• Shenghe Resources completed full acquisition of Peak Rare Earths, gaining control of Tanzania's Ngualla rare earth project, while advancing African zirconium-titanium assets as part of an overseas expansion strategy.
• The company launched an upgraded compliance framework and export control training, signaling adaptation to heightened global scrutiny of Chinese critical mineral operations.
• Shenghe positions zirconium-titanium projects as a 'second growth curve' alongside rare earths, broadening critical minerals portfolio to hedge price cycles and leverage shared infrastructure.

On January 29–30, Shenghe Resources held its 2025 Annual Meeting in Chengdu under the theme “Shared Prosperity, Global Reach.” The meeting reviewed the 2025 performance of all business segments and subsidiaries and examined the annual work report delivered by the company’s General Manager.

The meeting provided a comprehensive summary of the company’s performance in 2025. It noted that Shenghe closely tracked market trends, seized opportunities, and achieved major progress in operating results, institutional development, and overseas business expansion. The company highlighted achievements in technological innovation, optimization of internal and external operating environments, and deeper integration of business units and organizational structures.

Following a smooth leadership transition last year, Shenghe focused on improving governance and accelerating overseas project development. The company completed the full acquisition of Peak Rare Earths, thereby gaining control of the Ngualla rare earth project in Tanzania, while making steady progress on African zirconium–titanium projects. Internally, Shenghe promoted organizational integration, increased internal talent mobility, strengthened regional coordination mechanisms, and enhanced talent support systems.

The company emphasized continued reinforcement of compliance and risk management, establishing a comprehensive compliance framework. It also advanced digitalization and information systems to support intelligent command and scientific decision-making. Shenghe further stressed the importance of market capitalization management and proactive engagement with capital markets.

Chairman Xie Bing stated that the company must fully recognize both opportunities and challenges, rigorously assess strengths and weaknesses, strictly adhere to national industrial policy, and strengthen policy research and on-the-ground assessments. He emphasized addressing management and talent-development gaps, maintaining steady progress in rare earths, accelerating zirconium–titanium projects, rapidly advancing overseas assets, and opening a “second growth curve.”

The meeting also set out key priorities for 2026 and included the launch of an upgraded compliance management system, export control compliance training, and a ceremony recognizing outstanding teams, managers, and employees for 2025. Senior management, including Chairman Xie Bing, Vice Chairman and CEO Huang Ping, and Overseas Division Chairman Wang Quangen, attended.

REEx: What The Update Informs Investors

Three signals matter for rare earth watchers outside China:

1. Overseas Control Is Now Central, Not Peripheral. The explicit emphasis on Peak Rare Earths and control of Tanzania’s Ngualla project confirms Shenghe’s strategy of locking in upstream optionality offshore—especially in jurisdictions Western firms also view as diversification targets.
2. Compliance Language Is Not Accidental. The repeated references to export-control training and compliance frameworks reflect real pressure. Chinese rare earth firms now operate under tighter global scrutiny, and Shenghe is signaling readiness to operate within—and influence—those rules.
3. Zirconium–Titanium as a Second Growth Curve. Shenghe is openly positioning zirconium–titanium projects alongside rare earths, indicating a broader critical-minerals portfolio that could hedge rare earth price cycles while leveraging shared processing and logistics.

REEx Takeaway

This is not just an annual pep rally. Shenghe is consolidating overseas assets, professionalizing compliance, and broadening its mineral base—moves that reinforce China-linked influence across multiple critical mineral chains.

Disclosure & Verification Notice

This material includes a translation of company-issued content distributed via WeChat and state-affiliated channels. Statements reflect Shenghe Resources’ own reporting and should be independently verified.

• The U.S. imports 80-100% of critical minerals including manganese, chromium, gallium, graphite, and rare earths, creating structural dependence on foreign suppliers.
• Mineral endowment alone doesn't equal strategic power—countries must build downstream processing, refining, and manufacturing capacity to leverage resources effectively.
• Southern Africa controls key supplies of manganese, PGMs, chromium, and cobalt, but realizing strategic leverage requires stable infrastructure, capital access, and value chain integration.

An infographic shared online and sourced from the U.S. Geological Survey (2025) via Visual Capitalist captures a hard truth: the United States is structurally dependent on foreign supply chains for critical minerals that underpin modern technology, defense systems, and energy transition goals. From gallium and graphite to rare earths and platinum group metals (PGMs), import reliance ranges from 80% to 100% across much of the critical minerals spectrum.

Underlying Premise: Largely Accurate, But Incomplete

The core claim—that mineral suppliers wield strategic power—is factually sound. The U.S. imports:

• ~100% of manganese, chromium, gallium, graphite, cesium, tantalum, and several specialty metals
• ~80% of rare earth elements
• ~85–90% of PGMs, antimony, and bismuth

Southern Africa, particularly South Africa and the DRC, is indeed central to global supply for manganese, PGMs, chromium, and cobalt. These materials are essential for steel, batteries, catalysts, semiconductors, EVs, and defense applications.

Where the narrative overreaches is in implying that mineral endowment alone equals leverage. Geology creates potential power; processing, logistics, finance, and governance determine whether that power is realized.

The Strategic Reality: Value Chains Matter

The article correctly identifies the next battlefield: beneficiation and downstream integration**.** The era of simple ore exports is ending. However, moving up the value chain requires:

• Stable power and water infrastructure
• Chemical processing expertise
• Environmental permitting regimes
• Long-term offtake contracts
• Access to Western capital markets and customers

This is where many mineral-rich regions still face constraints, as Rare Earth Exchanges™ reports on frequently.

Rare Earth Exchanges Takeaway

This chart is not just a warning to Washington—it is also a reality check for supplier nations. Strategic power is not automatic. It must be built. Countries that pair resources with processing, refining, and manufacturing capacity will define the next phase of the global industrial order.

Minerals are leverage. Value chains are powerful. How does your nation’s value chain rank?

• World Bank paper by Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala positions Africa as a necessary pillar for global economic resilience.
• Africa holds 30% of the world's mineral reserves, including 15% of rare earths.
• Africa accounts for less than 3% of global trade.
• Africa's bottleneck isn't geology but value addition and infrastructure.
• Trade costs in Africa run 37% higher than global averages.
• Slow AfCFTA implementation blocks regional value chain development.
• For critical mineral investors, Africa can diversify global supply chains only if:
  • Capital pairs with permitting certainty.
  • Infrastructure delivery is secured.
  • Credible local partnerships are formed.
• Investment in Africa is not optional, but not turnkey either.

A new World Bank Policy Research Working Paper, authored by Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala, makes a bold claim: Africa is no longer a peripheral player in global supply chains but a necessary pillar of future economic and strategic resilience. Delivered as the 2025 Mattei Lecture and published in January 2026, the paper argues that overdependence on a handful of regions—China for critical minerals, East Asia for semiconductors, and the U.S. for demand—has made the global economy fragile and weaponizable.

From a Rare Earth Exchanges™ perspective, the framing is notable. Africa is presented not merely as resource-rich, but as systemically underutilized—holding nearly 30% of the world’s known mineral reserves (15% of rare earth elements), including rare earths, yet accounting for less than 3% of global goods trade. The bottleneck is not geology; it is value addition, infrastructure, and policy execution.

From Extraction to Leverage: The Value-Addition Gap

The paper accuratelydiagnoses Africa’s central challenge: exports remain overwhelmingly commodity-based, with minimal downstream processing. High trade costs—up to 37% higher than global averages for manufactured goods—and slow implementation of the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) continue to block regional value chains.

Where the paper is strongest is its linkage between critical minerals and global resilience. Okonjo-Iweala explicitly notes that if African rare earth and critical mineral value chains had been developed earlier, recent Chinese export controls would have triggered far less alarm. That observation aligns with hard lessons now being learned in Washington, Brussels, and Tokyo.

What’s Real—and What’s Aspirational

What holds up under scrutiny:

• Africa’s demographic advantage is real: the working-age population is projected to reach 1.6 billion by 2050.
• Select projects already validate the thesis, including Malawi’s Songwe Hill rare earth project backed by the U.S. DFC and designated strategic by the EU.
• Infrastructure gains like the Lobito Corridor show logistics can materially improve when execution occurs.

Where caution is warranted:

• The paper leans heavily on “potential” while underweighting execution risk, including various challenges at a country-to-country level.
• Governance variability, security concerns, and capital discipline are acknowledged but softened.
• Europe’s proposed “modernized Mattei formula” is compelling rhetorically, yet remains largely unproven at scale.

Why This Matters for Rare Earth Supply Chains

For rare earth and critical mineral investors, the message is clear: Africa is not optional—but it is not turnkey. The continent can diversify global supply chains only if capital is paired with permitting certainty, infrastructure delivery, and credible local partnerships. Without that, Africa risks remaining a strategic talking point rather than a functional alternative.

The paper is best read not as a forecast, but as a policy challenge to the West:resilience requires building new nodes, not just reshoring oldones.

Source: World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 11295, African Trade and Investment for Global Resilience (opens in a new tab) (January 2026).

Disclaimer: This analysis is based on a World Bank working paper reflecting the author’s views, not necessarily official institutional positions.

• China, Russia, Iran, and South Africa conduct joint naval exercise 'Will for Peace 2026' at Cape of Good Hope (Jan 9-16, 2026)
• Focus on maritime security, counter-terrorism, and interoperability—led by China in strategically vital waters
• The Cape shipping route becomes critical when Suez and Red Sea chokepoints tighten, carrying petroleum, LNG, and energy-transition materials like critical minerals and rare earths essential to global supply chains
• Exercise signals strategic normalization:
  • China rehearses distant-water command
  • Russia projects reach despite war strain
  • Iran positions as stakeholder
  • South Africa tests non-alignment limits—raising Western supply-chain security concerns

In the salt-air glamour of Simon’s Town, where naval steel meets postcard views of the Cape, a decidedly non-touristic cast has assembled: China, Russia, and South Africa—with Iran also in the mix—opening a China-led maritime exercise branded “Will for Peace 2026 / Peace Will-2026.”

Beijing confirmed the drills via the Ministry of National Defense’s official WeChat channel, echoed by state media, framing them as a “joint action to safeguard important shipping routes and economic activities.”

South Africa’s defense establishment adds the operational detail: January 9–16, 2026, in South African waters, with China as lead nation, featuring maritime safety operations, interoperability drills, counter-terrorism rescue, and maritime strike training. On its face, it’s a tidy script of seamanship. Beneath the surface, it’s about who gets to shape the arteries of global commerce.

