution.

REEx Take

This pact won’t crack China’srare earth grip overnight. But it signals something new: serious capital stepping onto the board. In rare earths, money doesn’t solve chemistry—but it decides who gets the chance to try.

Source: The National (UAE)

• Critical Metals Corp and Saudi conglomerate TQB have signed a non-binding agreement to build a $1.5 billion rare earth processing facility in Saudi Arabia.
• The facility is designed to supply the U.S. defense industrial base and break China's processing monopoly.
• The joint venture would process concentrates from Greenland's Tanbreez Project.
• Critical Metals retains 50% ownership without new equity or debt.
• All finished products go exclusively to U.S. defense applications.
• This venture represents a significant geopolitical shift.
• It positions Saudi Arabia as a new rare earth processing hub.
• The venture creates a Western-aligned supply chain that bypasses China-centric chokepoints in critical minerals.

According to reporting cited by Reuters (opens in a new tab), Critical Metals Corp (opens in a new tab) has executed a non-binding agreement with Saudi diversified industrial group Tariq Abdel Hadi Abdullah Al-Qahtani & Brothers Company ( (opens in a new tab)TQB) to jointly build a large-scale rare earth processing facility in Saudi Arabia.

 The proposed project carries an estimated capital cost of up to $1.5 billion and is designed as a fully integrated mine-to-processing rare earth supply chain explicitly aimed at supporting the U.S. defense industrial base, advanced manufacturing, and energy transition needs. If realized, this would represent one of the most ambitious ex-China rare earth processing investments announced to date.

Under the agreement, the joint venture would process rare earth concentrates from the Tanbreez Project in southern Greenland—one of the largest undeveloped rare earth deposits outside China. During production, 25% of Tanbreez’s output would be supplied to the Saudi facility under market-based offtake terms. With this agreement in place, Tanbreez’s entire projected concentrate output is now reportedly covered by long-term offtake contracts.

Critically, CriticalMetals Corp would retain 50% ownership of the joint venture without issuing new equity or incurring debt related to the processing facility, subject to conditions. All finished products from the plant—separated rare earth oxides, metals, and downstream products including magnet-grade materials for aerospace, defense, and high-performance industrial applications—would be delivered exclusively to the U.S. defense industrial complex.

Why This Is Business-Relevant News

There is no technological breakthrough disclosed, but the structural implications are significant. This plan directly challenges China’s dominance in rare earth processing by combining Greenland resources, Saudi industrial capital, and U.S. defense demand into a single aligned supply chain. It also positions Saudi Arabia as a potential new hub for rare earth separation and downstream materials—an area Beijing has historically controlled.

For Western policymakers, the project highlights a new geopolitical configuration: Middle Eastern capital anchoring critical minerals infrastructure for U.S. and allied security needs, bypassing China-centric chokepoints.

Profile

Abdel Hadi Abdullah Al‑Qahtani & Sons Group of Companies (often referred to as AHQ Group) is a long-established, diversified Saudi Arabian conglomerate headquartered in Dammam, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, with roots dating back to the early 1940s–1945 when Sheikh Abdel Hadi Abdullah Al-Qahtani founded the first trading company that began as a food wholesaler and supplier. Over the decades, the group expanded into a broad range of sectors — including oil & gas infrastructure and services, industrial manufacturing, pipeline construction, petrochemicals, water treatment, logistics, heavy machinery, transportation, consumer goods, and services — and now comprises numerous affiliated companies operating in multiple countries with extensive global reach and diversified capabilities.

AHQ Group’s business portfolio includes supplying materials, equipment, and engineering services to major industries, substantial investments in manufacturing (such as steel pipe production, corrosion control, chemicals, gases, and food packaging), and ventures in insurance, travel, tourism, and real estate; it also maintains specialized subsidiaries in education, agriculture and farms, and sector-specific operations such as beverage bottling under its beverage arm.

The group is led by the Al-Qahtani family — with Tariq Abdel Hadi Al-Qahtani as Chairman, Salah Abdel Hadi Al-Qahtani as Vice Chairman, and Abdullah Abdel Hadi Al-Qahtani as Vice President — and maintains strong long-term relationships with major Saudi and international clients, including government agencies and large industrial partners.

AHQ also engages in strategic alliances and international projects, with offices and operations beyond Saudi Arabia (including the United States and Europe), reflecting its evolution from a regional supplier to a multifaceted industrial and services group with a global footprint.

Bottom Line

If executed, this venture would mark a meaningful shift in the global rare earth map—though it remains non-binding and capital-intensive, with execution risk high. Still, the intent alone signals that Western-aligned actors are now willing to deploy industrial-scale capital to break China’s processing monopoly.

• Copper has shifted from an industrial commodity to a strategic bottleneck due to electrification, grid expansion, and data centers driving structural demand.
• New copper supply faces challenges such as permitting delays, capital expenditure inflation, and declining ore grades.
• The industry faces a massive supply gap: approximately 700 million tonnes of copper needed in 18 years, requiring six new Tier-1 mines annually. However, the sector struggles to deliver even one due to physical and political constraints.
• Copper shortage threatens rare earth supply chains since all REE processing facilities, magnet factories, and EV infrastructure depend on copper wiring.
• This situation makes copper the enabling constraint that can throttle ex-China rare earth buildouts.

Copper has quietly crossed a line—from background industrial input to front-line strategic constraint. The claim circulating online that “copper is no longer an industrial metal — it is a strategic bottleneck” may read like provocation, but it reflects a real shift investors can no longer afford to ignore. Electrification, grid expansion, and data-center buildouts are copper-hungry, long-cycle, and politically protected, locking demand into place just as supply growth slows. The formulation, popularized by global investor Anthony Blumberg (opens in a new tab), lands not as clickbait but as a warning shot for capital markets now confronting physical limits, not just price cycles.

First, is copper a critical mineral?

Yes, it is. Copper is officially designated as a critical mineral by the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) as of its 2025 list, recognizing its vital role in the U.S. economy, national security, and especially in clean energy technologies like electric vehicles, power grids, and data centers, despite its abundance in the U.S.. The inclusion signifies potential supply chain risks and guides federal efforts to secure domestic sourcing and processing. 

The Friedland Thesis: A Reckoning With Time, Permits, and Physics

Blumberg points to Robert Friedland’s Future Minerals Forum (opens in a new tab) messaging: ~700 million tonnes of copper needed in ~18 years, and “six Tier-1 copper mines per year” to meet demand—when the industry struggles to deliver even one. The core logic holds: permitting timelines, capex inflation, declining grades, water/power constraints, and community opposition make new supply structurally slow.

What Holds Up Under Scrutiny—and What’s Rhetorical

Solid as a rock**:** copper demand is being pulled by grids, electrification, and now AI-linked data center buildouts; credible reporting shows copper is increasingly treated as infrastructure-critical rather than purely cyclical.

What’s more slogan than spreadsheet: “six Tier-1 mines every year” and “only a doubling of price fixes supply” are directional, not precise forecasting. They compress uncertainty into memorable numbers—useful for urgency, risky for valuation models. Also, “40% of new supply consumed by grids and data infrastructure” can be true in spirit while varying materially by definition, timeframe, and scenario assumptions.

Why Rare Earth Investors Should Care: Copper Is the Gatekeeper Metal

Rare earths (NdPr, Dy/Tb) power motors and magnets, but copper wires the entire system—mines, refineries, separation plants, magnet factories, EV charging, and grid interconnects. A copper squeeze can delay “ex-China” REE buildouts even when REE feedstock exists, because substations, transformers, and power upgrades become the pacing item. In other words, copper is the enabling constraint that can quietly throttle the rare earth supply chain.                                                                                                                                                     

Citation: Blumberg LinkedIn post; corroborating context from Reuters and Ivanhoe Mines/Future Minerals Forum materials.

• U.S. DFC and Abu Dhabi's IHC announced a strategic partnership to accelerate private capital into critical minerals and other priority sectors, though no specific projects or capital commitments were disclosed.
• The alliance combines U.S. geopolitical priorities with IHC's $239B market cap and 1,400 subsidiaries to counter China's dominance in rare earth and battery material supply chains.
• This signals Washington's shift toward partnering with aligned foreign capital for industrial capacity-building rather than waiting for domestic permitting reform.

On January 14, 2026, the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation (DFC) and International Holding Company (IHC) announced a new investment partnership aimed at accelerating private-sector capital into “strategic markets” and priority sectors—including critical minerals. The agreement was signed in Abu Dhabi by DFC CEO Ben Black (opens in a new tab) and IHC CEO Syed Basar Shueb (opens in a new tab), in the presence of Sheikh Tahnoon bin Zayed Al Nahyan (opens in a new tab). Symbolism matters—and this one was carefully staged.

Capital With Flags Attached

DFC, established in 2019 as Washington’s development finance arm, blends taxpayer-backed capital with geopolitical intent. Its mandate: crowd in private investment while advancing U.S. national security and foreign policy objectives—especially where China’s influence looms large. IHC, by contrast, is a $239 billion market-cap Abu Dhabi-based holding company with more than 1,400 subsidiaries spanning energy, logistics, healthcare, technology, and finance. Together, they represent a fusion of state-aligned U.S. capital and Gulf-scale balance sheets.

Why Critical Minerals Are Front and Center

The press release explicitly names critical minerals alongside energy, logistics, ICT, and healthcare manufacturing. That is not accidental. The U.S. remains acutely exposed to China-dominated rare earth and battery material supply chains. Gulf capital—particularly from the UAE—has been increasingly deployed into mining, refining, and downstream industrial assets across Africa, Latin America, and Central Asia. This partnership formalizes a channel through which U.S. strategic priorities and Middle Eastern capital can co-invest.

What’s Solid—and What’s Still Vapor

What’s real:

• DFC has already financed rare earth and critical mineral projects globally.
• IHC has the scale, risk tolerance, and political backing to deploy capital quickly.
• The partnership framework lowers friction for joint underwriting and execution.

What’s missing:

• No projects named.
• No capital commitments disclosed.
• No clarity on whether rare earth processing, magnet manufacturing, or upstream mining will be prioritized.

The platform announcement last week is hopefully a signal of important deals to come.

The Strategic Subtext Investors Shouldn’t Miss

This partnership is less about returns in isolation and more about re-shaping capital flows. It signals that Washington is increasingly comfortable outsourcing industrial capacity-building to aligned foreign capital, rather than waiting for domestic permitting reform to catch up.

REEx Take

The DFC–IHC partnership is credible, well-capitalized, and strategically aligned. But until specific critical mineral assets are named, this remains potential energy—not a kinetic supply chain change. Watch for the first project. That’s when this gets real.

Source: DFC press release, Jan. 14, 2026.

• Saudi Arabia's mining capital is accelerating from SAR 45 billion to SAR 92 billion by 2030, focusing on compressing development timelines from 15 years to 8-10 years through coordinated permitting, financing, and infrastructure coupling.
• Regulatory reforms, streamlined licensing, expanded geological data, and integrated infrastructure (ports, rail, power, industrial zones) are lowering entry barriers and supporting coordinated mineral development at global-standard velocity.
• The Kingdom is building a capital-rich rare earth platform outside East Asia by engineering convergence of discovery, finance, infrastructure, and downstream capacity—creating optionality that alters investor calculus and global supply chain assumptions.

Going from blueprint to bulldozers? Saudi Arabia’s mining strategy has moved beyond aspiration into execution. Years of regulatory reform, expanded geological mapping, and deliberate downstream planning have laid the groundwork. The widely cited figure—mining capital rising from roughly SAR 45 billion to SAR 92 billion by 2030—does not represent a policy pivot. It signals acceleration. This capital is intended to shorten development timelines, anchor logistics and industrial infrastructure, and impose scale on a sector long constrained by sequencing and delays.

What Holds Up Under Scrutiny

Several core claims withstand verification. Regulatory clarity has improved, with licensing processes streamlined and data accessibility expanded—lowering entry friction for both domestic and foreign operators. Infrastructure coupling is real: ports, rail, power, and industrial zones are being designed alongside mineral development, reflecting global best practice rather than greenfield optimism. Finally, the goal of compressing mine development from ~15 years toward an 8–10 year window is ambitious but credible when permitting, financing, and logistics are coordinated. Exploration incentives function as early-stage risk sharing, a familiar tool in jurisdictions seeking first-wave capital.

Reading Between the Riyals

Where caution is warranted is in forward projections. Public references to internal rates of return “up to 30%” reflect best-case scenarios under favorable commodity pricing and execution, not baseline expectations across projects. Likewise, capital commitments do not equate to immediate output—especially for rare earths, which require complex separation, processing, and downstream integration. The Kingdom is building optionality across critical minerals. Rare earths remain part of the strategic thesis, not yet the delivered proof.

The Signal the Market Can’t Ignore

High-profile convenings such as the 2025 Future Minerals Forum amplify visibility, but attention is ultimately drawn by pace. In an industry notorious for slippage, Saudi Arabia is prioritizing velocity. Early movers in such environments often become reference points—setting standards, attracting partners, and shaping trade flows before competitors exit deliberation. That advantage grows as global supply chains seek diversification away from single-country concentration.

