• India is positioning itself as a strategic U.S. partner in securing critical minerals.
• India's 2026-27 budget is committed to developing rare earth corridors focused on separation, processing, and magnet manufacturing, not just extraction.
• The U.S. is supporting this shift with a $12 billion strategic stockpile (Project Vault) and $3.8 billion in rare earth investments.
• Supply security emphasizes the need for trusted processing capacity, not just mineral access.
• India's strengths in engineering and manufacturing are significant, but success will be measured in tonnage processed and magnets shipped, not merely diplomatic agreements.

India is being positioned as a key partner in U.S. and allied efforts to secure critical minerals and reduce reliance on China. Experts say this move is timely—but success depends on whether India can build real processing and manufacturing capacity, not just sign agreements or mine more ore.

USA and India  Makes Sense

According to reporting by ANI, India’s participation in U.S.-led critical minerals frameworks reflects a shift from diplomatic intent to industrial execution. Benchmark Mineral Intelligence’s Neha Mukherjee accurately notes that India’s 2026–27 budget commitment to dedicated rare earth corridors signals a move beyond extraction toward separation, processing, magnet manufacturing, and downstream capability—the true choke points of the rare earth value chain.

The report correctly situates this momentum within a broader allied push, including the upcoming U.S.-hosted Critical Minerals Ministerial and Washington’s launch of a $12 billion strategic critical minerals stockpile (Project Vault). These steps underscore a shared recognition: supply security now hinges on trusted processing and stockpiling, not just access to rocks.

Where the Optimism Runs Ahead of Reality

Recent news out of India leans optimistic.  While India’s ambitions are real, timelines are long. Building separation plants, qualifying magnet-grade output, and scaling manufacturing take years—not budget cycles. The report also highlights U.S. investment of $3.8 billion across the rare earth value chain, but does not parse how much of that targets midstream processing versus early-stage projects.

There’s also a subtle diplomatic gloss. Initiatives like Pax Silica—a U.S.-led effort to secure AI and semiconductor supply chains—sound comprehensive, yet remain policy scaffolding. Execution risk is high without aligned standards, bankable offtakes, and predictable permitting.

Why This Matters for the Rare Earth Supply Chain

India’s comparative advantage is not geology alone; it’s scale, engineering talent, chemicals expertise, and manufacturing depth. As Rare Earth Exchanges™ has chronicled, India could emerge as a leader in key areas of the rare earth supply chain, including recycling and non-rare earth motor technology, for example. But the Indian government has sought to be more proactive with a comprehensive industrial policy.

So if paired with allied capital and guaranteed markets, India could credibly host separation and magnet facilities that diversify supply away from China. If not, partnerships risk becoming symbolic.

REEx Takeaway: This is a necessary pivot—from speeches to supply chains—but success will ultimately be measured in tonnage processed and magnets shipped, not memoranda signed.

Source: ANI, (opens in a new tab) Feb. 4, 2026

• India's 2026 Union Budget announced dedicated rare earth corridors in Odisha, Kerala, Andhra Pradesh, and Tamil Nadu to build integrated mine-to-magnet capacity and reduce 90% reliance on Chinese rare earth processing.
• While India's monazite-bearing coastal sands offer a real geological advantage, corridors alone don't equal capacity—refining, separation, and magnet manufacturing require capital, technical expertise, and years to scale.
• Odisha's Orissa Sands Complex holds commercially attractive beach-sand deposits, but radioactive monazite processing regulations and lack of downstream infrastructure mean raw-material dependency may persist without rapid execution.

India’s 2026 Union Budget announced dedicated “Rare Earth corridors” to cut dependence on China and build a domestic critical-minerals ecosystem. On paper, the plan targets the real bottleneck—processing and magnets, not just mining. This Rare Earth Exchanges (REEx) analysis separates what is solid from what is aspirational, flags assumptions and bias, and explains why investors should watch execution, not headlines.

Odisha—one of India’s contemplated rare earth corridors

What New Delhi Actually Announced

According to reporting (opens in a new tab) by Rashmi Ranjan Mohanty (OTV, Feb. 3, 2026), India will support four mineral-rich states—Odisha, Kerala, Andhra Pradesh, and Tamil Nadu—to develop integrated rare-earth corridors linking mining, processing, R&D, and manufacturing. The goal is to reduce reliance on China-led supply chains and support sectors from EVs and renewables to defense and electronics.

This follows a November 2025 incentive package (~₹7,280 crore) aimed at building 6,000 metric tons per year of domestic permanent-magnet capacity.

The Part the Article Gets Right

The diagnosis is accurate. Rare earths are not scarce in the ground; they are scarce in refining, separation, and magnet manufacturing—where China controls ~90% of capacity. India’s monazite-bearing coastal sands are real, sizable, and strategically located near ports. April 2025 Chinese export restrictions that disrupted India’s auto and EV sectors underscore the vulnerability.

Corridors that integrate mine-to-magnet capacity—rather than isolated mines—are the correct industrial design.

Where Optimism Leaps Ahead of Proof

The recent news out of India leans heavily on potential. Corridors do not equal capacity. Refining rare earths—especially heavy rare earths—requires capital, technical know-how, environmental controls, and years of learning curves. None of the reporting specifies timelines, technology partners, or whether India can rapidly scale separation and sintered magnet production to global quality standards.

There is also a subtle nationalist framing: China’s dominance is correctly cited, but the article understates how hard it is to replicate decades of downstream integration.

Why Odisha Matters—and Why That’s Not Enough

Odisha’s mineral sands (monazite, ilmenite, zircon) make it a logical anchor. But mining without metallurgical mastery simply recreates dependency one step downstream. Investors should ask: Who builds and operates the separators? Who makes the alloys and magnets? And who buys them at scale?

Odisha Profile

Odisha sits at the heart of India’s rare earth strategy, hosting some of the country’s most significant and accessible REE deposits concentrated along its coastalbelt from Dhamra to Gopalpur, with the flagship Orissa Sands Complex(OSCOM) at Chhatrapur in Ganjam district covering more than 2,400 hectares.

These beach-sand deposits are rich in monazite—a rare-earth phosphate mineral containing thorium and uranium—alongside ilmenite, rutile, zircon, sillimanite, and garnet, with high heavy-mineral grades of roughly 10–12% found just 1.5 meters below the surface, making them commercially attractive. Following the Union Budget 2026–27, Odisha has been designated a Rare Earth Corridor, aiming to integrate mining, processing, research, and downstream manufacturing, including permanent magnets for EVs, defense, and electronics, to reduce reliance on China.

However, the opportunity comes with constraints: monazite processing is tightly regulated due to radioactivity, environmental risks such as saline intrusion require strict oversight, and India must still scale advanced refining and magnet-making infrastructure if Odisha’s geological advantage is to translate into true supply-chain power rather than continued raw-material dependency.

REEx Takeaway for Investors

India’s corridor strategy aligns with global reshoring efforts in the U.S., EU, and Japan. It is directionally right and geopolitically rational. But corridors are infrastructure concepts, not supply chains. Until processing and magnet plants are financed, permitted, built, and staffed, China’s leverage remains intact.

Citation: Rashmi Ranjan Mohanty, OTV, Feb. 3, 2026

• Indonesia establishes Perminas, a new state-owned enterprise under its sovereign wealth fund, to manage strategic minerals including rare earths—reinforcing national control upstream while downstream processing capacity remains limited.
• Indonesia's rare earth resources exist mainly as by-products in nickel, bauxite, and manganese operations, not stand-alone deposits, creating dependence on foreign technology for separation chemistry and magnet manufacturing.
• Without domestic processing infrastructure, Perminas risks repeating a familiar pattern: state ownership of minerals upstream while China retains control of downstream value creation and supply chains.

Indonesia plans to form a new state-owned company, Perminas, to manage strategic minerals, including rare earths, under its sovereign wealth fund. The move reinforces Jakarta’s preferencefor national control—but, as Rare Earth Exchanges has repeatedlyshown, ownership alone does not create a rare earth supply chain. Processing, not possession, still decides the game.

A New Flag, Same Terrain

According to ANTARA News (opens in a new tab), Indonesia will establish Perminas (Perusahaan Mineral Nasional), a new state-owned enterprise directed by President Prabowo Subianto andhoused under Danantara. Officials say Perminas will focus on strategicminerals, explicitly including rare earth elements, while remaining distinct from MIND ID.

This fits Indonesia’s post-nickel-ban playbook: consolidate upstream control first, sort out downstream later.

What Indonesia Really Has—and What It Doesn’t

Rare Earth Exchanges™ has documented that Indonesia’s rare earth potential is real but secondary. REEs appear mainly as by-products in nickel laterites, bauxite residues, tin tailings, and manganese systems—not as large, stand-alone rare earth deposits. As we’ve previously noted, Indonesia’s manganese story carries a “rare earth signal,” but signals are not supply chains.

The ANTARA framing is accurate on state intent, but incomplete on industrial reality. Rare earth value is unlocked through separation chemistry, solvent extraction, metallization, and magnet manufacturing—areas where Indonesia remains at an early stage and is largely dependent on foreign technology.

