• AI servers require thousands of multilayer ceramic capacitors (MLCCs) per board to stabilize power delivery, pushing these components into unprecedented regimes of sub-0.5 μm dielectric layers and extreme electric-field stress with near-zero failure tolerance.
• Manufacturers increasingly rely on rare-earth dopants (Dy, Y, Ho) to maintain MLCC reliability under DC bias and high temperature, quietly tying AI infrastructure performance to China's ~90% dominance in rare-earth separation and refining.
• Oxygen-vacancy accumulation in ultra-thin dielectrics has emerged as the dominant reliability threat for AI-grade MLCCs, requiring automotive-level validation rigor and elevating passive components from invisible parts to strategic supply-chain chokepoints.

Jung Rag Yoon of Samwha Capacitor’s R&D Center (Yongin, Korea), together with collaborators Seok No Seo (Samwha), Min-Woo Ha (Myongji University), and Moon-Taek Cho (Daewon University College), examine a critical but largely invisible constraint on modern AI infrastructure: multilayer ceramic capacitors (MLCCs)—the sand-grain-sized components that stabilize power delivery in GPUs and data-center power systems.

In their January 2026 review published in the Journal of Electrical and Electronic Materials, the authors argue that AI servers are forcing MLCC technology into an unprecedented regime of extreme miniaturization (sub-0.5 μm dielectric layers), elevated electric-field stress, and near-zero-tolerance failure requirements.

To maintain performance under these conditions, manufacturers increasingly rely on rare-earth-doped BaTiO₃ dielectrics (notably Dy, Y, and Ho) to stabilize capacitance under DC bias and high temperature. That materials solution, however, quietly ties next-generation AI reliability to a geopolitical reality: China’s dominant position in rare-earth separation and refining, particularly for mid- and heavy-rare-earth supply chains.

Google Data Center

Why MLCCs Matter to AI (A Lay Explanation That Investors Should Not Skip)

An MLCC functions as a local energy buffer and high-frequency noise suppressor on a circuit board. AI accelerators draw power in abrupt, microsecond-scale bursts. Without rapid local charge delivery, voltagessag, electrical noise spikes, and systems destabilize. This is why asingle AI accelerator board can incorporate thousands to tens of thousands of MLCCs, and why power-integrity engineering has become a first-order design constraint in data centers. The review underscores a clear trend across the supply chain: AI servers consume far more MLCCs than conventional servers, and demand is rising sharply as compute density and power draw continue to climb.

Multilayer Ceramic Capacitors (MLCCs)

Study Methods and What This Paper Actually Is

This publication is a technical review, not a single-laboratory experimental study. The authors synthesize peer-reviewed research, industry practice, and reliability frameworks across four domains:

• Materials engineering: BaTiO₃ particle size control, grain-boundary behavior, and core–shell dielectric microstructures
• Additives and dopants: rare-earth elements and multivalent oxides used to suppress defects and stabilize dielectric response
• Manufacturing processes: slurry dispersion → tapecasting → electrode printing → lamination → reducing-atmosphere sintering → controlled re-oxidation
• Reliability physics and testing: HALT, TSDC analysis, Weibull lifetime modeling, and the emerging “tipping-point” framework tied to oxygen-vacancy accumulation

As a review, its value lies in consolidating technical consensus and highlighting where failure modes are emerging as MLCCs shrink and AI duty cycles intensify.

Key Findings: MLCC Technology Has Entered a New Stress Regime

1. Ultra-thin dielectrics (<0.5 μm) raise the stakes

Shrinking dielectric layers increases volumetric capacitance but simultaneously amplifies electric-field intensity and defect sensitivity. At these scales, a single weak interface or vacancy cluster can become a catastrophic failure path.

2. DC bias “steals” capacitance—core–shell designs try to steal it back

Under sustained DC bias, BaTiO₃-based MLCCs can lose a substantial fraction of effective capacitance. The review highlights core–shell grain architectures that redistribute field stress and preserve dielectric response across temperature and voltage ranges.

3. Oxygen vacancies become the dominant reliability threat in base-metal electrode MLCC

The shift to Ni/Cu internal electrodes requires sintering in reducing atmospheres, which promotes oxygen-vacancy formation. Over time, these vacancies migrate, accumulate, and degrade insulation resistance, eventually forming conductive paths.

4. AI reliability expectations are converging on “ppm-level failure or else.”

AI data centers operate continuously. A single capacitor failure can disable a board, server, or rack. The paper argues that AI-grade MLCCs are approaching automotive-level documentation and validation rigor, but under a distinct stress profile dominated by electrical transients rather than mechanical shock.

Where Rare Earths Enter the “Passive Component” Story

The strategic takeaway is subtle but important: rare-earth dopants are becoming reliability enablers, not performance luxuries. Elements such as Dy, Ho, and Y suppress abnormal grain growth, regulate oxygen-vacancy behavior, reduce dielectric loss, and stabilize capacitance under extreme operating conditions. In short, rare earths are embedded in the power plumbing of AI, not just in motors and magnets.

The Controversial Intersection: AI Reliability Meets Processing Concentration

While the review itself is technical and Korea-centric, its implications intersect directly with geopolitics:

• The International Energy Agency and other bodies note that China’s dominance is more pronounced in rare-earth separation and refining than in upstream mining, with processing shares commonly cited around ~90% for several categories.
• Security and industrial-policy analysts describe this as structural leverage, particularly for mid- and heavy-rare-earth oxides used in advanced materials.
• Recentexport-control actions covering selected rare-earth categories reinforce that availability is shaped as much by policy as by geology.

REEx takeaway

Even when used in small dopant fractions, AI-scale deployment requires high-purity, process-qualified, and highly consistent inputs. That is precisely where processing concentration matters most. When refining is the bottleneck, small quantities can still be strategically decisive.

Limitations and What Readers Should Not Over-Interpret

• This is a review, not a new dataset. It consolidates knownmechanisms rather than establishing novel causal claims.
• Industry authorship matters. With the lead author based at a capacitor manufacturer, the paper naturally emphasizes manufacturable solutions and may underweight alternative architectures or substitution pathways.
• “China monopoly” is context-specific. Dominance is strongest in separation and refining; upstream mining and certain downstream manufacturing steps are more geographically distributed.
• Substitution is slow. Although alternatives are being explored (as acknowledged in funding disclosures), reliability qualification cycles, cost, and yield constraints limit near-term displacement.

Implications for Investors, Policymakers, and the AI Supply Chain

• AI scaling is a passive-component story. GPUs draw attention; MLCCs keep systems alive. Expect capacitor qualification, failure analytics, and supply assurance to become board-level procurement issues.
• Rare-earth strategy must extend beyond magnets. Ceramic dielectrics and passive components are an underappreciated demand vector.
• Processing chokepoints remain the center of gravity. Concentrated refining capacity means even the most advanced AI hardware inherits upstream vulnerabilities—even when rare earths appear only as dopants.

Yoon, J. R., Seo, S. N., Ha, M.-W., & Cho, M.-T. (2026). Multilayer ceramic capacitors for AI servers and data centers: Challenges, reliability issues, and future technology directions. Journal of Electrical and Electronic Materials, 39(1), 34–51. https://doi.org/10.4313/JEEM.2026.39.1.5 (opens in a new tab)

• China's rare earth dominance stems from integrated ecosystems linking mines to separation, magnets, and manufacturing—not merely resource abundance or geology.
• Western rare earth processing was hollowed out by industrial policy and short-term capitalism, not ESG constraints alone, while China leveraged state capital and long-term vision.
• Korea's call for a rare earths complex is sound but requires decade-long commitment, guaranteed offtake, and allied coordination to avoid collapsing back into Chinese dependency.

The Korea JoongAng Daily column argues that rare earth dominance flows not from geology, but from integration—mines linked to separation, magnets, and end-use manufacturing (opens in a new tab). On this central point, the author is correct as the Rare Earth Exchanges™ community is fully aware. China’s advantage is not merely resource abundance but ecosystem design, exemplified by hubs such as Bayan Obo Mining District and downstream magnet clusters. The Two Rare Earth Bases China paradigm, now on an accelerated trajectory with patients, innovation and monetization across relevant sectors.

The article correctly highlights the chemical difficulty of separating 17 near-identical elements and the industrial importance of solvent-extraction know-how accumulated over decades. This is aligned with global expert consensus and with REEx’s own supply-chain mapping.

The ESG Mirage and the Cost Story

Environmental constraints are portrayed as the West’s primary barrier. That framing is directionally true but incomplete. ESG hurdles matter, as seen in controversies surrounding Lynas Rare Earths operations in Malaysia, but they are not the decisive constraint.

The deeper truth: China’s advantage stems from state-coordinated capital, tolerance for long payback periods, vision to strategy to execution, and the willingness to run loss-leading separation capacity to defend downstream dominance. ESG alone did not hollow out Western processing—industrial policy did. Not to mention the short-termism associated with modern-day capitalism.

Where the Narrative Overreaches

The column leans into a deterministic tone: China’s system is portrayed as effectively unassailable. That crosses from analysis into strategic fatalism. While it is true that China produces roughly 85–90% of rare earth permanent magnets, the suggestion that alternative ecosystems are futile understates recent progress in Australia, the U.S., and Japan—albeit fragmented and underscaled.

Speculation also appears in references to thorium reuse via molten salt reactors. This remains experimental and commercially unproven, not a current cost-offset mechanism.

Korea’s Dilemma: Vision vs. Execution

The call for a “Korea-style integrated rare earths complex” is intellectually sound. Korea sits downstream of rare earth value creation—EV motors, semiconductors, displays—but lacks refining and magnet sovereignty. The article is right to warn that mine-only strategies collapse back into Chinese dependency.

What’s missing is time, capital, and alliance math. Integration requires a decade-long commitment, guaranteed offtake, security-priced inputs, and coordination with allies—not editorial urgency alone.

Why Relevant Now?

A notable topic, reflective of a broader Asian reassessment: rare earths are no longer a procurement issue, but a national industrial architecture problem. Korea is asking the right question. Whether it can execute before the next “valve turn” is the unanswered risk investors must price.

Citation

Lee, C-m. “Building a Korea-style integrated rare earths complex.” Korea JoongAng Daily, Jan 26, 2026.

• Energy Fuels acquires Australian Strategic Materials for approximately $299 million.
• Aim: Create integrated mine-to-metal-alloy rare earth platform to address critical gap in Western supply chain downstream production.
• Deal pairs Energy Fuels’ White Mesa Mill separation capacity with ASM’s operational Korean Metals Plant.
• Korean Metals Plant produces NdPr, Dy, Tb metals and alloys at commercial scale outside China.
• Strategic bet targets industrial scarcity over geological factors.
• Positions Energy Fuels as potential midstream champion.
• Success depends on managing execution risks around permitting, capex, and U.S. metallization plant.