Why This Matters for Rare Earth Supply Chains

Saudi Arabia is not claiming instant rare-earth dominance. It is engineering a platform where discovery, finance, infrastructure, and downstream capacity converge. If rare earths scale within that system, the market gains a capital-rich node outside East Asia. The possibility alone alters investor calculus—and incumbent assumptions.

Citation: Future Minerals Forum 2025; Saudi mining investment disclosures; industry timelines

• Saudi Arabia's Ma'aden unveils a $110 billion decade-long minerals investment plan.
• The plan includes moving beyond traditional dig-and-ship mining to build a vertically integrated processing system.
• This strategy challenges China's rare earth dominance.
• The Kingdom is positioning itself as a strategic bridge between China's processing monopoly and Western supply chain rebuilding.
• Efforts involve partnerships, domestic refining capacity, and policy reforms.
• Policy reforms include tax cuts from 45% to 20%.
• Ma'aden's market cap surged to $73.8 billion.
• This growth included a 24.4% revenue increase and 127% earnings growth year-over-year.
• The company is backed by 63.9% ownership from Saudi's Public Investment Fund.
• Minerals are now treated as strategic infrastructure rather than commodity exports.

Saudi Arabia’s state-backed mining champion, Ma’aden (opens in a new tab), has unveiled an $110 billion, decade-long minerals investment plan. But describing it as “mining investment” misses the deeper story. What is unfolding in the Kingdom is not a resource boom—it is the construction of a vertically integrated minerals operating system, deliberately designed to capture value across exploration, processing, policy, and geopolitics.  Saudi Arabia wants to be able to take on China as a rare earth element and critical mineral processing hub.

For rare earths and critical minerals investors, this matters far beyond the Arabian Peninsula.

From Dig-and-Ship to Strategic Infrastructure

The familiar mining model—discover, extract, export—still dominates much of the world. It works, but it caps value at the port. Saudi Arabia is explicitly rejecting that ceiling. Instead, it is treating minerals as strategic infrastructure, not a standalone sector.

Recent partnerships illustrate the shift:

• Rare earth refining joint venture aligned with U.S. defense supply chains, structured so Ma’aden holds majority ownership.
• Exploration alliances importing Australian geological expertise at scale.
• Equity stakes in global base metals platforms, securing long-duration exposure to nickel, copper, and cobalt across top-tier jurisdictions.

This is not opportunistic dealmaking. It is system design—coordinating discovery, processing, capital, and offtake under one national framework.

What Holds Up Under Scrutiny

Several claims withstand close inspection. Saudi Arabia has materially improved market access through a new mining law, slashing headline tax rates from 45% to 20%. Exploration activity has surged. The state has clearly designated Ma’aden as a national champion, with multiple large-scale projects in the pipeline.

Saudi Public Investment Fund—Majority Shareholder

Most importantly, the emphasis on domestic processing and refining reflects a hard-earned lesson the West is still absorbing: in rare earths, separation, refining and seamless integration to magnet, assembly and component manufacturing—not mining—defines power. China’s leverage comes from chemistry and scale, not just ore.

Where Enthusiasm Outruns Evidence

That said, some assumptions deserve caution. Scaling processing—especially rare earth separation—is technically complex, capital-intensive, and environmentally sensitive. Partnerships alone do not guarantee execution. Nor does lots of capital and policy alignment eliminate market risk. Saudi Arabia is assembling the pieces, but industrial integration takes time, and rare earths are among the hardest materials to master.

There is also an implicit geopolitical bet: that allied supply chains will prioritize Saudi-based processing. That remains a strategic aspiration, not a settled outcome. Afterall companies in the U.S. are also working furiously to offer refining capacity from MP Materials and Energy Fuels to ReElement Technologies and USA Rare Earths, not to mention Lynas Rare Earths (Australia/Malaysia) and others.

Why Rare Earth Investors Should Pay Attention

What’s notable is not the $110B figure—it’s the intent. Saudi Arabia is positioning itself between China’s processing dominance and Western industrial rebuilding, offering capital, policy coherence, and geopolitical alignment.  Given the nation’s deep pockets and commitment to a diversified economy, strong, organized government and pedigree with petroleum, they should be taken seriously.  But the timeline will very likely be substantial.

Minerals have crossed a threshold. They are no longer inputs. They are constraints. And Saudi Arabia is acting accordingly.

Profile

Saudi Arabian Mining Company (Ma'aden) is showing clear signs that scale-up is translating into financial momentum. Market capitalization has risen to approximately SAR 277B (≈ $73.8B), up from about SAR 176B (≈ $46.9B) less than a year earlier, reflecting growing investor confidence in Ma’aden’s expansion strategy and its role in Saudi Arabia’s minerals agenda.

Operating performance is strong: trailing twelve-month revenue reached SAR 37.9B (≈ $10.1B) with 24.4% year-over-year revenue growth, while earnings growth has accelerated sharply, with quarterly earnings up 127% YoY. Operating fundamentals are solid for a capital-intensive miner—operating margins near 29% and EBITDA of ~SAR 14.2B (≈ $3.8B) point to improving efficiency as new assets ramp. The stock’s low beta of 0.32 and +45% 52-week performance suggest Ma’aden is increasingly viewed as a strategic infrastructure platform rather than a purely cyclical commodity producer.

That confidence comes with elevated expectations. Valuation metrics are rich: a trailing P/E of ~46x and EV/EBITDA above 21x place Ma’aden at a premium to traditional mining peers, implying that investors are pricing in long-duration growth, downstream processing value, and geopolitical relevance rather than near-term yield. Leverage is notable but manageable, with total debt of ~SAR 35B (≈ $9.3B) versus operating cash flow of ~SAR 11.4B (≈ $3.0B), a current ratio of 1.59, and positive levered free cash flow of ~SAR 3.9B (≈ $1.0B) supporting continued expansion without immediate liquidity stress.

The absence of a dividend reinforces the reinvestment thesis: capital is being recycled into growth and capacity build-out. Taken together, the financial profile depicts a company evolving from a conventional miner into a state-backed growth and processing champion, where valuation hinges less on today’s multiples and more on execution of Saudi Arabia’s long-term minerals strategy.

The largest shareholder of Ma'aden is the Public Investment Fund (opens in a new tab) (PIF), the Saudi sovereign wealth fund, holding a significant majority, around 63.9%, with other major institutional holders including The Vanguard Group, BlackRock, and Geode Capital Management, though their stakes are considerably smaller.

• David Copley, NSC Special Assistant and White House 'Critical Minerals Czar,' outlined a four-pillar U.S. doctrine at FMF 26:
  • Accelerate project investment
  • Build strategic stockpiles
  • Protect domestic miners from dumping
  • Rebuild permitting/midstream capacity
• The administration signals a shift toward market-structuring mechanisms including:
  • Anti-dumping measures
  • Coordinated allied procurement
  • Price stabilization
• The goal is moving beyond traditional commodity markets to engineer profitability for Western critical mineral projects.
• Key questions remain:
  • Actual funding deployment
  • Permitting timelines
  • Workforce bottlenecks
  • Implementation of 'protection' measures without triggering retaliation
• The approach marks the most tangible U.S. progress on critical minerals in decades.

David Copley (opens in a new tab)—identified at Future Minerals Forum(FMF) 26 as a Special Assistant to the President at the National Security Council, former naval intelligence and mining executive (and considered by industry now the White House Critical Minerals “Czar”)—delivered a clear directive: the Trump White House now treats minerals as foundational industrial policy, not a niche commodity story. Reuters previously reported Copley’s NSC role would center on supply chains and U.S. access to critical minerals.

Copley’s talking points in Saudi Arabia centered on his “four things” framework, equaling  the administration’s operational doctrine:

1. Invest(including equity) to accelerate projects “thatpencil,”
2. Stockpile to buy time and de-risk supply shocks,
3. Protect domestic miners from state-subsidized overproduction/dumping, and
4. Rebuild the ecosystem—especially permitting speed and midstream capacity.

That posture aligns with contemporaneous reporting on new U.S. stockpile initiatives and an overt shift toward market-structuring mechanisms.

The Hard Power Subtext: Price Discipline plus Allied Coordination

Copley’s most consequential line wasn’t “green vs. security”—it was the admission that returns have been structurally unattractive due to “strategic overproduction and dumping,” and that Washington is in “nearly daily” talks with partners on how to protect collective mining ecosystems.  Copley and team are refreshing given DC for too long was incredibly detached from reality.

Translation for REEx readers: this sounds like a move toward quasi-industrial policy for commodity pricing—anti-dumping, tariffs, coordinated procurement, price floors, or stockpile operations designed to put a backstop under Western projects.

The “Strategic Resilience Reserve” concept explicitly aims to stabilize markets while building inventories.

The Proof Points—and What They Imply

Copley referenced specific deal-making, including a major midstream buildout with Korea Zinc. Rare Earth Exchanges™ reported the ~$7.4B Korea Zinc U.S. facility with significant U.S. government financing and DoD participation—consistent with his “we’ll invest like never before” message.

The strategic advisor also framed stability as bipartisan—a notable claim given Congress is simultaneously debating new stockpile/market-support architectures.

What REEx Should Question

• “Hundreds of billions”: What is real appropriated funding vs. leverage/headline project totals? What vehicles—DoD, DFC, DOE LPO, EXIM—actually deploy at that scale?
• Permitting reality: “EIS in less than a month” collides with litigation risk, state authority, and procedural constraints. How often can “emergency” pathways be used without backlash?
• “Protect” = what, exactly? Tariffs? anti-dumping cases? coordinated G7-style price floors? stockpile as market-maker? Each has different second-order effects and retaliation risk.
• Workforce bottleneck: multiple panelists flagged talent scarcity in mining, refining, and metallurgy. Without skilled labor, capital alone doesn’t build capacity. Why is Washington, D.C. not raising this topic more often?
• Saudi/GCC role: FMF is a signal that the U.S. may treat Gulf partners as capital + processing + infrastructure nodes in “friend-shored” supply chains—so where do offtakes, refining, and security guarantees land?

Final Thoughts

Copley’s remarks read like an executive summary of an emerging U.S. doctrine: subsidize speed, stockpile resilience, and deliberately engineer profitability to rebuild a domestic-and-allied critical minerals base—fast enough to matter in an increasingly multipolar contest. While this represents a striking departure from decades of U.S. neglect—and arguably more tangible progress than any prior administration achieved in its first year—the reality is that it is still incomplete.

Rebuilding rare earth and critical mineral supply chains at scale will ultimately require a more comprehensive, durable industrial policy that extends beyond tactical investments toward long-term market structure, pricing stability, workforce development, and downstream integration.

• Saudi Arabia's Vice Minister Khalid Almudaifer highlights Riyadh's growing role as a global mining convening hub.
• Initiatives like the Future Minerals Forum see participation from 57 countries.
• Saudi Arabia is making state-backed investments via Maaden and NIDLP.
• The country is hosting innovation competitions and showcasing digital mining tools.
• Despite these efforts, Saudi Arabia currently lacks critical downstream infrastructure such as:
  • Separation plants
  • Metallization facilities
  • Magnet manufacturing
• China controls 85-90% of global rare earth processing, presenting a challenge for Saudi Arabia.
• Ministerial narrative risks conflating symbolic leadership with material capability.
• Saudi Arabia's strategic positioning could be successful with investments in separation plants, magnet lines, and strategic joint ventures.

Saudi Arabia’s Vice Minister for Mining, Khalid Almudaifer (opens in a new tab), is largely accurate in his recent online claims. Through platforms like the Future Minerals Forum, Riyadh (opens in a new tab) is positioning itself as a global conveninghub for mining dialogue, innovation showcases, and cross-border collaboration. Participation from 57 countries, multinational teams, and delegations spanning India, Europe, and emerging markets reflects genuine diplomatic and industrial outreach—not empty optics, serious business.

Future Rare Earth Element & Critical Mineral Processing Hub?

State-backed players such as Maaden (opens in a new tab) and initiatives under the National Industrial Development and Logistics Program (NIDLP) (opens in a new tab) are indeed investing heavily in mining modernization, digital tools, and downstream ambition. As a signal of intent, this aligns squarely with Vision 2030 and Saudi Arabia’s broader push to diversify beyond hydrocarbons.

Where the Applause Fades

What matters most, however, is what the narrative leaves out. Mining “innovation,” competitions, and smart technologies do not solve the hard physics of the rare earth element (REE) supply chain: separation chemistry, solvent extraction, metallization, and magnet manufacturing. None of the cited achievements meaningfully alter the uncomfortable reality that China still controls roughly 85–90% of global rare earth processing and magnet output.

Being an innovation hub is not the same as being a rare earth power. Without commercial-scale separation plants, qualified flowsheets, and long-term offtake-backed capital, innovation remains upstream theater rather than downstream leverage.

Vice Minister for Mining, Khalid Almudaifer

The Optimism Gap

The ministerial tone is understandably celebratory, but it risks blurring ideation with industrial control. That is not misinformation—it is narrative inflation. Competitions reward concepts; supply chains reward execution, permitting, environmental compliance, and years of capital burn. Investors should distinguish symbolic leadership from material capability.

Why This Still Matters

Despite the gloss, this moment is not trivial. Saudi Arabia is signaling its intent to help shape the rules, norms, and capital flows of future critical mineral markets. Hosting and convening often precede asset deployment. If Riyadh follows this soft power with hard infrastructure—separation plants, magnet lines, or strategic joint ventures—today’s signaling will look prescient. For now, it is an overture, not a crescendo.