China Is the Quiet Variable

In earlier REEx coverage, we highlighted Indonesia’s delicate positioning between resource nationalism and quiet dependence on Chinese processing partners, as well as other Chinese economic entanglements.  Perminas does not change that overnight. Without domestic separation plants or magnet capacity, Indonesia risks reinforcing a familiar pattern: state control upstream, China downstream.

The optimism is political. The constraint is chemical.

The Martabe Tell

ANTARA’s reference to the Martabe gold mine—whose license was revoked after environmental disasters—matters symbolically. Martabe is not a rare-earth asset, but its mention suggests that Perminas could become a policy absorber for assets deemed sensitive or problematic. For investors, this introduces sovereign and execution risk under the banner of strategic management.

Why This Matters for Rare Earth Markets

Perminas is less about near-term rare earth supply and more about precedent. If it catalyzes real downstream investment, Southeast Asia’s role could evolve. If not, Indonesia joins a growing list of countries that control minerals—but not markets.

National control is not the bottleneck. Processing still is.

Highlights

• Vimag Labs secured $5M led by Accel to commercialize magnet-free electric motor technology using software-defined controls, aiming to match permanent-magnet efficiency without rare earth dependence.
• The company's electronics-driven architecture targets rare earth supply risks concentrated in China, though scalability to mass-market EV applications remains unproven.
• Investor capital is flowing toward rare earth alternatives, signaling downstream innovation as a key pressure point reshaping the magnet supply economy.

Bengaluru-based Vimag Labs (opens in a new tab) has raised $5 million in a funding round led by Accel (opens in a new tab), backing its push to commercialize magnet-free electric motor and control systems. Thecompany claims its software-defined, electronics-driven architecture candeliver efficiencies comparable to permanent-magnet motors—without relying on rare earth elements, whose refining and magnet production remain heavily concentrated in China.

What’s accurate is the problem statement. High-performance EV and industrial motors today overwhelmingly depend on NdFeB permanent magnets, embedding rare earth supply risk, price volatility, and geopolitical exposure into downstream manufacturing. Alternatives like induction motors exist, but historically lag in efficiency and power density in demanding applications. Vimig’s approach—electronically generating magnetic fields via advanced controls—aims to close that gap.

What remains unproven is scale. Efficiency parity in lab or pilot settings does not automatically translate to mass-market EV drivetrains, where cost, thermal management, durability, and supply-chain maturity decide winners. Magnet-free architectures reduce rare earth dependence, but they do not eliminate broader materials, power electronics, or semiconductor constraints.

The strategic signal matters, however. Capital is flowing toward technologies that route around rare earth bottlenecks rather than confront them head-on. For investors, this is not a death knell for rare earths—but a reminder that downstream innovation is one of several pressure points reshaping the magnet economy.

Source: Economic Times, January 2026

• Advanced Electric Machines announces partnership with Asian automotive OEM for magnet-free electric motors.
• Partnership aims to eliminate dependency on neodymium and dysprosium, reducing exposure to China's supply chain.
• AEM's reluctance-based motor technology is credible but still unproven at scale.
• Efficiency data for the technology remains undisclosed.
• AEM is facing financial struggles, including declining revenues and widening losses after a major customer collapse.
• Automakers are funding rare-earth alternatives as a strategic hedge rather than an imminent replacement.
• This strategic move creates optionality, weakening the demand concentration of rare earths at the margin.

Advanced Electric Machines (AEM), (opens in a new tab) a UK startup positioning itself at the center of the rare-earth-free electric motor narrative, has announced another development partnership—this time with an unnamed Asian automotive OEM—following a previously disclosed seven-figure deal with a Tier-1 supplier. The headline is attractive: magnets out, rare earths out, supply-chain risk reduced. The details, however, deserve careful parsing.

This is meaningful news—but not quite the breakthrough some readers may assume.

What Holds Up Under Scrutiny

The core claim is sound. Advanced Electric Machines develops magnet-free electric motors that eliminate neodymium and dysprosium—two rare-earth elements closely linked to Chinese processing dominance. That aligns with well-established industry facts: permanent-magnet motors remain one of the most China-exposed components in EV drivetrains.

AEM’s focus on reluctance-based motor architectures is also credible. These designs are known, manufacturable, and already deployed at scale in certain industrial and automotive contexts. The company’s SSRD (Super Speed Reluctance Drive) targeting passenger vehicles by decade’s end fits realistic automotive development timelines.

The strategic motivation cited by OEMs—reducing exposure to concentrated supply chains—is legitimate and consistent with broader industry behavior.

Where the Story Starts to Stretch

Several claims lean forward of the evidence. AEM has not disclosed its full operating principle, efficiency curves, or cost parity versus permanent-magnet motors at scale. That matters. Magnet-free motors historically trade material security for lower power density or higher system complexity.

The push to replace copper windings with compressed aluminium is also speculative at this stage. Aluminium windings are feasible, but they introduce conductivity penalties, thermal challenges, and packaging trade-offs. No public data yet shows this approach outperforming copper in automotive duty cycles.

The suggestion of “queues of global manufacturers” should be read as optimism, not proof. Development contracts are not production commitments.

The Financial Subtext Investors Should Not Ignore

AEM’s financials add context. Revenues declined sharply after 2022, and 2024 losses widened materially, driven in part by the collapse of a major customer. This does not invalidate the technology—but it reinforces that commercial execution remains unproven.

These announcements signal interest, not inevitability.

Why This Matters for the Rare Earth Supply Chain

The notable point is not that rare-earth-free motors are imminent replacements for permanent-magnet systems. It is that automakers are actively funding optionality. Even partial substitution weakens rare-earth demand concentration at the margin—especially in Europe and Asia.

This is not the end of rare earth magnets. It is the beginning of strategic hedging.

Source: Information via email (German); reporting by Cora Werwitzke, 28 Jan 2026

• Malaysia's MITI insists the ART agreement with the U.S. maintains sovereignty, allowing partnerships with any nation including China without forcing alignment with U.S. sanctions or technology coercion.
• Despite policy optimism, Malaysia lacks proven separation flowsheets and magnet IP; capital-intensive midstream processing remains the bottleneck that no trade agreement alone can solve.
• Indonesia's nickel export ban serves as a cautionary tale: export restrictions intended to force domestic value-add often backfire through inflated costs, retaliation, and deeper foreign operator dependence.

Malaysia’s government insists its rare earth strategy remains sovereign, open, and commercially pragmatic—even as headlines warn of geopolitical capture and industrial overreach. A newly released FAQ (opens in a new tab) from Malaysia’s Ministry of Investment, Trade and Industry (MITI) on the Malaysia–U.S. Agreement on Reciprocal Trade (ART) pushes back against claims that the deal locks Kuala Lumpur into U.S. orbit or excludes China. The truth, as ever in rare earths, sits in the engineering, capital, and governance details—not the press releases.

The Promise: Neutrality, Optionality, and Value-Add

Malaysia’s official position is clear: cooperation with the United States on critical minerals and rare earth elements does not compel alignment with U.S. sanctions, nor does it prohibit partnerships with other countries, including China. Export controls remain governed by Malaysian law; technology transfer is voluntary, not coerced; and unprocessed REE exports remain restricted to encourage domestic value creation. On paper, this preserves strategic optionality while courting Western capital and know-how.

The Physics: Capital, Chemistry, and Scale Still Rule

Where optimism thins is midstream reality. Separation and refining are capital-intensive, environmentally sensitive, and brutally unforgiving to newcomers. Malaysia lacks proven, scaled separation flowsheets and proprietary magnet IP. No trade agreement changes that. Claims that ART alone can “integrate Malaysia into Western supply chains” gloss over the time, cost, and yield curves that define rare earth processing. Investors know this; chemistry doesn’t negotiate.

The Cautionary Tales We Keep Relearning

Commentary invoking Indonesia’s nickel ban is not alarmist—it’s empirical. Export restrictions meant to force domestic value-add often inflate costs, invite retaliation, and deepen dependence on foreign operators who do have technology. Malaysia’s own history with Lynas’ Gebeng facility shows how social license, waste management, and regulatory clarity can make or break projects—regardless of geopolitics.

Where the Coverage Overreaches

Some analyses imply ART implicitly sidelines Chinese capital or guarantees downstream success. The MITI text does neither. It promises dialogue, not dominance; openness, not outcomes. The bias here is structural optimism—assuming policy alignment can substitute for decades of industrial learning.

Why This Matters Now

Rare earth supply chains are fragmenting. Malaysia could become a credible node—but only if it resists shortcuts, funds midstream rigor, and aligns ESG enforcement with investor certainty. Trade frameworks set the table. Chemistry decides who eats.

Citation: Ministry of Investment, Trade and Industry (MITI), FAQs on the Malaysia–USA Agreement on Reciprocal Trade, updated Nov. 3, 2025.