Those arteries run straight past the Cape. When chokepoints elsewhere tighten—from the Suez to the Red Sea—oil tankers, LNG carriers, and bulkers swing south, rounding the Cape of Good Hope. The route carries petroleum, refined fuels, and the industrial inputs that keep factories humming. It also moves the raw materials of the energy transition: critical minerals and rare earth elements essential to magnets, motors, electronics, and defense systems. Control of—or even comfort operating in—these waters signals influence over supply chains that Washington has spent decades keeping open.

That’s why the guest list matters. Reporting identifies Russian and Iranian naval assets alongside Chinese warships, forming a selective “BRICS Plus” tableau. India and Brazil appear absent, underscoring a central truth: BRICS is not a military alliance; this is cooperation by subset, not consensus. The exercise is hosted by South Africa, but led by China—an unmistakable demonstration of distant-water command confidence at one of the world’s most strategic sea corners.

The concern isn’t that navies practice rescue drills. It’s strategic normalization. China gains rehearsal space for protecting trade flows tied to its manufacturing base and mineral processing dominance; Russia signals reach despite wartime strain; Iran gains another venue to present itself as a stakeholder along routes that move sanctioned hydrocarbons. Meanwhile, South Africa tests how far “non-alignment” can stretch as it hosts forces whose interests increasingly diverge from Western supply-chain security priorities.

The United States doesn’t need to overreact—but it shouldn’t look away. The Cape is where energy security, critical minerals, and rare earth supply chains converge. Exercises like Will for Peace 2026 are modest in tonnage yet loud in potential meaning: a reminder that maritime power is inseparable from who safeguards—and who influences—the flow of oil, minerals, and the materials of modern industry.

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• Botswana will open an embassy in Moscow.
• Botswana has invited Russian investors to collaborate on diamonds and potentially rare earth minerals, though no concrete rare earth projects exist.
• Diamonds generate one-third of Botswana's revenue and have established infrastructure.
• Rare earth references in Botswana lack geological data, mining licenses, or confirmed deposits.
• The announcement reflects diplomatic intentions rather than active mining developments.
• Investors should await concrete geological assessments before considering rare earth supply potential.

Botswana says (opens in a new tab) it plans to open an embassy in Moscow and has invited Russian investors to work with the country on diamonds and rare earth minerals. This news, reported by Reuters citing Russia’s state outlet TASS, is about diplomacy and future intentions—not about any active mining projects. Diamonds are already a major part of Botswana’s economy. Rare earths, however, are only mentioned as a possibility, with no confirmed mines, projects, or investments announced.

According to the report, Botswana’s foreign minister said the country is politically and economically stable and welcomes Russian investment, including in diamonds and rare earth elements. Russia, facing sanctions and strained relations with the West, has been actively seeking deeper economic ties in Africa. Opening an embassy in Moscow would formalize diplomatic relations and potentially support future business discussions.

What Is Concrete — and What Is Missing

The diamond side of the story is well established. Diamonds generate roughly one-third of Botswana’s national revenue and dominate its export earnings. Botswana has decades of experience governing this sector. By contrast, the rare earth reference lacks substance. The article does not cite known rare earth deposits, exploration data, mining licenses, processing plans, or timelines.

Botswana is not currently recognized as a rare earth producer, and no evidence is provided that it is close to becoming one. The mention of Russia’s Norilsk Nickel settling a past dispute in Botswana adds historical color, but that case involved nickel and platinum-group metals—not rare earths.

How the Story Is Framed

Reuters reports the comments neutrally, but the information pipeline matters. TASS is a state-run outlet and naturally emphasizes Russia’s outreach. The article does not ask whether Botswana has commercially viable rare earth resources or how Russian firms—already limited in processing capacity—would compete in a sector where China dominates refining and separation. This does not make the report incorrect, but it does leave important questions unanswered.

Why This Matters for the Rare Earth Supply Chain

For investors and policymakers, the key lesson is restraint. Diplomatic statements often come years before any real mining activity, if it happens at all. In rare earths, real value lies in processing, separation, and magnet production—not in announcements. Until Botswana releases geological data, launches licensing rounds, or names technical partners, rare earths remain a talking point, not a supply source.

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• University of Witwatersrand study forecasts 60-80% increases in African critical minerals production costs by 2055, driven by energy prices, labor dynamics, and capital investment needs across cobalt, copper, platinum, and zinc sectors.
• Mine-site operational costs—especially energy, labor, and consumables—account for over 70% of total production expenses, with rising costs threatening Africa's competitive advantage despite superior ore grades.
• Without strategic interventions in energy stabilization, local beneficiation, and processing capacity, Africa risks deepening dependence on external processors like China while capturing less value from its own resources.

A new open-access study in Resources Policy (January 2026) by Mulundumina Shimaponda-Nawa (opens in a new tab) and Glen T. Nwaila (opens in a new tab) both affiliated with African Research Centre for Ore Systems Science (CORES), School of Geosciences, University of the Witwatersrand and University (opens in a new tab) of Zambia, School of Engineering, Department of Electrical and Electronics (opens in a new tab), provides one of the most detailed cost assessments to date of Africa’s critical minerals sector. Analyzing cobalt, copper, platinum, and zinc over a 24-year period (2000–2023), theauthors find that while Africa remains globally competitive—oftenbenefiting from higher ore grades—production costs are on a sustained upward trajectory, driven primarily by energy prices, labor dynamics, and rising capital and technology investment. Using historical cost trends, the study projects cost increases of roughly 60–80% by 2055, raising important questions about long-term competitiveness, energy security, and investment strategy.

How the Study Was Done

The researchers compiled long-run production and cost data from authoritative sources, including S&P Global and the US Geological Survey, and applied well-established time-series forecasting models (ARIMA, SARIMA, and Holt variants). Rather than assuming future policy or geopolitical shifts, the models extend historical cost patterns forward, providing statistically grounded estimates of where mine-site and total production costs may trend if past dynamics persist. Costs are disaggregated into mine-site operations (labour, energy, consumables) and depreciation, clarifying which factors drive inflation.

What the Data Show

Africa remains competitive—but unevenly.

Cobalt and platinum benefit from high-grade deposits, particularly in the Democratic Republic of Congo and South Africa, while copper and zinc face higher costs linked to deeper mining, energy intensity, and logistics.

Mine-site costs dominate.

Across all four commodities, mine-site costs—especially labor, electricity, fuel, and miscellaneous operational expenses—often exceed 70% of total production costs, with depreciation from aging infrastructure as the next largest contributor.

Costs are rising structurally, not cyclically.

Forecasts indicate:

• Platinum: +70–80% by 2055
• Cobalt & copper: +60–65%
• Zinc: up to ~60%

These increases reflect long-term pressures—energy volatility, mechanisation, deeper orebodies, and environmental compliance—rather than short-term shocks.

Why This Matters for Rare Earths and Global Processing Power (REEx Analysis)

Although the paper focuses on cobalt, copper, platinum, and zinc—not rare earths directly—the implications extend to the broader critical minerals balance of power. Africa supplies vast volumes of upstream material, yet most value is still captured downstream, where China dominates processing, refining, and advanced manufacturing.

So, according to Rare Earth Exchanges™ review of this work,  rising African production costs, without parallel expansion of local beneficiation and processing, risk reinforcing this asymmetry. China’s integrated system—combining energy control, processing scale, and state-backed infrastructure—can absorb cost shocks more effectively than fragmented producer systems.

Policy Implications Highlighted

The authors point to clear intervention priorities:

• Energy reform: Stabilizing electricity supply and integrating renewables near mine sites
• Skills and automation: Pairing mechanisation with workforce development
• Beneficiation: Capturing more value locally to offset rising extraction costs
• Data-driven planning: Using long-term cost forecasts rather than short price cycles

Limitations

This is a statistical forecasting study, not a scenario-based or geopolitical model. It does not explicitly incorporate inflation regimes, exchange rates, carbon pricing, or future policy reforms. Forecasts beyond roughly 10–15 years should therefore be treated as trend envelopes, not precise predictions. Nonetheless, consistency across models supports the central conclusion: cost pressure is real, persistent, and rising.

The Bottom Line

Africa remains indispensable to global critical minerals supply—but cheap extraction can no longer be assumed. Without decisive action on energy, beneficiation, and industrial policy, rising costs may deepen reliance on external processors. For investors and policymakers, the message is clear: future competitiveness will depend as much on systems and strategy as on geology.

Citation: Shimaponda-Nawa, M., & Nwaila, G. T. (2026). Analysis of the production cost structure and future prospects of Africa's critical minerals. Resources Policy, 112, 105781. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.resourpol.2025.105781 (opens in a new tab)

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• Political scholar Adekeye Adebajo claims approximately 30% of global rare earths are in Africa, but USGS data shows the continent holds only a low single-digit percentage of proven reserves—highlighting a critical distinction between rhetoric and resource reality.
• Nigeria, while resource-rich in oil and gas, is not a meaningful rare earth producer or central supply chain node, weakening the mineral-motive argument for potential U.S. military intervention.
• The conflation of 'critical minerals broadly' with 'rare earth elements specifically' creates market mispricing risk—investors must separate geopolitical narratives from empirical supply chain data.

In a December 22, 2025 commentary (opens in a new tab) published by The Gleaner, political scholar Adekeye Adebajo argues that President Donald Trump’s threat of military action against Nigeria may be driven, in part, by a “mercantilist quest for rare-earth minerals,” asserting that roughly 30% of global rare earths are located in Africa. Does an “imperialist” mindset remain endemic in DC?

The Author: Adekeye Adebajo

The essay is forceful, historically literate, and morally charged—but for investors and policymakers operating in the rare earth space, that single statistic warrants scrutiny.

Because once minerals enter the argument, facts matter.

The Rare Earth Claim: Directionally Interesting, Numerically Weak

Africa is undeniably rich in critical minerals broadly defined—including cobalt, manganese, graphite, and platinum-group metals. But the specific claim that ~30% of global rare earths are located on the continent is not supported by the most credible public datasets.

According to U.S. Geological Survey reserve estimates and corroborating industry sources, Africa’s known rare earth reserves—primarily in countries such as Tanzania, South Africa, and Burundi—represent a low single-digit percentage of global reserves, not anything approaching 30%. Africa’s future potential is real, but proved reserves and operating supply chains remain limited.

What appears to be occurring is category slippage: a common conflation between critical minerals overall and rare earth elements specifically. In political commentary, that distinction is often blurred. In markets, it cannot be.

Nigeria: Strategic State, Not a Rare Earth Powerhouse

Nigeria is resource-rich—oil, gas, bitumen, tin, columbite—but it is not currently a meaningful rare earth producer, nor a central node in the global REE supply chain. There is no evidence that U.S. strategic planners view Nigeria as a near-term rare earth prize comparable to China, Australia, or emerging African projects elsewhere.

This does not invalidate Adebajo’s broader critique of imperial rhetoric or humanitarian pretexts. It does, however, weaken the mineral motive as framed.