• New study reveals Arabian Peninsula's untapped potential for copper, lithium, and cobalt could help diversify global critical minerals supply chains currently dominated by China's 80% processing control.
• Research emphasizes that mining alone won't break supply chain dependence—China's dominance is industrial (refining/processing), not geological, requiring downstream investment beyond extraction.
• Saudi Arabia and Oman could become strategically important supplementary sources if exploration, processing capacity, and governance gaps are addressed through sustained industrial policy and capital.

In a wide-ranging review published in The Extractive Industries and Society (June 2026), lead author Muhammad Zaka Emad (opens in a new tab) of King Fahd University of Petroleum and Minerals (opens in a new tab), together with collaborators from regional and international institutions, examines whether the Arabian Peninsula could play a meaningful role in diversifying global critical mineral supply chains currently dominated by China.

Drawing on geological data, supply-risk analysis, and sustainability frameworks, the authors conclude that the Arabian Shield—spanning Saudi Arabia and Oman—hosts substantial untapped potential for copper, lithium, cobalt, nickel, phosphates, and associated critical minerals. While the study does not claim the region can replace China’s processing monopoly, it argues the Middle East could become a strategically important supplementary pillar if exploration, processing, and governance gaps are addressed.

Why Critical Minerals Matter—and Why Supply Chains Are Fragile

Critical minerals are essential inputs for electric vehicles, wind turbines, semiconductors, defense systems, and modern electronics. Demand is rising sharply as countries pursue energy-transition goals. The problem, as the study underscores, is concentration: more than 70% of global cobalt mining occurs in the Democratic Republic of Congo, while China controls roughly 80% of rare earth processing and a majority share of global critical-mineral refining capacity.

For lay readers, this means that even when minerals are mined elsewhere, they are often sent to China for chemical separation and refining—the most technically complex and strategically sensitive steps. This imbalance creates geopolitical, economic, and national-security risks.

Study Methods: A Broad Review, Not a New Discovery Campaign

This paper is a review article, not a field-drilling or feasibility study. The authors synthesize existing geological surveys, production statistics, policy documents, and sustainability case studies, combining:

• Global supply-risk assessments
• Geological analysis of the Arabian Shield (a Precambrian formation rich in metallic minerals)
• Case examples such as Saudi Arabia’s Ma’aden phosphate operations
• Policy frameworks including Saudi Vision 2030 and Oman’s mining strategy
• Emerging exploration tools such as AI-assisted remote sensing

The goal is to assess strategic potential, not to quantify near-term production volumes.

Key Findings: Opportunity Exists—but Mostly Upstream

The authors identify several important trends:

• The Arabian Peninsula hosts mineralized systems comparable to other major mining regions, particularly for copper, phosphates, and battery-related metals.
• Relative political stability and capital availability reduce some risks seen in higher-volatility jurisdictions.
• Government-led diversification efforts aim to reduce reliance on hydrocarbons and position mining as a “third pillar” of economic growth.
• Advanced exploration technologies could accelerate discovery while reducing environmental disturbance.

However, the paper implicitly reinforces a critical reality: most of the region’s potential lies upstream. Mining alone does not resolve supply-chain dependence if processing and refining remain external.

The China Question: Monopoly by Processing, Not Mining

One of the study’s most consequential acknowledgments—though not its central focus—is that China’s dominance is industrial, not geological. China built decades of chemical processing capacity, tolerated environmental costs, and absorbed losses that market-driven systems typically reject.

The Arabian Peninsula, as described, could diversify where minerals are sourced, but without large-scale investment in separation, refining, and downstream manufacturing, China’s midstream leverage remains intact. This distinction is crucial and often lost in public discourse.

Implications: Strategic Optionality, Not a Silver Bullet

If developed responsibly, the Arabian Peninsula could:

• Provide alternative sources of key minerals
• Reduce over-reliance on high-risk jurisdictions
• Align mining growth with ESG and circular-economy principles
• Attract Western and Asian partners seeking supply diversification

But the study also implies that realizing this vision would require industrial policy, workforce development, and sustained capital, not geology alone—points Rare Earth Exchanges™ often raises. And this is especially so with the announcement of the U.S. Pentagon joint venture with state-owned Ma’aden, along with a partnership with U.S.-based MP Materials.

Limitations and Open Questions

Several limitations deserve attention:

• The paper does not provide project-level economics or timelines.
• Processing and refining capacity is discussed conceptually, not operationally.
• ESG alignment is aspirational and dependent on enforcement, not policy statements alone.
• Geopolitical trade-offs and export-control dynamics are not fully explored.

In short, this is a strategic survey, not an execution roadmap.

Potential Without Power Is Not Security

This study contributes valuable context to the global critical minerals debate. It correctly identifies the Arabian Peninsula as an underexplored and geopolitically relevant region with long-term promise. But it also—perhaps unintentionally—reinforces a core truth: diversifying mining without rebuilding processing does not break China’s grip.

The Arabian Peninsula may become part of the solution—but only if upstream opportunity is matched by downstream ambition.

Citation: Emad, M.Z. et al. Global trends and untapped potential of critical minerals for a sustainable future in the Arabian Peninsula. The Extractive Industries and Society, Volume 26, June 2026, Article 101840. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.exis.2025.101840 (opens in a new tab)

© 2025 Rare Earth Exchanges™ – Accelerating Transparency, Accuracy, and Insight Across the Rare Earth & Critical Minerals Supply Chain.

• Kazakhstan offers Europe a critical minerals partnership combining its resource base (lithium, nickel, copper) with EU technology.
• Kazakhstan warns Brussels must act quickly or lose out to China and the U.S.
• Europe's friendshoring strategy extends to Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan as domestic mineral autonomy is impossible.
• Clean energy and defense needs require strategic partnerships beyond Canada and Australia.
• The Kazakhstan-EU Gateway signals Europe's next upstream projects will include:
  • Joint venture refining plants
  • Lithium processing hubs
  • ESG-compliant supply chains outside Chinese dominance

Europe rarely receives such a blunt warning: “Kazakhstan is ready to do business with the European Union (EU). But if the EU is too slow, it will miss the bus.” That line—offered by Professor Peter Tom Jones, Director of the KU Leuven SIM2 Institute—hung over yesterday’s Kazakhstan–EU Gateway launch in Brussels like an industrial policy flare. It signaled urgency, opportunity, and a quiet frustration increasingly felt across Europe’s critical-minerals community.

Rare Earth Exchanges tracks experts, such as Professor Jones, key influencers in this evolving, nascent ex-China rare earth and critical mineral supply chain.

The Friendshoring Imperative

Europe cannot become autonomous in critical raw materials. That is not pessimism—it is physics, geology, and time. The EU’s clean-energy, digital-technology, and defense requirements cannot be met solely from domestic deposits, even under the most optimistic CRM Act scenarios.

Kazakhstan–EU Gateway’s new cooperation platform

Thus, “friendshoring” has become more than a buzzword. It is the architecture of Europe’s survival strategy: MoUs with Canada, Australia, Chile, Argentina, Ukraine—and now, pointedly, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan. Europe is extending its diplomatic radius because supply chains have become fault lines in a disorderly world where, as Tom Jones notes, a “resource Marxist” sits across the Atlantic shaping U.S. industrial policy through export controls, subsidies, and de-risking rhetoric.

Kazakhstan’s Moment—and Europe’s Opening

Kazakhstan carries real industrial weight: substantial lithium, nickel, copper, and rare-earth endowments; a rising appetite for joint ventures; and a Eurasian logistics position that can feed both European gigafactories and defense supply chains.

Professor Jones’s message was straightforward: Europe excels at innovation—advanced battery chemistries, low-impact mining, precision refining, and recycling—but falters at deployment. Kazakhstan, on the other hand, has the scale, political will, and resource base to move quickly.

The proposition is asymmetrically perfect:

Europe brings technology. Kazakhstan brings throughput. Together, they build resilience.

It is a partnership model that avoids replicating China’s dominant extract-to-refine architecture while preventing Europe from sliding into a patchwork of new dependencies.

Why This Matters to Rare Earth and Battery Investors

The Kazakhstan–EU Gateway is not diplomatic theater. It is an early indicator of where Europe’s next wave of upstream and midstream projects may be anchored: pilot refining plants, JV hydromet facilities, lithium processing hubs, and traceability-driven ESG frameworks.

If Brussels moves slowly, China—or increasingly, the U.S.—will not. And in a world where gigafactories are being built faster than the mines that feed them, timing is no longer strategic. It is existential.

Professor Jones shared the fullreport. (opens in a new tab)

© 2025 Rare Earth Exchanges™ – Accelerating Transparency, Accuracy, and Insight Across the Rare Earth & Critical Minerals Supply Chain

• Kazakhstan offers Europe a critical minerals partnership combining its resource base (lithium, nickel, copper) with EU technology.
• Kazakhstan warns Brussels must act quickly or lose out to China and the U.S.
• Europe's friendshoring strategy extends to Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan as domestic mineral autonomy is impossible.
• Clean energy and defense needs require strategic partnerships beyond Canada and Australia.
• The Kazakhstan-EU Gateway signals Europe's next upstream projects will include:
  • Joint venture refining plants
  • Lithium processing hubs
  • ESG-compliant supply chains outside Chinese dominance

Europe rarely receives such a blunt warning: “Kazakhstan is ready to do business with the European Union (EU). But if the EU is too slow, it will miss the bus.” That line—offered by Professor Peter Tom Jones, Director of the KU Leuven SIM2 Institute—hung over yesterday’s Kazakhstan–EU Gateway launch in Brussels like an industrial policy flare. It signaled urgency, opportunity, and a quiet frustration increasingly felt across Europe’s critical-minerals community.

Rare Earth Exchanges tracks experts, such as Professor Jones, key influencers in this evolving, nascent ex-China rare earth and critical mineral supply chain.

The Friendshoring Imperative

Europe cannot become autonomous in critical raw materials. That is not pessimism—it is physics, geology, and time. The EU’s clean-energy, digital-technology, and defense requirements cannot be met solely from domestic deposits, even under the most optimistic CRM Act scenarios.

Kazakhstan–EU Gateway’s new cooperation platform

Thus, “friendshoring” has become more than a buzzword. It is the architecture of Europe’s survival strategy: MoUs with Canada, Australia, Chile, Argentina, Ukraine—and now, pointedly, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan. Europe is extending its diplomatic radius because supply chains have become fault lines in a disorderly world where, as Tom Jones notes, a “resource Marxist” sits across the Atlantic shaping U.S. industrial policy through export controls, subsidies, and de-risking rhetoric.

Kazakhstan’s Moment—and Europe’s Opening

Kazakhstan carries real industrial weight: substantial lithium, nickel, copper, and rare-earth endowments; a rising appetite for joint ventures; and a Eurasian logistics position that can feed both European gigafactories and defense supply chains.

Professor Jones’s message was straightforward: Europe excels at innovation—advanced battery chemistries, low-impact mining, precision refining, and recycling—but falters at deployment. Kazakhstan, on the other hand, has the scale, political will, and resource base to move quickly.

The proposition is asymmetrically perfect:

Europe brings technology. Kazakhstan brings throughput. Together, they build resilience.

It is a partnership model that avoids replicating China’s dominant extract-to-refine architecture while preventing Europe from sliding into a patchwork of new dependencies.

Why This Matters to Rare Earth and Battery Investors

The Kazakhstan–EU Gateway is not diplomatic theater. It is an early indicator of where Europe’s next wave of upstream and midstream projects may be anchored: pilot refining plants, JV hydromet facilities, lithium processing hubs, and traceability-driven ESG frameworks.

If Brussels moves slowly, China—or increasingly, the U.S.—will not. And in a world where gigafactories are being built faster than the mines that feed them, timing is no longer strategic. It is existential.

Professor Jones shared the fullreport. (opens in a new tab)

© 2025 Rare Earth Exchanges™ – Accelerating Transparency, Accuracy, and Insight Across the Rare Earth & Critical Minerals Supply Chain

• The U.S. has accelerated rare earth development in 2025 through deals like Vulcan and bilateral agreements with Japan, Australia, and Saudi Arabia.
• Structural supply chain independence remains at least a decade away without major policy changes.
• America currently lacks commercial-scale separation plants.
• There are no domestic heavy rare earth capabilities.
• The U.S. faces multi-year permitting challenges.
• The U.S. is assembling pieces but not yet operational at scale.
• Washington's optimistic framing overlooks critical realities:
  • Geopolitical risks in foreign partnerships.
  • Unproven domestic processing technologies.
  • Starting from near zero makes any progress look like acceleration.

When Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIC) Critical Minerals Director Gracelin Baskaran tells Bloomberg that the U.S. is “way ahead of last year” in rare earth development, the headline sounds reassuring—almost triumphant.

But Rare Earth Exchanges readers know that rare earth resilience is not built in a fiscal quarter. It is built in infrastructure, industrial capability, human capital, and time—lots of it. And without major industrial-policy additions, the United States remains a decade away from genuine supply-chain resilience.

On the Money

First, the U.S. has moved faster in 2025 than in any prior year. That is true, and Gracelin Baskaran is one of the most quoted rare earth sector subject matter experts.