• Three mining companies in Malaysia's Perak state resumed operations on January 13 after a November suspension triggered by river discoloration complaints.
• Authorities found insufficient grounds to maintain the shutdown.
• The incident reveals tensions between Malaysia's push for critical mineral revenue and stricter environmental enforcement.
• Regulatory suspensions can disrupt supply chains faster than feasibility studies predict.
• Malaysia's response—swift suspension followed by quick clearance—signals a balancing act that downstream buyers monitor closely.
• Southeast Asia emerges as a non-China source for tin, rare earths, and heavy minerals.

Three mining companies in Malaysia’s Perak state have been cleared to resume operations after a high-profile environmental scare that briefly halted activity across multiple river systems, including the Perak River. State authorities lifted the suspension on January 13 after investigations found no grounds to maintain the shutdown, according to statements by Perak’s chief minister following inspections by federal mineral and environmental agencies.

The episode reads like a local compliance story. It is also a case study in how environmental enforcement, licensing risk, and critical mineral supply quietly intersect in Southeast Asia.

What the Facts Support

The reporting is clear on the process. The temporary suspension—issued in November by Malaysia’s mineral and geoscience authorities—followed complaints of river discoloration and non-compliance with operating approvals. Water sampling and site inspections were conducted. Authorities concluded that while there may have been procedural lapses, evidence did not justifyprolonged suspension. Operations resumed with a warning: compliancefailures will not be tolerated if they threaten public safety.

That is credible, routine regulatory behavior—not a cover-up, not a greenwashing exercise.

What’s Left Unsaid—but Matters

What’s missing is context. Perak is not just any mining district. Malaysia sits on ionic clay and hard-rock mineral systems increasingly relevant to rare earths, tin, and associated heavy minerals. In a world scrambling for non-China supply, Southeast Asian jurisdictions are under pressure to accelerate output while proving environmental credibility.

This incident underscores a tension investors should watch closely: governments want mining revenue and strategic relevance, but public tolerance for environmental missteps is thinning. Suspensions—even temporary ones—can disrupt supply chains far faster than feasibility studies predict.

Reading Between the Currents

There is no evidence here of rare earth production being directly implicated. But the regulatory choreography matters. Malaysia is signaling two things at once: it will pause operations swiftly under public pressure, and it will restart them just as quickly when investigations clear. That balance—assertive oversight without permanent disruption—is precisely what downstream buyers want to see.

The Investor Takeaway

This is not a scandal. It is a stress test. Malaysia passed—for now. But as rare earth and critical mineral projects scale outside China, environmental incidents will increasingly shape timelines, valuations, and geopolitical trust. Rivers may clear quickly. Reputational risk does not.

Citation: The Edge Malaysia (opens in a new tab), Jan. 26, 2026

• India and EU finalized a landmark free trade agreement slashing tariffs on nearly all goods.
• The agreement affects 96.6% of EU exports and 99.5% of Indian goods.
• EU firms are expected to save €4 billion annually.
• Exports are projected to double by 2032.
• The deal dramatically reduces Indian auto tariffs from 110% to 10% over time.
• Europe will open to Indian textiles, gems, and chemicals.
• The agreement is praised as the 'mother of all deals' by Modi and von der Leyen.
• The agreement contains no binding framework for rare earth minerals or critical supply chains.
• While it serves as a macro trade tailwind, it is not a catalyst for breaking China's rare earth dominance.

Is this a tariff earthquake, by the numbers? Is the India and European Union deal a Trump stunner as spin goes in European and India media? India and the EU have finalized a long-delayed free trade agreement that slashes tariffs on nearly all traded goods. According to Reuters, India will reduce tariffs on 96.6% of EU exports, while the EU will cut duties on 99.5% of Indian goods over seven years. European firms are projected to save roughly €4 billion annually in duties, with EU exports to India forecast to double by 2032.

The deal sharply lowers Indian tariffs on EU autos—from as high as 110% to 10% over time—while opening Europe to Indian textiles, gems, chemicals, leather, and marine products. Leaders including India’s Prime Minister Narendra Modi and European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen have branded it the “mother of all deals.”

What the Coverage Gets Right

Reporting from BBC (opens in a new tab) and Reuters (opens in a new tab) is largely accurate on mechanics and scale. This is India’s largest trade agreement to date, driven in part by U.S. tariffs that pushed both sides to diversify trade exposure. The pact meaningfully improves EU access to a historically protected Indian market and cushions India’s labor-intensive exporters hit by 50% U.S. duties.

Claims of job creation and export booms, however, remain projections. They assume frictionless implementation, regulatory alignment, and demand growth—conditions that rarely arrive all at once.

The Strategic Omission Investors Should Notice

For rare-earth and critical minerals observers, the silence is deafening. Despite parallel talks on security and defense cooperation, the trade text offers no binding framework on rare earth extraction, separation, magnet manufacturing, or stockpiling. At a moment when both India and Europe publicly frame rare earths as strategic vulnerabilities, this agreement liberalizes finished goods while leaving mineral chokepoints untouched.

That matters. Tariff relief does not weaken China’s dominance in rare earth midstream processing. It simply reroutes trade around tariffs, not around dependency.

Bottom Line

This is a major trade deal—real, consequential, and politically timely. It is not an industrial strategy for critical minerals. Investors should treat it as a macro trade tailwind, not a rare earth catalyst.

• China's rare earth dominance stems from controlling midstream processing and downstream magnet production, not mining—making separation technology and value-chain integration the real strategic choke points.
• India remains trapped upstream, mining minerals but lacking the separation plants and magnet manufacturing needed to become a strategic partner rather than just a raw material vendor.
• The paper argues India's rare earth moment depends on industrial sequencing: building credible processing capacity to avoid shipping concentrate out and buying finished products back in.

In a January 2026 UNISCI Journal analysis, Ratnadeep Maitra, Shiv Nadar University, Delhi, and Tapas Das, Kandi Raj College, Kalyani University, argue that India’s “rare earth problem” is not a geology story—it’s a value-chain control story. Certainly a familiar point of view for the Rare Earth Exchanges™ community. Using security and geoeconomics frameworks, the authors map how China’s dominance in processing, separation, and magnets converts global dependence into strategic leverage, then ask a pointed question: can India become a trusted node in emerging “friend-shored” supply chains without mastering the downstream steps that actually make rare earths useful?

Study Method: A Theory-Led Supply Chain Autopsy

This is not a lab study or dataset-driven mining report. It is a conceptual and policy analysis built on:

• Keohane & Nye’s “complex interdependence” (supply chains as power networks).
• Barry Buzan’s “multi-dimensional security” (economic, societal, environmental security alongside military concerns).
• A synthesis of secondary sources on semiconductors, critical minerals, and institutional design—then applied to India’s rare earth constraints and options.

Key Findings: China’s “Monopoly” Is a Chemistry-and-Scale Machine

The paper’s most investor-relevant argument is blunt: rare earth mining is not the choke point—processing is. China’s advantage comes from controlling the midstream “alchemy” (separation, refining) and downstream conversion (metals, alloys, magnets), enabling export controls to function like a geopolitical circuit breaker. This aligns with widely cited estimates that China dominates separation/processing and magnet production, even where mined feedstock originates elsewhere.

The authors also highlight a non-obvious economic truth: rare earths are produced as co-products. If a country only wants NdPr or Dy/Tb and cannot absorb or monetize the “less glamorous” elements (La/Ce), unit economics worsen—one reason China’s integrated ecosystem stays cost-competitive.

India’s Constraint: The “Upstream Trap” and the State-Centric Model

Maitra and Das argue India remains stuck upstream: even with coastal mineral sands and state entities like IREL, India struggles to scale separation, metal-making, and magnet manufacturing—meaning domestic manufacturers often import higher-value derivatives and components. They describe a system where strategic control (thorium/monazite sensitivities) and institutional fragmentation constrain private capital, innovation, and speed.

Implications: India’s Strategic Choice—Vendor or Architect

For REEx readers, the implication is clear: India’s “rare earth moment” will be won or lost by industrial sequencing. If India builds credible midstream processing (and eventually magnets), it becomes a strategic partner in semiconductor and defense supply chains. If not, “diversification” risks becoming theater—shipping concentrates out and buying value back in.

Limitations and Controversies Worth Noting

This is theory-forward and relies heavily on secondary sources; it does not quantify India’s capacity, project timelines, or cost curves. Some policy ideas (e.g., new rare-earth departments/regulators) are provocative but not stress-tested against India’s complex federal governance or permitting realities. And while “China monopoly” is directionally accurate, market shares vary by segment and year—serious investors should treat round-number claims as approximations unless backed by current industry data.

REEx Takeaway: The Monopoly Is Industrial, Not Geological

This paper is valuable because it tells the truth many headlines dodge: rare-earth resilience is built in separation plants, metal shops, magnet lines, and offtake contracts—not in patriotic speeches over orebodies. India can matter. But only if it chooses to become an architect of the value chain, not a vendor at the bottom of it.

Citation: Maitra, R., & Das, T. (2026). India and the Rare Earth Conundrum: Navigating Security, Geoeconomics and Global Supply Chains (opens in a new tab). UNISCI Journal, No. 70–71 (Jan 2026). DOI: 10.31439/UNISCI-256.