Why This Still Matters for Investors

The lesson for Rare Earth Exchanges™ readers is not about Nigeria per se—it’s about how mineral narratives get weaponized. When geopolitical arguments borrow credibility from imprecise resource statistics, markets can misprice risk, policy intent, and opportunity. Minerals are increasingly cited as strategic motives. That makes precision a form of risk management.

Bottom Line

Adebajo’s essay is a powerful moral and political critique. But its rare earth claim is rhetorically useful, not empirically sound. Investors should separate resource reality from rhetorical leverage—especially when headlines hint at minerals as casus belli. 

Source: Adekeye Adebajo, The Gleaner, December 22, 2025.

© 2025 Rare Earth Exchanges™ – Accelerating Transparency, Accuracy, and Insight Across the Rare Earth & Critical Minerals Supply Chain.

While Nigeria historically struggled with refining its massive crude oil output, importing most refined fuels despite being Africa's largest crude producer, this is changing rapidly with the huge new Dangote Refinery (opens in a new tab) in operation, which significantly boosts capacity and aims to meet all domestic needs, turning Nigeria into a potential net exporter of refined products.

The Signal Worth Taking Seriously

Nasarawa’s approach—state participation, formal permitting, and downstream aspirations—stands in sharp contrast to the destructive informality seen in places like Zamfara. Rare Earth Exchanges™ has argued that formalization is the first gate to value. Nigeria’s willingness to anchor processing, not just extraction, is notable in a global market where processing—not mining—defines power, as covered previously.

Nigeria’s geology also warrants attention. Monazite-bearing sands are plausible hosts for light rare earths and thorium. That alone does not create a supply chain—but it does justify serious exploration, metallurgical testing, and phased investment.  See “Nigeria’s Monazite Moment: Promise, Hype and the Hard Road to Rare Earth Reality.”

According to the company behind the refinery, Hasetins Commodities (opens in a new tab), there are multiple sites for potential feedstock. Rare Earth Exchanges™ has reached out to the company for an interview request to hopefully learn more. 

Does Optimism Runs Ahead of Evidence?

Coverage such as in NewsDiary Online (opens in a new tab) moves quickly from a groundbreaking to 10,000 jobs and a full-stack rare earth future. That is where investors should pause. A $400 million budget is meaningful, but is it sufficient on its own to deliver solvent extraction at scale, radioactive waste handling, individual oxide separation, and compliance with global environmental standards? Rare earth processing is not a single plant; it is a system.

There is also a familiar conflation at work. Listing the 17 rare earth elements and citing Shanghai prices implies broad value capture. In reality, markets reward specificity—NdPr for magnets, Dy/Tb for high-temperature performance. Nigeria’s monazite potential skews light rare earths; heavy rare earths are neither guaranteed nor cheap to separate.

Governor Speaks

As reported via  ADBN TV (opens in a new tab) last month, Nigeria’s Nasarawa State indeed broke ground on the  $400 million rare earth and critical metals processing plant, marking what state officials describe as the country’s first major rare-metal processing facility. Led by Governor Abdullahi Sule (opens in a new tab), the project—developed in partnership with Hasetins—follows engagements that began in 2024 and is intended to position Nasarawa within the global rare earth value chain. 

Governor Sule Goes on the Record

According to Governor Sule at the November ceremony:

At the ceremony, the CEO of Hasetins, Prince Jidai Ejudigal, also emphasized their plans to process rare earth elements. 

The facility, located in Karu Local Government Area (opens in a new tab), is designed for an annual processing capacity of roughly 12,000 tons and is scheduled for completion in 2026. Federal ministers, including Nigeria’s Minister of Solid Minerals Development (opens in a new tab) and Minister of Foreign Affairs, attended the groundbreaking and praised the project for its potential to drive job creation, revenue generation, and responsible mineral development under President Bola Tinubu’s (opens in a new tab) economic reform agenda. 

Project proponents emphasized Nasarawa’s secure investment climate, while labor officials highlighted commitments to global occupational safety and environmental standards. Local traditional leaders and government officials framed the plant as a catalyst for regional development, with expectations of thousands of direct and indirect jobs and broader economic spillovers across the state.

Henry Dele Alake: Nigeria’s Head of Solid Minerals

Any Missing Chapters

Absent—and decisive—are details on feedstock grade, mineralogy, separation flowsheets, tailings management, and offtake. 

But to be fair, the company behind the processing, Hasetins Commodities, is privately held and under no obligation for disclosure.  Rare Earth Exchanges was pounded online via LinkedIn for suggesting there is such an obligation. Fair enough. Yes, without these and an on-site tour, the project remains more elusive.  But there is certainly sufficient high-level data to suggest this potentially emerges as a bankable asset: capital in the West just needs to learn more. Training local talent to move beyond oxides into alloys and magnets is laudable—yet, historically rare without long-term partners and IP transfer.  Although, as we discuss below, Chinese companies are in the areas focusing on other critical minerals. 

Nasarawa State

Any Chinese Capital?

Has Chinese capital been mobilized in this part of Nigeria?  The answer depends on what sort of mineral we are talking about, for some critical minerals absolutely. For rare earth elements, we cannot find any evidence of this. 

Hasetins Commodities Limited is described in official reports as an “indigenous” or local private company, incorporated in Abuja in 2019. It is spearheading Nigeria’s $400 million rare earth and critical metals processing plant in Nasarawa State, and it has been lauded by government officials as a patriotic, locally-led investment. Importantly, no Chinese ownership or partnership has been disclosed in Hasetins’s shareholding or financing to date. 

The Nigerian Ministry of Solid Minerals, in statements and press releases, credits Hasetins as the sole project funder and does not mention any foreign JV partner, according to multiple news sources. Xinhua (Chinese state media) likewise reported that the “project, funded by Hasetins Commodities Limited, ”aligns with Nigeria’s value-add campaign – again implying Hasetins itself is financing it. If Chinese state or corporate investors were behind this venture, it would likely be publicized as foreign direct investment (FDI) from China, but all public messaging so far frames it as a Nigerian-driven FDI project.

In-depth industry analysis notes that Hasetins has not published details on its “capital stack” or external financiers.  Again, to our critics online, they are under no obligation to do so. The entire $400 million is frequently referred to as FDI, yet the specific investors or lenders remain opaque. 

Analysts at both Ecofin and Rare Earth Exchanges have pointed out that for a specialized chemical processing project of this scale, outside technical or financial partners are likely to be involved eventually – but no such partners (Chinese or otherwise) have been named publicly as of now. 

There is no evidence of Chinese financial or technical involvement in Hasetins Commodities or its $400 million rare earth and critical metals processing plant in Nasarawa State, based on all publicly available disclosures. Again, Hasetins is presented by Nigerian officials as an indigenous, privately held company, and project messaging emphasizes a domestically led effort to build Nigeria’s first rare-metal processing facility. 

Available information suggests the company has engaged non-Chinese private capital and advisers, including Western investors and technical experts, consistent with Nigeria’s stated goal of developing a non-China-dependent midstream capability for global technology and magnet markets. No Chinese equity stake, joint venture, equipment contract, or technical partnership has been publicly disclosed for the Hasetins rare earth project to date.

That said, Chinese capital is highly active elsewhere in Nasarawa State’s (and beyond) mining sector (opens in a new tab), particularly in lithium and other battery and industrial minerals. Chinese firms have financed and built multiple large-scale lithium processing plants in the state since 2023, with total Chinese investment in Nigeria’s lithium value chain now exceeding $1 billion, according to Nigerian government statements. 

According to a report from the Nanyang Technological University in Singapore (opens in a new tab), “two Chinese-backed lithium processing plants are set to start production in Nigeria later this year, as the West African country moves to enforce a policy requiring miners to refine minerals locally rather than export them in raw form.”

According to this assessment, a growing demand for lithium prompts this push. After al,l the critical mineral remains a key raw material for electric vehicle (EV) batteries. Purportedly, “China is reportedly exploring further moves up the EV value chain, including the potential establishment of EV manufacturing facilities in Nigeria.”  This would make sense given thatthe nation’s need to overcome an overproduction crisis in the EV sector. 

Apparently, one of the processing plants is a US$600m project by Jiuling Lithium Mining Company (opens in a new tab), located on the boundary of Kaduna and Niger States in northern Nigeria. Production is slated to begin this year. The second, a US$200m facility by Canmax Technologies (opens in a new tab) in Nasarawa State, near the capital Abuja, is scheduled to come online in the third quarter. 

Additional Chinese-backed projects targeting tin and other solid minerals have also been announced in Nigeria.

Crucially, however, these Chinese investments do not appear to overlap with the Hasetins rare earth initiative, which remains the notable exception in an otherwise China-linked regional mining landscape. Although if we learn the contrary, we will report.  

For investors, this distinction matters: Nasarawa’s rare earth project is being positioned—at least for now—as a strategic effort to diversify Nigeria’s minerals sector away from both oil and Chinese rare earth dominance, even as Chinese capital continues to shape other parts of the state’s mining economy.

Final Thoughts 

Nigeria is a potentially strong location for rare earth refining precisely because it already possesses growing, hard-earned experience in complex, capital-intensive processing industries, most notably oil refining and petrochemicals. Refining crude oil into usable fuels required Nigeria to build and operate large-scale chemical plants, manage hazardous by-products, enforce environmental controls, develop skilled technical labor, and coordinate logistics across ports, pipelines, and power infrastructure—many of the same competencies required for rare earth separation and refining.

While Nigeria’s refining history has been uneven, they struggled to develop the institutional knowledge, regulatory frameworks, engineering talent, and service ecosystems around hydrocarbons to the extent that they completely offers a non-trivial industrial foundation that many emerging rare earth source nations lack. If paired with modern governance, transparent project execution, and credible technical partners, this legacy position positions Nigeria to translate refining know-how into rare earth processing capability, accelerating its entry into the global critical minerals value chain rather than starting from zero.

So Nigeria’s recent announcements are directionally right and geopolitically timely. And the state’s Governor is on the record via Nigerian news on the matter. That is, the criticality of Nigeria moving down the value chain from merely extracting to processing hard mineral/element commodities.   Let us not forget, rare earths punish shortcuts. The real test will be transparent data, staged financing, and the right partners who understand that processing is where nations win—or stall. The Hasetins endeavor remains a mission-critical initiative, apparently domestically financed, and according to speeches, ready sometime in 2026 should the project remain on track. 

© 2025 Rare Earth Exchanges™ – Accelerating Transparency, Accuracy, and Insight Across the Rare Earth & Critical Minerals Supply Chain.