• The Vulcan deal (mining + processing + magnet ambitions) is real, though early.
• The U.S. is aggressively assembling bilateral mineral agreements with Japan, Australia, Brazil, Saudi Arabia, and the DRC.
• Washington’s renewed interest in heavy rare earths, especially via Saudi deposits, aligns with known U.S. deficits.
• The observation that U.S. automakers must bring magnet supply closer to home is accurate—Detroit learned in 2024–25 that supply-chain shocks shut factories.
• Of course the MP Materials deal and more.

These statements match REEx’s independent tracking.

Where the Outlook Leans a Bit Optimistic

Baskaran’s suggestion that processing rare earths domestically is a simple matter of “choice” understates the reality. The U.S. faces:

• Zero commercial-scale separation plants online today, aside from limited tolling or pilot capabilities.  Yes, MP Materials received $150 million to expand a heavy rare earth facility, but that will take time.  Yes, ReElement Technologies is excited about their proprietary, patented chromatographic separation and purification technology, based on research from Purdue University--employing ligand-assisted displacement (LAD) chromatography in aqueous (water-based) systems, avoiding toxic organic solvents. But they must prove this out at scale.  Phoenix Tailings also shows real promise—but it's still early days.
• A multi-year permitting slog for every mine, refinery, or magnet facility.
• No domestic heavy-rare-earth separation capabilities yet commercialized—and we are a ways out!
• A magnet industry that is still in infancy, despite DoD-backed MP Materials and Noveon.

This isn’t doom. It is the truth: the U.S. is assembling pieces, but the orchestra is not yet playing.

Where Bias and DC Framing Appear

CSIS operates in Washington’s gravitational field, and it shows.

• The claim that the U.S. will be “self-sufficient” in two years is rightly dismissed by Baskaran herself—but the framing still implies a short runway to independence. Unrealistic. But we give kudos to Baskaran for calling out the obvious.
• Portrayal of U.S. deals abroad (DRC, Saudi Arabia, Brazil) as unequivocal progress glosses over the geopolitical risks, ESG constraints, and on-ground instability that have stalled similar efforts for 20 years. Like Saudi Arabia, were we not going to refine rare earths in the USA? Why outsource to Saudi Arabia? That will not be an issue for years, regardless.
• The narrative contrasts “clean U.S. processing” with “dirty Chinese processing” without acknowledging that U.S. refineries do not yet exist at scale to prove this, nor that China’s modernization has been uneven but real. And they do not touch on the massive green initiative China state-backed entities have embraced—Rare Earth Exchanges reports on those efforts in China.

There is a lot of optimism in Washington, that’s certain. President Trump has declared on at least a couple of occasions that we would have more magnets next year. Will we?

The REEx Bottom Line

America is indeed “ahead of last year”—but when starting from near zero, any movement looks like acceleration. Real resilience demands industrial build-out, not diplomatic snapshots. According to Rare Earth Exchanges’ estimates, the U.S. remains at least a decade from structural independence, unless policy, capital, and permitting frameworks change dramatically, and we have our Operation Warp Speed moment in critical minerals and rare earths.

Check out the Bloomberg episode (opens in a new tab) with guest Ms. Baskaran.

© 2025 Rare Earth Exchanges™ – Accelerating Transparency, Accuracy, and Insight Across the Rare Earth & Critical Minerals Supply Chain.

• The U.S. has accelerated rare earth development in 2025 through deals like Vulcan and bilateral agreements with Japan, Australia, and Saudi Arabia.
• Structural supply chain independence remains at least a decade away without major policy changes.
• America currently lacks commercial-scale separation plants.
• There are no domestic heavy rare earth capabilities.
• The U.S. faces multi-year permitting challenges.
• The U.S. is assembling pieces but not yet operational at scale.
• Washington's optimistic framing overlooks critical realities:
  • Geopolitical risks in foreign partnerships.
  • Unproven domestic processing technologies.
  • Starting from near zero makes any progress look like acceleration.

When Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIC) Critical Minerals Director Gracelin Baskaran tells Bloomberg that the U.S. is “way ahead of last year” in rare earth development, the headline sounds reassuring—almost triumphant.

But Rare Earth Exchanges readers know that rare earth resilience is not built in a fiscal quarter. It is built in infrastructure, industrial capability, human capital, and time—lots of it. And without major industrial-policy additions, the United States remains a decade away from genuine supply-chain resilience.

On the Money

First, the U.S. has moved faster in 2025 than in any prior year. That is true, and Gracelin Baskaran is one of the most quoted rare earth sector subject matter experts.

• The Vulcan deal (mining + processing + magnet ambitions) is real, though early.
• The U.S. is aggressively assembling bilateral mineral agreements with Japan, Australia, Brazil, Saudi Arabia, and the DRC.
• Washington’s renewed interest in heavy rare earths, especially via Saudi deposits, aligns with known U.S. deficits.
• The observation that U.S. automakers must bring magnet supply closer to home is accurate—Detroit learned in 2024–25 that supply-chain shocks shut factories.
• Of course the MP Materials deal and more.

These statements match REEx’s independent tracking.

Where the Outlook Leans a Bit Optimistic

Baskaran’s suggestion that processing rare earths domestically is a simple matter of “choice” understates the reality. The U.S. faces:

• Zero commercial-scale separation plants online today, aside from limited tolling or pilot capabilities.  Yes, MP Materials received $150 million to expand a heavy rare earth facility, but that will take time.  Yes, ReElement Technologies is excited about their proprietary, patented chromatographic separation and purification technology, based on research from Purdue University--employing ligand-assisted displacement (LAD) chromatography in aqueous (water-based) systems, avoiding toxic organic solvents. But they must prove this out at scale.  Phoenix Tailings also shows real promise—but it's still early days.
• A multi-year permitting slog for every mine, refinery, or magnet facility.
• No domestic heavy-rare-earth separation capabilities yet commercialized—and we are a ways out!
• A magnet industry that is still in infancy, despite DoD-backed MP Materials and Noveon.

This isn’t doom. It is the truth: the U.S. is assembling pieces, but the orchestra is not yet playing.

Where Bias and DC Framing Appear

CSIS operates in Washington’s gravitational field, and it shows.

• The claim that the U.S. will be “self-sufficient” in two years is rightly dismissed by Baskaran herself—but the framing still implies a short runway to independence. Unrealistic. But we give kudos to Baskaran for calling out the obvious.
• Portrayal of U.S. deals abroad (DRC, Saudi Arabia, Brazil) as unequivocal progress glosses over the geopolitical risks, ESG constraints, and on-ground instability that have stalled similar efforts for 20 years. Like Saudi Arabia, were we not going to refine rare earths in the USA? Why outsource to Saudi Arabia? That will not be an issue for years, regardless.
• The narrative contrasts “clean U.S. processing” with “dirty Chinese processing” without acknowledging that U.S. refineries do not yet exist at scale to prove this, nor that China’s modernization has been uneven but real. And they do not touch on the massive green initiative China state-backed entities have embraced—Rare Earth Exchanges reports on those efforts in China.

There is a lot of optimism in Washington, that’s certain. President Trump has declared on at least a couple of occasions that we would have more magnets next year. Will we?

The REEx Bottom Line

America is indeed “ahead of last year”—but when starting from near zero, any movement looks like acceleration. Real resilience demands industrial build-out, not diplomatic snapshots. According to Rare Earth Exchanges’ estimates, the U.S. remains at least a decade from structural independence, unless policy, capital, and permitting frameworks change dramatically, and we have our Operation Warp Speed moment in critical minerals and rare earths.

Check out the Bloomberg episode (opens in a new tab) with guest Ms. Baskaran.

© 2025 Rare Earth Exchanges™ – Accelerating Transparency, Accuracy, and Insight Across the Rare Earth & Critical Minerals Supply Chain.

• MP Materials announced a three-way joint venture with the U.S. Department of Defense and Saudi Arabia's Maaden to build a rare earth refinery in Saudi Arabia.
• Shares surged 271% YTD as the company evolves beyond its Mountain Pass operations into a multinational magnet-materials force.
• According to Simply Wall St, MP Materials remains 23% undervalued at $79.11 fair value.
• Significant execution risks exist, including:
  • Unproven Saudi refining capabilities.
  • Narrow customer concentration.
  • A stretched 44× sales valuation compared to the 1.9× industry average with 15% short interest.
• MP Materials may deserve a 'too strategic to fail' premium as the only meaningful U.S. domestic NdPr source with Pentagon backing.
• This positions MP Materials as an essential national-security asset similar to defense contractors.
• The strategic significance could potentially justify elevated valuation multiples despite traditional mining sector metrics.

The emergence of a bold new triangle: MP Materials (NYSE: MP)  the Pentagon and Ma’aden?  Was America not sufficient for that future refining?

MP Materials stunned markets

With a three-way joint venture alongside the U.S. Department of Defense and Saudi mining giant Ma’aden to build a rare earth refinery in Saudi Arabia. Recent Simply Wall St coverage (opens in a new tab) frames the deal as a fresh flag planted on the global map—a sign that MP is evolving beyond Mountain Pass into a multinational magnet-materials force. With shares up 271% YTD and 187% over one year, the market clearly believes MP is entering its next strategic phase.

The JV aligns with Washington’s “ally-shoring” strategy: deploy U.S.-friendly capacity abroad while diversifying away from China’s monopoly on refining. On its face, the strategic logic holds.

But investors deserve a sharper lens.

The Optimism Narrative: Undervaluation or Overexuberance?

Simply Wall St leans heavily on a valuation model claiming MP remains 23% undervalued, with a “fair value” of $79.11 versus a ~$61 share price. The bullish stance hinges on:

• Structural demand for NdPr oxide and magnet metals,
• Pentagon capital and political backing,
• MP’s move downstream into magnets and metalmaking, and
• Policy shields that could protect margins long-term.

This narrative is coherent—but incomplete.

The Missing Risks: Refining Competence, Customer Concentration, and Saudi Execution

Rare Earth Exchanges analysis highlights several potential gaps:

1. Saudi Refining Is Not a Risk-Free Bet.

Building advanced separation capacity in the Gulf requires metallurgical know-how that MP has not yet demonstrated at an industrial scale. Saudi industrial zones remain largely untested for REE chemistry. We stand ready to take a different stance with material evidence.

2. MP Still Has a Narrow Customer Base.

At least some dependence on a few U.S. OEM and defense customers for larger contracts creates renegotiation risk—even with Pentagon support.

3. Valuation Looks Stretched.

MP trades at 44× sales, wildly above the 1.9× industry average. For a mining/refining hybrid, this implies perfect execution—rare in this sector.

4. Short Interest leans High.

With 15% of the float shorted, a sizeable cohort of investors is betting on a pullback.

These omissions do not make Simply Wall St’s analysis wrong—but they make it incomplete.

A Case for Higher Valuation: The “Too Strategic to Fail” Premium

There is also a credible argument that MP Materials deserves a structural valuation premium. No other U.S. company occupies a comparable position across the national rare earth industrial policy stack. MP controls the only meaningful domestic NdPr source, holds long-term Pentagon backing, and sits at the center of America’s effort to rebuild a cradle-to-magnets supply chain.

In geopolitical terms, MP is not merely another mining firm—it is an essential national-security asset—that U.S. treasure trove referred to by Rare Earth Exchanges.  Investors (and the government) may reasonably assign MP a “too strategic to fail” premium, similar to defense contractors or semiconductor foundries during early CHIPS Act expansion.

We could not disagree with this sentiment. At this juncture, that is, the early stages of rebuilding the nascent American rare earth supply chain,  MP Materials is in fact too important to fail.

So from this point of view, even if MP stumbles, Washington cannot allow it to fall. That reality supports a higher multiple than traditional mining peers and at least partially justifies today’s elevated valuation metrics.

Investor Bottom Line: Strategic Win, Execution Risk Unchanged

From this Simply Wall St vantage, MP’s Saudi JV represents a high-profile geopolitical victory. It reinforces U.S. strategic control, purports to weaken China’s refining narrative, and broadens MP’s global footprint. And the stock now prices in at least a near flawless future: rapid downstream expansion, zero commissioning setbacks, and unwavering government support.

The upside is real—but so are the risks, though increasingly cushioned by MP’s centrality to U.S. industrial policy. For now, the company stands in a class of its own.

Citation

Source: Simply Wall St, Dec. 3, 2025.

© 2025 Rare Earth Exchanges™ – Accelerating Transparency, Accuracy, and Insight Across the Rare Earth & Critical Minerals Supply Chain.

• MP Materials stock jumped 12.3% after BMO upgraded to Buy with a $75 target.
  • Citing reasons for the upgrade:
    • Department of Defense (DoD) partnerships
    • $400 million investment
    • New Saudi Ma'aden joint venture
  • These developments position MP Materials as America's rare earth flagship.
• Despite strategic advantages, MP Materials faces critical execution risks such as:
  • Delayed magnet production
  • Dependency on Chinese processing
  • Capital overruns at the Texas facility
• Current stock status:
  • Trading at $61.80
  • Technical resistance at $66-$68
  • Investors are advised to reassess rather than chase the rally.
• The company’s profitability depends on:
  • Unproven full magnet integration
  • Elimination of reliance on China

Shares of MP Materials surged 12.3% this week after BMO upgraded the stock from Hold to Buy with a $75 target. The analyst cites a post-selloff entry point, MP’s new joint venture with Saudi mining giant Ma’aden, and reinforced ties with the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD). For retail investors in the rare earth sector, Rare Earth Exchanges™ (REEx) breaks down what is signal, what is spin, and what is missing.