Energy Fuels Inc.’s announced acquisition (opens in a new tab) of Australian Strategic Materials Limited (ASM) is not a routine M&A transaction. It is a direct strike at the most fragile link in the ex-China rare earth supply chain: downstream metals and alloy production. At ~US$299 million, the deal is modest in price but ambitious in scope, stitching together U.S. separation capacity with Korean and planned U.S. metallization assets into a single “mine-to-metal & alloy” platform.

Rowena Smith, MD & CEO, ASM and Mark S. Chalmers, CEO, Energy Fuels (CNW Group/Energy Fuels Inc.)

What Holds Up Under Scrutiny—The Midstream Matters

The strategic logic is sound. ASM’s operating Korean Metals Plant (KMP) is one of very few facilities outside China producing NdPr, Dy, Tb metals and NdFeB/DyFe alloys at commercial scale. Pairing that with Energy Fuels’ oxide output from the White Mesa Mill—currently the only U.S. site licensed to process monazite into separated REE oxides—directly addresses the separation-to-metal gap that has long undermined Western supply-chain ambitions. This is where value, pricing power, and customer lock-in actually live.

Where the Story Leans Forward—Scale and Timelines

The forward-looking narrative is aggressive. Planned expansions to 6,000 tpa NdPr oxide and a future U.S. American Metals Plant capable of 2,000 tpa alloy output assume smooth permitting, capex discipline, and customer offtake alignment—none guaranteed in the rare earth world.

Calling this the “largest fully integrated producer outside China” is directionally plausible, but execution risk remains non-trivial, particularly around heavy REE throughput and cost competitiveness versus Chinese incumbents.

What’s Notable for Investors—A Shift in Playbook

This deal reflects a broader pivot: Western rare earth strategy is finally moving beyond mines and into manufacturable products. If Energy Fuels can operationalize ASM’s IP, de-risk U.S. metallization, and secure magnet-adjacent customers, it could emerge as a differentiated midstream champion—something policy has promised for years but markets have rarely delivered.

Bottom Line

Energy Fuels is betting—correctly—that rare earth scarcity is not geological, but industrial. The prize is not ore. It is metal, alloy, and relevance.

ASM Profile

Australian Strategic Materials Ltd (ASM) is an Australian company developing a vertically integrated business for critical metals, focusing on its large polymetallic Dubbo Project in NSW for rare earths, zirconium, niobium, and hafnium, and operating the KMP to produce high-purity metals and alloys like neodymium for EV magnets and clean energy tech, aiming to supplyglobal manufacturers.

• Korea Zinc and Alta Resource Technologies announce joint venture to process end-of-life permanent magnets into purified rare earth oxides at a 100-ton-per-year U.S. facility by 2027.
• The partnership addresses critical supply chain choke points in separation technology, though modest scale won't materially replace primary supply or solve heavy rare earth shortages.
• Initiative signals U.S.-Korea critical minerals alignment and chips away at China's separation advantage, but should be viewed as a serious pilot rather than an immediate system transformation.

Korea Zinc (opens in a new tab), the world’s largest refined zinc smelter, announced a joint venture with Alta Resource Technologies (opens in a new tab) to process end-of-life permanent magnets into purified rare earth oxides in the United States. The JV plans a 100-ton-per-year facility at an existing U.S. site operated by PedalPoint (opens in a new tab), a Korea Zinc subsidiary, targeting operations in 2027. The news, reported by The Korea Times via Yonhap, lands amid rising concern over supply security.

What the Announcement Gets Right

Recycling magnets is a credible, necessary pillar of non-Chinese rare earth supply. End-of-life NdFeB magnets are among the highest-value secondary feedstocks available, and processing them into oxides inside the U.S. addresses a real choke point: separation. Alta’s claim of separation technology “purpose-built” for complex magnet mixtures aligns with industry needs. Korea Zinc’s scale, capital access, and recycling footprint add execution credibility. The planned siting at an existing facility reduces permitting friction—often the silent killer of timelines.

Where Optimism Outpaces Physics

A 100-tpa facility is meaningful but modest. It will not materially replace primary supply, nor will it solve heavy rare earth (Dy/Tb) tightness at scale unless feedstock quality and recovery rates are exceptional. Recycling also depends on collection economics—magnets must be gathered, sorted, and demagnetized efficiently. None of that is guaranteed. The announcement does not disclose recovery yields, element slate, or long-term offtake commitments—key details investors should watch.

Reading Between the Lines

Korea Zinc frames the JV alongside its $7.4 billion U.S. smelter plan in Tennessee (operations targeted for 2029), signaling a broader U.S.–Korea critical minerals alignment. That narrative is directionally fair, but it leans promotional. Recycling is not a silver bullet; it is a bridge strategy that buys time while primary mining, separation, and magnet capacity come online.

Why This Matters Now

What’s notable isn’t the tonnage—it’s the architecture. Pairing recycling with domestic separation chips away at China’s advantage where it matters most. If replicated, standardized, and paired with offtake and pricing discipline, this model can scale. Until then, treat it as a serious pilot, not a system rewrite.

• China, Japan, and South Korea are establishing a strategic Arctic presence through scientific research stations and commercial activities on Svalbard, normalizing non-Arctic state involvement between 2015-2025.
• Meyer's thesis argues these nations are reshaping Arctic governance through practice rather than law, using science as a legitimizing mechanism to build long-term positioning.
• For critical minerals, the study reveals a key pattern: control over Arctic access precedes resource control, with implications for future rare earth competition and supply chain leverage.

As Arctic geopolitics intensify, a new master’s thesis (opens in a new tab) by Jacob Alexander Meyer offers a timely, structured examination of how China, Japan, and South Korea have become consequential—if still indirect—actors in the Arctic through their expanding footprint on Svalbard, (opens in a new tab) the Norwegian archipelago governed under the 1920 Svalbard Treaty (opens in a new tab).

For rare earth and critical mineral observers, the perspective might provide relevant context on how science, commerce, and diplomacy are increasingly fused as instruments of long-term strategic positioning.

Core Thesis and Assumptions

Meyer’s central argument is that Asian states’ Arctic policies are not abstract strategies but are actively expressed through concrete behavior on Svalbard. The thesis assumes that:

• Scientific research functions as a legitimizing mechanism, allowing non-Arctic states to establish a durable presence despite the treaty’s silence on science.
• States operate through a mix of classical realist logic (power, access, positioning) and constructivist norm-building, particularly by shaping accepted practices around research and cooperation.
• Svalbard serves as a microcosm of Arctic governance stress, where legal ambiguity enables incremental political change without treaty revision.

Key Findings

Between 2015 and 2025, China, Japan, and South Korea each expanded activities on Svalbard through:

• Research stations and scientific collaboration are framed as neutral but strategically persistent.
• Commercial and logistical engagement, often adjacent to shipping, resource awareness, and future economic optionality.
• Diplomatic signaling, emphasizing multilateralism while quietly testing governance boundaries.

Meyer finds that although these states share overlapping scientific interests, their cumulative presence has altered the political landscape of Svalbard by normalizing non-Arctic state involvement—effectively reshaping governance through practice rather than law.

Limitations and Gaps

The thesis is qualitative and interpretive, relying on policy analysis and case studies rather than quantitative trade or investment data. It does not directly model rare earth extraction, processing, or supply-chain economics, nor does it assess military dimensions. As a master’s thesis, its conclusions are theory-driven, not predictive.

Implications for Rare Earth and Critical Minerals

For Rare Earth Exchanges™, the study underscores a critical insight: control over Arctic access may precede control over Arctic resources. While Svalbard is not currently a rare earth production hub, the normalization of Asian state presence via science and commerce mirrors patterns seen elsewhere—presence first, leverage later. For Western policymakers, the findings highlight how governance frameworks can be reshaped quietly, with long-term consequences for Arctic resource competition, shipping routes, and strategic minerals access.

Disclaimer: This analysis summarizes an academic master’s thesis. Conclusions reflect the author’s interpretations and should be evaluated alongside additional empirical research and policy sources.

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• LS Eco Energy approved a $19.3 million investment to build rare earth metallization capacity in Vietnam.
• The project targets the technically difficult processing step between oxides and finished magnets.
• The move addresses a critical supply chain chokepoint where China dominates.
• Vietnam is positioned as neutral ground with strong Korea-Vietnam industrial ties and manufacturing infrastructure.
• The investment, while strategically notable, remains modest with no disclosed capacity targets.
• No commissioning timelines or binding offtake agreements have been revealed.
• The project is considered a pilot-scale bet rather than an immediate market disruption.

Will a Korean conglomerate step into the metallization gap?  Rare Earth Exchanges™ reports that South Korea’s LS Eco Energy has approved a KRW 28.5 billion (~US$19.3 million) investment to enter Vietnam’s rare earth metals segment. Headquartered in South Koreaand majority-owned by LSCable & System (opens in a new tab), LS Eco Energy (opens in a new tab) plans to build rare earth metallization capacity—the technically difficult step between oxides and finished magnets—at its Ho Chi Minh City subsidiary (LSCV).

This is not mining. It’s processing. And that distinction matters.

Vietnam

What the Company Actually Plans

LS Eco Energy intends to refine rare earth oxides into rare earth metals in Vietnam, sourcing oxides from “global mining firms” while negotiating supply agreements and potential joint ventures (including a reported oxide purchase agreement with a Vietnamese miner). The stated ambition is to link upstream oxides to downstream permanent magnet manufacturing within the broader LS Group ecosystem cites Vietnam Investment Review (opens in a new tab).

Importantly, the article does not specify magnet production volumes, locations, or binding offtake terms. Any reference to downstream magnets should therefore be read as strategic intent, not confirmed capacity.

CEO Lee Sang-ho describes the move as a shift from planning to execution, expanding beyond cables into “core strategic materials.” Financing includes the sale of treasury shares to LS Cable & System, reinforcing vertical alignment.

New Rare Earth Midstream Player?  Ho Chi Minh City

What’s Solid—and What’s Still Soft

Solid:

• Metallization is a genuine chokepoint outside China.
• Vietnam offers industrial infrastructure, labor depth, and policy support, not to mention potential feedstock.
• Korea–Vietnam industrial ties are long-standing and robust.