• The World Bank's new minerals strategy arrives amid geopolitical rivalry and social resistance.
• It requires correction beyond clean transition narratives to address defense procurement, export controls, and bilateral deals shaping NdPr, lithium, and nickel supply chains.
• Durable economic gains emerge from knowledge-intensive supplier ecosystems such as engineering services, environmental monitoring, and separation chemistry.
• This has been demonstrated in countries like Chile, Brazil, and South Africa.
• Community legitimacy now functions as critical infrastructure.
• Water conflicts and environmental backlash represent tangible schedule, cost, and financing risks.
• These conflicts can transform strategic assets into stranded projects in securitized supply chains.

The World Bank’s forthcoming minerals and mining strategy (opens in a new tab) arrives at a moment when critical minerals have slipped the polite language of development economics and entered the harsher terrain of geopolitics, industrial rivalry, and social resistance. Anabel Marín’s intervention is not radical; it is corrective. She argues that the Bank’s familiar narrative—clean transition, institutional reform, foreign investment—no longer matches the lived reality of rare earths, lithium, nickel, and the supply chains that now surround them.

From a Rare Earth Exchanges™ perspective, this framing matters. The global race for NdPr, Dy, Tb, lithium, and nickel is not being shaped by abstract sustainability goals alone, but by defense procurement, export controls, and tightly negotiated bilateral deals. Any strategy that fails to integrate these forces risks becoming aspirational literature rather than operational policy.

Where the Analysis Holds Its Ground

Marín is at her strongest when she dismantles the illusion that “value addition” means simply building downstream battery plants. In practice, the most durable gains in mineral economies have emerged in supplier ecosystems—engineering services, environmental monitoring, automation, and geotechnical problem-solving. This aligns closely with observed success cases in Chile, Brazil, and South Africa, and with investor reality: supplier capabilities travel; raw materials do not.

Her emphasis on knowledge-intensive diversification is particularly relevant for rare earth supply chains, where separation chemistry, metallurgical precision, and environmental controls—not ore grades alone—determine who captures value. The argument that innovation policy, rather than capital inflows alone, underwrites long-term resilience is well supported by decades of industrial-policy evidence.

The Soft Edges of Policy Optimism

Where the analysis begins to soften is in its treatment of collective South–South bargaining and multilateral coordination. While initiatives such as the African Green Minerals Alliance are conceptually sound, history suggests that coordination fractures quickly under price volatility, fiscal stress, or bilateral pressure from major consuming states. This is not misinformation, but it is a constraint that deserves more weight.

Export bans are similarly framed as tools that merely require better planning. Indonesia’s nickel experience remains the exception, not the template. For most rare earth and lithium producers, restrictive trade policies without embedded technical capacity risk deterring capital rather than catalyzing domestic capability.

The Supply Chain Reality Check

What makes this analysis notable is its insistence that legitimacy itself functions as infrastructure. Community resistance, water conflicts, and environmental backlash are no longer peripheral concerns; they are schedule risks, cost risks, and financing risks. In an increasingly securitized supply-chain environment—where timelines are compressed and safeguards quietly weakened—ignoring legitimacy is no longer neutral. It is destabilizing.

For investors and policymakers alike, the message is clear: critical-minerals strategy must be grounded in political economy, not just ESG language. Otherwise, today’s “strategic assets” risk becoming tomorrow’s stranded projects.

© 2025 Rare Earth Exchanges™ – Accelerating Transparency, Accuracy, and Insight Across the Rare Earth & Critical Minerals Supply Chain.

• China's decades-long strategy has secured control over 87% of global mineral refining.
• China holds control over 70% of rare earth mining.
• China has captured African upstream assets through vertically integrated infrastructure.
• The Belt and Road Initiative has created a logistical lattice binding African minerals to Chinese refineries.
• Diversification is structurally challenging for Western supply chains.
• Western firms like UK-based Pensana and U.S. investors are gaining traction in Africa.
• Nations impose export controls, signaling potential shifts in mineral geopolitics.

China’s dominance of Africa’s critical minerals sector is neither accidental nor sudden—it is the result of decades of upstream acquisition, midstream consolidation, and downstream industrial integration. The Africa Center for Strategic Studies via All Africa (opens in a new tab) outlines a system that is vast, vertically aligned, and extremely difficult to dislodge. For Rare Earth Exchanges readers, the strategic question is simple: What does China’s mineral empire in Africa mean for the future of rare earth diversification?

The Long Shadow of Beijing’s Mineral Strategy

The article accurately notes China’s overwhelming control of refining capacity—87% of global processing, nearly 70% of rare earth mining, and 93% of permanent magnet manufacturing. These figures track with known REEx research and global assessments. Also accurate is China’s push into African upstream assets—Goulamina lithium (Mali), Ngualla rare earths (Tanzania), and Khoemacau copper (Botswana). These acquisitions give Beijing raw material certainty through the 2030s.

 What stands out is the infrastructure dimension: China’s Belt and Road Initiative isn’t just ports and rail—it is a logistical lattice binding African minerals to Chinese refineries, from the Lobito Corridor to Dar es Salaam. This is the part most mainstream reporting misses, and it is correctly emphasized here.

Where the Narrative Needs Nuance

The claim that China “weaponizes” export controls is partially accurate—Beijing has restricted gallium, graphite, and magnet production inputs. The article’s framing is strong but not misleading. REEx would simply caution investors: export restrictions are asymmetric—they hurt China’s customers, but they also pressure China’s own manufacturers, who depend on global demand.

Similarly, the discussion of environmental violations is grounded in real events (e.g., Zambia’s Kafue spill). Yet the article risks implying this is unique to Chinese firms. Historically, Western mining houses also operated with poor oversight in Africa. The issue is enforcement capacity, not nationality.

Why This Matters for Rare Earth Supply Chains

The central takeaway for investors: China’s dominance is structural, not incidental. Africa’s enormous magnet-metal potential (NdPr, Dy, Tb) remains tied to Chinese capital, smelting capacity, and rail-port corridors. Western or Japanese attempts to build “China-free” value chains must confront this geography of influence—not just geology.

 Still, pockets of opportunity are emerging. UK-based Pensana, operating in Angola, has become a standout example of a Western company successfully localizing operations—working with African financiers, building local business partnerships, and demonstrating that non-Chinese actors can gain traction on the continent. Pensana’s progress represents a meaningful breach in what has long been viewed as a near-unshakeable Chinese stronghold in African rare earths and critical minerals.

At the same time, nations like Malawi, Tanzania, and Namibia are asserting greater control through export restrictions aimed at keeping more value on the continent. Whether these moves spark genuine diversification and industrial empowerment—or simply reshape old patterns of dependency—remains one of the defining questions for the next decade of global mineral geopolitics.

President Donald Trump, recently brokering a Central African peace deal between Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of Congo, along with the U.S. government, is encouraging collaboration in central Africa.  And as Rare Earth Exchanges has reported, U.S. investors are pivoting toward Africa in search of critical minerals and rare earth value.

Note UK-based Pensana Plc (opens in a new tab) operating in Angola has done a good job localizing, collaborating with African financial partners, and local businesses at the mine. Pensana is on the move representing a Western breach in the Chinese African critical mineral and rare earth dam. Nations like Malawi, Tanzania, and Namibia are imposing export controls to capture more value at home. Whether this becomes meaningful diversification or another cycle of dependency remains an open question.

© 2025 Rare Earth Exchanges™ – Accelerating Transparency, Accuracy, and Insight Across the Rare Earth & Critical Minerals Supply Chain.

• China's decades-long strategy has secured control over 87% of global mineral refining.
• China holds control over 70% of rare earth mining.
• China has captured African upstream assets through vertically integrated infrastructure.
• The Belt and Road Initiative has created a logistical lattice binding African minerals to Chinese refineries.
• Diversification is structurally challenging for Western supply chains.
• Western firms like UK-based Pensana and U.S. investors are gaining traction in Africa.
• Nations impose export controls, signaling potential shifts in mineral geopolitics.

China’s dominance of Africa’s critical minerals sector is neither accidental nor sudden—it is the result of decades of upstream acquisition, midstream consolidation, and downstream industrial integration. The Africa Center for Strategic Studies via All Africa (opens in a new tab) outlines a system that is vast, vertically aligned, and extremely difficult to dislodge. For Rare Earth Exchanges readers, the strategic question is simple: What does China’s mineral empire in Africa mean for the future of rare earth diversification?

The Long Shadow of Beijing’s Mineral Strategy

The article accurately notes China’s overwhelming control of refining capacity—87% of global processing, nearly 70% of rare earth mining, and 93% of permanent magnet manufacturing. These figures track with known REEx research and global assessments. Also accurate is China’s push into African upstream assets—Goulamina lithium (Mali), Ngualla rare earths (Tanzania), and Khoemacau copper (Botswana). These acquisitions give Beijing raw material certainty through the 2030s.

 What stands out is the infrastructure dimension: China’s Belt and Road Initiative isn’t just ports and rail—it is a logistical lattice binding African minerals to Chinese refineries, from the Lobito Corridor to Dar es Salaam. This is the part most mainstream reporting misses, and it is correctly emphasized here.

Where the Narrative Needs Nuance

The claim that China “weaponizes” export controls is partially accurate—Beijing has restricted gallium, graphite, and magnet production inputs. The article’s framing is strong but not misleading. REEx would simply caution investors: export restrictions are asymmetric—they hurt China’s customers, but they also pressure China’s own manufacturers, who depend on global demand.

Similarly, the discussion of environmental violations is grounded in real events (e.g., Zambia’s Kafue spill). Yet the article risks implying this is unique to Chinese firms. Historically, Western mining houses also operated with poor oversight in Africa. The issue is enforcement capacity, not nationality.

Why This Matters for Rare Earth Supply Chains

The central takeaway for investors: China’s dominance is structural, not incidental. Africa’s enormous magnet-metal potential (NdPr, Dy, Tb) remains tied to Chinese capital, smelting capacity, and rail-port corridors. Western or Japanese attempts to build “China-free” value chains must confront this geography of influence—not just geology.

 Still, pockets of opportunity are emerging. UK-based Pensana, operating in Angola, has become a standout example of a Western company successfully localizing operations—working with African financiers, building local business partnerships, and demonstrating that non-Chinese actors can gain traction on the continent. Pensana’s progress represents a meaningful breach in what has long been viewed as a near-unshakeable Chinese stronghold in African rare earths and critical minerals.

At the same time, nations like Malawi, Tanzania, and Namibia are asserting greater control through export restrictions aimed at keeping more value on the continent. Whether these moves spark genuine diversification and industrial empowerment—or simply reshape old patterns of dependency—remains one of the defining questions for the next decade of global mineral geopolitics.