REEx reviews an assessment in The Motley Fool (opens in a new tab) by Lee Samaha.

A Closer Look at the News: Real Strategic Value or Market Euphoria?

At face value, the story is accurate: MP’s public-private partnership with the U.S. DoD remains the single most strategically important asset in America’s rare earth supply chain—confirming MP as the cornerstone of U.S. magnet independence.  REEx refers to the mine and company as “America’s rare earth treasure trove.”

The Motley Fool correctly highlights:

• A $400M DoD investment and a decade-long magnet purchase agreement.
• A joint venture with Ma’aden for a Saudi rare earth refinery (MP holding 49%).
• A $500M partnership with Apple for magnet supply.
• REEx adds a $1+ billion debt offering with major investment banks plus $150 million federal deal to accelerate heavy rare earth refining.

These reinforce MP’s status as a protected national-security supplier. The company is officially at the top of the Trump-admin rare earth food chain.

But REEx must ask: Does any of this resolve MP’s biggest execution risks?

The article glosses over:

• MP’s long delays in achieving full-scale NdFeB magnet production.
• Mountain Pass’ continued dependence on Chinese separation tolling for key products. Note they have had to stop this but they must be afforded a transitionary period.
• High geopolitical exposure if China restricts intermediate feedstocks or possibly other inputs that are part of the value chain.
• What about the heavy rare earths?  200 tons of SEG, yes. But getting sufficient amounts of what is needed effectively and efficiently?
• Capital intensity and cost overruns at MP’s Texas magnet factory.

The analyst’s $75 target assumes near flawless execution—rare in this sector. Magnet making is hard.

Fundamental & Technical Review: What the Chart and Balance Sheet Say

Fundamentals:

MP trades at a premium relative to still-nascent cash flows. Revenue visibility improves with the DoD/Apple deals, but profitability hinges on full magnet integration—a milestone not yet achieved. Free cash flow remains volatile.

Technicals:

At $61.80, MP is bouncing off intermediate support with strong volume confirmation. RSI shows recovery from an oversold position. But resistance sits near $66–$68, the zone where previous rallies stalled. Without operational catalysts, upside may be capped in the short term.

Critical Investor Questions the Coverage Doesn’t Answer

• When will MP fully eliminate reliance on China for processing?
• How will the Saudi refinery JV integrate with U.S. strategic goals? Why do we have to ship the product all the way to the Kingdom and then back again? This is starting to remind us of Biden and the chip debacle with Taiwan.
• What magnet output volumes can MP realistically deliver by 2026–27?
• Will DoD contracts shield MP from further cost-overrun dilution?
• How realistically can MP Materials achieve near flawless execution (we will give their management credit—they are good).

REEx Assessment

The news is accurate, but not complete. MP remains the U.S. flagship rare earth equity—but also the most execution-sensitive. Investors should treat the rally as an opportunity to reassess—not blindly chase. And let’s not forget we are not anticipating marked political changes as we head to mid-terms next November.  How might that impact MP Materials?

© 2025 Rare Earth Exchanges™ – Accelerating Transparency, Accuracy, and Insight Across the Rare Earth & Critical Minerals Supply Chain.

• Lynas Rare Earths' Texas heavy rare-earth processing plant is stalling due to failed offtake negotiations with the U.S. DoD, with CEO Amanda Lacaze warning it 'might not proceed' under current conditions.
• Washington's 'America First' policy favored domestic rival MP Materials with a multibillion-dollar deal, making the U.S. government its top shareholder while effectively sidelining Lynas's U.S. venture.
• Any cancellation would undermine U.S. efforts to diversify supply of critical heavy rare earths like dysprosium and terbium, as Lynas pivots to Malaysia expansion and other partnerships.

Australia’s Lynas Rare Earths had once been poised to build a heavy rare-earth processing plant in Texas, but evidence is mounting that the project is stalling – and may never materialize. The company itself has flagged “significant uncertainty” around the Texas facility’s future. In an August results call, CEO Amanda Lacaze cautioned that construction “might not proceed” unless Lynas secures offtake agreements on acceptable terms with the U.S. Department of Defense. Those terms have proven elusive: offtake talks are dragging on, and management now concedes the proposed Seadrift, Texas, plant looks “unlikely to proceed” under current conditions.

These doubts coincide with a hardening U.S. industrial policy that some characterize as an “America First” approach. In July, Washington struck a multibillion-dollar deal with MP Materials – Lynas’s U.S.-based rival – becoming MP’s top shareholder, guaranteeing a price floor for its key rare-earth output, and extending a $150 million loan for heavy rare-earth separation expansion.

Although Rare Earth Exchanges notes that the U.S. government has just announced a major processing outsourcing deal with Saudi Arabia.

And the heavy backing for a domestic champion has, according to some sources, effectively sidelined Lynas’s U.S. venture, as even Lynas has acknowledged. The company admitted its Texas project could falter after Washington directed major funding toward competitors, underscoring that government favoritism – not just resource quality – may decide who thrives in the U.S. rare-earth supply chain.

Any cancellation or prolonged delay of Lynas’s Texas plant would be a significant setback for U.S. efforts to diversify the supply of critical heavy rare earths like dysprosium and terbium. The Texas facility, originally slated to begin operations by 2026, was intended to bolster an American supply chain outside China’s orbit.

Is Lynas pivoting? Lacaze has made clear she won’t rely on the White House to crack the U.S. market, and the company is pursuing other avenues – from expanding output in Malaysia to partnering on magnet manufacturing projects – to secure its role in Western rare-earth ecosystems. The fate of the Lone Star plant, however, remains a cautionary tale of policy shifts and strategic misalignment.

© 2025 Rare Earth Exchanges™ – Accelerating Transparency, Accuracy, and Insight Across the Rare Earth & Critical Minerals Supply Chain.

• Lynas Rare Earths' Texas heavy rare-earth processing plant is stalling due to failed offtake negotiations with the U.S. DoD, with CEO Amanda Lacaze warning it 'might not proceed' under current conditions.
• Washington's 'America First' policy favored domestic rival MP Materials with a multibillion-dollar deal, making the U.S. government its top shareholder while effectively sidelining Lynas's U.S. venture.
• Any cancellation would undermine U.S. efforts to diversify supply of critical heavy rare earths like dysprosium and terbium, as Lynas pivots to Malaysia expansion and other partnerships.

Australia’s Lynas Rare Earths had once been poised to build a heavy rare-earth processing plant in Texas, but evidence is mounting that the project is stalling – and may never materialize. The company itself has flagged “significant uncertainty” around the Texas facility’s future. In an August results call, CEO Amanda Lacaze cautioned that construction “might not proceed” unless Lynas secures offtake agreements on acceptable terms with the U.S. Department of Defense. Those terms have proven elusive: offtake talks are dragging on, and management now concedes the proposed Seadrift, Texas, plant looks “unlikely to proceed” under current conditions.

These doubts coincide with a hardening U.S. industrial policy that some characterize as an “America First” approach. In July, Washington struck a multibillion-dollar deal with MP Materials – Lynas’s U.S.-based rival – becoming MP’s top shareholder, guaranteeing a price floor for its key rare-earth output, and extending a $150 million loan for heavy rare-earth separation expansion.

Although Rare Earth Exchanges notes that the U.S. government has just announced a major processing outsourcing deal with Saudi Arabia.

And the heavy backing for a domestic champion has, according to some sources, effectively sidelined Lynas’s U.S. venture, as even Lynas has acknowledged. The company admitted its Texas project could falter after Washington directed major funding toward competitors, underscoring that government favoritism – not just resource quality – may decide who thrives in the U.S. rare-earth supply chain.

Any cancellation or prolonged delay of Lynas’s Texas plant would be a significant setback for U.S. efforts to diversify the supply of critical heavy rare earths like dysprosium and terbium. The Texas facility, originally slated to begin operations by 2026, was intended to bolster an American supply chain outside China’s orbit.

Is Lynas pivoting? Lacaze has made clear she won’t rely on the White House to crack the U.S. market, and the company is pursuing other avenues – from expanding output in Malaysia to partnering on magnet manufacturing projects – to secure its role in Western rare-earth ecosystems. The fate of the Lone Star plant, however, remains a cautionary tale of policy shifts and strategic misalignment.

© 2025 Rare Earth Exchanges™ – Accelerating Transparency, Accuracy, and Insight Across the Rare Earth & Critical Minerals Supply Chain.

• Lynas Rare Earths' Texas heavy rare-earth processing plant is stalling due to failed offtake negotiations with the U.S. DoD, with CEO Amanda Lacaze warning it 'might not proceed' under current conditions.
• Washington's 'America First' policy favored domestic rival MP Materials with a multibillion-dollar deal, making the U.S. government its top shareholder while effectively sidelining Lynas's U.S. venture.
• Any cancellation would undermine U.S. efforts to diversify supply of critical heavy rare earths like dysprosium and terbium, as Lynas pivots to Malaysia expansion and other partnerships.

Australia’s Lynas Rare Earths had once been poised to build a heavy rare-earth processing plant in Texas, but evidence is mounting that the project is stalling – and may never materialize. The company itself has flagged “significant uncertainty” around the Texas facility’s future. In an August results call, CEO Amanda Lacaze cautioned that construction “might not proceed” unless Lynas secures offtake agreements on acceptable terms with the U.S. Department of Defense. Those terms have proven elusive: offtake talks are dragging on, and management now concedes the proposed Seadrift, Texas, plant looks “unlikely to proceed” under current conditions.

These doubts coincide with a hardening U.S. industrial policy that some characterize as an “America First” approach. In July, Washington struck a multibillion-dollar deal with MP Materials – Lynas’s U.S.-based rival – becoming MP’s top shareholder, guaranteeing a price floor for its key rare-earth output, and extending a $150 million loan for heavy rare-earth separation expansion.

Although Rare Earth Exchanges notes that the U.S. government has just announced a major processing outsourcing deal with Saudi Arabia.

And the heavy backing for a domestic champion has, according to some sources, effectively sidelined Lynas’s U.S. venture, as even Lynas has acknowledged. The company admitted its Texas project could falter after Washington directed major funding toward competitors, underscoring that government favoritism – not just resource quality – may decide who thrives in the U.S. rare-earth supply chain.

Any cancellation or prolonged delay of Lynas’s Texas plant would be a significant setback for U.S. efforts to diversify the supply of critical heavy rare earths like dysprosium and terbium. The Texas facility, originally slated to begin operations by 2026, was intended to bolster an American supply chain outside China’s orbit.

Is Lynas pivoting? Lacaze has made clear she won’t rely on the White House to crack the U.S. market, and the company is pursuing other avenues – from expanding output in Malaysia to partnering on magnet manufacturing projects – to secure its role in Western rare-earth ecosystems. The fate of the Lone Star plant, however, remains a cautionary tale of policy shifts and strategic misalignment.

© 2025 Rare Earth Exchanges™ – Accelerating Transparency, Accuracy, and Insight Across the Rare Earth & Critical Minerals Supply Chain.

• Major players in the U.S., including MP Materials Chief Communications Officer Matt Slousther, went on the record for Congress about the urgent need for rare earth and critical mineral supply chain resilience.
• Major Saudi-U.S. venture: MP Materials, the U.S. Department of Defense, and Saudi Arabia’s Ma’aden formed a joint venture to build a rare earth refinery in Saudi Arabia – marking a significant Middle East entry into rare earth processing. This deal, according to Rare Earth Exchanges (REEx), raises more questions than it answers. Why outsource refining from an America First perspective?
• U.S. supply chain strides: A 10,000 t/year magnet plant (Vulcan Elements) was confirmed for North Carolina (backed by over $600 million in U.S. loans), and a new ERI–ReElement partnership will recycle end-of-life magnets into refined rare earth oxides domestically. And REEx suggests that investors read the fine print.
• Strategic alliances in Asia: India moved to nearly triple funding for rare-earth magnet manufacturing incentives to ₹70 billion ($788 million) pe [REEx report]. Pakistan, meanwhile, shipped its first rare earth minerals to the U.S. under a new $500 million agreement. While this deal was announced earlier, PCMA confirmed it recently (opens in a new tab). 
• Europe’s cautious progress: Belgium’s Solvay secured deals to supply rare earth oxides from its French plant to two U.S. magnet makers, highlighting transatlantic cooperation as Europe seeks to catch up. Solvay noted U.S. customers are quicker to sign contracts – thanks to robust American support – whereas European buyers remain hesitant pending greater EU incentives.
• Ex-China market dynamics: China’s export curbs on rare earths are temporarily eased but not eliminated, keeping heavy rare earths tightly controlled as REEx reminds readers. Western buyers continue paying 15–30% price premiums for non-Chinese rare earth supply, with long-term contracts featuring protective terms like price floors (e.g., ~$110/kg NdPr oxide in a U.S. defense deal) and take-or-pay clauses to ensure supply security.