Soft:

• The investment size is modest for a capital-intensive metallization process.
• No disclosed capacity, yields, or commissioning timeline.
• JV terms, equity splits, and long-term offtake remain undefined.

Claims about “accelerating” a full magnet value chain hinge on execution, not announcements, of course. So a lot of work needs to be done. Such capability would be some years away, depending on a series of unfolding assumptions.

Why This Is Notable for the Rare Earth Supply Chain

Most non-Chinese diversification efforts stall at mining or oxide production. LS Eco Energy is targeting the middle of the chain, where China’s advantage is strongest, and alternatives are scarcest. If successful—even at a small scale—this could incrementally rebalance processing geography.

Vietnam’s role is pragmatic: neutral ground with manufacturing gravity in East Asia. Still, this is a pilot-scale bet, not a China-displacing move.

Company Profile: LS Eco Energy

• Headquarters: South Korea
• Ownership: Majority-owned by LS Cable & System
• Focus: Energy materials, cables, strategic inputs
• Vietnam Footprint: Manufacturing subsidiary in Ho Chi Minh City

Source: Vietnam Investment Review, Dec. 22, 2025.

© 2025 Rare Earth Exchanges™ – Accelerating Transparency, Accuracy, and Insight Across the Rare Earth & Critical Minerals Supply Chain.

• Energy Fuels successfully qualified 99.9% purity dysprosium oxide produced at White Mesa Mill for rare earth permanent magnet applications with a major South Korean manufacturer.
• This marks a key milestone toward U.S. heavy rare earth supply chain independence.
• Despite the technical achievement of producing 29 kg of Dy oxide at pilot scale, commercialization questions remain unanswered:
  • Monazite feedstock security
  • Cash costs versus Chinese competitors
  • Conversion of qualification into binding offtake contracts
• UUUU stock rose 6.77% on the news, but investors should distinguish between initial qualification and full commercial production.
• The company targets full commercial production for Q4-2026 with planned capacity of 48 t/y Dy oxide and 14 t/y Tb oxide.

Energy Fuels (UUUU) reports (opens in a new tab) that its 99.9% purity dysprosium (Dy) oxide, produced at the White Mesa Mill (Utah), has passed initial purity and QA/QC benchmarks for rare earth permanent magnet (REPM) applications by a major South Korean manufacturer. The company frames this as a milestone toward U.S. heavy rare earth independence, citing ongoing Chinese export controls affecting Dy, Tb, and Sm.

As of writing this stock is up 6.77% to 14.92 on the news as cited from Yahoo Finance (opens in a new tab).

Why This Matters—and What’s Substantive Versus Promotional

There is a real signal here. Heavy rare earth separation plus downstream qualification is one of the hardest bottlenecks in the rare earth supply chain, and end-user QA/QC acceptance is a meaningful step beyond lab-grade purity claims. White Mesa is licensed and operating, which generally reduces execution risk versus greenfield separation builds. Energy Fuels also discloses a tangible pilot output—about 29 kg of Dy oxide—at 99.9% purity, above typical automotive thresholds.

But investors should temper enthusiasm. This remains pilot scale, not commercial production. The qualification is described as initial, and the end user is unnamed. The release does not disclose binding volumes, pricing, or term structure, which are what ultimately validate demand and economics. Feedstock security (monazite), operating costs, and scale-up yield stability remain the gating factors.

The Bigger Question: Can This Scale Fast Enough?

Energy Fuels targets commercial heavy REE production as soon as Q4-2026, citing planned annual capacity of 48 t/y Dy oxide and 14 t/y Tb oxide (subject to feed availability). Key unanswered investor questions include:

• Will monazite supply be consistent, contractable, and economical at scale?
• What is the expected cash cost per kg versus Chinese material?
• How quickly can “qualified” convert into multi-year offtake contracts?
• What capex, timelines, and commissioning risks remain for commercial circuits?

Stock Check: Fundamentals and Technical Context (UUUU)

Fundamentally, UUUU remains a hybrid story: uranium leverage plus rising rare earth optionality. The REE narrative strengthens strategic positioning, but REE cash flows are not yet the core driver. Technically, UUUU tends to trade as a policy- and catalyst-sensitive equity, with headline-driven moves that require contract and earnings confirmation to sustain.

REEx Verdict: Directionally Correct, Execution Pending

This is directionally important and appears internally consistent as a technical milestone. Still, the market should distinguish qualification from commercialization and demand clarity on contracts, costs, and scale.

© 2025 Rare Earth Exchanges™ – Accelerating Transparency, Accuracy, and Insight Across the Rare Earth & Critical Minerals Supply Chain.

• South Korean DGIST researchers developed next-generation Nd-Fe-B magnets.
• The new magnets cut heavy rare earth elements (dysprosium and terbium) usage by 80% while preserving high-temperature performance.
• This breakthrough addresses critical supply chain chokepoints by reducing dependence on Chinese-refined dysprosium and terbium.
• Rare earth separation expertise remains concentrated.
• Although peer-reviewed and technically sound, the laboratory innovation faces scaling challenges before industrial adoption.
• This development represents incremental progress toward reducing China's leverage in critical magnet materials.

A laboratory breakthrough with supply chain implications reported out of South Korea. The Korean research team reports a potentially meaningful advance in permanent magnet design: a next-generation Nd-Fe-B magnet that reduces reliance on heavy rare earth elements (HREEs) by roughly 80% while maintaining high-temperature performance.

The work, led by researchers at the Daegu Gyeongbuk Institute of Science and Technology (opens in a new tab) (DGIST) and published in the Journal of Materials Research and Technology (opens in a new tab) in early December 2025, targets one of the most stubborn chokepoints in the global rare earth supply chain—dependence on dysprosium (Dy) and terbium (Tb), metals overwhelmingly refined in China.

From a supply-chain perspective, the claim matters.

HREEs are not scarce in the Earth’s crust, but they are exceptionally hard to separate, refine, and alloy at scale. Any credible pathway to reduce their use in high-performance magnets draws attention from automakers, wind turbine OEMs, and defense planners alike.

What the Researchers Actually Did

The DGIST team did not “eliminate” heavy rare earths, nor did they invent an entirely new magnet class. Instead, they re-engineered the composition and processing strategy, substituting part of the HREE content with light rare earths and transition metals, while preserving coercivity in high-temperature environments—long the Achilles’ heel of Nd-Fe-B magnets without Dy or Tb.

That distinction matters. Incremental materials science, not miracle chemistry, is how magnet performance has historically improved. The reported 80% reduction aligns with prior academic efforts worldwide—but achieving it without catastrophic performance loss is the key technical claim here.

What’s Solid—and What’s Still Speculative

The publication itself appears technically sound and peer-reviewed, and the performance claims are within the realm of known physics, not hype-driven impossibility. However, as Rare Earth Exchanges has repeatedly noted, laboratory success does not equal industrial adoption. Scaling magnet innovations from grams to thousands of tonnes introduces cost, yield, reproducibility, and IP barriers that are often glossed over in media coverage.

There is also a subtle but common bias in institutional announcements: conflating materials innovation with immediate supply-chain independence. Even if HREE use falls sharply, Nd-Fe-B magnets still rely on rare earth separation and alloying expertise, which remains highly concentrated in China and a handful of allied countries.

Why This Still Matters

That said, this research fits a broader, strategically important trend: demand-side pressure on heavy rare earths. Every credible pathway that reduces Dy and Tb intensity weakens China’s leverage at the margin. For investors and policymakers, that margin is where future resilience is built—not through silver bullets, but through cumulative, engineering-driven erosion of single-point dependencies.

Source: Journal of Materials Research and Technology, December 2025; institutional announcements from DGIST and GIST via DongaScience (opens in a new tab).

© 2025 Rare Earth Exchanges™ – Accelerating Transparency, Accuracy, and Insight Across the Rare Earth & Critical Minerals Supply Chain.

• South Korean LS Cable & System is studying a rare earth permanent magnet manufacturing plant in Chesapeake, Virginia.
• The initiative signals allied reshoring efforts to reduce dependence on China's 80-90% global magnet production dominance.
• The proposed facility would focus on downstream magnet manufacturing, a strategically important supply chain segment, rather than mining.
• There are potential synergies from LS Cable's existing submarine cable operations for offshore wind and grid markets.
• Although still in the feasibility stage, the project shows credible industrial interest in testing U.S. commercial viability for magnet production.
• Challenges remain, including feedstock access, metallurgical capabilities, and environmental permitting.

South Korea’s LS Cable & System says it is studying a rare earth permanent magnet plant in the United States, with Chesapeake, Virginia emerging as a candidate site. The proposal, still at feasibility stage, is framed as both a diversification play away from China and a logical extension of LS Cable’s existing U.S. footprint, including its large submarine cable investment nearby.

This is not a signed deal or a ground-breaking. It is, however, a meaningful signal.

Magnets Are the Prize—Not the Ore

This comes by way of The Dong-A Ilbo, a daily South Korean news media, and is directionally accurate on the central constraint: rare earth permanent magnets, not raw rare earth mining, are the most strategically concentrated node of the supply chain. China’s dominance—often cited at roughly 80–90% of global NdFeB magnet output—remains structural. U.S. magnet manufacturing capacity is thin, fragmented, and heavily dependent on imported feedstock.

For investors, LS Cable’s interest matters because magnets sit downstream of mining and separation. This is where value, margins, and geopolitical leverage accumulate. A Korean industrial firm contemplating U.S.-based magnet manufacturing reflects buyer-side pressure, not just policy rhetoric.

Chesapeake Synergies—and Their Limits

The Chesapeake angle is plausible. Co-locating magnet manufacturing with a submarine cable plant could offer logistics, labor, and infrastructure advantages, particularly for offshore wind, grid expansion, and electrification markets. Supplying automakers and automotive electronics firms also aligns with LS Cable’s customer adjacency.

Still, feasibility studies exist for a reason. Magnet plants require reliable access to separated oxides or metals, metallurgical know-how, environmental permitting for waste streams, and long-term offtake certainty. None of those challenges disappear by choosing the right ZIP code.

Strategic Framing, With a Familiar Tilt

The Dong-A Ilbo leans into a familiar policy narrative: U.S.–Korea industrial security versus China dependence. That framing is not wrong, but it is incomplete. A U.S. magnet plant does not equal supply chain independence if upstream materials remain imported, often from China or Chinese-linked processors.

Why This Still Matters

What’s notable is not scale—it’s intent. LS Cable is a credible industrial actor testing whether the U.S. can host magnet manufacturing at commercial standards. Even a modest plant would represent incremental de-risking and a proof point for allied reshoring. For the rare earth supply chain, this is how change actually starts: quietly, experimentally, and with capital on the line.