President Donald Trump, recently brokering a Central African peace deal between Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of Congo, along with the U.S. government, is encouraging collaboration in central Africa.  And as Rare Earth Exchanges has reported, U.S. investors are pivoting toward Africa in search of critical minerals and rare earth value.

Note UK-based Pensana Plc (opens in a new tab) operating in Angola has done a good job localizing, collaborating with African financial partners, and local businesses at the mine. Pensana is on the move representing a Western breach in the Chinese African critical mineral and rare earth dam. Nations like Malawi, Tanzania, and Namibia are imposing export controls to capture more value at home. Whether this becomes meaningful diversification or another cycle of dependency remains an open question.

© 2025 Rare Earth Exchanges™ – Accelerating Transparency, Accuracy, and Insight Across the Rare Earth & Critical Minerals Supply Chain.

• Lindian Resources acquired full 100% ownership of the Kangankunde Rare Earths Project in Malawi with a final US$10 million payment for the remaining 33% stake.
• Kangankunde is one of the world's largest and most strategically significant rare earth deposits, positioned as a cornerstone asset for non-Chinese supply chains.
• Full ownership accelerates project financing and development timelines while strengthening Lindian's negotiating position for offtake and downstream processing deals.

Lindian Resources has taken a decisive step forward in the global rare earth race, completing its final US$10 million payment to acquire the remaining 33% of Rift Valley Resource Developments, giving it full 100% ownership of the Kangankunde Rare Earths Project (opens in a new tab) in Malawi.

This consolidation matters: Kangankunde is widely considered one of the world’s largest and most strategically significant rare earth deposits, with high-grade mineralization and robust geology that position it as a potential cornerstone asset for non-Chinese supply chains.

Full ownership simplifies project financing, accelerates development timelines, and strengthens Lindian’s posture in future offtake and downstream processing negotiations. As geopolitical demand intensifies for diversified magnet-metal sources, Lindian’s move signals confidence—and ambition—with Kangankunde now firmly under its control at a pivotal moment for the rare earth sector.

© 2025 Rare Earth Exchanges™ – Accelerating Transparency, Accuracy, and Insight Across the Rare Earth & Critical Minerals Supply Chain.

• Lindian Resources acquired full 100% ownership of the Kangankunde Rare Earths Project in Malawi with a final US$10 million payment for the remaining 33% stake.
• Kangankunde is one of the world's largest and most strategically significant rare earth deposits, positioned as a cornerstone asset for non-Chinese supply chains.
• Full ownership accelerates project financing and development timelines while strengthening Lindian's negotiating position for offtake and downstream processing deals.

Lindian Resources has taken a decisive step forward in the global rare earth race, completing its final US$10 million payment to acquire the remaining 33% of Rift Valley Resource Developments, giving it full 100% ownership of the Kangankunde Rare Earths Project (opens in a new tab) in Malawi.

This consolidation matters: Kangankunde is widely considered one of the world’s largest and most strategically significant rare earth deposits, with high-grade mineralization and robust geology that position it as a potential cornerstone asset for non-Chinese supply chains.

Full ownership simplifies project financing, accelerates development timelines, and strengthens Lindian’s posture in future offtake and downstream processing negotiations. As geopolitical demand intensifies for diversified magnet-metal sources, Lindian’s move signals confidence—and ambition—with Kangankunde now firmly under its control at a pivotal moment for the rare earth sector.

© 2025 Rare Earth Exchanges™ – Accelerating Transparency, Accuracy, and Insight Across the Rare Earth & Critical Minerals Supply Chain.

• Nigeria holds credible monazite reserves estimated at 6 million tonnes, but the $300 billion valuation is speculative without the necessary processing infrastructure, radiological regulations, and waste management systems currently absent in the country.
• Monazite's value depends entirely on downstream separation capacity—raw ore sells for $2,000-$5,000 per tonne, while processed oxides command prices 10 times higher. However, Nigeria lacks the refineries, regulatory framework, and infrastructure to capture this value.
• Nigeria's strategic importance lies in supply chain optionality rather than current output; transparent licensing, partnerships with experienced processors, and midstream chemical facilities could position it as a non-Chinese NdPr source under AfCFTA.

Nigeria’s monazite deposits are once again in the headlines, framed in the West African nation media (opens in a new tab) as a potential $300 billion treasure chest capable of transforming national fortunes. The reporting is energetic and patriotic—but investors deserve a clearer, quieter lens. Rare Earth Exchanges (REEx) cuts through the noise to examine what is fact, what is conjecture, and what truly matters for the global rare earth supply chain.

A Sleeping Giant, But Still Only Potential

Nigeria does hold monazite-bearing sands across Plateau, Kaduna, Kogi, Cross River, and Taraba, and the U.S. Geological Survey’s ~6 million tonne estimate is credible. Monazite is indeed rich in Nd, Pr, La, Ce, with NdPr being the magnetic gold of the energy transition. The global context is also accurately captured: China still controls 80–90% of rare earth separation, and demand for NdPr oxide is set to surge with EVs and wind turbines.

But the article’s implied valuation—monazite as a “$300bn asset”—belongs in marketing decks, not investor analysis. Monazite’s value is entirely dependent on processing, and processing monazite means radiological regulations, solvent extraction plants, waste management, and long-term capital discipline.

None of that exists in Nigeria today.

Where Facts Meet Fiction: The Missing Middle

The piece notes monazite ore sells for $2,000–$5,000/tonne, rising tenfold when converted to separated oxides. Correct in principle—but this assumes:

• Stable feedstock quality
• Working separation capacity
• A regulatory environment aligned with international nuclear-material standards
• Infrastructure to move reagents, waste, and finished oxides

Note Hasetins has broken ground on a rare earth refining facility in Nigeria.

However until that operation is up and in production, Nigeria currently has none of those prerequisites. Without downstream capability, monazite is simply another unprocessed commodity, vulnerable to the same boom-and-bust, export-of-raw-materials pattern that has defined prior eras.

The Strategic Angle: Why the World Actually Cares

For global supply chains, Nigeria’s monazite matters less for current output and more for optionality. The world is scrambling for non-Chinese sources of NdPr. If Nigeria were to deploy transparent licensing, partner with experienced processors (Australia, U.S., India), and build a midstream chemical sector, it could become a continental anchor—especially under the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA).

But until processing enters the picture, the “rare earth revolution” is still conceptual.

Critical Questions Investors Should Ask

• Where are Nigeria’s radiation-handling regulations for thorium-bearing ore?
• Which companies have offtake, pilot plants, or processing MoUs?
• Is the government prepared to ban illegal artisanal monazite mining, which would jeopardize export compliance?
• Is Nigeria aiming for long-loop separation, or will monazite again be exported raw to Asia?

Until these answers solidify, monazite remains a strategic story, not a strategic sector.

© 2025 Rare Earth Exchanges™ – Accelerating Transparency, Accuracy, and Insight Across the Rare Earth & Critical Minerals Supply Chain.

• China's new platinum futures exchange aims to shift PGM price discovery to Shanghai, offering South African producers deeper liquidity but greater Chinese market influence.
• European yttrium prices have surged due to China's production controls and Myanmar instability, though this appears to be a short-term price reflex rather than a structural shift.
• The convergence of volatile markets, geopolitical maneuvering, and emerging fragmented pricing systems reveals critical patterns for strategic metals investors beyond headline glamour.

South Africa’s platinum group metals (opens in a new tab) (PGMs) were back in the global spotlight this week, thanks to China’s launch of platinum futures trading—a move that Mining Weekly’s Martin Creamer suggests (opens in a new tab) could buoy South African producers. Add to that a sudden European uptick in yttrium prices, plus a spin through Johannesburg in a platinum-catalyzed hydrogen fuel cell vehicle, and you have a news cycle that feels suspiciously like a preview of 2030. But beneath the shiny headlines lies a more interesting question: what matters for the rare earth sector right now?

Signals in the Noise: The Yttrium Surprise

Mining Weekly highlights a “surge in European yttrium prices” benefiting the Phalaborwa rare earths project. That detail is directionally credible—yttrium pricing has indeed shown intermittent tightness in 2024–25 due to China’s production controls and Myanmar’s instability. Yttrium sits outside the headline-grabbing NdPr market yet remains essential to phosphors, high-temperature ceramics, and advanced alloys. This is not a magnet metals signal.

However, the report offers no volumes, no baselines, and no explanation of what “surge” means—classic commodity-press shorthand. For investors, the key question is whether this is a structural tightening or a seasonal wobble. Based on known supply dynamics, REEx suggests this as a short-term price reflex, not a fundamental shift—useful for sentiment at Phalaborwa, but not evidence of a durable new market regime.

China’s Platinum Futures and South Africa’s Quiet Advantage

China’s new platinum futures exchange, (opens in a new tab) debuting this week, is accurately reported and strategically important: Beijing is trying to pull PGM price discovery closer to Shanghai. For South African producers, that means deeper liquidity—but also more price influence from a country aggressively stockpiling strategic metals.

Mining Weekly frames this largely as good news. REEx agrees—with an asterisk. In a world where China wants greater control over critical mineral benchmarks (rare earths included), investors should watch for similar financial instruments emerging in other strategic commodities, especially magnet metals.

The Fuel Cell Cameo: Glamour or Ground Truth?

A demonstration ride in a platinum-catalyzed hydrogen fuel-cell EV makes for great video content, but it is—bluntly—marketing theatre. Fuel cells remain a niche automotive segment. Still, the optics matter: platinum’s long-term demand story strengthens if industrial and mobility use cases diversify.

What This Means for Rare Earths Investors

Takeaway: The Mining Weekly piece is harmless, mostly accurate, and occasionally breathless. It hints at broader themes—China’s grip on strategic metals, Europe’s sporadic price volatility, and South Africa’s role in PGMs—but offers little analysis. For rare earth investors, the real story is not platinum test drives or vague yttrium “surges,” but the pattern: volatile markets, geopolitical jockeying, and early signs of a fragmented global critical-minerals pricing system.

© 2025 Rare Earth Exchanges™ – Accelerating Transparency, Accuracy, and Insight Across the Rare Earth & Critical Minerals Supply Chain.

• China's new platinum futures exchange aims to shift PGM price discovery to Shanghai, offering South African producers deeper liquidity but greater Chinese market influence.
• European yttrium prices have surged due to China's production controls and Myanmar instability, though this appears to be a short-term price reflex rather than a structural shift.
• The convergence of volatile markets, geopolitical maneuvering, and emerging fragmented pricing systems reveals critical patterns for strategic metals investors beyond headline glamour.

South Africa’s platinum group metals (opens in a new tab) (PGMs) were back in the global spotlight this week, thanks to China’s launch of platinum futures trading—a move that Mining Weekly’s Martin Creamer suggests (opens in a new tab) could buoy South African producers. Add to that a sudden European uptick in yttrium prices, plus a spin through Johannesburg in a platinum-catalyzed hydrogen fuel cell vehicle, and you have a news cycle that feels suspiciously like a preview of 2030. But beneath the shiny headlines lies a more interesting question: what matters for the rare earth sector right now?