North America

U.S. Magnet Plant and Supply Chain Expansion

The United States advanced plans for a vertically integrated rare earth magnet supply chain. Vulcan Elements – a North Carolina-based startup – selected Benson, NC (opens in a new tab) as the site for a $918 million neodymium magnet factory. The facility will span 1 million sq. ft., target 10,000 metric tons per year of NdFeB magnet production, and create about 1,000 jobs in engineering and manufacturing.

This project follows Vulcan’s $1.4 billion public-private partnership announced earlier in November, backed by a $620 million low-interest Department of Defense loan and $50 million in CHIPS Act equity funding, alongside ~$550 million from private investors.

Vulcan will produce sintered NdFeB magnets for use in EV motors, electronics, and defense systems, while partner ReElement Technologies expands recycling and refining capacity to supply Vulcan with domestic rare earth feedstock from recycled magnets.

These investments aim to establish an end-to-end U.S. magnet supply chain entirely outside China.

Recycling Partnership to Process End-of-Life Magnets

In the recycling segment, ERI – the largest U.S. electronics recycler – inked a strategic agreement with ReElement Technologies (an American rare-earth refining innovator) to process end-of-life magnets.

Under this commercial partnership, ERI will use its nationwide e-waste collection network and facilities to aggregate and pre-process discarded magnets, while ReElement will refine the recovered material into high-purity rare earth oxides.

The arrangement, if properly executed, creates a domestic, circular supply of critical rare earth elements by transforming recycled electronics waste into new magnet-grade materials. This will bolster U.S. supply chains for magnet inputs used in mobility, defense, and advanced tech applications.

ReElement has already begun pilot production – shipping 99.99% pure rare earth oxides to qualified defense and commercial customers – and is scaling up output at its Indiana facilities.

The ERI–ReElement collaboration exemplifies how recycling is being leveraged alongside mining to secure rare earth supplies in North America.

Testimony to the U.S. Congress

A historic congressional hearing brought rare alignment between industry, national security officials, and lawmakers, declaring that America is dangerously behind in rare earths and lithium after China executed a deliberate 30-year strategy of subsidies, predatory pricing, acquisitions, and export controls that wiped out U.S. refining and triggered factory shutdowns within days.

MP Materials testified as both a symbol of resilience—with $2 billion invested, a Pentagon-backed magnet plant, and a decade-long offtake agreement with GM and Apple—and a reminder of how exposed the nation remains.

Lithium Americas delivered the same warning on lithium, noting China’s 70%–80% dominance in processing and batteries, the fragile status of Thacker Pass as the only major U.S. project under construction, and the crippling effect of 10-year permitting timelines.

The hearing produced rare bipartisan consensus: the U.S. must shorten permitting, counter predatory pricing, rebuild domestic refining and magnet-making, reward U.S.-origin minerals, and forge alliances to break China’s chokehold.

The record is clear—China’s dominance was intentional, the U.S. moved too slowly, and public–private partnerships, now backed by the Pentagon as a direct investor, are essential to restoring industrial and economic sovereignty.

Europe

Transatlantic Agreements and Processing Ramps

Europe saw incremental progress in rare earth supply efforts, often in collaboration with North America.

Belgian chemicals group Solvay announced it has agreed to supply rare earth oxides to two U.S. magnet manufacturers as it ramps up its new separation plant in La Rochelle, France.

One deal will provide Texas-based Noveon Magnetics with neodymium-praseodymium (NdPr) as well as dysprosium and terbium oxides – the critical ingredients for high-performance NdFeB magnets.

The other agreement will supply samarium oxide to Permag (a U.S. Sm–Co magnet producer), with conversion to metal handled by Britain’s Less Common Metals.

These contracts support Solvay’s initial production run and signal confidence from U.S. customers in European refining capability.

Notably, Solvay’s CEO highlighted a disparity in market support (opens in a new tab): American customers are “ready to sign” commercial rare earth contracts now, thanks to strong U.S. government incentives, whereas European firms have been slower to commit. This underscores Europe’s continued reliance on policy development (and possibly EU support mechanisms) to spur comparable supply-chain investment.

While Europe has launched initiatives (like the European Raw Materials Alliance and magnet projects in Estonia and elsewhere), industry voices warn that without faster action – such as funding or offtake guarantees – Europe risks falling behind the U.S. in establishing independent rare earth magnet production.

Russia

Domestic Extraction Push Amid Isolation

Russia is turning inward to develop its rare earth resources, as geopolitical rifts limit international collaboration. President Vladimir Putin ordered his cabinet to draft a comprehensive road map by December 1 for expanding rare earth mineral extraction in Russia, which he announced (opens in a new tab) a couple of weeks ago.

The directive, issued in mid-November, aims to exploit Russia’s sizable rare earth reserves (estimated at ~3.8 million tonnes) and improve transport links to Asian markets.

However, Western sanctions and the ongoing war in Ukraine constrain Russia’s rare earth ambitions on the global stage. Putin’s decree follows an April U.S.–Ukraine deal granting the U.S. access to Ukrainian critical minerals – a partnership that Moscow viewed warily.

The Kremlin even signaled interest in partnering with the U.S. on rare earth projects, but any such prospects have been stymied by the lack of progress toward ending the Ukraine conflict.

For now, Russia’s focus is on self-reliance: building domestic mining and processing capacity (likely with Chinese or other non-Western help) to reduce its dependence on Western technologies, while its rare earths remain largely untapped due to political and economic headwinds.

South America

Quiet Week, with Earlier Financing in Brazil

No major rare earth deals were announced in South America during the week of Nov 14–21. The region’s most notable recent development came earlier in the month: the U.S. International Development Finance Corp. approved up to $465 million in financing to expand Brazil’s Serra Verde rare earth mine, cited in REEx.

Serra Verde hosts one of the largest rare earth reserves outside China, and this funding will support scaling up its production of NdPr-rich monazite deposits. The U.S.-backed investment in Brazil underscores ongoing efforts to bolster non-Chinese rare earth supply chains in South America.

Beyond Brazil, other South American rare earth projects (in countries like Argentina or Chile) saw no new deals this week, reflecting a relatively quiet period as projects continue advancing through studies and permitting. Stakeholders note that Western financing and offtake commitments – like the DFC’s support for Serra Verde – remain key to unlocking the region’s potential in the rare earth sector.

Africa & Middle East

Saudi Arabia’s Refinery Joint Venture

A landmark Middle Eastern partnership was finalized this week. Saudi Arabia’s mining champion Ma’aden signed a joint venture with U.S.-based MP Materials (and the U.S. Department of Defense) to develop a major rare earth refinery in the Kingdom.

Under the binding agreement, Saudi Arabia will hold a 51% stake in the project through Ma’aden, while MP Materials and the U.S. government (via the Pentagon’s investment arm) share the remaining 49%.

The planned facility will process rare earth concentrates into separated oxides of both “light” and “heavy” rare earths – an advanced step in the supply chain that China currently dominates.

Feedstock will come from ore mined in Saudi Arabia and potentially other sources, and the refined oxides (including critical heavy elements like dysprosium and terbium) will be used in manufacturing high-performance magnets and military/industrial components in Saudi Arabia and the U.S.

This venture, announced during a visit by the Saudi crown prince to Washington, is seen as a win-win: it helps Riyadh’s Vision 2030 plan to diversify into critical minerals, while aiding Washington’s goal of building alternative rare earth processing capacity outside China.

Industry analysts noted the deal carries minimal financial risk for MP (given backing by Saudi and U.S. partners) and could pave the way for MP to secure more downstream magnet supply deals in the region.

MP Materials also indicated it is in discussions to support magnet manufacturing in Saudi Arabia, which would further integrate the Kingdom into the rare earth magnet value chain. REEx suggested the announcement raises more questions than it answers.

African Project Updates

Elsewhere in Africa, no new deal closures were reported during the week, but progress continues on key rare earth projects. Nigerian media announced the commencement of the Hasetins Commodities refining facility.

In Angola, Pensana’s Longonjo rare earth mine announced a major drill program to boost Longonjo resources to over 1 billion tonnes (opens in a new tab).                                                                                         

Meanwhile, in Kenya, the massive Mrima Hill deposit – estimated to contain ~$62 billion worth of rare earth minerals – is drawing intense interest from both Western and Chinese entities but more data is needed.

However, Kenyan authorities have yet to strike any extraction deal, amid local sensitivities and regulatory hurdles. Across Africa, governments are keen to attract investment for their critical mineral resources, but the timeline from interest to concrete agreements remains slow.

Stakeholders note that sustained Western engagement (through financing, partnerships, and technical assistance) is crucial if African rare earth projects are to materialize and provide diversified supply outside of China.

Asia (Non-China)

Japan–U.S. High-Tech Partnership

Japan further solidified its role in allied rare earth initiatives. In a groundbreaking move, Japan’s state-backed JOGMEC agency signed an MOU with U.S.-based REAlloys Inc., marking JOGMEC’s first-ever partnership with a U.S. rare earth company.

This strategic memorandum will facilitate the transfer of Japanese rare earth separation technology and magnet manufacturing know-how to the U.S. partner and coordinate investment to expand non-Chinese supply chains.

Under the agreement, REAlloys and JOGMEC will collaborate to develop and qualify high-performance rare earth materials and magnets, with an eye toward supporting the U.S.–Japan alliance’s advanced manufacturing and defense needs.

JOGMEC’s decades of experience (it famously helped Lynas of Australia rise with $250M in funding a decade ago) and Japan’s cutting-edge processing expertise will be leveraged to boost U.S. capacity.

The deal aligns with a broader U.S.–Japan critical minerals framework that aims to finance new projects and ensure the allied nations' share offtake from them. Analysts describe the JOGMEC–REAlloys tie-up as a “fusion of strengths” – combining Japanese technology and capital with U.S. resource potential – and a significant step toward supply chain independence from China.

Japan quietly secures the West’s only heavy rare earth supply as Sojitz began imports from Lynas Rare Earths.

India Triples Magnet Industry Incentives

India is ramping up support to build its own rare earth magnet industry. The Indian government approved a plan to nearly triple the funding for its Production-Linked Incentive (PLI) scheme on rare earth magnets to ₹70 billion (approximately $788 million) per REEx.

This boosted incentive program (up from a previous ₹25 billion allocation) is intended to attract global magnet manufacturers to set up factories in India by offsetting capital and operating costs.

The move comes as India recognizes the strategic importance of permanent magnets for electric vehicles, wind turbines, and defense systems, and the risk of heavy reliance on imported Chinese magnets.

With the expanded PLI, India is actively courting Western and Japanese magnet makers – offering subsidies, potentially cheap financing, and expedited permits – to establish joint ventures or local production that can utilize India’s own rare earths (the country has modest rare earth reserves and state-owned firms like IREL in the sector).

This week’s incentive boost reflects India’s broader critical minerals strategy and its aim to emerge as an alternate magnet supply hub in Asia.

Industry observers note that sustained policy support will be key: India’s challenge will be convincing big magnet companies to invest and ensuring consistent rare earth oxide supply for those new plants.

Pakistan’s First Rare Earth Exports to the U.S.

In South Asia, Pakistan entered the rare earth arena with an inaugural shipment of critical minerals to the United States under a new partnership. Officials announced that Pakistan dispatched its first-ever batch of rare earth elements and other minerals to the U.S. as part of a $500 million agreement with U.S. Strategic Metals (USSM).

Not new news but updated announcements, this milestone shipment implements two MoUs signed on Sept 8 between Pakistan’s Frontier Works Organization (a military-run mining entity) and Missouri-based USSM.

According to the agreement, Pakistan will export a mix of minerals including antimony, copper concentrates, and rare earth oxides (notably neodymium and praseodymium).

The deal also outlines plans to develop the full mineral value chain in Pakistan – from exploration to beneficiation to ultimately building a local refining facility.

For Pakistan, which asserts it has trillions of dollars in untapped mineral wealth, this collaboration is a bid to attract foreign investment and technical expertise to its mining sector.

For the U.S., it opens a new source of critical minerals, supporting Washington’s goal to diversify supply chains away from China.

The partnership will initially focus on shipping readily available ores and concentrates (leveraging stockpiles or small-scale mines), while jointly evaluating the feasibility of a polynetallic refinery in Pakistan (wtop.com (opens in a new tab)).

This rare earth “strategic handshake” is seen as a win for U.S.–Pakistan ties and a signal to Beijing, which has historically had influence in Pakistan’s mineral sector, that Pakistan is open to Western critical mineral investment.

Going forward, security and infrastructure challenges (especially in Balochistan, where many resources lie) will need to be managed to realize the full potential of this deal.  Critics seek to better understand the details.

New U.S. Critical Mineral MoUs in Southeast Asia

In October, the United States broadened its network of critical mineral partnerships in Southeast Asia during the APEC summit. Washington signed bilateral Memoranda of Understanding with Thailand and Malaysia to deepen cooperation on critical minerals, aiming to eventually develop local rare earth value chains.

These MOUs, while modest in scope, establish a framework for the U.S. and the two Southeast Asian nations to exchange technical knowledge, promote investment, and ensure fair regulatory treatment for mining projects.

Unlike the more concrete U.S.–Australia and U.S.–Japan critical mineral agreements (which include multi-billion-dollar funding commitments and explicit timelines), the Thai and Malaysian accords do not come with immediate funding or offtake guarantees.