• Baogang Group's Sunding Environmental Technology secured an industrial dust-collection project in Vietnam.
• This success follows an earlier achievement in Serbia.
• The projects demonstrate China's growing competitiveness in green industrial equipment exports under the Belt and Road Initiative.
• The proprietary sintered plastic plate system achieves sub-5 mg/m³ particulate emissions, which is stricter than many international standards.
• This showcases China's shift from rare-earth resource dominance to high-value downstream environmental systems engineering.
• The expansion reveals a competitive gap for Western nations.
• China now leads not just in mining but in systems integration, standards-setting, and commercialization speed for industrial decarbonization solutions across global markets.

A Baogang Group–affiliated environmental engineering company, Sunding Environmental Technology Co. (opens in a new tab) has won a new industrial dust-collection project in Vietnam, marking another step in China’s export of green industrial technologies under the Belt and Road Initiative. The contract follows Sunding’s earlier breakthrough into Europe via a Serbian mining dust-control project, signaling the growing competitiveness of Chinese environmental equipment suppliers in markets traditionally led by Western firms.

This is an important news item because it shows China’s rare-earth–anchored industrial policy maturing from upstream resource dominance into downstream, exportable green industrial systems. Baogang is not merely mining and separating rare earths; it is embedding them into proprietary environmental equipment, validating performance at home, and then exporting turnkey solutions abroad, including into Europe. That is the essence of vertical integration with policy backing: materials → engineering → standards → overseas deployment. For those watching China’s rare earth strategy, this signals a shift toward capturing more value per ton of rare earths or select critical minerals, reducing regulatory risk through greener processes, and locking in long-term influence over how heavy industry decarbonizes globally. For the U.S. and allies, it underscores a competitive gap—not just in mining, but in systems engineering, standards-setting, and commercialization speed—at precisely the moment when Western industrial policy is trying to build greener supply chains without comparable vertical cohesion.

The Latest Announcement

The Vietnam project deploys a sintered plastic plate dust-collection system designed for heavy industrial use. According to the company, the system integrates computational fluid dynamics (CFD) flow-field simulation and BMI modeling to optimize structural design and airflow efficiency. Its proprietary “Sonding” sintered filter plates are reported to consistently limit particulate emissions to below 5 mg/m³, a level stricter than many current international standards and positioned to meet anticipated future regulatory tightening.

Company executives stress that this overseas win is not an isolated case. Sunding previously met stringent European requirements for dust-collection efficiency, energy consumption, and operational safety, enabling it to secure the Serbian mining project. The firm has also deliveredlarge-scale installations in South Korea and India, building acumulative track record of more than 200 industrial dust-control projects worldwide across steelmaking, mining, and power generation.

Strategically, this expansion reflects a broader shift at Baogang Group, which is increasingly positioning itself as an integrated provider of environmental and industrial solutions, not solely a steel and rare-earth producer. Sunding is a key vehicle in this transition, exporting solutions that Baogang claims have already been validated through domestic industrial deployment.

For Western industrial suppliers and policymakers, the development highlights China’s growing ability to compete in industrial decarbonization and pollution-control equipment on performance and systems integration—not just cost. If independently verified, sub-5 mg/m³ emissions performance could challenge incumbent U.S. and European providers in emerging markets and infrastructure retrofits.

Company Profile: Sunding Environmental Technology Co.

• Headquarters: Baotou, Inner Mongolia, China
• Country: People’s Republic of China
• Ownership / Affiliation: Industrial environmental engineering subsidiary affiliated with Baogang Group
• Founded: Not publicly disclosed (operating history suggests multiple years of commercial deployment)
• Employees: Not disclosed
• Core Business: Industrial dust-collection systems; environmental equipment engineering; full-lifecycle emissions-control solutions
• Key Technologies: Sintered plastic plate dust collectors, CFD-optimized system design, energy-efficient filtration systems
• Intellectual Property: 30+ patents and software copyrights; lead contributor to China’s industry standard for sintered plate dust collectors
• Global Footprint: China, Serbia, Vietnam, South Korea, India
• Industries Served: Steel, mining, power generation, heavy industry

Disclaimer: This news item originates from Baogang Daily, a publication of a Chinese state-owned enterprise. The information presented should be independently verified before forming business, investment, or policy conclusions.

• Matter plans a $150M investment through 2028 to scale production to 180,000 electric two-wheelers annually.
• Partnering with Niron Magnetics to integrate rare-earth-free iron nitride (FeN) magnets into motors.
• FeN magnet technology signals an intent to reduce NdPr dependency in lower-power EV applications.
• FeN technology remains pre-commercial at scale with unproven cost parity and performance across demanding duty cycles.
• This development represents margin-testing substitution pressure starting at the low end of the EV market.
• High-performance segments will remain NdPr-intensive, suggesting contested rather than eliminated rare earth demand growth.

India’s electric two-wheeler market just delivered a data point worth scrutiny. Ahmedabad-based Matter (opens in a new tab) plans to invest $150 million by 2028, ramp capacity beyond 120,000 units annually, and sell up to 180,000 electric two-wheelers per year—while publicly emphasizing rare-earth-free motor technology through a partnership with U.S.-based Niron Magnetics (opens in a new tab). For rare earth investors, this is not noise. It’s a test case.

The Build-Out: Real Capex, Real Ambition

Matter’s capital plan—on top of ~$100 million already deployed—targets product expansion (including an electric scooter), distribution, and plant ramp-up. Near-term volumes are modest (≈20,000 units in 2026), but the stated trajectory is aggressive for India’s price-sensitive market. On execution alone, this is a credible EV growth story. The question is whether its materials strategy is equally credible at scale.

The Magnet Question: Substance Over Soundbite

Matter’s collaboration aims to integrate iron nitride (FeN) magnets—an emerging alternative to NdFeB—into its electric motorcycle platform. That matters. Motors are a primary driver of NdPr demand in EVs. If FeN can meet torque density, thermal stability, and durability targets at competitive cost, it would chip away at incremental NdPr demand growth, especially in two-wheelers where power requirements are lower than in passenger EVs.

But investors should keep perspective. FeN remains pre-commercial at mass scale. Performance validation, manufacturing yield, and cost curves are still being proven. Today, NdFeB remains the gold standard for high-efficiency traction motors. This announcement signals intent, not displacement.

What’s Accurate—and What’s Aspirational

Accurate:

• India EV volumes are rising; two-wheelers lead adoption.
• NdPr exposure is a strategic risk; OEMs are actively exploring substitutes.
• Pilot integrations of non-REE magnets are underway globally.

Speculative:

• Near-term large-scale substitution of NdPr in traction motors.
• Cost parity without performance trade-offs across climates and duty cycles.
• Rapid replication beyond niche or lower-power applications.

Why This Matters for the REE Supply Chain

This is not a death knell for rare earths. It’s a reminder that demand is elastic at the margin. Substitution pressure will likely start at the low end (two-wheelers, auxiliaries), while high-performance segments (autos, robotics, wind) remain NdPr-intensive for longer. For investors, the takeaway is nuance: REE demand growth persists—but the slope is contested.

Bottom line: Matter’s move is a credible experiment, not a market pivot. Watch performance data, not press lines.

• Myanmar functions as China's heavy rare earth pressure valve, supplying dysprosium/terbium-rich material critical for EV motors, with the Kachin Independence Army now acting as de facto gatekeeper for northern output.
• When conflict dynamics govern a supply node, price, continuity, and traceability become political variables rather than market variables, creating a midstream dependency stress test for rare earth supply chains.
• If the West wants magnets without Myanmar-linked risk, it must rapidly fund separation, metal-making, and magnet capacity while backing alternative HREE supply and accepting higher costs.

Myanmar isn’t a footnote—it's the heavy rare earth pressure valve. Myanmar sits near the top of Rare Earth Exchanges’ heavy rare earth rankings, not because it runs a clean industrial machine, but because it supplies dysprosium/terbium-rich material into China’s midstream. Tobias Rossi’s essay in Illuminem argues (opens in a new tab) the Kachin Independence Army (KIA) now functions as a de facto gatekeeper for northern Myanmar’s heavy rare earth output—making Western “de-risking” rhetoric collide with battlefield realities.

What’s notable for investors

When a supply node is governed by conflict dynamics, price, continuity, and traceability become political variables—not market variables.

Sturdy foundations (generally consistent with known supply-chain mechanics):

• Myanmar’s heavy rare earth feedstock matters because dysprosium is used to stabilize NdFeB magnets for high-heat EV motor applications.
• The environmental critique tracks: Myanmar’s rare earth extraction has been widely associated with in-situ leaching, a method with significant groundwater and soil risks when poorly managed.
• The article’s broader thesis—China’s dominance is reinforced by midstream processing concentration—is directionally sound. Even “ex-China” ore often bottlenecks at the separation capacity.