Signals in the Noise: The Yttrium Surprise

Mining Weekly highlights a “surge in European yttrium prices” benefiting the Phalaborwa rare earths project. That detail is directionally credible—yttrium pricing has indeed shown intermittent tightness in 2024–25 due to China’s production controls and Myanmar’s instability. Yttrium sits outside the headline-grabbing NdPr market yet remains essential to phosphors, high-temperature ceramics, and advanced alloys. This is not a magnet metals signal.

However, the report offers no volumes, no baselines, and no explanation of what “surge” means—classic commodity-press shorthand. For investors, the key question is whether this is a structural tightening or a seasonal wobble. Based on known supply dynamics, REEx suggests this as a short-term price reflex, not a fundamental shift—useful for sentiment at Phalaborwa, but not evidence of a durable new market regime.

China’s Platinum Futures and South Africa’s Quiet Advantage

China’s new platinum futures exchange, (opens in a new tab) debuting this week, is accurately reported and strategically important: Beijing is trying to pull PGM price discovery closer to Shanghai. For South African producers, that means deeper liquidity—but also more price influence from a country aggressively stockpiling strategic metals.

Mining Weekly frames this largely as good news. REEx agrees—with an asterisk. In a world where China wants greater control over critical mineral benchmarks (rare earths included), investors should watch for similar financial instruments emerging in other strategic commodities, especially magnet metals.

The Fuel Cell Cameo: Glamour or Ground Truth?

A demonstration ride in a platinum-catalyzed hydrogen fuel-cell EV makes for great video content, but it is—bluntly—marketing theatre. Fuel cells remain a niche automotive segment. Still, the optics matter: platinum’s long-term demand story strengthens if industrial and mobility use cases diversify.

What This Means for Rare Earths Investors

Takeaway: The Mining Weekly piece is harmless, mostly accurate, and occasionally breathless. It hints at broader themes—China’s grip on strategic metals, Europe’s sporadic price volatility, and South Africa’s role in PGMs—but offers little analysis. For rare earth investors, the real story is not platinum test drives or vague yttrium “surges,” but the pattern: volatile markets, geopolitical jockeying, and early signs of a fragmented global critical-minerals pricing system.

© 2025 Rare Earth Exchanges™ – Accelerating Transparency, Accuracy, and Insight Across the Rare Earth & Critical Minerals Supply Chain.

• Washington is directing EXIM and DFC financing toward African rare earth projects.
• Harena's Madagascar mine is receiving $143M.
• Pensana's Angola refinery is supported by a $160M EXIM loan.
• Both Harena and Pensana are pursuing U.S. listings to access American capital markets.
• Pensana's Longonjo project targets production of 20,000 tonnes annually by 2027.
• Harena's Ampasindava aims for 5,000 tonnes by 2028.
• This positions Africa as a strategic counterweight to China's refining and magnet supply dominance.
• U.S. state-backed financial support is turning African rare earth diversification from policy ideal to operational reality.
• Africa has the potential to become America's most important non-Chinese rare earth partner by decade's end.

The United States is accelerating its diversification strategy with fresh capital flowing into African rare earth ventures, signaling that Washington sees the continent as an essential counterweight to China’s entrenched dominance. Harena Rare Earths (opens in a new tab) and Pensana Rare Earths (opens in a new tab), both London-listed, are now pursuing U.S. listings—Harena on the OTCQB and Pensana targeting Nasdaq in 2026—aiming to tap deep American demand for strategic mineral exposure. The timing is no accident: the U.S. government is actively directing financing tools such as EXIM and DFC toward African supply chains to secure magnet-grade feedstock beyond China’s orbit.

Harena’s Ampasindava project in Madagascar (opens in a new tab), requiring $143 million to develop a 5,000-tonne-per-year TREO mine by 2028, has already drawn strong U.S. investor attention. In Angola, Pensana’s Longonjo development (opens in a new tab) is further along, with construction underway and ambitions to deliver 20,000 tonnes of mixed rare earth carbonate annually starting in 2027. Pensana’s request for a $160 million EXIM loan, combined with its partnership with magnet producer VAC, positions Longonjo as a potential anchor in a future U.S.-Africa NdPr supply corridor as covered by Rare Earth Exchanges. For both companies, suggests Ecofin Agency, (opens in a new tab) access to American capital markets offers a broader investor base and the possibility of financing terms difficult to secure in Europe alone.

Behind these individual moves lies a bigger trend: Washington is increasingly leveraging federal finance to cultivate African rare earth capacity, from Madagascar to South Africa’s Phalaborwa project, backed by DFC. The U.S. is no longer treating diversification as a policy ideal—it is mobilizing state-backed financial firepower to challenge Beijing’s dominance in refining and magnet supply.

If projects like Ampasindava and Longonjo reach steady production, could Africa emerge as the United States’ most important non-Chinese rare earth partner by the end of the decade?  The unfolding dynamic, assuming execution and frankly consistent policy out of Washington, D.C., will ultimately reshape global supply chains that have long run through China.

© 2025 Rare Earth Exchanges™ – Accelerating Transparency, Accuracy, and Insight Across the Rare Earth & Critical Minerals Supply Chain.

• Hasetins Commodities announced a $400M rare earth processing plant in Nasarawa State.
• The plant is claimed to be Africa's largest.
• The project lacks verified feedstock or JORC-compliant deposits to support operations.
• Nigeria possesses REE-bearing minerals like monazite across multiple states.
• The project suffers from geological data gaps, undefined reserves, and unclear processing specifications.
• REEx advises investors to view this as a high-aspiration, early-stage project until Nasarawa yields bankable deposits.
• Processing capacity means nothing without proven mineral resources.

Rare Earth Exchanges (REEx) evaluates Nigeria’s announced $400M rare earth processing plant, integrating our prior analysis of Nigeria’s geological potential. It separates credible mineral opportunity from political optimism, highlights the absence of verified feedstock, and explains why investors should view this project as early-stage and unproven.

BusinessDay Nigeria reports (opens in a new tab) that Hasetins Commodities has broken ground on a US$400 million rare earth and critical metals processing plant in Nasarawa State—touted as the largest in Africa and expected to generate 10,000 jobs. It fits neatly into the Federal Government’s narrative of mineral-led diversification.

Nasarawa State

But as REEx warned in our August 2025 deep-dive, “Nigeria’s Rare Earth Mineral Potential: A Wealth of Untapped Opportunities,” Nigeria’s challenge is not ambition—it is verification. Nigeria possesses occurrences of monazite, xenotime, and placer-hosted REE sands, but suffers from geological data gaps, undefined reserves, and an informal-first mining ecosystem.

This new announcement does little to resolve those gaps.

The Golden Shine: What the Article Gets Right

Nigeria does sit on substantial REE-bearing minerals, especially monazite, across Plateau, Benue, Nasarawa, and Cross River. REEx previously highlighted USGS estimates pointing to millions of tonnes of monazite-rich sands across multiple states—an untapped opportunity if properly surveyed and developed.

The government is also correct that global demand for NdPr, Dy, and Tb is rising, and that developing in-country processing would move Nigeria up the value chain—a point REEx has supported repeatedly. On paper, adding 12,000 tpa of processing to Hasetins’ existing claimed 6,000 tpa capacity could position Nigeria as an African refining hub.

But capacity without feedstock is just stainless steel and ceremony.

The Hard Grit: Where the Story Exceeds the Facts

1. No Bankable Feedstock Exists

Despite references to “rising feedstock,” Nigeria has zero JORC or NI 43-101 compliant REE deposits in Nasarawa. Without a defined resource, Hasetins risks building a refinery in search of a mine—a pattern REEx previously flagged in Abuja’s “refinery-first, geology-later” approach.

2. 18,000 tpa… of What Exactly?

Is this ore throughput? Mixed REE concentrate? Carbonate? Actual separated oxides?

The article never specifies. As REEx has noted, early-stage Nigerian facilities often perform only basic beneficiation, not true solvent extraction.

3. “Largest in Africa” Looks Like PR, Not Peer Review

South Africa’s Steenkampskraal and Madagascar’s monazite projects are better characterized. Nigeria’s claim is aspirational until backed by flowsheets and production.

4. 10,000 Jobs Is Political Theatre

Rare earth separation is capital-intensive and automated. Such numbers are implausible.

Why Investors Should Care

Nigeria has real geological potential—REEx has documented it in detail—but processing ambitions must follow resource proof, not precede it. This project is noteworthy, but remains speculative until Nasarawa yields a bankable deposit.

For now, investors should classify Hasetins’ refinery as high on aspiration, low on geological grounding.

© 2025 Rare Earth Exchanges™ – Accelerating Transparency, Accuracy, and Insight Across the Rare Earth & Critical Minerals Supply Chain

• Rainbow Rare Earths has expanded its Phalaborwa resource estimate to include yttrium.
• Completion of a strategic SEG+ product basket covering all commercially important medium and heavy rare earths.
• Base-case NPV10 of US$611M.
• CEO George Bennett highlighted competitive advantages:
  • No mining required from phosphogypsum stacks (0.44% TREO).
  • Targeted 75% EBITDA margins.
  • 45% IRR and US$326M CAPEX.
  • First production expected in 2028.
• Trading at 19.5p (£126M market cap) after doubling from April lows.
• Stock reflects optimism but carries execution risk related to:
  • Offtake pricing.
  • CAPEX discipline.
  • Dependence on Western defense/EV demand for high-value heavy REEs.

Rainbow Rare Earths (LSE: RBW) has updated the Phalaborwa Mineral Resource Estimate to include yttrium, confirming that its planned SEG+ product will carry commercial quantities of all the economically important medium and heavy rare earths: Sm, Eu, Gd, Dy, Tb and now Y, alongside NdPr.

The company leans hard on the latest USGS 2025 Critical Minerals List, highlighting that these elements sit in the highest risk tier for supply disruption – with Lynas still the only commercial heavy-REE producer outside China. Rainbow’s updated interim study pegs Phalaborwa’s base-case NPV10 at US$611m, with a chemically “pre-cracked” surface stockpile that should translate into lower opex versus hard-rock peers.

On paper, the yttrium-inclusive SEG+ basket is strategic, timely, and directly levered to China’s tightening export posture.

What George Bennett Told Rare Earth Exchanges

In our recent REEx interview (opens in a new tab), CEO George Bennett doubled down on Rainbow’s core narrative: grade, simplicity, and speed. Phalaborwa’s phosphogypsum stacks (0.44% TREO) and Uberaba’s 0.52% TREO compare favorably to many ionic clay projects, with no mining, drilling, or blasting and only trace U/Th – a genuine ESG and cost advantage versus many peers.