Instead, they focus on foundational steps: conducting joint workshops, sharing best practices on mining regulations and environmental standards, and exploring opportunities for U.S. companies to invest in or assist early-stage rare earth projects in those countries.

REEx recently featured one such Malaysian-American company called DTEC MMT.

Both Thailand and Malaysia have shown interest in leveraging their mineral resources – Malaysia, for instance, hosts an existing rare earth processing facility (Lynas’s plant in Kuantan) and is exploring additional refining projects.

The U.S. outreach via these MOUs is largely seen as opening the door for future deals: as Thailand and Malaysia build capacity and identify viable projects, the expectation is that more substantial partnerships (loans, JVs or offtakes) could follow.

In essence, the U.S. is laying diplomatic groundwork in Southeast Asia to ensure it has friendly access to any emerging rare earth supplies there, complementing its deeper alliances with Australia, Japan, and others.  Malaysia has expressed concern about ensuring the land is cared for.

China & Global Market Dynamics

Export Curbs: Partial Pause, Continued Tight Control

China’s grip on the rare earth supply chain remains a central factor in market dynamics. In a conciliatory step after recent U.S.–China talks, Beijing suspended the implementation of new rare-earth export controls for one year, issuing temporary export licenses to ease shipments of certain rare-earth products to foreign customers.

This pause (in effect through mid-2026)partly rolls back the extra export permit requirements China introduced in late 2025.

However, it’s important to note that China’s core restrictions are still in place. Exports of the most critical heavy rare earth elements (like dysprosium and terbium) and of finished magnet alloys remain tightly controlled, largely due to their strategic importance in defense and high-tech applications.

As of late November, U.S. and Chinese officials were still negotiating the specifics of the one-year license scheme, and industry experts warn China could re-impose tougher rules at any time, suggests REEx.

In fact, the “truce” on rare earth exports is seen as fragile – a political gesture that could evaporate if relations deteriorate. China continues to dominate at least 85% of global rare earth refining capacity and an even greater share of magnet production.

This means that any Chinese export squeeze (even informal slowdowns) can quickly ripple through global supply. The partial easing of controls has provided some short-term relief to non-Chinese buyers, but heavy rare earth supplies remain scarce outside China, keeping Western governments on high alert to build alternative sources.

Non-Chinese Supply Fetches Premium Prices

Facing China’s enduring dominance, Western buyers are paying steep premiums to secure rare earth materials from new sources. Recent contracts for non-Chinese rare earth oxides have been 15–30% more expensive than equivalent Chinese prices.

This premium reflects both the scarcity of non-Chinese supply and the willingness of U.S. and allied governments to underpin new projects financially.

In fact, many long-term offtake agreements now include unprecedented clauses to protect producers from China’s market leverage. For example, one U.S. defense-related contract set a price floor of about $110/kg for NdPr oxide (for MP Materials) – roughly double the current China domestic price (~$55–60/kg), ensuring the supplier a viable margin even if China lowers its prices. 

However, not all companies have this contractual guarantee with the federal government. “Take-or-pay” provisions are also becoming common, obligating buyers to pay for a set volume whether or not they take delivery.

Such terms give emerging producers (in the U.S., Australia, Africa, etc.) confidence to invest in capacity by insulating them against a potential Chinese price war.

On the flip side, Western end-users are effectively paying an “security surcharge” for non-Chinese material. Market analysts note that bifurcation is emerging: a higher-priced rare earth supply chain outside China co-existing with a lower-cost China-dependent stream.

Magnet makers and OEMs in the West are accepting higher input costs in exchange for supply security and geopolitical stability of supply.

Whether these premiums endure long-term may depend on how quickly new mines and plants can bring costs down – and assuming demand growth assumptions remain accurate--but for now, the trend is clear.

Governments are even directly subsidizing some of the gap (through grants, loans, or tax credits) to make non-China rare earth projects economically feasible.

Conclusion

Overall, the past week’s deal-making – from Saudi Arabia to USA – exemplifies this new reality: supply chain security is taking precedence over lowest-cost pricing, reshaping the rare earth market with new pricing models and partnerships outside of China.

But unless critical mineral and rare earth industrial policy becomes a permanent factor in the market, troubling possibilities (price collapse, glut, etc.) remain around the corner.

© 2025 Rare Earth Exchanges™ – Accelerating Transparency, Accuracy, and Insight Across the Rare Earth & Critical Minerals Supply Chain.

• Baogang's showcase at ADIPEC 2024 demonstrates China's strategic advantage in rare earth microalloyed seamless steel pipes for oil and gas infrastructure, extending beyond EV supply chains into critical energy sector materials.
• These rare-earth-enhanced steel pipes offer superior strength and corrosion resistance for extreme conditions, positioning China to capture Middle Eastern energy infrastructure markets while Western competitors struggle to rebuild supply chains.
• China is converting decades of rare earth resource dominance into global market penetration by embedding advanced materials into international energy projects, potentially locking Western firms out of high-performance industrial segments.

Baogang’s appearance at the 41st Abu Dhabi International Petroleum Expo (opens in a new tab) (ADIPEC)—the world’s most influential oil and gas trade show—signals more than another Chinese industrial exhibition. By promoting its rare-earth microalloyed seamless steel pipes, Baogang is exporting a core advantage the West has struggled to replicate: China’s deep, integrated use of rare earth elements in high-performance industrial materials, not just magnets.

These microalloys dramatically enhance strength, corrosion resistance, and performance under extreme conditions—critical for Middle Eastern oil fields, offshore extraction, and deep-well engineering. For Western investors, this is a reminder that China’s rare earth strategy extends far beyond EV supply chains; it permeates advanced steel, energy infrastructure, and heavy industrial technology.

What makes this especially relevant to the U.S. and Europe is the competitive context.

Western developers are fighting to rebuild rare earth supply chains at the same moment China is monetizing its decades-long head start by embedding rare-earth-enhanced materials into global energy infrastructure.

Baogang’s deals and cooperation agreements in Abu Dhabi show how China can convert its domestic resource dominance into international market capture, forging partnerships across the Middle East—the very region many Western oilfield equipment makers rely on for long-term revenue.

As Rare Earth Exchanges has repeatedly stressed in earlier analyses, rare earths are not just a raw material advantage; they are a technology and manufacturing advantage, now being scaled globally.

The broader implication is strategic

As China embeds rare-earth-based industrial materials into major energy projects worldwide, Western energy, defense, and manufacturing firms may find themselves increasingly locked out of high-performance segments unless they accelerate materials innovation and secure their own rare-earth capacity. Rare Earth Exchanges has stressed the importance of this downstream innovation.

Baogang’s ADIPEC showcase is not merely a trade-show victory—it is a demonstration of China’s ability to fuse rare earth science with industrial production and deploy it internationally. In a world where the West is battling to secure heavy rare earth feedstock, China is already selling finished products that rely on those same critical elements.

© 2025 Rare Earth Exchanges™ – Accelerating Transparency, Accuracy, and Insight Across the Rare Earth & Critical Minerals Supply Chain.

• CSIS correctly identifies heavy rare earths as the global choke point and Saudi Arabia's genuine strategic ambition.
• Treats ministry-supplied estimates as bankable geology when Jabal Sayid remains an unproven copper mine without JORC or NI 43-101 compliant REE resources.
• The MP-Ma'aden refinery joint venture faces critical unresolved hurdles:
  • No published flowsheet
  • No engineering design
  • No timeline to production
  • Unproven heavy REE separation capabilities
• Makes near-term claims of reshaping global refining overly optimistic.
• The partnership risks creating new dependency rather than diversification as every ton refined in Saudi Arabia is a ton not refined in the U.S.
• Potentially transforms 'friendshoring' into long-term strategic offshoring while midstream jobs and technical know-how move offshore.

When Center for Strategic & International Studies (opens in a new tab) (CSIS) describes (opens in a new tab) the new U.S.–Saudi minerals partnership as a “realignment” that will “directly reduce China’s leverage,” it is speaking the language Washington wants to hear. You know, that narrative thing.  And Gracelin Baskaran’s analysis—sharp, articulate, and well-researched—captures why heavy rare earths, Saudi capital, and civil nuclear cooperation matter.

But in the rush to cast this moment as a minerals-for-nuclear sequel to the 1945 oil-for-security pact, CSIS leans heavily on aspiration as if it were established geology and built midstream infrastructure. That’s where Rare Earth Exchanges (REEx) parts ways.

Where CSIS Gets It Right

CSIS deserves real credit where its analysis is grounded and compelling. It correctly identifies heavy rare earths as the global choke point, noting that Beijing’s leverage hinges on its dominance in dysprosium and terbium—materials embedded in everything from F-35s and submarines to radar systems and precision-guided munitions. It also recognizes that Saudi Arabia is serious, capital-rich, and moving quickly; Vision 2030, accelerated permitting, expanding exploration budgets, and the headline $2.5 trillion minerals endowment reflect genuine strategic ambition rather than PR varnish.

CSIS is equally right to spotlight energy economics: rare earth separations are energy-intensive, and Saudi Arabia’s ultra-low solar and wind LCOEs give it a real midstream cost advantage. Finally, its emphasis on civil nuclear cooperation is well taken—linking uranium resources, alternatives to Russian and Chinese enrichment, and Saudi baseload power to future minerals processing is strategically sound. On the fundamental question of why Saudi Arabia matters and why heavy REEs matter, CSIS is firmly on solid ground.

Where the Story Gets Ahead of the Drill Bit

Where REEx parts ways with CSIS is in how confidently the think tank treats ministry-supplied optimism as if it were bankable geology. CSIS leans heavily on Saudi government estimates that paint Jabal Sayid deposit as a rare earth treasure chest—552,000 tons of heavy REEs and another 355,000 tons of lights—elevating it to one of the world’s “four most valuable” rare earth deposits. It’s a striking claim, but one built on sand, not rock. In the real world, Jabal Sayid is—right now—a copper mine.

Barrick and Ma’aden’s own disclosures classify it as a VHMS copper operation with zinc credits, not a defined REE deposit, not a JORC resource, not NI 43-101 compliant, and not backed by metallurgical testwork or a mine plan.

And this is where the narrative drifts into fiction-by-extrapolation. “Value” is not a resource category, and ministry estimates are not substitutes for independent audits. A reminder to investors.  Saudi Arabia may well sit on meaningful REE potential—its geology is young in exploration terms, and the government is spending aggressively—but promoting Jabal Sayid as a top-tier global rare earth asset today is not analysis; it’s ambition masquerading as certainty.

Rare Earth Exchanges sticks with the disciplined framing: Saudi’s rare earth base is promising but unproven—anyone claiming otherwise is getting ahead of the drill bit.

The Refinery JV: Diversification or Distant Mirage?

CSIS accurately summarizes the deal mechanics:

• Ma’aden holds 51%
• The U.S. (via the Department of War) funds America’s 49%
• MP Materials supplies technical expertise
• The refinery will operate in Saudi Arabia, leveraging cheap energy and multiple feedstock sources

That is correct.

Where the analysis overreaches is in its conclusion that the JV will “reshape rare earth refining” and “reduce dependence on China” in the near term.

For that to be true, several hurdles must be cleared:

1. Saudi rare earth resources must progress from ministry estimates to bankable reserves.
2. Heavy REE flowsheets—especially Dy/Tb—must be developed, piloted, and scaled.
3. The refinery must secure consistent non-Chinese feedstock at industrial volumes.
4. Th expertise, know-how and established infrastructure must arrive at scale.

None of these conditions are yet proven.

As REEx previously noted, the project is operationally nascent:

• No published flowsheet
• No engineering design
• No declared throughput
• No timeline to first rare earth oxide
• No clarity on Saudi vs imported feedstock

CSIS’s framing underestimates how many steps lie between a Crown Prince handshake and a shipment of separated Dy₂O₃ leaving a Saudi port.

Friendshoring or Strategic Offshoring?

Both CSIS and REEx agree: Saudi Arabia could become a powerful processing hub, particularly for African feedstock.

Where REEx applies sharper scrutiny is the question Washington avoids:

Are we building a new dependency?

• Every ton refined in Saudi Arabia is a ton not refined in the United States (and the market trend, due to U.S. spending, has been a migration to America for such midstream activity).
• The U.S. is financing its equity share while midstream jobs and technical know-how accrue offshore.
• “Friendshoring” can quietly morph into long-term strategic offshoring—especially if U.S. permitting timelines remain 7–10 years and domestic opposition stiffens.

CSIS acknowledges Saudi’s faster permitting and U.S. delays—but stops short of addressing the underlying risk: the JV may deepen midstream reliance, just with a different partner.

Verdict: Strong Analysis, Overconfident Arc

Gracelin Baskaran delivers a thoughtful, well-written assessment of the geopolitical stakes behind U.S.–Saudi minerals cooperation. On energy, Vision 2030, and Saudi’s processing ambitions, she is compelling.

Where Rare Earth Exchanges parts company is in the degree of certainty layered onto:

• Saudi Arabia’s unproven REE geology
• The MP–Ma’aden refinery’s heavy REE ambitions
• The assumed inevitability of Saudi-led refining diversification
• The notion that this JV will materially reduce Chinese dominance in the near term

Saudi Arabia is a rising mineral power—no question. But glowing policy narratives should not be mistaken for geology, metallurgy, or project execution.