The Company

LS Cable & System (opens in a new tab) is a South Korea-based industrial corporation with global operations and one of the biggest cable manufacturers worldwide. Its products comprise power and telecommunication cables and systems, as well as integrated modules and other related industrial materials. 

LS Cable & System is part of the larger LS Group (opens in a new tab), but the parent company, LS Cable & System (Korea), is considered a private company (opens in a new tab), though a subsidiary, LS Cable & System Asia Ltd. (opens in a new tab) (229640.KS), is publicly traded. Revenues vary by entity: the main Korean unit had sales around 6.2 trillion KRW (approx. $4.5 billion) in 2023/2024, while the Asia subsidiary saw around 869 billion KRW revenue in 2024, with overall group revenue figures also available. 

© 2025 Rare Earth Exchanges™ – Accelerating Transparency, Accuracy, and Insight Across the Rare Earth & Critical Minerals Supply Chain.

• USA Rare Earth stock fell over 12% on December 15.
• The U.S. government awarded nearly $2 billion in backing to Korea Zinc for a zinc smelter project.
• USAR was not selected for the federal deal.
• The selloff reflects investor impatience rather than operational failure.
• Washington appears to be prioritizing established players for bulk metals processing.
• USAR's focus is on magnet manufacturing, positioning it later in the policy rollout sequence.
• USAR's strategic relevance in rare earth separation and magnet production remains intact.
• USAR must convert policy alignment into tangible contracts soon.

Shares of USA Rare Earth (opens in a new tab) (NASDAQ: USAR) slid more than 12% on December 15, not because the company stumbled operationally, but because Washington once again chose a different partner. The Biden—now Trump 2.0—era reality of industrial policy is setting in: being strategic does not guarantee being selected.

When the Music Stops, Who’s Still Standing?

The immediate trigger as reported by Scott Levine writing for The Motley Fool (opens in a new tab) was news that the U.S. government is backing Korea Zinc in a nearly $2 billion zinc smelter project on U.S. soil.

Zinc, notably, sits on the USGS Critical Minerals List, and the deal fits squarely within the administration’s push to rebuild domestic metals processing capacity.

Markets reacted swiftly—and somewhat emotionally. USA Rare Earth had no news of its own, yet investors appeared rattled by the implication: another federal deal, another company not named USAR. After prior government-backed moves involving MP Materials, Lithium Americas, and downstream magnet producers, a quiet assumption had formed that USA Rare Earth would be next. That assumption broke yesterday.

What the Article Gets Right—and What It Overreaches

The piece is directionally accurate in one key respect: government alignment is becoming a material valuation input in the rare earth sector. Companies perceived as “inside the tent” are rewarded; those outside are punished, sometimes abruptly. On the other hand, there is a case to be made that today’s government-related deal could be tomorrow’s liability without a comprehensive, integrated, durable industrial policy in place.

Where the article drifts into speculation is in implying that the Korea Zinc deal meaningfully reduces USA Rare Earth’s strategic relevance. Zinc smelting, while important, sits adjacent—not equivalent—to rare earth separation and magnet manufacturing, which remain among the most geopolitically sensitive choke points in the supply chain. The absence of a USAR announcement is not evidence of exclusion; it is evidence of sequencing.

The Real Supply-Chain Signal Investors Should Watch

What’s notable here is not USA Rare Earth’s share price volatility—it’s the pattern of U.S. industrial policy now emerging clearly. Washington is funding processing and midstream capacity first, often with established global players that already know how to run complex metallurgical systems at scale. This is less about favoritism and more about execution risk management.

USA Rare Earth’s story remains fundamentally different. Its value proposition lies in rare earth magnet manufacturing and domestic integration, not bulk metals smelting. That places it closer to the endgame of supply-chain security—but also later in the policy rollout.

A Market Reacting to Silence, Not Substance

The selloff reflects impatience more than insight. Investors are pricing in disappointment based on what didn’t happen, not on deteriorating fundamentals. That said, the market is also delivering a message: hope is not a strategy, and companies trading at policy premiums must eventually convert alignment into contracts, capital, or offtake certainty, and the cash that ensues.

For USA Rare Earth, the clock is ticking—but it has not struck midnight.

Source: Yahoo Finance / Motley Fool, Dec. 15, 2025

© 2025 Rare Earth Exchanges™ – Accelerating Transparency, Accuracy, and Insight Across the Rare Earth & Critical Minerals Supply Chain.

• The U.S. Office of Strategic Capital has committed $1.25 billion to Korea Zinc as part of the Pax Silica initiative.
• Pax Silica is an eight-nation alliance aimed at decoupling critical minerals, semiconductors, and advanced manufacturing from Chinese control.
• Korea Zinc is reprocessing defense-critical materials such as antimony, germanium for Lockheed Martin, and gallium, which are under Chinese export controls.
• This positions Korea Zinc as essential to U.S. supply chain security.
• Washington is transitioning from funding mines to investing in metallurgical capacity.
• The focus is on refining and multi-metal smelting as key leverage points in critical mineral security and alliance-level industrial policy.

The U.S. Office of Strategic Capital’s (opens in a new tab) $1.25 billion conditional commitment to Korea Zinc now reads less like a standalone financing story and morelike a chapter in a broader geopolitical script. South Korean reportingvia Chosun Daily (opens in a new tab) confirms Korea Zinc is a key industrial pillar of the U.S. State Department’s newly announced “Pax Silica” initiative—an eight-nation alliance designed to hard-decouple critical minerals, rare earth adjacencies, semiconductors, and advanced manufacturing from Chinese dominance.

This matters

The OSC announcement spoke in the language of continuity and access. Pax Silica supplies the missing context: bloc-level supply-chain re-engineering, not incremental diversification.

Smelting as Strategy, Not Symbol

What holds up under scrutiny is Korea Zinc’s operational relevance. The company is already reprocessing antimony, a defense-critical mineral for which the U.S. remains more than 70 percent import-dependent on China. It is supplying germanium to Lockheed Martin. It is building gallium recovery capacity—notably one of the first materials Beijing explicitly placed under export controls.

These are not hypothetical capabilities. They are functioning, revenue-linked activities aligned with U.S. defense and semiconductor demand. A U.S.-based smelter—whether acquired or built—would close a real midstream gap, linking North American mining to domestic processing and defense procurement. That is the hard part of the supply chain, and Korea Zinc knows it.

Where the Narrative Runs Ahead of the Metal

Some caution is warranted. Talk of a “fully decoupled value chain” compresses time and complexity. The proposed U.S. smelter will be smaller than the Onsan complex and focused narrowly on strategic minerals. Feedstock diversity, permitting timelines, energy pricing, and technology transfer constraints remain unresolved.

Likewise, the suggestion that U.S. Department of Defense equity participation would instantly transform Korea Zinc into a protected “security asset” reflects political reality more than legal certainty. Influence, not immunity, is the more precise term.

Why This Is Not a Rare Earth or Critical Mineral Sideshow

For rare earth or, for that matter, critical mineral investors, this is not a distraction—it is a signal. The future of rare earth and critical mineral security runs through multi-metal smelting, by-product recovery, and alliance-level industrial policy, not single-commodity nationalism. Pax Silica quietly acknowledges what markets already know: refining capacity is the leverage point.

Washington is no longer just funding mines. It is choosing metallurgists. And that’s important to note.

The Company

Korea Zinc (opens in a new tab) is the world's leading non-ferrous (not containing iron) metal smelting company, headquartered in Seoul, South Korea. It is a global leader in the production of various metals, with a strong focus on sustainability and expansion into future-focused industries like renewable energy and secondary battery materials.

© 2025 Rare Earth Exchanges™ – Accelerating Transparency, Accuracy, and Insight Across the Rare Earth & Critical Minerals Supply Chain.

• South Korea is opening an ODA-funded rare metals cooperation center in Ulaanbaatar to help Mongolia develop processing capabilities for tungsten, molybdenum, lithium, and REEs.
• This move aims to transform Mongolia from a raw ore supplier to a refined materials partner.
• The initiative represents strategic industrial policy disguised as development assistance, allowing Korea to build bilateral mineral pipelines that bypass China's midstream dominance in a traditionally Beijing-influenced region.
• The shift in the rare earth race now depends on refining capacity and technical partnerships rather than mining concessions.
• Korea is planning to establish similar centers across Uzbekistan, Vietnam, Kazakhstan, and Indonesia.

South Korea is moving decisively to secure its critical mineral future. According to The Korea Times (opens in a new tab), Seoul will launch a rare metals cooperation center in Ulaanbaatar this week—an Official Development Assistance (ODA)-funded facility inside Mongolia’s University of Science and Technology. (opens in a new tab) The center opens on Friday and is designed to help Mongolia elevate the industrial value of its vast but underutilized rare metal reserves, including tungsten, molybdenum, lithium, and rare earth elements.

This is not charity. It is a strategic industrial policy executed with diplomatic subtlety.

Turning Mongolia Into a Value-Add Partner

The center will research Mongolia’s rare metals and offer technical training in processing and refining—capabilities the country currently lacks. Korea’s aim is straightforward: help Mongolia climb the value chain so it becomes a reliable partner supplying refined materials rather than raw ore.

For REEx readers, this fits a broader global pattern:

Nations with high-tech ambitions are building bilateral mineral-development pipelines to bypass China’s dominance in midstream processing. Mongolia, rich in resources but thin in refining capacity, is a logical choice.

Signals Between the Lines

The announcement aligns with well-documented realities:

• Mongolia holds meaningful deposits, including promising REE prospects.
• Korea remains heavily import-dependent for EV, semiconductor, and battery materials.
• Since 2022, Seoul has aggressively pursued supply-chain diversification.

But the strategic subtext is equally notable:

• Korea is positioning itself within a region where China has long exercised influence, cultivating an upstream partner that Beijing historically viewed as a buffer state.
• Plans for similar centers in Uzbekistan, Vietnam, Kazakhstan, and Indonesia resemble a coordinated critical-minerals corridor—a soft-power alternative to China’s Belt and Road.

Nothing in the report is misleading, but the framing clearly advances Korea’s national interest: development assistance as a mechanism for stabilizing high-risk supply chains.

Why It Matters for the West

This is another reminder that the rare earth race is shifting from mining concessions to midstream capture and technical capacity-building. In critical minerals, the country that controls refining—not ore—ultimately controls the market.

© 2025 Rare Earth Exchanges™ – Accelerating Transparency, Accuracy, and Insight Across the Rare Earth & Critical Minerals Supply Chain.