Bennett reiterated targeted EBITDA margins of ~75%, a 45% post-tax IRR, and CAPEX around US$326m, with optimization studies underway. U.S. International Development Finance Corporation (DFC)-backed TechMet is slated to provide US$50m of equity (opens in a new tab); Rainbow expects roughly two-thirds project debt and first production in 2028, after a DFS now effectively sliding into 2026.

Strategically, Rainbow aims to deliver separated NdPr and a SEG+ stream, leaving mid-stream metal/alloy and magnet manufacturing to partners in the US, UK, EU, and Japan.

Stock Check: Re-Rated, But Not De-Risked

As of mid-November 2025, Rainbow’s shares trade around 19.5p, up sharply from ~9p lows in April, giving a market cap near £126m and sitting mid-range between 9p and 26.5p over 12 months. Technical services flag a short-term “buy candidate” in a rising trend, but with high volatility. Consensus analyst targets in the high-20s to low-30s imply roughly 40–70% upside, while fundamentals still show negative earnings and a double-digit P/B multiple – classic high-beta development-stage risk.

Unanswered Questions for Investors

Can Rainbow lock in premium “ex-China” pricing or floor-price style offtakes to justify its margin story if spot REE markets remain weak?

• Will CAPEX and timeline discipline hold as SX/CIX flowsheet choices are finalized and engineering risk crystallizes?
• How concentrated will project value be in a small number of high-value heavy REEs (Dy, Tb, Y) – and what happens if
• Western defence/EV demand slips or is delayed?
• Can Uberaba’s economics really surpass Phalaborwa’s, or is that still promotional until the full economic assessment is in the market?

REEx View

The latest entry and our interview support Rainbow’s claim to be a genuinely differentiated, circular-economy heavy-REE play. But at this valuation, the market is already paying for a good chunk of that future. Execution, offtake quality, and policy support will now matter more than slide decks.

© 2025 Rare Earth Exchanges™ – Accelerating Transparency, Accuracy, and Insight Across the Rare Earth & Critical Minerals Supply Chain.

• Lindian Resources (ASX:LIN) is on track for first production at Kangankunde by late 2026.
• The project is unaffected by Malawi's raw mineral export restrictions due to its in-country beneficiation strategy.
• Petra Capital values Lindian at A$0.91/share—nearly triple its current A$0.32 price.
• Stage 1 aims for approximately 8 ktpa REE oxides with EBITDA reaching A$96M by FY30.
• Stage 2 expansion could scale Kangankunde's output to match MP Materials and Lynas in NdPr production (~10.7 ktpa).
• This positioning could make it a potential third non-Chinese REE producer in the West-led supply chain.

A recent Petra Capital (opens in a new tab) report (October 30, 2025) confirms that Lindian Resources Ltd (opens in a new tab) (ASX:LIN) remains on track for first production at its Kangankunde Rare Earths Project by late 2026—despite temporary turbulence following Malawi’s Executive Order No. 02 of 2025 restricting raw mineral exports. The Mines and Minerals Regulatory Authority (MMRA) swiftly clarified that Lindian’s project is unaffected, as its monazite concentrate will be beneficiated in-country before export.

This response not only stabilizes investor sentiment but also signals Malawi’s commitment to local value addition—an encouraging sign for a country seeking to modernize its mining sector without derailing foreign capital flows.

Building a Benchmark African REE Project

According to Petra’s projections, Stage 1 of Kangankunde will process roughly 440 ktpa of ore, producing ~15 ktpa of monazite concentrate at 3% TREO, yielding ~8 ktpa of contained REE oxides. A gravity and magnetic separation circuit will precede minor flotation to remove sulphide impurities. Material will be railed via Nacala Port in Mozambique, giving the project credible logistics at scale.

Petra’s financial model values Lindian at A$0.91/share—nearly triple its current trading level of A$0.32—implying a 525 M market cap against a potential EV/EBITDA of 5.2× (FY29). The broker expects EBITDA to swing to positive in FY27, ramping to A$96M by FY30.

Technically, LIN’s chart (Figure 6) shows resilience amid volatility in the rare-earth sector. After a year-long consolidation, price momentum aligns with NdPr upswings, supported by robust liquidity (~A$150 M avg. monthly turnover).

Stage 2: Scaling Into the Majors

Petra’s expansion scenario envisions output of up to 100 ktpa monazite concentrate, potentially matching MP Materials and Lynas Rare Earths in NdPr volume (≈ 10.7 ktpa). A pre-production capex near US$200 M is modeled, with beneficiation and modular circuits expected to reduce future opex. If executed, Kangankunde could anchor a West-led African REE supply chain for magnet feedstocks.

Investor Takeaway: Fundamentals Intact, Policy Risk Contained

The Executive Order episode underscores sovereign sensitivity but ultimately highlights regulatory maturity. Malawi’s government effectively diffused risk—something rare in emerging jurisdictions. From a fundamentals view, Lindian’s valuation gap appears unjustified given its project de-risking, secured funding through first pour, and clear beneficiation strategy.

 Some open questions: For starters, can Lindian attract Western offtake partners before 2026 and cement its role as the third non-Chinese REE producer? Investors should watch for these signals carefully.

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• Mount Mulanje is Malawi's first UNESCO World Heritage Site.
• The site faces an $820 million bauxite mining proposal.
• The mining project threatens the ecological and spiritual core supporting over a million people.
• The project promises to create 1,300 jobs and generate $260 million in annual revenue.
• The project lacks local refining capacity.
• There are risks of destroying rivers, forests, and sustainable industries such as tourism and tea farming.
• The situation highlights the paradox of 'green' technology requiring resource extraction from ecologically sensitive regions.
• There is community resistance, indicating operational risks for mining projects lacking social license.

Mount Mulanje, newly crowned as Malawi’s first UNESCO World Heritage Site, now sits at the center of an intensifying national standoff between conservation and commerce. Rising nearly 3,000 meters above sea level, this granite giant sustains over a million people through its rivers, forests, and fertile slopes. Yet Akatswiri Mineral Resources (opens in a new tab), a local mining firm, has proposed an $820 million bauxite and rare earth project across its Lichenya and Linje plateaus—territory described by UNESCO as a living symbol of harmony between people and nature.

Supporters frame the project as economic salvation: 1,300 jobs, $260 million in annual revenue, and a seat for Malawi in the critical minerals race. But for chiefs, environmentalists, and global observers, the proposal threatens something irreplaceable—the spiritual and ecological core of southern Malawi. “Mount Mulanje is not just a mountain,” one village elder told Nyasa Times. “It is our identity.”

The Mirage of “Mining as Development”

Akatswiri’s pitch reflects a familiar narrative in resource-poor nations: short-term wealth traded for long-term risk. Malawi lacks both the energy infrastructure and refining capacity to process bauxite or rare earths locally. That means heavy export dependence, little value capture, and potential environmental collapse in a fragile ecosystem already battered by illegal logging and wildfires.

The Mulanje Mountain Conservation Trust warns that open-pit extraction would deforest the slopes, poison rivers that feed Blantyre, and devastate endemic plant species. Tourism, tea farming, and sustainable hydropower—industries that already generate revenue and employment—could all suffer. Here, the economic math seems thin: trading steady, renewable income for a speculative mining windfall.

The Rare Earth Paradox

For investors and policymakers, the Mulanje dispute reveals a deeper paradox at the heart of the global critical minerals rush. The very materials needed for “green” technologies—rare earths, lithium, bauxite—often lie beneath the world’s most ecologically sensitive regions. Without rigorous governance and transparency, “green growth” risks becoming brown extraction by another name. Malawi’s decision, therefore, carries moral and strategic weight far beyond its borders: it tests whether developing nations can protect natural capital while courting mineral investment.

Rare Earth Exchanges Takeaway

The facts reported by Nyasa Times are credible and corroborated by local conservation groups, though early revenue estimates from Akatswiri remain speculative. The bias lies in corporate framing—equating extraction with progress, a story as old as mining itself.

For investors, the key insight isn’t just the conflict—it’s the signal: community resistance, global scrutiny, and UNESCO oversight mean projects without social license face growing operational risk across Africa’s critical mineral frontiers.

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• Dr. Biplab Munshi's 2025 paper offers a practical, industry-ready roadmap for extracting critical metals such as neodymium, dysprosium, and terbium.
• These metals are essential for permanent magnets used in electric vehicles (EVs), wind turbines, and defense systems.
• The extraction is from complex monazite-xenotime deposits.
• The study integrates hydrometallurgical innovations, including:
  • Synergistic solvent extraction
  • Diglycolamide systems
  • Ionic liquids
• It provides detailed operational parameters and a decision matrix for matching processes to specific feed characteristics.
• If widely adopted, this scalable flowsheet could:
  • Diversify global supply chains
  • Enable emerging producers in Australia, India, and Africa to process their own resources
  • Reduce dependence on China's refining dominance

A new paper (opens in a new tab) by Dr. Biplab Munshi, an independent scholar, titled “Selective Extraction and Separation of High-Value Rare Earth Elements (Nd, Dy, Tb) from Mixed Monazite–Xenotime Deposits” synthesizes decades of hydrometallurgical advances into a practical, industry-ready roadmap for extracting neodymium (Nd), dysprosium (Dy), and terbium (Tb) — the metallic core of high-performance permanent magnets. Published in 2025, the study integrates over a dozen process innovations, from synergistic solvent extraction (Cyanex 572 + TBP) to diglycolamide and ionic-liquid systems, providing a unified flowsheet designed specifically for complex monazite–xenotime placer deposits often found in Asia, Africa, and Australia.

Munshi’s research stands out for transforming a traditionally laboratory-bound problem — separating chemically similar rare earths — into a clear process framework that engineers can apply at pilot and commercial scales. The study not only details the chemistry but also operational parameters such as temperature, pH, diluent selection, and stripping conditions. It even factors in radioactive impurity control (thorium and uranium) and regulatory compliance — a common industrial stumbling block.

From the Lab Bench to the Processing Plant

The proposed “decision matrix” provides practical guidance on matching leaching and extraction systems to feed characteristics. For example, alkaline cracking is recommended for thorium-rich monazite, while chloride-based solvent extraction suits mixed monazite–xenotime concentrates destined for Nd/Dy/Tb recovery. Newer techniques such as ionic-liquid-assisted extraction and oxalic acid leaching reduce environmental impact by minimizing solvent loss and effluent generation.

The broader implication is strategic: if adopted widely, this flowsheet could help diversify global rare earth supply away from China’s near-total dominance in refining. It offers a scalable blueprint for emerging producers in Australia, India, and Africa to process their own resources instead of exporting raw concentrates.