At Rare Earth Exchanges, we call this deal what it currently is:

Strategically interesting. Politically valuable. Technically early. Operationally unproven.

A headline moment, yes—but the ore body, the flowsheet, and the refinery must still catch up to the diplomacy.

© 2025 Rare Earth Exchanges™ – Accelerating Transparency, Accuracy, and Insight Across the Rare Earth & Critical Minerals Supply Chain

• MP Materials and Saudi Ma'aden unveil joint venture for rare earth refinery.
• The announcement coincides with Crown Prince's visit to Washington, raising questions about geopolitical theater versus operational reality.
• The project relies on:
  • An unproven Saudi resource base.
  • Undeveloped heavy rare earth separation capabilities.
  • U.S. taxpayer subsidies.
• MP Materials gains low-risk optionality with this venture.
• Despite the strategic appeal of non-China refining capacity, the venture prioritizes offshore processing over domestic U.S. capability.
• The project remains operationally nascent with underplayed risks.

As the Saudi Crown Prince arrives in Washington, MP Materials and the U.S. Department of War unveil a splashy joint venture with Saudi mining giant Ma’aden to build a rare earth refinery in the Kingdom. Rare Earth Exchanges has suggested that Saudi Arabia’s national mining company had such aspirations.  The timing is not subtle. Could this be geopolitical theater masquerading as industrial strategy? Certainly an announcement designed to signal partnership strength, not necessarily near-term operational reality.

The press release promises a “pivotal step toward rebalancing the global supply chain.” But investors should take a breath: the strategic implications are far more complex, and the risks are buried beneath a thick veneer of diplomatic varnish.

The Polished Stone: What’s Actually True

Several claims in the announcement are grounded in fact:

• Saudi Arabia does have abundant energy, strong infrastructure, and ambitions to enter the critical minerals game.
• MP Materials possesses genuine technical leadership in light rare earth separation—Mountain Pass is producing real NdPr, not PowerPoint chemistry.
• A refinery outside China is strategically meaningful, particularly one with U.S. oversight and heavy-rare-earth ambitions.

All fine. All accurate. But accuracy is not the full story.

Under the Sand: What the PR Glosses Over

This JV hinges on three assumptions that the press release never interrogates, suggesting Rare Earth Exchanges:

1. “Untapped Saudi rare earth resources”

The resource base is largely unexplored, unevaluated, and unmodeled. The phrase “significant potential” is diplomatic code for “we don’t actually know yet.”

2. Heavy rare earth separation at scale

Saudi Arabia currently lacks demonstrated flowsheets for Dy/Tb, the very materials Western defense magnets require most. Bringing heavy REE separation online is nontrivial—even for MP, this is uncharted territory.

3. Capital-light for MP, capital-heavy for taxpayers

MP contributes expertise; DoW foots the bill. U.S. taxpayers subsidize the risk while MP gains optionality and Saudi Arabia gains a refinery. Investors should ponder who really benefits first.

The Unspoken Tension: Is Offshore Refining the Goal?

Washington’s public line is “friend-shoring.” But building a major refining hub in Saudi Arabia means fewer volumes refined on U.S. soil—even as policy claims to prioritize domestic capability. This deserves scrutiny.

Meanwhile, China—still the overwhelming source of global midstream know-how—won’t lose sleep until feedstock volumes and refinery throughput are proven.

REEx Verdict: A Big Stage, A Bigger Question Mark

MP’s Saudi JV is strategically interesting but operationally nascent. The news is real; the ambition is enormous; the risks are underplayed. Until Saudi feedstock, refinery design, and heavy REE flowsheets are proven, this remains more diplomacy than diversification.

© 2025 Rare Earth Exchanges™ – Accelerating Transparency, Accuracy, and Insight Across the Rare Earth & Critical Minerals Supply Chain

• Saudi Minister Bandar Alkhorayef met with U.S. Interior Secretary Doug Burgum in Riyadh to strengthen bilateral cooperation on critical minerals exploration, processing, and supply chain security.
• Saudi Arabia aims to position itself as a neutral convener and bridge node connecting U.S. capital to African, Asian, and Middle Eastern mineral deposits through the Future Minerals Forum.
• While the diplomatic framework is verified, actual implementation remains speculative—investors should view this as a geopolitical signal rather than immediate commercial certainty until refining capacity and governance materialize.

Riyadh and Washington Talk Rocks—and Power

In Riyadh this week, Saudi Minister of Industry and Mineral Resources Bandar Alkhorayef (opens in a new tab) met with U.S. Secretary of the Interior and

National Energy Dominance Council Chairman Doug Burgum to deepen cooperation on critical minerals. The bilateral meeting revisited a May 2025 memorandum of cooperation between Saudi Arabia’s Ministry of Industry and the U.S. Department of Energy, initially signed at the Saudi-U.S. Investment Forum.

The agenda was clear: joint frameworks for exploration, processing, and rare-earth supply chain security—a conversation that now sits at the very core of both nations’ industrial strategies. Saudi Arabia wants to diversify beyond oil; the U.S. wants to de-risk its dependence on China’s stranglehold over rare-earth refining and magnet manufacturing.

Bandar Alkhorayef, Minister of Industry and Mineral Resources

Beneath the Diplomacy: A Quiet Resource Realignment

The meeting’s language—“boosting partnerships,” “securing sustainable supply chains,” “advancing energy transition”—is familiar diplomatic shorthand. But it signals something tangible: Saudi Arabia’s ambition to become a central hub between East and West in critical minerals.

Hosting the Future Minerals Forum (opens in a new tab) (FMF) in January 2026, Riyadh seeks to position itself as a neutral convener in a polarized resource world. The forum’s annual rhythm—drawing policymakers, NGOs, investors, and mining technologists—has become a stage for emerging alliances outside the traditional Western mining ecosystem. If Saudi Arabia plays its cards right, it could emerge as a bridge node connecting U.S. capital to African, Asian, and Middle Eastern deposits—a geopolitical reshuffling of extraordinary scale.

What Rings True—and What Needs Proof

From a factual standpoint, the reported meeting and signed frameworks are accurate and verifiable, supported by public records from both ministries and prior FMF releases. What remains speculative is the depth of U.S. follow-through. The term “National Energy Dominance Council” suggests a Trump-era extension of industrial strategy, but implementation details—permits, investment vehicles, technology transfers—are yet to materialize.

The framing by some outlets leans toward optimistic symmetry, implying parity between Saudi and U.S. industrial influence. In reality, Washington’s goal is to anchor alternative supply chains under U.S. standards, while Riyadh seeks to diversify partners to preserve autonomy. The dance is polite—but strategic.

Why It Matters for Investors

For Rare Earth Exchanges readers, at least one takeaway is that Saudi Arabia’s mining strategy is morphing into a global diplomatic instrument. The U.S. partnership gives legitimacy; the FMF gives visibility. The missing link remains industrial execution—refining capacity, ESG credibility, and transparent governance. Until those materialize, investors should view this as a geopolitical signal, not yet a commercial certainty.

© 2025 Rare Earth Exchanges™ – Accelerating Transparency, Accuracy, and Insight Across the Rare Earth & Critical Minerals Supply Chain.

• Pakistan possesses $6 trillion in mineral deposits including copper, lithium, and cobalt.
• The country lacks the critical processing infrastructure and technology to transform geological potential into economic prosperity.
• Without midstream refining capacity and value-chain integration like China and Australia, Pakistan risks exporting raw minerals instead of engineered products, limiting true wealth creation.
• The nation's greatest untapped resource isn't underground—it's human capital that requires skills training, governance reform, and environmental safeguards to monetize mineral reserves effectively.

Why geology alone won’t fix a fractured supply chain—or a fractured nation. In an October 27th Dawn article titled “Mineral Investments vs Human Capital,” Dr. Abdul Waheed Bhutto frames Pakistan’s mineral potential as a $6 trillion geological jackpot waiting to be tapped—copper, lithium, cobalt, nickel, zircon, beryllium, and even rare earth elements. His thesis is elegantly simple: Pakistan must balance mining the ground with investing in its people. The argument is morally sound. Economically? It needs a little refining.

The Hard Rock Reality

Let’s be blunt: Pakistan’s mineral endowment is impressive, but its rare earths story is still largely theoretical. Balochistan and the broader Tethyan Belt indeed sit atop promising deposits, but the operational and metallurgical challenges remain steep. The Reko Diq and Saindak projects may yield copper and gold, but rare earth processing—especially separation and purification—demands technology, capital, and environmental management Pakistan does not yet possess.

Pakistan Rare Earth Elements

Dr. Bhutto correctly notes that countries like China, Chile, and Australia dominate because they control the _entire value chain_—from ore to oxide to magnet. Pakistan’s challenge isn’t what lies underground; it’s what happens after extraction. Without midstream processing and refining capacity, mineral wealth risks becoming another export of raw opportunity rather than engineered prosperity.

Where the Facts Hold—and Where They Drift

Dr. Bhutto’s call for investment in human capital and digital innovation rings true. AI-driven geological mapping, for example, could improve exploration accuracy dramatically. His warning against geopolitical manipulation—particularly U.S.-China competition over Balochistan—is also fair. Yet, his implication that foreign investment alone could unlock Pakistan’s mineral promise oversimplifies a far more tangled equation.

Mining infrastructure requires not just funds, but power grids, clean water, governance, and processing technology—and those aren’t solved by policy essays or foreign MOUs. Moreover, the “US interest” narrative borders on speculative; no credible data yet supports direct American commercial engagement at scale in Balochistan’s rare earths.

A Tale of Two Investments

In the rare earth supply chain, human capital is mineral capital. Pakistan’s youth could become its strongest resource—data scientists, metallurgists, engineers, entrepreneurs—if trained and deployed with purpose. But without governance reform and environmental safeguards, the mineral rush could become just another boom-to-bust mirage.

The real headline here isn’t that Pakistan has $6 trillion in rocks—it’s that its greatest rare resource is untapped capacity in its people.

REEx Summary

This Rare Earth Exchanges (REEx) review of Dawn’s “Mineral Investments vs Human Capital” praises Dr. Bhutto’s emphasis on balanced development. Still, flags oversimplified assumptions about Pakistan’s readiness to monetize rare earths. The piece is factual about geological potential but speculative about economic outcomes. For supply-chain observers, the takeaway is clear: Pakistan’s mineral frontier remains real—but without processing infrastructure, governance reform, and skills investment, it risks staying theoretical.

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• Turkey's Beylikova deposit holds 694 million tons of ore, but only 12.5 million tons of recoverable rare earth oxides—a significant distinction often lost in political messaging.
• Turkey possesses substantial undeveloped REE reserves and dominates global boron supply, but it currently lacks industrial-scale refining and magnet production capacity.
• The deposit represents geopolitical potential for Eurasian supply chains, but remains 'potential energy' until processing infrastructure, permitting, and export frameworks materialize.

When Daily Sabah publishes an op-ed titled “Türkiye’s Role in the New Rare Mineral Order,” it reads like a manifesto. The author, Merve Suna Özel Özcan, declares that Turkey holds 694 million tons of rare earth reserves in Beylikova (opens in a new tab), positioning it as the world’s second-largest holder after China. That’s a bold claim — and one that demands a sober, technical look through the Rare Earth Exchanges (REEx) lens.

Rare Earth Exchanges recently interviewed Sait Uysal (opens in a new tab), Exploring Turkey's rare earth element and critical mineral potential.

Buried Treasure—or Political Alchemy?

The figure — 694 million tons — traces back to estimates by Turkey’s Eti Maden and the Ministry of Industry and Technology, but the fine print matters. The ore mass is vast, yes, but the recoverable rare earth oxide (REO) content is closer to 12.5 million tons. That’s significant—perhaps the largest undeveloped deposit outside China—but it does not equate to 694 million tons of usable rare earths—the op-ed’s framing borders on exaggeration, conflating ore tonnage with extractable value.

Still, Beylikova is no mirage. Independent geological surveys confirm the site’s mineral complexity: REEs are interwoven with barite, fluorite, and thorium—tricky but real. If Turkey builds the processing and separation capacity to handle this material, it could become a serious regional player, linking Eurasian supply chains from the Balkans to Central Asia.

Geo-Colonialism or Geostrategy?

Özcan’s essay veers into academic geopolitics, describing a new era of “geo-colonialism” defined by control of underground resources. It’s florid and a touch conspiratorial, but not entirely wrong. Resource nationalism is back, and Ankara’s messaging fits a broader playbook: portray mineral development as sovereignty-building. Yet the author sidesteps the elephant in the mine—Turkey currently lacks industrial-scale refining or magnet production capacity. Possessing ore is one thing; converting it into NdFeB magnets for EVs or wind turbines is another.

Between Vision and Verification

The author’s tone carries a patriotic sheen, not surprising for a state-aligned outlet. The article correctly identifies Turkey’s dominance in boron (over 70% of global reserves) and recognizes the rising Western demand for non-Chinese REEs. But calling Turkey the “world’s second REE superpower” is premature until a verified, commercial extraction and separation operation is running.

For investors, this is a signal story, not a trigger. Turkey’s Beylikova deposit deserves attention—but until processing capacity, environmental permitting, and export frameworks materialize, this remains a potential energy of geopolitics, not yet kinetic value.

Source: Merve Suna Özel Özcan, Daily Sabah, Oct. 23, 2025.

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