• South Korea is opening an ODA-funded rare metals cooperation center in Ulaanbaatar to help Mongolia develop processing capabilities for tungsten, molybdenum, lithium, and REEs.
• This move aims to transform Mongolia from a raw ore supplier to a refined materials partner.
• The initiative represents strategic industrial policy disguised as development assistance, allowing Korea to build bilateral mineral pipelines that bypass China's midstream dominance in a traditionally Beijing-influenced region.
• The shift in the rare earth race now depends on refining capacity and technical partnerships rather than mining concessions.
• Korea is planning to establish similar centers across Uzbekistan, Vietnam, Kazakhstan, and Indonesia.

South Korea is moving decisively to secure its critical mineral future. According to The Korea Times (opens in a new tab), Seoul will launch a rare metals cooperation center in Ulaanbaatar this week—an Official Development Assistance (ODA)-funded facility inside Mongolia’s University of Science and Technology. (opens in a new tab) The center opens on Friday and is designed to help Mongolia elevate the industrial value of its vast but underutilized rare metal reserves, including tungsten, molybdenum, lithium, and rare earth elements.

This is not charity. It is a strategic industrial policy executed with diplomatic subtlety.

Turning Mongolia Into a Value-Add Partner

The center will research Mongolia’s rare metals and offer technical training in processing and refining—capabilities the country currently lacks. Korea’s aim is straightforward: help Mongolia climb the value chain so it becomes a reliable partner supplying refined materials rather than raw ore.

For REEx readers, this fits a broader global pattern:

Nations with high-tech ambitions are building bilateral mineral-development pipelines to bypass China’s dominance in midstream processing. Mongolia, rich in resources but thin in refining capacity, is a logical choice.

Signals Between the Lines

The announcement aligns with well-documented realities:

• Mongolia holds meaningful deposits, including promising REE prospects.
• Korea remains heavily import-dependent for EV, semiconductor, and battery materials.
• Since 2022, Seoul has aggressively pursued supply-chain diversification.

But the strategic subtext is equally notable:

• Korea is positioning itself within a region where China has long exercised influence, cultivating an upstream partner that Beijing historically viewed as a buffer state.
• Plans for similar centers in Uzbekistan, Vietnam, Kazakhstan, and Indonesia resemble a coordinated critical-minerals corridor—a soft-power alternative to China’s Belt and Road.

Nothing in the report is misleading, but the framing clearly advances Korea’s national interest: development assistance as a mechanism for stabilizing high-risk supply chains.

Why It Matters for the West

This is another reminder that the rare earth race is shifting from mining concessions to midstream capture and technical capacity-building. In critical minerals, the country that controls refining—not ore—ultimately controls the market.

© 2025 Rare Earth Exchanges™ – Accelerating Transparency, Accuracy, and Insight Across the Rare Earth & Critical Minerals Supply Chain.

• South Korea's rare earth import dependence on China remains at ~80% for 15 years.
• Japan successfully reduced reliance on rare earth imports from 90% to 60-70% through strategic mining investments, recycling, and substitution technologies.
• China's expanded export controls now cover any product with 0.1% Chinese rare earth content, creating structural supply risks for Korea's EV, robotics, and electronics industries that depend on NdFeB magnets.
• Korea's failed national strategy—marked by the collapse of KORES and lack of overseas resource investments—creates opportunities for non-Chinese suppliers like Lynas, MP Materials, and Arafura to fill the gap.

South Korea has had fifteen years to reduce its exposure to Chinese rare earths—and has essentially stood still. That is the uncomfortable conclusion of new reporting from ChosunBiz, which highlights Korea’s persistent ~80% dependence on Chinese rare earth imports, a level that has barely improved since China first “weaponized” exports against Japan in 2010.

South Korea has a large, highly developed economy

Ranking as the world's 13th-largest by nominal GDP, around $1.87 trillion in 2024/2025, making it Asia's 4th biggest economy, known for its strong tech (Samsung, LG) and automotive (Hyundai, Kia) sectors, high R&D investment, and rapid growth (the "Miracle on the Han River (opens in a new tab)"). 

So what’s with Korea’s failure to reduce rare-earth dependence, contrasting with Japan’s successful diversification? And does China’s tightening export controls suggest strategic risks to the Korean industry? What are some opportunities for emerging non-Chinese suppliers?

This is not merely a Korean problem. It is an Asian supply chain tremor that matters to automakers, semiconductor producers, battery manufacturers, and global NdFeB magnet buyers.

A Tale of Two Neighbors: Japan Diversifies, Korea Drifts

Today’s Chosun.Biz entry accurately frames Japan’s remarkable decoupling success. Since the 2010 crisis, Tokyo has executed a disciplined four-pillar strategy—overseas mining rights, recycling, substitution, and strategic stockpiling—reducing Chinese dependence from >90% to roughly 60–70%.

Japan’s approach is verifiable:

• JOGMEC’s AU$200M investment in Lynas (2023)
• €100M investment in Carester
• Toyota and Shin-Etsu technologies that cut Nd use by 50% and Chinese content by two-thirds

These facts align with known industry disclosures and demonstrate Japan’s consistent midstream strategy.

Korea, by contrast, has struggled. The ChosunBiz report correctly notes that Korea Resources Corporation (KORES) collapsed (opens in a new tab) under overseas investment losses, leaving no national champion to secure foreign resources. As of 2024, Korea’s permanent magnet imports remain ~90% Chinese, and government diversification plans lack execution detail.

The one caution: Korea’s dependence figure (79.8%) comes from government data but may understate embedded Chinese content in finished magnets.

China Tightens the Tap—Again

China has delayed export licenses for Japanese firms and newly expanded controls on samarium, dysprosium, and any product containing even 0.1% Chinese rare earths. Export-control language released in October matches the 0.1% threshold. For investors, this is a structural warning: China is shifting from controlling raw oxides to controlling downstream value. Export licensing for Europe will hinge on “political confidence,” as BDI’s Strack notes—a subtle but essential detail.

The Untold Risk: Korea’s Industries Run on NdFeB

Korea’s EV, robotics, and electronics sectors cannot operate without rare earth magnets. Korea may become the weakest link in Asia’s supply chain if diversification stalls—creating opportunity for non-Chinese producers if they can scale.

Investors should ask:

• Does Korea intend to replicate Japan’s recycling and substitution model?
• Will Korea reestablish an overseas mining/processing strategy?
• What companies stand to benefit from Korea’s vulnerability—Lynas, Arafura, MP, USAR, Vulcan, Noveon?

Source: ChosunBiz (Jeong Mi-ha), Dec. 10, 2025

© 2025 Rare Earth Exchanges™ – Accelerating Transparency, Accuracy, and Insight Across the Rare Earth & Critical Minerals Supply Chain.

• South Korea's rare earth import dependence on China remains at ~80% for 15 years.
• Japan successfully reduced reliance on rare earth imports from 90% to 60-70% through strategic mining investments, recycling, and substitution technologies.
• China's expanded export controls now cover any product with 0.1% Chinese rare earth content, creating structural supply risks for Korea's EV, robotics, and electronics industries that depend on NdFeB magnets.
• Korea's failed national strategy—marked by the collapse of KORES and lack of overseas resource investments—creates opportunities for non-Chinese suppliers like Lynas, MP Materials, and Arafura to fill the gap.

South Korea has had fifteen years to reduce its exposure to Chinese rare earths—and has essentially stood still. That is the uncomfortable conclusion of new reporting from ChosunBiz, which highlights Korea’s persistent ~80% dependence on Chinese rare earth imports, a level that has barely improved since China first “weaponized” exports against Japan in 2010.

South Korea has a large, highly developed economy

Ranking as the world's 13th-largest by nominal GDP, around $1.87 trillion in 2024/2025, making it Asia's 4th biggest economy, known for its strong tech (Samsung, LG) and automotive (Hyundai, Kia) sectors, high R&D investment, and rapid growth (the "Miracle on the Han River (opens in a new tab)"). 

So what’s with Korea’s failure to reduce rare-earth dependence, contrasting with Japan’s successful diversification? And does China’s tightening export controls suggest strategic risks to the Korean industry? What are some opportunities for emerging non-Chinese suppliers?

This is not merely a Korean problem. It is an Asian supply chain tremor that matters to automakers, semiconductor producers, battery manufacturers, and global NdFeB magnet buyers.

A Tale of Two Neighbors: Japan Diversifies, Korea Drifts

Today’s Chosun.Biz entry accurately frames Japan’s remarkable decoupling success. Since the 2010 crisis, Tokyo has executed a disciplined four-pillar strategy—overseas mining rights, recycling, substitution, and strategic stockpiling—reducing Chinese dependence from >90% to roughly 60–70%.

Japan’s approach is verifiable:

• JOGMEC’s AU$200M investment in Lynas (2023)
• €100M investment in Carester
• Toyota and Shin-Etsu technologies that cut Nd use by 50% and Chinese content by two-thirds

These facts align with known industry disclosures and demonstrate Japan’s consistent midstream strategy.

Korea, by contrast, has struggled. The ChosunBiz report correctly notes that Korea Resources Corporation (KORES) collapsed (opens in a new tab) under overseas investment losses, leaving no national champion to secure foreign resources. As of 2024, Korea’s permanent magnet imports remain ~90% Chinese, and government diversification plans lack execution detail.

The one caution: Korea’s dependence figure (79.8%) comes from government data but may understate embedded Chinese content in finished magnets.

China Tightens the Tap—Again

China has delayed export licenses for Japanese firms and newly expanded controls on samarium, dysprosium, and any product containing even 0.1% Chinese rare earths. Export-control language released in October matches the 0.1% threshold. For investors, this is a structural warning: China is shifting from controlling raw oxides to controlling downstream value. Export licensing for Europe will hinge on “political confidence,” as BDI’s Strack notes—a subtle but essential detail.

The Untold Risk: Korea’s Industries Run on NdFeB

Korea’s EV, robotics, and electronics sectors cannot operate without rare earth magnets. Korea may become the weakest link in Asia’s supply chain if diversification stalls—creating opportunity for non-Chinese producers if they can scale.

Investors should ask:

• Does Korea intend to replicate Japan’s recycling and substitution model?
• Will Korea reestablish an overseas mining/processing strategy?
• What companies stand to benefit from Korea’s vulnerability—Lynas, Arafura, MP, USAR, Vulcan, Noveon?

Source: ChosunBiz (Jeong Mi-ha), Dec. 10, 2025

© 2025 Rare Earth Exchanges™ – Accelerating Transparency, Accuracy, and Insight Across the Rare Earth & Critical Minerals Supply Chain.