Claims that may be accurate but should be treated as unverified unless sourced directly:

• KIA troop counts (“15,000”), precise seizure timelines (“late 2024”), and the revenue/tax schedule (e.g., “35,000 yuan/ton + 20% levy,” “>$200m annually”). These numbers may be plausible, but the essay does not show primary documentation.

Rhetoric vs reality: where the piece leans hard

Rossi writes with a strong moral frame (“planetary salvation,” “ESG fantasy,” “Beijing’s cold pragmatism”). That framing is compelling—but it can also over-conclude. The line “China deals with them because it chooses to” implies a neat, centralized control story. Real-world trade flows tend to be messier: multiple intermediaries, local power bargains, and cross-border enforcement gaps.

No obvious “gotcha” misinformation jumps out. The main risk is precision theater: confident figures and vivid imagery that may outpace verifiable data.

REEx takeaway: the Kachin supply chain is the stress test

Myanmar’s heavy rare earths are not just another upstream story. They are a midstream dependency stress test. If the West wants magnets without Myanmar-linked risk, it must fund separation, metal-making, and magnet capacity—fast—while backing alternative HREE supply (and accepting higher costs).

Source: Tobias Rossi, “Leaching sovereignty,” Illuminem Voices, Jan 19, 2026 (and sources cited therein).

• Southern Alliance Mining's 40%-owned MCRE Resources resumed operations on January 15, 2026, after Malaysian regulators lifted temporary suspension orders.
• The suspension was triggered by 15 environmental and procedural compliance issues.
• The company swiftly remediated all non-compliances, including:
  • Erosion controls
  • Waste management
  • Reporting deficiencies
• This demonstrates that prompt corrective action can lead to regulatory re-engagement rather than prolonged shutdowns.
• The case underscores Southeast Asia's intensifying regulatory scrutiny in critical minerals mining.
• Operational discipline and environmental governance are becoming decisive competitive factors for investors seeking non-Chinese REE supply chains.

Southern Alliance Mining Ltd. (opens in a new tab) (SGX: QNS) has confirmed that temporary work suspension orders affecting its 40%-owned joint-operation associate, MCRE Resources Sdn Bhd, were formally lifted on January 15, 2026, allowing operations to resume.

Rare Earth Exchanges_™ recently showcased the Malaysian mine in “SAM is the Place to be: Malaysia’s Rising Rare Earth Player_.”

The suspension orders were issued by Malaysia’s Minerals and Geoscience Department (JMG) (opens in a new tab) and the Department of Environment (opens in a new tab) (DOE) following inspections that identified a series of procedural and environmental management non-compliances. Importantly for investors and regional stakeholders, the company emphasized that the suspension was entirely unrelated to the widely reported Sungai Perak river discolouration incident in late 2025, which involved separate investigations into mining activity upstream in Gerik, Perak.

What Triggered the Suspension

According to the company, regulators cited 15 discrete compliance issues, including:

• Eight items related to erosion and sedimentation control plans (ESCP), including runoff discharge parameters under Malaysia’s Minerals Development Rules (Effluent) 2016
• Three deviations from approved operational workflows
• Two reporting deficiencies
• Single issues involving scheduled waste management, Environmental Management Plan (EMP) requirements, and the appointment of a competent environmental officer

No structural safety failures or material environmental incidents were cited.

Remediation Completed, Operations Restarted

Southern Alliance stated that all non-compliances have been fully addressed, with corrective actions verified by Malaysian authorities prior to the lifting of the suspension orders. Measures implemented included strengthened environmental controls, procedural corrections, and enhanced compliance oversight.

Dato’ Sri Pek Kok Sam, Managing Director of Southern Alliance Mining, said the outcome reflects “constructive engagement” with regulators and reiterated the company’s commitment to maintaining “rigorous environmental and operational standards.”

Rare Earth Element Mine, Malaysia

Why This Matters for the Mining & Critical Minerals Community

While Southern Alliance Mining is primarily an iron ore producer, the episode underscores a broader regional reality relevant to investors tracking critical mineral and mining supply chains across Southeast Asia such as the firm’s rare earth elements:

• Regulatory scrutiny is intensifying as governments respond to environmental concerns and rising public sensitivity around mining activity.
• Operational resilience increasingly depends on compliance execution, not just geology or commodity pricing.
• Swift remediation and transparency matter — the relatively short suspension period suggests Malaysian regulators remain open to corrective engagement rather than prolonged or punitive shutdowns when issues are addressed promptly.

For _Rare Earth Exchanges_™ readers evaluating Southeast Asia as a diversification region away from China-dominated supply chains, this case illustrates how regulatory credibility and operational discipline are becoming decisive competitive factors.

Company Snapshot

Southern Alliance Mining is listed on the Catalist Board of the Singapore Exchange (opens in a new tab) and operates primarily from Pahang, Malaysia. Its flagship Chaah Mine spans 225.7 hectares across two mining leases and supports:

• Four fixed crushing plants
• Two mobile crushing lines
• Two beneficiation plants operating on 24-hour shifts

The group reports an approximate monthly capacity of ~60,000 tonnes of iron ore concentrate, with additional activities spanning pipe-coating materials, gold exploration in Johor, and broader commodity trading.

REE Acquisition

SAM executed a deliberate diversification strategy in Malaysia by acquiring 40% of MCRE Resources and 100% of Paramount Synergy, part of a process pivoting from iron ore into rare earth elements (REEs) at a time of accelerating global demand for non-Chinese supply. The centerpiece is

MCRE’s Gerik Mine, Malaysia’s first ion-adsorption clay REE operation, which uses environmentally friendlier in-situ leaching (ISL) and has already reached commercial production, exporting rare-earth carbonates since early 2023 from an estimated 84.9 million tonnes of REE-bearing material.

SAM’s full ownership of Paramount Synergy adds longer-dated exploration optionality in Johor, strengthening its upstream footprint. Collectively, these moves reduce SAM’s reliance on iron ore, align with Malaysia’s ambition to build a value-added REE supply chain, and position the company as a credible regional supplier as Western manufacturers seek diversification away from China—an effort reinforced by MCRE’s existing technical linkage with Chinalco Guangxi. The acquisitions, initiated via MOUs in 2023 and substantially completed by 2025, signal SAM’s intent to anchor Malaysia’s emerging non-Chinese ion-adsorption clay REE sector.

Bottom Line

The lifting of MCRE’s suspension removes a near-term operational overhang for Southern Alliance Mining. More broadly, it reinforces a central lesson for the region’s mining sector: environmental governance is now a balance-sheet issue, not a footnote.

• Niron Magnetics and MATTER Motor Works unveiled a rare-earth-free variable flux motor prototype at CES 2025, combining Iron Nitride magnet technology with advanced motor architecture for high-performance electric motorcycles.
• Variable flux motor designs dynamically adjust magnetic flux to deliver both high low-speed torque and high-speed efficiency, eliminating the traditional performance trade-off faced by conventional permanent-magnet motors.
• Niron's claim to scale mass production of Iron Nitride magnets represents a potential manufacturing inflection point, introducing strategic optionality for OEMs and pricing pressure on rare-earth-dependent supply chains.

Rare Earth Exchanges™ has been tracking a quiet but accelerating revival: the return of non-rare-earth magnet technologies—this time armed with modern materials science, advanced manufacturing, and system-level motor redesign.

Earlier generations of electric motors relied on ferrite magnets or induction architectures to avoid rare earths, but they paid a steep price in power density, torque control, and efficiency. The rise of neodymium-iron-boron (NdFeB) magnets in the 1990s decisively tilted the market toward rare earth permanent magnets—locking in performance gains but also embedding geopolitical risk.

Now, that trade-off is being challenged again.

A New Collaboration Signals Momentum

At CES 2026, Niron Magnetics (opens in a new tab) and India’s MATTER Motor Works (opens in a new tab) (leading maker of electric motor bikes) unveiled a prototype rare-earth-free variable flux motor (VFM) for high-performance electric motorcycles—an announcement that fits squarely into this broader trend.

Niron is contributing its Iron Nitride (Fe-N) permanent magnet technology, which contains zero rare earth elements, alongside proprietary Variable Flux Motor architectures. MATTER brings liquid-cooled powertrain engineering, in-house gearbox development, and intelligent vehicle systems, drawing on experience since its founding in Ahmedabad in 2019.

Why Variable Flux Matters

Conventional permanent-magnet motors face a fundamental compromise:

• High-low-speed torque conflicts with
• High-speed efficiency and top-end performance

Niron claims its VFM designs dynamically adjust magnetic flux, eliminating that trade-off. For electric motorcycles, the implications are material:

• Faster acceleration off the line
• Improved controllability in stop-and-go urban riding
• Efficient high-speed cruising
• Better thermal stability under sustained load

If validated at scale, this architecture could reshape how OEMs think about performance without rare earth dependency.

Manufacturing Is the Real Inflection Point

What makes this announcement more than a lab curiosity is Niron’s manufacturing claim. The company says it is “scaling the world’s first advanced manufacturing process for the mass production of permanent magnets” based on Iron Nitride formulations.