Promise Meets Pragmatism

Yet, as with all advances, there are limits. Munshi’s framework relies heavily on data from controlled studies; full-scale industrial validation is still limited. The economics of multi-stage solvent extraction and radioactive waste treatment remain challenging for smaller operators. In addition, while “green” ionic-liquid systems look promising, they are not yet proven at tonnage scale, and reagent cost recovery will determine their real-world viability.

Why It Matters

This paper captures the rare balance between chemistry and commercial realism. For engineers and investors, it provides a tangible process map for separating the metals that power the world’s magnets — from EVs to wind turbines to defense systems. For policymakers, it underscores how technological know-how, not just resource ownership, defines true critical-mineral independence.

Citation: Munshi B. (2025). Selective Extraction and Separation of High-Value Rare Earth Elements (Nd, Dy, Tb) from Mixed Monazite–Xenotime Deposits: Processes, Advances, and Industrial Implementation. Independent Scholar.

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• Mrima Hill in Kenya reportedly holds billions worth of rare-earth minerals for electric vehicles (EVs) and defense tech, drawing interest from Western and Asian powers seeking supply chain diversification.
• Valuations range from $62 billion to $7 trillion, which remain speculative and are based on early estimates rather than proven reserves.
• The leap from exploration to commercial mining is still uncertain.
• Investors should watch for drilling results, offtake deals, and community consent as promising indicators.
• Treat media hype and unverified valuations as red flags until certified production begins.

In a recent Indian-YouTube news segment (opens in a new tab), the spotlight turned to Mrima Hill (opens in a new tab) on Kenya’s Indian Ocean coast, where rumored riches of rare-earth elements are stirring global investor curiosity. According to the report, colossal deposits of minerals used in EVs, high-tech magnets and strategic defense applications are waiting beneath the forest canopy.

The Promise as Presented: Dreams of a “New Frontier”

The video claimed that Kenya is sitting on a stockpile of rare‐earth oxides worth billions, positioning the country as a future key supplier. Big headlines: multinational players are circling; local land issues and regulatory reform are at the forefront of mind; and global powers see Kenya as a piece in the supply-chain puzzle.

What We Know and What Still Must Be Verified

First, after reviewing a YouTube episode and multiple media, Rare Earth Exchanges (REEx) confirms that Kenya has long‐acknowledged exploration interest in Mrima Hill. Reports cite that a licence was held (and later revoked) by Cortec Mining Kenya in 2013, pointing to earlier assessments of large mineral potential.

The area has become geopolitically visible: media flagged that Western and Asian countries are eyeing Kenyan forests for critical mineral access.  Kenya’s mining regulatory regime is undergoing shifts—aiming to boost transparency, reform licensing, and raise the mining contribution to GDP.

Yet what is speculative or uncertain? The valuations thrown around in the media (e.g., “$62 billion” or “$7 trillion”) are based on early estimates and may not reflect measured, proven resources or mineable reserves. The presence of rare‐earth oxide concentrations versus mere base minerals is often ambiguous in the public domain. The leap from “potential deposit” to “commercial mine” involves many steps (resource drilling, feasibility, environment, permitting).

Finally, the recent YouTube segment (opens in a new tab) reviewed by REEx appears to blend enthusiasm with evangelism; some claims verge on hype rather than conservative resource engineering.

Why This Matters to Rare Earth Supply Chains

The global rare‐earth supply chain today is heavily dominated by a handful of countries and regulatory chokepoints. Should Kenya progress from exploration to production, markets could see:

• Diversification of supply away from existing dominant producers
• Upstream advantages: potential development of mining → beneficiation in a new region
• Strategic repositioning for consumers of rare earths (automotive, renewables, defence) seeking new supplier options

Yet: until projects move from “promising” to “permit and production”, the real impact remains future-potential rather than current supply relief.

Watch for These Red Flags (and Bright Signs)

Bright signs: actual drilling results reported, commercial offtake deals signed, local community consent obtained, and environmental regulation adherence.

Red flags: numerical valuations given without explanation of resource category; hype videos that skip permitting/feasibility; local land/community tension not addressed (which can stall projects).

Indeed, the segment’s tone suggests optimism, but investors and media watchers should stay skeptical until the certification of resources, defined reserves, and financed mine development are on the table.

Final Take

The Kenyan rare-earth story is promising, but it still has potential. The Indian-YouTube episode injects renewed interest—and that matters in the narrative landscape of critical minerals. What remains is for industry and regulators to convert promise into production. Until then, treat the valuations and geopolitical framing as an exciting trailer, not the full feature.

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• Lindian Resources (ASX: LIN) confirms its Kangankunde Rare Earths Project in Malawi remains exempt from raw mineral export restrictions due to planned on-site beneficiation into concentrate before export.
• The project represents one of the world's largest undeveloped rare earth deposits with ultra-low impurities and bottom-quartile costs, backed by A$91.5M funding and Iluka Resources partnership.
• Malawi's policy reflects Africa's growing resource nationalism trend, requiring local value-add processing and testing the balance between national beneficiation goals and investor confidence in non-Chinese supply chains.

Australia’s rare earth hopeful reassures investors amid policy turbulence—why this matters for global magnet supply chains. Lindian Resources Ltd (ASX: LIN) has confirmed that its flagship Kangankunde Rare Earths Project in Malawi (opens in a new tab) remains unaffected by Malawi’s Executive Order No. 2 (2025) restricting the export of raw minerals. The clarification follows investor concern after media reports suggested the country might suspend all unprocessed mineral exports.

The Project

The company cited Section 3 of the order, which exempts processed or value-added minerals produced domestically. Lindian’s Kangankunde operation plans to beneficiate rare earth ore into concentrate prior to export, satisfying these criteria. The government of Malawi has been briefed on Lindian’s beneficiation plans and, according to the company, supports its approach.

Why This Matters: A Test of Africa’s Value-Add Era

Across Africa, nations are tightening controls on raw mineral exports to stimulate local processing—mirroring Indonesia’s nickel policy and Zimbabwe’s lithium restrictions. For Lindian, the confirmation underscores both regulatory resilience and a pivot toward local value creation, now central to resource nationalism trends.

Kangankunde, one of the world’s largest undeveloped rare earth deposits, is projected to produce a 55% TREO monazite concentrate with ultra-low impurities and bottom-quartile operating costs. The project’s economics remain robust even at low NdPr spot prices, positioning it as a strategic non-Chinese source of magnet feedstock. The project also enjoys strong community and government backing, and following its A$91.5 million placement and partnership with Iluka Resources, Lindian has made its Final Investment Decision for Stage 1 and commenced early site works

Investor Read: Fact, Signal, and Sentiment

Fundamentally

Lindian remains fully funded for Stage 1 with an Iluka offtake channel offering downstream security. The Malawi clarification removes a short-term overhang that could have depressed sentiment around African projects.

Technically

LIN shares trade around A$0.145–A$0.16, consolidating after strong gains earlier in 2025. Support sits near A$0.13, with resistance near A$0.17—levels that may strengthen as construction milestones roll in.

Unanswered questions:

• Will Malawi’s export restrictions evolve into stricter local-processing mandates?
• Can Lindian eventually upgrade from concentrate to separated oxides in Malawi, or will refining migrate offshore (e.g., Iluka’s Eneabba)?
• How will policy shifts affect logistics, taxation, and foreign-exchange frameworks across the African rare earth corridor?

Editorial Takeaway

REEx finds Lindian’s statement factually sound and timely, aligning with known policy exemptions. Does the development highlight a new equilibrium between national beneficiation goals and investor confidence? Such a dynamic that will increasingly shape rare earth supply diversification beyond China?

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• Steenkampskraal Monazite Mine has unveiled a six-phase roadmap to vertically integrate South Africa's rare earth value chain, from raw monazite ore to separated oxides, metals, and finished products, backed by IDC funding.
• The ambitious plan aims to bring rare earth separation on-site using magneto-electrochemical technology, potentially positioning South Africa as a credible alternative supplier to China's market dominance.
• With world-class grades exceeding 15% TREO, the project faces high execution risks but could transform South Africa from a resource supplier to a global player if regulatory, capital, and technical challenges are overcome.

In a rare move for Africa’s mining landscape, Steenkampskraal Monazite Mine (opens in a new tab) (SMM) has unveiled (opens in a new tab) a six-phase roadmap to vertically integrate South Africa’s rare earth value chain—from raw monazite ore to separated oxides, metals, and ultimately finished products. Backed by initial funding from the Industrial Development Corporation (opens in a new tab) (IDC), the plan positions Steenkampskraal as more than a mine—it’s a bet on national beneficiation, industrial independence, and a foothold in a market long dominated by China.

The Ambitious Blueprint

SMM’s plan reads like an industrial symphony in six movements. Phase 1 establishes a concentration plant producing >50% TREO monazite concentrate, forming the backbone of subsequent steps. Phase 2 adds value by removing low-margin cerium and lanthanum, leaving behind higher-value elements. Phase 3, the real pivot, aims to bring rare earth separation—China’s historical choke point—on-site, using magneto-electrochemical technology in partnership with the Remedy Group (opens in a new tab).

South Africa’s REE Treasure Trove?

Downstream, Phases 4 through 6 envision a fluorination process, metallization facilities, and full end-product manufacturing, culminating in a rare African mine-to-magnet ecosystem. By capturing each link of the value chain, SMM could, if executed, move South Africa from a resource supplier to a global player.

Reality Check: Ambition Meets Metallurgy

It’s a bold vision—but also one that risks reading as aspirational marketing. South Africa’s last two decades of industrial policy are littered with stalled beneficiation projects, and rare earth processing requires a trifecta rarely found in one jurisdiction: chemical engineering depth, patient capital, and regulatory stability. SMM’s leadership touts partnerships with Chimerical Technology and Rare Earth Refiners, yet details on licensing, environmental readiness, and off-take agreements remain thin.

Still, the IDC’s participation is significant—a signal of state-backed seriousness. The inclusion of Thor Medical to harvest radium-228 as a by-product hints at diversified revenue potential, a practical edge many rare earth juniors lack.

Investor Lens: Africa’s High-Grade Wild Card

With grades exceeding 15% TREO, Steenkampskraal is undeniably world-class. If even half of the roadmap materializes, South Africa could emerge as a credible alternative supplier of strategic elements like neodymium, dysprosium, and terbium. But execution risk remains high. Investors should watch for progress in pilot-scale separation, regulatory permitting, and credible off-take partnerships before assigning valuation premiums.

The narrative here is not just about South Africa’s geology, but about whether it can build the industrial muscle to match its mineral wealth.

Source: Tasneem Bulbulia, Mining Weekly, October 24, 2025

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