• Korean researchers find that green media coverage significantly reduces ESG rating divergence among suppliers in critical mineral supply chains, improving transparency and alignment through reputational pressure.
• Study of 22,486 Chinese firms shows positive and neutral green news drives ESG convergence, while negative coverage increases divergence and defensive supplier behavior.
• For rare earth and critical mineral investors, media ecosystems can function as informal governance tools, reducing due-diligence costs and reputational tail risk in opaque global supply chains.

ESG rating divergence—where different suppliers have inconsistent environmental, social, and governance ratings—creates operational risk in complex supply chains, especially those tied to critical minerals, manufacturing, and resource extraction. This new academic study provides evidence that “green news” (media coverage of environmental topics) measurably reduces ESG misalignment across suppliers.

For rare earth and critical mineral investors, this is notable: supply chains in this sector are global, often opaque, and politically exposed. Anything that reduces ESG uncertainty lowers due diligence costs and reputational tail risk.

Based in South Korea, YaPin Wang, Hanyang University in Seoul, and JiDuo Wang, Jeonbuk National University, Jeonju, investigate this mission-critical topic.

Key Findings: Media Coverage Can Pressure Suppliers Toward ESG Convergence

Using a two-way fixed-effects model and 22,486 firm-year observations from Chinese A-share companies (2015–2023), the recent Korea-based study (opens in a new tab) finds:

Implications for Investors in Rare Earths & Critical Minerals

This research suggests that ESG standardization can be improved through media pressure, not solely regulation or contractual enforcement. For REE mining, magnet manufacturing, and battery materials—where ESG scrutiny is intense—the paper offers several investor-relevant insights:

• Media ecosystems can function as informal governance when formal ESG monitoring is weak.
• Firms with strong ESG reputations exert ripple effects on upstream partners.
• Negative coverage can fragment supplier behavior—important when geopolitical or environmental controversies erupt in resource-rich regions.
• Supply-chain transparency remains a competitive advantage; companies that “own the narrative” may see tighter ESG alignment across their suppliers.

Limitations Worth Noting

• Study is China-specific; results may differ in the U.S., EU, or developing markets.
• Depending on the behavior of the Chinese media, which does not operate with full independence.
• ESG scores were standardized across four Chinese rating agencies—global comparability may be limited.

Summary

Wang & Wang (2025) find that green news reduces ESG rating divergence among suppliers by improving transparency and reputational pressure. The two Korean authors offer insights relevant to rare earth and critical mineral supply chains, where ESG clarity is mission-critical. Investors should note the potential of media signals to shape supplier behavior, as well as the risks introduced by negative coverage

© 2025 Rare Earth Exchanges™ – Accelerating Transparency, Accuracy, and Insight Across the Rare Earth & Critical Minerals Supply Chain.

• Korean researchers find that green media coverage significantly reduces ESG rating divergence among suppliers in critical mineral supply chains, improving transparency and alignment through reputational pressure.
• Study of 22,486 Chinese firms shows positive and neutral green news drives ESG convergence, while negative coverage increases divergence and defensive supplier behavior.
• For rare earth and critical mineral investors, media ecosystems can function as informal governance tools, reducing due-diligence costs and reputational tail risk in opaque global supply chains.

ESG rating divergence—where different suppliers have inconsistent environmental, social, and governance ratings—creates operational risk in complex supply chains, especially those tied to critical minerals, manufacturing, and resource extraction. This new academic study provides evidence that “green news” (media coverage of environmental topics) measurably reduces ESG misalignment across suppliers.

For rare earth and critical mineral investors, this is notable: supply chains in this sector are global, often opaque, and politically exposed. Anything that reduces ESG uncertainty lowers due diligence costs and reputational tail risk.

Based in South Korea, YaPin Wang, Hanyang University in Seoul, and JiDuo Wang, Jeonbuk National University, Jeonju, investigate this mission-critical topic.

Key Findings: Media Coverage Can Pressure Suppliers Toward ESG Convergence

Using a two-way fixed-effects model and 22,486 firm-year observations from Chinese A-share companies (2015–2023), the recent Korea-based study (opens in a new tab) finds:

Implications for Investors in Rare Earths & Critical Minerals

This research suggests that ESG standardization can be improved through media pressure, not solely regulation or contractual enforcement. For REE mining, magnet manufacturing, and battery materials—where ESG scrutiny is intense—the paper offers several investor-relevant insights:

• Media ecosystems can function as informal governance when formal ESG monitoring is weak.
• Firms with strong ESG reputations exert ripple effects on upstream partners.
• Negative coverage can fragment supplier behavior—important when geopolitical or environmental controversies erupt in resource-rich regions.
• Supply-chain transparency remains a competitive advantage; companies that “own the narrative” may see tighter ESG alignment across their suppliers.

Limitations Worth Noting

• Study is China-specific; results may differ in the U.S., EU, or developing markets.
• Depending on the behavior of the Chinese media, which does not operate with full independence.
• ESG scores were standardized across four Chinese rating agencies—global comparability may be limited.

Summary

Wang & Wang (2025) find that green news reduces ESG rating divergence among suppliers by improving transparency and reputational pressure. The two Korean authors offer insights relevant to rare earth and critical mineral supply chains, where ESG clarity is mission-critical. Investors should note the potential of media signals to shape supplier behavior, as well as the risks introduced by negative coverage

© 2025 Rare Earth Exchanges™ – Accelerating Transparency, Accuracy, and Insight Across the Rare Earth & Critical Minerals Supply Chain.

• South Korea has established a national resource security council—an interagency control tower—to monitor and manage disruptions across critical mineral supply chains for EVs, batteries, and semiconductors.
• The initiative signals Korea's pivot from dependence-management to power-projection, moving beyond assuming global mineral market stability to preparing for sustained geopolitical turbulence.
• Investors should watch Korea's deployment of three key levers:
  • Stockpiling heavy rare earths during China's export restrictions.
  • Backing domestic magnet plants.
  • Partnering with US, Australian, and ASEAN upstream projects.

South Korea has unveiled a national resource security council—an interagency “control tower” designed to monitor and manage disruptions across mineral supply chains. The launch, led by Industry Minister Kim Jung-kwan (opens in a new tab), is not a symbolic bureaucratic reshuffle. It is a structural shift in how a major technological economy intends to navigate an era defined by rare earth scarcity, geopolitical risk, and intensifying U.S.–China competition.

For investors, this signals something simple but consequential: Korea is no longer assuming global stability in the mineral markets that underpin EVs, batteries, motors, AI hardware, and semiconductor manufacturing. It is preparing for sustained turbulence.

Jung-Kwan Kim

What’s Real: The Facts Behind the Announcement

The core elements of the Yonhap report are accurate and consistent with Korea’s policy trajectory:

• Creation of an interagency resource-security council aligns with Korea’s Critical Minerals Strategy and recent KRW expansions of stockpile budgets.
• A crisis-alert system and public–private response framework reflect Korea’s recognition that private industry often feels disruption first—particularly battery giants like LG Energy Solution, Samsung SDI, and SK On.
• Expanded petroleum and critical mineral reserves match known efforts to reduce import concentration, especially for cobalt, nickel, and heavy rare earths.
• Support for overseas resource development echoes ongoing Korean partnerships in Australia, Indonesia, and Kazakhstan.

These are verifiable, non-speculative commitments.

Where the Story Stretches: Strategic Ambition vs. Practical Limits

The article suggests Korea will “boost participation in overseas resource projects.” True—but Korea has struggled historically to secure upstream equity, frequently losing to Chinese SOEs on cost, speed, and geopolitical access.

Similarly, establishing “biofuel infrastructure” is real policy but largely unrelated to mineral security—an example of bureaucratic bundling more than REE strategy.

Why It Matters: REE Security Is Leaving the Defensive Posture

Here’s the market-moving insight: Korea is pivoting from dependence-management to power-projection. EV and battery OEMs rely overwhelmingly on China for heavy rare earth separation and magnet-grade materials. A national control tower indicates that Korea sees the threat mounting—not hypothetical, not academic, but kinetic.

Investors should watch how this council deploys three levers:

• Stockpiling HREEs during China’s export-license slowdown.
• Backing Korean magnet plants (e.g., Vacuumschmelze Korea) seeking non-China alloy feedstock.
• Partnering with U.S., Australian, and ASEAN upstream projects to diversify the pipeline.

In a tightening world, Korea is declaring it will not be caught unprepared.

© 2025 Rare Earth Exchanges™ – Accelerating Transparency, Accuracy, and Insight Across the Rare Earth & Critical Minerals Supply Chain.

• ASM shipped another 60 tonnes of high-purity NdFeB alloy to Noveon Magnetics from its Korean Metals Plant.
• This shipment fulfills part of a 100-tonne commercial contract, demonstrating that midstream rare earth production is operational, not just theoretical.
• Noveon is the only fully integrated NdFeB magnet manufacturer in the U.S.
• Noveon is scaling its Texas facility with stable feedstock from ASM at a critical time when China's export-licensing regime is tightening on rare earth materials.
• This update represents real operational de-risking for investors.
• ASM has evolved from a project developer to a functioning industrial supplier, filling a crucial gap in America's magnet manufacturing ecosystem.
• The U.S. still lacks full domestic upstream capabilities for rare earth materials.

Australian Strategic Materials (opens in a new tab) (ASM’s) latest update—another 60 tonnes of high-purity NdFeB alloy sold to Noveon Magnetics (opens in a new tab) under its existing 100-tonne contract—reads simple on the surface. But in the rare earth supply chain, simplicity often hides structural importance.

The alloy comes from ASM’s Korean Metals Plant (opens in a new tab), a facility designed to produce NdFeB alloy at purity levels demanded by advanced magnet makers. Noveon, possibly the only fully integrated NdFeB magnet manufacturer in the United States, relies on consistent feedstock to scale production. ASM’s ability to deliver that material at commercial tonnage matters far beyond this single delivery.

What the Facts Actually Support

ASM indeed operates a functioning commercial alloy plant in Korea capable of producing NdFeB feedstock to magnet-grade specifications, and the company does have a 100-tonne supply contract with Noveon—of which this new 60-tonne shipment is a straightforward continuation. At the same time, Noveon is actively scaling its San Marcos, Texas magnet facility, a fact independently validated by Adamas Intelligence’s on-site tour, providing meaningful third-party confirmation. These operational realities matter because the United States still struggles with upstream NdPr oxide supply, yet urgently needs reliable midstream alloy capability to rebuild domestic magnet manufacturing—a gap ASM is currently helping to fill. All of these points are factual, verifiable, and strategically relevant.