Historically, non-rare-earth magnets have failed not on physics alone, but on manufacturability, consistency, and cost at volume. If Iron Nitride magnets can be produced reliably at an industrial scale, the implications extend well beyond motorcycles—to:

• Light EVs and scooters
• Automotive auxiliary motors
• Industrial drives
• Defense-sensitive applications seeking rare-earth avoidance

Strategic Context for Rare Earth Markets

For Rare Earth Exchanges, developments like this do not signal the end of rare earth magnets. NdPr-based systems will remain dominant in high-power-density, compact applications—especially in automotive traction motors, wind turbines, and defense platforms — for the foreseeable future.

However, every credible rare-earth-free alternative introduces:

• Optionality for OEMs
• Pricing pressure at the margin
• Reduced exposure to Chinese-controlled refining and magnet supply chains

In that sense, Iron Nitride and VFM architectures represent strategic hedging, not wholesale substitution.

Bottom Line

This collaboration revives an old idea—non-rare-earth magnets—but with new materials, smarter motor architectures, and modern manufacturing ambition. Whether Niron and MATTER can move from prototype to scalable production remains the key question. But the direction is clear: the permanent magnet landscape is no longer a one-material story. Innovation to disrupt must occur.

MATTER Motor Works

Matter Motor Works is an Indian electric vehicle and energy storage start-up headquartered in Ahmedabad, Gujarat. The company was founded in 2019 and is known for developing the Matter AERA, India's first electric motorcycle with a liquid-cooled motor and a gearbox.

• Malaysia holds over 16 million tonnes of rare earth potential.
• Hosts Lynas's critical Pahang refinery accounting for 5% of global output.
• Strategically positioned in midstream processing.
• Government's ambitious target of a 30,000-tonne annual output by 2030.
• Faces structural barriers such as:
  • Reagent access
  • Environmental licensing
  • Downstream partnerships
  • Decades-long development timelines
• Balances deep operational ties with China against diversification ambitions toward America.
• Navigates environmental opposition while demonstrating the challenges of true supply chain independence.

Malaysia wants a larger seat at the global rare earth table. Demand is rising, geopolitics are sharpening, and policymakers see opportunity. A recent report (opens in a new tab) by CNA captures the tension well: ambition is real, but so are theconstraints. For investors and policymakers, this is not a hype story—it is a systems story.

What the Ground Truth Supports

Malaysia does hold meaningful rare earth potential. Estimates of over 16 million tonnes beneath Peninsular Malaysia are plausible, particularly ionic adsorption clay (IAC) deposits similar in geology—though not scale—to southern China.  Southern Alliance Mining represents one of the notable assets in the Southeast Asian nation. The country also hosts one of the world’s most important non-Chinese processing assets: Lynas Rare Earths’s Pahang refinery, which already accounts for more than 5% of global rare earth output.

Those facts matter. Processing—not mining—is the choke point in the rare earth supply chain. Malaysia already participates in the midstream, a position far more valuable than raw resource ownership alone.

Visions and Realities

The government’s target of 30,000 tonnes of annual rare earth output by 2030 certainly is an assertive target. Industry veterans quoted by CNA are correct to push back. China took decades to build itsecosystem. Lynas itself required more than ten years to reachscale.

Scaling IAC mining is not simply a matter of political will. It requires:

• Multiple new processing facilities
• Secure access to chemical reagents
• Environmental licensing at both the state and federal levels
• Downstream customers are willing to commit long-term

None of these is trivial. The target reads more like policy signaling than an execution-ready forecast.

The China Shadow That Never Leaves the Room

Despite talk of diversification, China remains embedded in Malaysia’s rare earth story. One local producer (SAM) exports all of its output to China, and partnerships with Chinese state-owned firms persist. That is not hypocrisy—it is supply-chain gravity.

Malaysia’s neutrality may be an advantage diplomatically, but supply-chain control is operational, not ideological. As industry sources note, without control over reagents, separation know-how, and buyers, scaling becomes risky fast.

Yet as Rare Earth Exchanges™ has chronicled over the past year, Malaysia wants to grow and prosper in heretofore new ways.  This includes doing deals with America.

Malaysia sits squarely in the middle of the rare earth chessboard. On one side, its industry is deeply interlinked with China—through offtake arrangements, technical partnerships, reagent supply, and decades of gravitational pull from the world’s dominant rare earth ecosystem. Those ties are not incidental; they are structural, and in many cases economically rational.

On the other side, Malaysia is clearly signaling a desire for a more prosperous, diversified future—one less defined by raw material dependency and more by domestic value creation, industrial capability, and strategic relevance.

As Rare Earth Exchanges has chronicled over the past year, Kuala Lumpur is exploring new pathways: strengthening midstream processing, encouraging downstream participation, tightening regulatory oversight, and positioning itself as a neutral but indispensable node in a fragmenting global supply chain---and this includes a look toward America.

This is not a clean pivot away from China, nor is it a rejection of existing relationships. It is a careful, pragmatic attempt to evolve—balancing legacy dependence with the ambition to prosper in new, more resilient ways.

Environmental Fault Lines, Not Footnotes

Any media must give appropriate weight to environmental concerns surrounding in-situ leaching. While often marketed as “less harmful,” the method still involves chemical injection into sensitive ecosystems. Opposition from activists and local fishermen is not noise—it is a material permitting risk that could slow or halt projects. And local Malaysian state land offices are watching.

Why This Matters for the Global Supply Chain

Malaysia’s story is notable because it shows how hard diversification really is. The country has geology, processing experience, and geopolitical relevance—yet still faces structural barriers. That is the lesson.

Rare earth dominance is not broken by declarations. It is rebuilt, painstakingly, layer by layer.

• Amanda Lacaze to retire as Lynas Rare Earths CEO after 12 years.
• During her tenure, Lacaze transformed the company from financial distress to a A$15 billion market cap and global leadership outside China.
• The leadership transition follows completion of the 'Lynas 2025' investment program and launch of the 'Towards 2030' strategy.
• A global search is underway for her successor.
• Lynas remains central to Western rare earth security strategies as the #1 ex-China upstream light rare earth producer.
• The company faces execution risks around sustained expansion and processing goals.

Lynas Rare Earths Ltd has announced (opens in a new tab) that Chief Executive Officer and Managing Director Amanda Lacaze will retire after 12 years in the role, marking a significant leadership transition for the world’s largest rare earths producer outside China. Ms. Lacaze will remain with the company until the end of the current financial year to support an orderly handover while the Board conducts a global search for her successor, considering both internal and external candidates.

Ms. Lacaze assumed the CEO role in 2014 when Lynas was under financial and operational stress. Over her tenure, the company stabilized its balance sheet, expanded production capacity, and built an integrated mining and processing footprint spanning Mt Weld, Kalgoorlie, and Malaysia. Lynas’ market capitalization increased from approximately A$400 million in 2014 to nearly A$15 billion by early 2026, reflecting its emergence as a strategically important supplier to global manufacturers and governments seeking diversified rare earth supply chains.

The company recently concluded its “Lynas 2025” capital investment program and launched its “Towards 2030” growth strategy, which management has framed as the natural inflection point for leadership transition. Board Chair John Humphrey credited Ms. Lacaze with transforming Lynas into a globally relevant producer with operational scale and technical capability. The company is #1 on the Rare Earth Exchanges ex-China upstream light rare earth producer ranking.

Market reaction was modestly positive, with Lynas shares rising in line with broader sector gains following the announcement, according to reporting by Reuters. Analysts and investors cited continuity of strategy and the planned transition period as stabilizing factors.

From a Rare Earth Exchanges™ perspective, the CEO transition comes at a time when Lynas remains central to Western rare earth security strategies. Execution risk now shifts toward leadership selection and sustained delivery on expansion, processing optimization, and downstream integration goals as global competition intensifies.

• Intelligence services are targeting rare earth processing and magnet manufacturing as strategic infrastructure, treating supply chain chokepoints as sites for denial, disruption, and covert action rather than normal market competition.
• China's 91% refining dominance and 94% magnet production share enables weaponized interdependence through export controls, as demonstrated by January 2026 restrictions on Japan, making processing capacity the critical bottleneck.
• Governments and investors must plan for security risks—including astroturfed environmental activism, licensing friction, and geopolitical sabotage—as normal variables in project timelines, not market anomalies.

In ORF Occasional Paper (opens in a new tab) No. 514 (January 2026), Samir Saran (President, Observer Research Foundation) and Archishman Ray Goswami (ORF; Oxford DPhil candidate) argue that the intelligence battlefield is expanding well beyond spies and satellites into the hard plumbing of critical mineral supply chains—especially rare earth elements (REEs). Their central claim is simple: as demand rises and supply chains fracture, nations will treat REE mining, processing, and magnets as strategic infrastructure that must be protected, monitored, and—at times—disrupted.

Background

This is a strategy/policy analysis, not a technical mining study. The authors synthesize recent geopolitical developments and security trends to explain how four forces are reshaping intelligence: digital “geotechnography,” the global race for REEs, the evolution of HUMINT amid ubiquitous technical surveillance, and the growing role of private-sector intelligence and Big Tech.