Where the Narrative Starts to Stretch

The statement that ASM is “a key enabler of industrial capability building in the United States and allied jurisdictions” is directionally true, but it leans promotional. ASM’s alloy is critical, yes—but the U.S. would need domestic NdPr separation, domestic alloying, and domestic magnet sintering before claiming a robust ecosystem.

ASM is one piece—not the system.

Similarly, the implication that this supply “positions ASM” as central to the future U.S. magnet base is aspirational. Noveon’s current output is meaningful but small relative to the enormous megawatt-scale needs of EV, wind, defense, robotics, and automation.

Why This Quiet Update Actually Matters

Because it demonstrates that the midstream is no longer theoretical but fully operational, it confirms that Noveon has secured a stable feedstock at a time when China’s export-licensing regime is tightening, and it signals that ASM is evolving from a project developer into a genuine industrial supplier—a rarity in this space. For investors, the message here is clear: this update represents real operational de-risking, not promotional noise.

Bottom Line for the Supply Chain

This is not a blockbuster announcement. It’s something more valuable: proof of execution at a moment when the West desperately needs it.

Citation: Company announcement, ASM (2025).                                                                                                           

© 2025 Rare Earth Exchanges™ – Accelerating Transparency, Accuracy, and Insight Across the Rare Earth & Critical Minerals Supply Chain.

• Korean researchers engineered lanthanum and gadolinium magnetocaloric materials into scalable sheets and wires, marking a technical milestone toward commercial magnetic refrigeration systems.
• Despite non-rare-earth alternatives in development, commercial magnetocaloric cooling remains dependent on gadolinium and lanthanum, with demand expected to rise as HFC refrigerants face phaseout under the Kigali Amendment.
• Magnetic cooling systems require strong NdFeB permanent magnets regardless of refrigerant material used, reinforcing rare earth dependencies and creating new demand drivers in the critical minerals sector.

A research team at the Korea Institute of Materials Science (opens in a new tab) (KIMS) has announced a full-cycle magnetic cooling system—materials, components, and modules—marking a technical milestone that pushes solid-state refrigeration closer to commercial reality. Led by Dr. Jong-Woo Kim and Dr. Da-Seul Shin, the team engineered lanthanum-based and manganese-based magnetocaloric materials into thin sheets, fine wires, and optimized modules—components required for scalable magnetic refrigeration.

Published in Rare Metals (IF 11.0), this work signals that Korea intends to compete in the next generation of cooling technologies, especially as tightening global regulations phase out gas-based refrigerants.

Where Physics Meets Policy: The Real Stakes Behind Solid-State Cooling

Magnetic cooling relies on the magnetocaloric effect—a temperature change induced by exposing a solid refrigerant to a magnetic field. The idea is not new, but the commercial barriers have been formidable: high materials cost, dependence on rare earths like gadolinium, and difficulty mass-producing large-area plates or precision wires.

KIMS claims progress on all three fronts. Their team fabricated 0.5 mm large-area lanthanum-based sheets and 1.0 mm gadolinium-based fine wires—credible performance numbers that align with world-class component research. They also improved non-rare-earth manganese alloys by reducing thermal hysteresis, a chronic performance drag in magnetocaloric materials.

Nothing here contradicts known science. However, one should note the institute’s subtle promotional tone—positioning Korea as achieving “world-class” results without independent benchmarking. The achievement is real; the competitive superlative is less certain.

Reading Between the Lines: Rare Earth Demand Isn’t Going Away

Despite the focus on eco-friendly alternatives, the technology remains anchored in rare earths—lanthanum and gadolinium, chief among them. Investors should not mistake “non-rare-earth” research for imminent rare-earth-free refrigeration.

KIMS’ manganese alloys are promising, but their performance still trails REE-based systems. If magnetic cooling gains commercial traction, demand for gadolinium, lanthanum, and heavy rare earth additives could rise sharply—particularly as Kigali Amendment timelines squeeze gas refrigerants out of the market.

The Kigali Amendment establishes a phasedown schedule for hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs), requiring developed countries to begin reduction in 2019 and reach an 85% phase-down by 2036, while developing countries begin reduction in 2024 and complete an 80-85% reduction by 2045-2047. The timeline for each country's phase-down depends on its economic status, with some developing nations starting later in 2028. 

The broader trend is undeniable: solid-state refrigeration is moving from lab curiosity to strategic industrial target. Germany is already demonstrating high-COP magnetic systems; Korea is racing to lock up IP; and global OEMs are preparing for a world where refrigerant compliance drives technology shifts.

The Investor Angle: Cooling Tech Could Become a New Magnet Metals Frontier

Magnetocaloric systems require strong magnetic fields generated by permanent magnets—and that loops us squarely back to NdFeB. Even if the refrigerant material changes, the magnets won’t. Any path to commercialization reinforces existing rare earth dependencies rather than eliminating them.

Citation

Source: National Research Council of Science and Technology (KIMS) / Newswise, Dec. 3, 2025.

© 2025 Rare Earth Exchanges™ – Accelerating Transparency, Accuracy, and Insight Across the Rare Earth & Critical Minerals Supply Chain.

• Gansu Rare Earths developed a cobalt-free, low-nickel NFC alloy powder that passed pilot validation and secured a 2-ton purchase order within a year of R&D launch.
• The breakthrough alloy offers lower costs, improved activation performance, and enhanced high-temperature charge-retention for hydrogen storage applications.
• This development signals China's push to dominate new-energy materials supply chains, potentially challenging Japanese and Korean incumbents in hydrogen-storage markets.

China’s Gansu Rare Earths has quietly reported (opens in a new tab) what may become an important development in the next generation of hydrogen-storage materials: a cobalt-free, low-nickel NFC alloy powder that just passed customer pilot validation and secured an initial two-ton purchase order.

While small in volume, the significance lies in what the company claims it has achieved—and how quickly. The project was launched only in January. Within a year, the R&D team reports breakthroughs in both cost reduction and performance stability, two of the biggest barriers to commercializing advanced hydrogen-storage alloys.

The innovation centers on a “co-doping, multiphase structural tuning” technique—language that signals China’s continued push to move upstream in specialty materials, especially those tied to new-energy technologies.

According to the company, the new NFC formulation offers:

• Lower raw-material costs by sharply reducing nickel content—important at a time when nickel prices are volatile and supply increasingly geopolitically sensitive.
• Improved activation performance, meaning the hydrogen-storage alloy can begin working faster and more efficiently, a critical parameter in fuel-cell and battery-hybrid systems.
• Comparable performance to mainstream cobalt-free powders on stability and reliability.
• A breakthrough in high-temperature charge-retention, a key metric for next-generation hydrogen storage, mobility applications, and grid-scale energy systems.

If validated independently, the combination of lower cobalt, lower nickel, and improved thermal performance may represent a material-level competitive advantage for Chinese suppliers—one that could challenge Japanese and Korean incumbents in hydrogen-storage alloy markets.

The company is also rapidly aligning production, sales, and technical support—the classic Chinese “industrial sprint” model—to accelerate commercialization and gain early market share.

For the West, two questions arise:

1. Is this a true materials breakthrough or a state-media overstatement?
2. If real, does it give China another edge in hydrogen-energy supply chains at a time when the U.S. and EU are trying to localize materials production?

Either way, Gansu Rare Earths’ announcement signals China’s intention to push deeper into high-value new-energy materials—not just rare-earth magnets, but hydrogen-storage alloys that could shape next-decade technologies.

Disclaimer: This news item originates from a Chinese state-owned media source. Key details should be independently verified.

© 2025 Rare Earth Exchanges™ – Accelerating Transparency, Accuracy, and Insight Across the Rare Earth & Critical Minerals Supply Chain.

• Malaysia and South Korea agree to develop a 3,000-tonne NdFeB super magnet facility in Pahang, partnering Lynas with JS Link to expand local rare earth capabilities.
• PM Anwar Ibrahim defends Malaysia's independence under the US Reciprocal Trade Agreement, emphasizing simultaneous cooperation with China and South Korea.
• Malaysia holds 16.1 million tonnes of REE worth RM800 billion but faces technology gaps, forcing reliance on foreign partnerships to convert resources into industrial leverage.

Malaysia’s latest rare earth maneuver reads like a diplomatic balancing act worthy of ASEAN intrigue. Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim told Parliament this week that Kuala Lumpur and Seoul have agreed to expand collaboration on local rare earth production—an announcement aimed squarely at critics claiming Malaysia is beholden to the United States under its new Reciprocal Trade Agreement (ART).

“This is not true,” Anwar declared, adding that negotiations in South Korea had already led to instructions for Malaysian GLCs to co-develop an additional “super magnet” facility in Pahang with Korean partners, reports the Malay Mail (opens in a new tab). The deal reportedly builds on the July memorandum between Lynas Rare Earths Ltd and South Korea’s JS Link, which targets 3,000 tonnes of neodymium-iron-boron (NdFeB) magnets annually near Lynas’s Kuantan facility.

Malaysia’s Balancing Act: Between Washington and Beijing

Anwar’s message was clear: Malaysia won’t be cornered into a single supply chain orbit. While the U.S.-Malaysia ART includes clauses discouraging export restrictions on rare earths to America, the Prime Minister emphasized ongoing cooperation with China, including potential projects with Khazanah Nasional Berhad and Premier Li Qiang.

This triangulation—simultaneously deepening ties with Seoul, Washington, and Beijing—reveals Malaysia’s pragmatic approach. With an estimated 16.1 million tonnes of non-radioactive REE worth over RM800 billion, Malaysia seeks to convert resource wealth into industrial leverage. But, as REEx notes, the technology gap remains the Achilles’ heel—Malaysia lacks indigenous processing expertise, forcing reliance on foreign capital and know-how.  As discussed earlier this morning, China may be on the verge of working with the nation’s sovereign wealth fund to establish a processing deal, however.

Between Pragmatism and Overreach

The magnet partnership with JS Link and Lynas is well-documented, and Malaysia’s REE resource estimates align with MITI data. The Prime Minister’s statements mirror official reports from Bernama and Reuters. However, Anwar’s claim that the new Pahang facility is already underway lacks published investment details or environmental disclosures. Assertions of “no restriction” on exports under the ART omit the nuanced language limiting certain policy tools. Malaysian media tilt toward framing Anwar’s policy as sovereign assertiveness, glossing over long-term dependency risks tied to Chinese and Korean technology.