Key findings for the rare earth supply chain

Rare earths are becoming a driver of state competition—and a mission for intelligence services. The authors describe REEs as “an increasingly central feature” of the security landscape and argue that competition over them will shape international politics in coming years.

“Weaponized interdependence” means supply chains can be attacked at choke points. Because supply chains stretch across jurisdictions, pressure at a single node (licenses, shipping, processing capacity, intermediates) can translate into geopolitical leverage. The authors explicitly frame REEs as emblematic of this vulnerability.

Expect more “denial and disruption” behavior around REEs.
The paper warns that sabotage/denial tactics—familiar from Cold War competition—are likely to spill into the REE domain, where preventing a competitor from scaling supply may be strategically valuable.

Conflict zones can become rare earth pressure valves.
The authors highlight Myanmar as a high-risk example: armed actors can leverage control over dysprosium/terbium-bearing areas to shape flows and relationships—especially with neighboring China.

Environmental narratives can be weaponized.
One of the paper’s more provocative warnings is that “local activism” and environmental concerns around REE mining can become targets for politicization—potentially including “astroturfed activism” and information warfare to obstruct competitors’ projects.

The paper’s anchor point: China’s near-monopoly and export restriction playbook

While the paper is broad, its REE urgency crystallizes in the “Implications for India” section: the authors cite the “near monopoly of China” in the sector and the export-restrictions strategy that can trigger a scramble for alternatives.

Independent, numbers-driven supply-chain analysis underscores why “processing dominance” matters more than ore: the IEA reports China’s share at roughly 91% of global separation and refining, and about 94% of sintered permanent magnet production—a downstream concentration that turns industrial supply into strategic leverage.

And this isn’t abstract. In January 2026, Reuters reported that China began limiting exports of rare earths and magnets to Japanese companies amid a widening dispute, highlighting how quickly administrative licensing can become geopolitical friction.

Implications for governments, industry, and investors

• Build strategy around processing, not just mining. The real bottleneck—and leverage point—is separation/refining and magnet manufacturing.
• Plan for “security risk” in project timelines. Permitting, activism, disinformation, licensing rules, and cross-border chokepoints increasingly behave like national-security variables, not normal market noise.
• Assume more export controls and compliance friction. The IEA documents escalating controls and how licensing delays/denials can ripple across autos, energy tech, defense, aerospace, semiconductors, and data centres.

Limitations and points of controversy

• Not an empirical dataset. The paper maps plausible mechanisms and incentives rather than proving causal claims with new data.
• Hard-to-verify domains. Predictions about covert action, proxy dynamics, and “astroturfing” are inherently difficult to substantiate publicly; treat them as risk scenarios rather than settled facts.
• India-forward framing. Its policy recommendations and urgency are anchored in India’s strategic context, though the supply-chain logic generalizes.

Bottom line

ORF’s message is both a warning and a catalyst: rare earths—especially processing and magnets—are no longer “just” industrial inputs; they are strategic terrain. As China’s dominance and export-control leverage harden, countries that move fastest on diversification, processing capacity, and supply-chain intelligence will be the ones that keep their clean-tech and defense futures in their own hands.

The Source

Note ORF is an independent global think tank headquartered in New Delhi, India, with additional centres in Mumbai, Chennai, and Kolkata, focusing on public policy, geopolitics, economics, and technology. Founded in the early 1990s with backing from the Dhirubhai Ambani family and historically funded largely by Reliance Industries, ORF states that it operates independently, though reports indicate Reliance provided up to 95% of its budget until 2009 and continues to account for a substantial share (estimated around 65%), alongside growing government and foreign foundation support.

ORF has gained prominence in Indian and global policy circles, notably through initiatives such as the Raisina Dialogue, but it has also faced scrutiny from independent media over potential conflicts of interest—particularly concerning its leadership under Samir Saran, a former Reliance executive, and its close proximity to senior government figures, including through ORF America and diplomatic engagements. Despite these criticisms, ORF remains highly influential and internationally recognized, ranking 20th globally and 2nd in Asia (China, India, Japan, South Korea) in the University of Pennsylvania’s 2020 Global Go To Think Tank Index.

Citations

• Samir Saran & Archishman Ray Goswami, “Swords and Shields: Navigating the Modern Intelligence Landscape,” ORF Occasional Paper No. 514 (Jan 2026).
• IEA (Oct 23, 2025), “With new export controls on critical minerals, supply concentration risks become reality” (processing/refining and magnet concentration; export controls escalation; 58,000 tonnes magnet exports in 2024).
• Reuters (Jan 7–8, 2026) reporting China’s rare earth/magnet export curbs to Japan amid dual-use controls dispute.

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• Energy Fuels' rebranded Vara Mada project in Madagascar projects $1.8B NPV, $500M+ annual EBITDA, and 38-year mine life, positioning it as a major integrated mineral sands-rare earth opportunity outside China.
• The company's strategy embeds rare earths as byproducts of heavy mineral sands mining, processing monazite at White Mesa Mill to supply critical magnet elements like dysprosium and terbium to U.S. markets.
• While projections claim 30% of U.S. light REEs and 85% of heavy REEs supply, execution risks remain including Malagasy permitting, fiscal terms, and Phase 2 expansion timelines before final investment decision.

Energy Fuels (opens in a new tab) (UUUU) has released an updated feasibility study for its Madagascar-based heavy mineral sands project—now rebranded Vara Mada—and the numbers are designed to command attention. A projected $1.8 billion NPV, $500+ million in annual EBITDA, and a 38-year mine life position the project as one of the largest integrated mineral sands–rare earth opportunities outside China. For investors tracking rare earth supply chains, this announcement matters—but not for every reason the press release suggests.

The Gravity Beneath the Glitter

What holds up under scrutiny is scale. Vara Mada’s Ranobe deposit (opens in a new tab) is vast by any metric: nearly a billion tonnes of Proven and Probable reserves, anchored by ilmenite, zircon, and—critically—monazite, the feedstock that actually matters for rare earth magnets. Energy Fuels’ strategy mirrors China’s own playbook: treat rare earths as a byproduct of mineral sands mining, not a standalone gamble.

That matters. Standalone rare earth mines outside China have repeatedly struggled with costs, metallurgy, and financing. By embedding REEs into a broader HMS revenue stack, Energy Fuels lowers marginal costs and stabilizes cash flow—an approach that is both proven and pragmatic.

Equally real is the downstream advantage. Processing monazite at the company’s White Mesa Mill (opens in a new tab) gives the U.S. one of its few licensed, operating pathways for separated rare earth oxides—particularly dysprosium and terbium, the bottleneck elements for high-performance magnets.

Where Optimism Leans Ahead of Reality

The more ambitious claims—supplying 30% of U.S. light REEs and 85% of heavy REEs—rest on forecasts, not contracts. They assume timely permitting in Madagascar, stable fiscal terms, smooth logistics, and successful Phase 2 expansion at White Mesa. None is guaranteed.

There is also a subtle narrative tilt: the rebranding of Toliara to “Vara Mada” emphasizes social benefit, yet negotiations with the Malagasy government over fiscal stability and monazite permitting remain unresolved. Until those terms are locked, the final investment decision (FID) risk is real and nontrivial.

Why This Still Matters

Strip away the promotional varnish and the core insight remains powerful: monazite-driven rare earth supply is one of the few scalable, near-term alternatives to China. If Energy Fuels executes, Vara Mada could become a cornerstone of allied magnet supply—feeding EVs, defense systems, and industrial automation without relying on Chinese separation.

That makes this less a hype story—and more a test case. Can the West finally industrialize rare earths the way China did decades ago?

Profile

Energy Fuels is a Denver-based critical minerals company with a 45-year operating history rooted in uranium refining—an advantage that materially differentiates it from most Western rare earth hopefuls. The company is the largest U.S. uranium producer and operates the White Mesa Mill in Utah, the only fully licensed, operating conventional uranium mill in the country. That refining pedigree—permitting, radiological handling, hydrometallurgy, waste management, and quality control—has enabled Energy Fuels to pivot credibly into rare earth separation, including early commercial production of separated rare earth oxides and progress toward heavy rare earths like dysprosium.

While current REE volumes remain small, Energy Fuels ranks higher among ex-China U.S. refiners because it is operating separation infrastructure today, not merely proposing it, and is pursuing a China-proven monazite feedstock strategy tied to projects in Madagascar, Brazil, Australia, and third-party sources.

Financially, Energy Fuels is best understood as a strategic scale-up story rather than a near-term earnings play. Revenues have surged off a low base, but margins remain deeply negative as the company invests ahead of cash flow, with operating and free cash flow firmly in the red. The balance sheet, however, is unusually strong for a company at this stage: substantial cash, no reported debt, and a very high current ratio provide runway to execute. The market’s valuation—high on sales and forward multiples—prices in future optionality: scaled uranium output, meaningful rare earth separation (especially heavy REEs), and integration into U.S. and allied magnet supply chains.