For investors, Malaysia’s message is both alluring and cautionary: the country is open for business—but its rare earth future will be forged through partnerships it cannot yet fully control.

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• Japan's Nikkei 225 dropped 2%.
• South Korea's KOSPI plunged 4%, triggering a rare circuit breaker halt.
• Tech stocks crashed across Asia.
• Semiconductor giants led the selloff:
  • SoftBank (-10%)
  • Samsung (-4%)
  • SK Hynix (-5%)
• Valuation concerns and Michael Burry's bearish bets contributed to the decline.
• Surging U.S. dollar rose above 100.
• Fading Fed rate cut expectations added pressure.
• First synchronized correction in Asian tech exporters since 2022.

Panic rippled across Asian markets this morning as Japan and South Korea saw their stock indices crater in a region-wide rout led by technology shares. The Nikkei 225 plunged more than 1,300 points (−2%), while South Korea’s KOSPI tumbled over 4%, triggering a rare “sidecar” trading halt — a circuit breaker designed to pause algorithmic sell orders for five minutes. It was the first such intervention since April.

Tech Stocks at the Eye of the Storm

The selloff mirrors last night’s U.S. tech correction, with semiconductor and AI-linked equities under pressure globally. In Tokyo, SoftBank Group slumped more than 10%, its steepest drop since October, while Advantest fell 8%. In Seoul, Samsung Electronics slid over 4% and SK Hynix dropped more than 5%.

Analysts blame a toxic combination of valuation fatigue and a resurgent dollar. After months of AI-driven exuberance, investors are cashing out of overextended chip and software names. Hedge fund icon Michael Burry (of The Big Short fame) reportedly disclosed new bearish positions on Palantir and NVIDIA, adding fuel to fears of a broader correction.

Wall Street’s warning tone has also seeped into Asia: Goldman Sachs CEO David Solomon predicted a potential 10–20% equity pullback within two years, echoed by Morgan Stanley’s Ted Pick, who described a 10–15% reset as “healthy.”

The Dollar’s Dominance Returns

The U.S. dollar index surged above 100 for the first time since August, pressuring Asian exporters and high-growth tech names sensitive to global capital flows. The strength stems from divisions within the Federal Reserve and fading expectations of a December rate cut — odds have fallen from 94% to 69%, according to CME FedWatch.

Meanwhile, political dysfunction in Washington has compounded volatility. The U.S. government shutdown entered its 35th day, tying the record for the longest in history. The Congressional Budget Office warned it could shave 1–2 percentage points off Q4 GDP, adding uncertainty to Fed policy decisions.

A Warning Shot for Global Tech Bulls

The Asian crash is not an isolated tremor — it’s the first synchronized correction across U.S., Japanese, and Korean tech since 2022. With the yen and won sliding, and AI valuations stretched to extremes, the selloff may mark the beginning of a sentiment reset. For Western investors, today’s rout is a reminder: the “AI supercycle” rests on fragile monetary and political foundations.

Disclaimer: This summary (opens in a new tab) is based on reporting from 券商中国 (Securities Times China), a state-affiliated financial outlet. Information should be independently verified before forming investment conclusions.

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• Korean researchers have developed an acid-free, closed-loop process that achieves over 80% lithium recovery and more than 99% lithium-carbonate purity.
• The solvent used in this process can be reused for 8 cycles, resulting in a 71% cost reduction.
• Fluorine impurity from LiPF₆ electrolyte and PVDF binder is critical, with 3.5 wt% F causing an 85% capacity loss while 0.1 wt% F provides performance similar to new commercial cathodes.
• This innovation indicates a potential rebalancing of battery-material refining in East Asia.
• However, real-world scaling challenges remain, especially regarding heterogeneous waste streams and industrial throughput.

Dr. Jong-Won Choi (opens in a new tab) and colleagues at the Korea Institute of Geoscience and Mineral Resources (opens in a new tab) (KIGAM), in collaboration with Jeonbuk National University and Huazhong University of Science and Technology, have developed an acid-free, closed-loop hydrometallurgical process that could redefine how the world recycles lithium-ion batteries.

Their paper, _“Closed-loop lithium recovery via antisolvent crystallization and the critical role of fluorine impurity control in regenerated NMC cathodes,”_now accepted in Separation and Purification Technology, reports> 80 % lithium recovery using simple water leaching, followed by > 99 % lithium-carbonate crystallization through an isopropanol-based antisolvent step. The recovered solvent is reused for eight consecutive cycles, cutting reagent cost by over 70 %.

Inside the Beaker—Methods in Motion

The process dissolves lithium ions from spent nickel-cobalt-manganese (NCM) cathodes while leaving transition metals intact. By introducing isopropanol (C₃H₈O) as an antisolvent, lithium carbonate precipitates selectively, allowing near-closed-loop recycling of both lithium and solvent. The team then re-fabricated NCM 622 cathodes from the recovered materials and systematically studied one overlooked impurity—fluorine (F)—originating from the electrolyte salt LiPF₆ and the polymer binder PVDF.

The F-Factor — When Trace Elements Turn Tragic

Performance tests revealed a sobering reality: fluorine contamination can make or break recycled-battery quality. Cathodes with 3.5 wt% % F lost 85 % of capacity, while those with only 0.1 wt% % F performed almost identically to new commercial NCM 622. In short, reclaiming lithium isn’t enough—purity engineering is mandatory. The work shows that even sustainable chemistry demands precision manufacturing discipline.

What It Means Beyond the Lab

For the broader rare-earth and critical-minerals ecosystem, this study underlines how Asia continues to dominate not only mining and refining but also process innovation. China controls roughly 90 % of global rare-earth and battery-material refining, yet this Korean-led advance hints at a regional rebalancing within East Asia itself. For Western supply-chain planners, it’s a reminder: without scalable, low-cost hydrometallurgy and impuritycontrol, “battery recycling” remains a slogan, not asector.

Caution Before Celebration

The paper’s limitations are pragmatic. Results were achieved at laboratory scale, using controlled waste streams. Real-world feedstocks—heterogeneous, contaminated, and carbon-rich—may challenge the process. Long-term solvent stability and industrial water management also need proof at ton-per-day throughput. Nevertheless, the economic modeling—71.6 % cost reduction—is compelling enough to justify pilot demonstrations.

A Quiet Revolution in a Beaker

Dr. Choi’s team did not invent alchemy, but something closer to industrial realism: a cleaner, closed-loop path to lithium recovery that could make future electric mobility both cheaper and greener. If scaled responsibly, it may narrowthe gap between policy ambition and chemical reality—and loosen,ever so slightly, the world’s dependence on Chinese refining lines.

Citation: Tran D. T., Vu T. T. P., Tran N. T. T., Ling L., Yoo B.-R., Lin X., Lee H., Choi J.-W., Ahn J., and Yun Y.-S.* (2025). Closed-loop lithium recovery via antisolvent crystallization and the critical role of fluorine impurity control in regenerated NMC cathodes. Separation and Purification Technology.

© 2025 Rare Earth Exchanges™ – Accelerating Transparency, Accuracy, and Insight Across the Rare Earth & Critical Minerals Supply Chain.

• Noveon Magnetics and Kangwon Energy signed an MOU to build a 2,000-ton-per-year NdFeB magnet plant in South Korea.
• This project will double Noveon's capacity and establish the first U.S.-Korea magnet manufacturing corridor outside China.
• The facility targets a 2027 production start.
• The collaboration combines Noveon's EcoFlux technology with Kangwon's EPC expertise.
• The plant will serve automotive, industrial, electronics, and defense sectors with a non-Chinese magnet supply.
• Success depends on meeting tight construction timelines.
• Securing allied rare-earth oxide supply is crucial.
• Managing cross-border compliance is required.
• Maintaining capital discipline while scaling internationally is essential.

How about the building a Trans-Pacific magnet corridor? In a decisive move to diversify the global rare-earth magnet supply chain, Noveon Magnetics (opens in a new tab)—the only operational manufacturer of sintered NdFeB magnets in the United States—has signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with Kangwon Energy Co., Ltd (opens in a new tab). to build a 2,000-ton-per-year NdFeB magnet plant in South Korea. The joint venture will double Noveon’s worldwide production capacity and create the first U.S.–Korea magnet manufacturing corridor outside China.

The planned facility, targeted to start production in 2027, will serve Korea’s automotive, industrial, electronics, and defense sectors, providing a secure non-Chinese source of high-performance magnets essential for EV motors, turbines, and defense systems.

Note Noveon Magnetics ranks #1 in Division 3 of the Rare Earth Exchanges (REEx) Rare Earth Magnet Manufacturing Rankings.

Technology Meets Engineering Execution

The collaboration pairs Noveon’s proprietary EcoFlux™ magnet-manufacturing (opens in a new tab) and recycling technology with Kangwon’s end-to-end Engineering, Procurement, and Construction (EPC) expertise in powder handling, thermal treatment, environmental systems, and factory automation. CEO Scott Dunn called the deal “a major milestone in building a secure, diversified, and resilient rare-earth magnet supply chain outside of China.”

Kangwon Energy CEO Jinyong Shin highlighted the alignment: “By combining our engineering and process capabilities with Noveon’s technology, we can de-risk and accelerate Korea’s transition to reliable, diversified magnet supply.”

Strategic Context and U.S.-Korea Linkage

The MOU underscores deep industrial collaboration between the United States and South Korea, reinforcing both nations’ drive to localize strategic materials production. For Korea, it represents a pathway to reduce dependence on Chinese magnet imports; for Noveon, it extends its manufacturing footprint into Asia’s high-demand markets while preserving Western technology control.

Execution Challenges Ahead

The opportunity is immense—but so are the hurdles. The facility must reach commercial throughput by 2027, a tight schedule for EPC, permitting, and qualification. Key questions remain:

• Can Noveon sustain capital discipline while scaling abroad?
• Will the supply of separated rare-earth oxides from U.S. or allied sources keep pace?
• How will environmental compliance and recycling logistics be managed across borders?

Success hinges on delivery, not design.

Market & Investor Perspective

Privately held Noveon—as cited above, the company ranks #1 in Division 3 of the REEx Magnet Manufacturing Rankings—and continues to lead in closed-loop U.S. magnet manufacturing. Another domestic player with potential is Permag (owner of EEC (opens in a new tab)). Its expansion could position the firm for eventual public-market entry or strategic partnerships. Investors in peer producers should watch for construction milestones and verified customer offtakes as the ultimate proof of execution.

© 2025 Rare Earth Exchanges™ – Accelerating Transparency, Accuracy, and Insight Across the Rare Earth & Critical Minerals Supply Chain.