For investors, the core question is execution: if Energy Fuels converts its refining DNA into sustained REE volumes and contracts, it could become a cornerstone of the ex-China supply chain; if not, today’s premium will prove premature.

Citation

Energy Fuels Inc., Jan. 8, 2026 press release; Feasibility Study prepared under S-K 1300 and NI 43-101 standards.

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• Phuket Island soils from former tin-mining areas show REE concentrations averaging 345 mg/kg with naturally occurring radioactivity (²²⁶Ra, ²³²Th, ⁴⁰K) slightly above UNSCEAR safety limits.
• Study reveals that rare earth supply chains carry hidden radiological risks from uranium and thorium in REE-bearing minerals like monazite and xenotime.
• Environmental and radiological compliance is becoming a gating factor for ex-China rare earth projects, affecting permitting timelines, costs, and bankability.

A new in-press paper (opens in a new tab) in the Journal of Environmental Sciences puts a spotlight on an under-discussed reality of the rare earth and critical minerals supply chain: REEs often travel with naturally occurring radioactivity, and old mining districts can leave a long environmental afterimage.

Researchers assessed soils across Phuket Island, Thailand—once a major tin-mining center—measuring both rare earth elements (REEs) and natural radionuclides linked to REE-bearing minerals such as monazite and xenotime (notably uranium and thorium).

Their headline finding: Phuket soils show light rare earth enrichment and heavy rare earth depletion, consistent with weathered granitic geology, but with signals that past tin-mining activity also plays a role.

What the Data Says

The reported total REE levels ranged from 0.14 to 1287 mg/kg, averaging ~345 mg/kg. Chondrite-normalized patterns show LREE enrichment and HREE depletion, while negative cerium (Ce) and europium (Eu) anomalies point mainly to granite weathering—with “exogenous” inputs suggested in places (a polite way of saying: not purely natural background).

Ecological risk metrics (EF, Igeo, PERI) largely land in the “moderate enrichment / moderate contamination / low ecological risk” bands. But the attention-grabber is radiological: average activity concentrations for ²²⁶Ra (149 Bq/kg), ²³²Th (105 Bq/kg), and ⁴⁰K (~825 Bq/kg) produced hazard indices slightly above UNSCEAR reference limits.

Supply Chain Implications: ESG Is Now a Market Constraint

For rare earth developers, processors, and offtakers, this is a reminder that “rare earth opportunity” can come bundled with radioactivity management, tailings liability, and land-use conflict—especially in former tin districts. For Thailand—where old mining regions overlap with high-value tourism—baseline studies like this can harden permitting, monitoring, and remediation expectations. That can raise costs, slow timelines, and reshape which projects become bankable.

What’s Still Unknown

This is labeled a preliminary assessment, not a definitive exposure or health-outcome study. “Slightly above limits” is a flag for follow-up, not a verdict. But for investors and policymakers, the direction is clear: environmental and radiological data is becoming pricing power—and a gating factor for “ex-China” supply.

Source: Nuchdang S. et al., Journal of Environmental Sciences (In Press, available online Jan 6, 2026). DOI: 10.1016/j.jes.2026.01.006

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• Lynas Rare Earths (ASX:LYC) surged 10% on January 7, 2026, rebounding from recent lows, driven by technical momentum and improving NdPr price sentiment rather than new contracts or operational upgrades.
• As the largest integrated rare earth producer outside China, Lynas benefits from strategic Japan partnerships (Sojitz/JOGMEC) for heavy rare earth offtake, but faces operational challenges including Kalgoorlie power disruptions affecting output and costs.
• Investors should scrutinize realized NdPr pricing versus benchmarks, Kalgoorlie reliability timelines, and whether Malaysia's heavy rare earth expansion can meaningfully improve margins amid structural volatility in rare earth equities.

Lynas Rare Earths Ltd (ASX:LYC) jumped (opens in a new tab) about 10% on Jan. 7, 2026, rebounding sharply from Jan. 2 lows near A$12.15. Is the move due to a technical snap-back and improving sentiment that rare earth prices, particularly NdPr, are stabilizing dynamics?  There was no new contract, discovery, or guidance upgrade. This was momentum—useful, but not the same as fundamentals.

Aaron Teboneras reported on the stock for The Motley Fool Australia.

The Feel-Good Story—and What It Misses

The bullish script is familiar: EV demand returns, NdPr bottoms, geopolitics re-rates non-China supply. That thesis is plausible, but incomplete. NdPr benchmarks have shown recent firmness (methodologies vary), yet realized pricing and margins matter more than spot headlines. Meanwhile, Lynas has navigated operational constraints—including reported Kalgoorlie power disruptions in late 2025—that can ripple into downstream output and costs.

Yet investors should discount exuberance until execution risks are fully de-risked.

Scale, Strategy, and Japan Ties

Lynas remains the largest integrated rare earth producer outside China, with MP Materials among the next most significant non-China players as the U.S. builds capacity. Importantly, Lynas’ Japan relationships are material: long-standing ties with  Sojitz/JOGMEC underpin offtake and financing support, including agreements covering heavy rare earths (Dy/Tb)—a strategic differentiator as magnet makers prioritize high-temperature performance.

Questions Investors Should Ask Now

• What NdPr prices is Lynas actually realizing versus benchmarks, net of contracts and costs?
• How quickly can Kalgoorlie reliability be stabilized, and at what capex/opex impact?
• Will heavy rare earth separation expansion in Malaysia materially improve product mix and margins in volatile price conditions?

StockCheck: Fundamentals vs. Charts

This move looks like a credible technical rebound from oversold levels—not proof of a cycle turn. Rare earth equities remain structurally volatile. Market quotes around the mid-teens AUD range during this period varied by venue and timing.

REEx Takeaway

If the Motley Fool piece is mostly correct, it’s also thin. Supply-chain resilience isn’t a chart pattern. The U.S. rebuild requires separation, metals, alloys, and magnets—or even best-in-class producers like Lynas remain exposed to China-set pricing.

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• Peer-reviewed research from Universitas Muslim Indonesia finds manganese ores in South Sulawesi's Anabanua District contain meaningful light rare earth element (LREE) concentrations that compare favorably with global deposits.
• The study used petrography, X-ray diffraction, and ICP-OES geochemistry on three samples to identify LREEs including lanthanum, cerium, praseodymium, neodymium, and samarium alongside manganese minerals.
• While the geological discovery adds to Indonesia's critical minerals potential, the lack of domestic processing capacity means any new feedstock risks flowing back to Chinese refineries, highlighting that discovery alone doesn't equal strategic independence.

A new peer-reviewed study led by Muhamad Hardin Wakila (opens in a new tab) of Universitas Muslim Indonesia, with collaborators from Universitas Gadjah Mada (opens in a new tab), delivers a detailed look at an underexplored source of rare earth elements (REEs): manganese deposits in South Sulawesi. Published in the Journal of Geoscience, Engineering, Environment, and Technology (Vol. 10, No. 4, 2025), the study finds that manganese ores from Anabanua District contain meaningful concentrations of light rare earth elements (LREEs)—in some cases exceeding levels reported at comparable deposits worldwide.

The takeaway is simple for non-specialists: Indonesia has more REE potential than commonly assumed—but turning geology into supply depends on processing, not discovery alone.

How the Study Worked—From Rock to Numbers

The research team collected three manganese samples from Anabanua Village, Barru Regency, South Sulawesi, and applied a three-step analytical approach:

• Petrography to identify mineral textures and alteration.
• X-ray Diffraction (XRD) to determine crystalline mineral phases.
• ICP-OES geochemistry to quantify individual rare earth elements.

This combination allowed the authors to connect what the rocks look like under a microscope with precise chemical measurements—an important bridge for investors and policymakers who need more than surface claims.

What They Found—REEs Riding Along with Manganese

The manganese ores host a wide range of REEs, including yttrium, scandium, lanthanum, cerium, praseodymium, neodymium, and samarium, alongside smaller amounts of heavy REEs such as dysprosium, terbium, and yttrium. Reported concentrations include:

• LREEs (La, Ce, Pr, Nd, Sm) are at levels that compare favorably with several known global deposits.
• HREEs are present but generally at lower concentrations.

The authors conclude that these manganese deposits are potentially viable LREE sources, warranting consideration in Indonesia’s strategic mineral planning.

Why This Matters—And Where China Still Dominates

From a Rare Earth Exchanges™ perspective, the geology is encouraging—but it does not change the global balance overnight. China’s near-monopoly in rare earth separation and refining remains the decisive chokepoint. Manganese-hosted REEs add exploration optionality for Indonesia, yet without domestic or allied processing capacity, any new feedstock risks flow back into Chinese refineries. Plus, we must factor in the intertwined trade dynamics between Indonesia and China.

For lay readers: finding REEs is not the same as supplying magnets or batteries. The value—and leverage—sit in the chemical processing steps that convert rock into usable materials.

Limitations and Controversial Edges

The study is careful and narrow by design:

• Small sample size (three samples) limits immediate economic conclusions.
• No beneficiation or processing tests were performed—grades alone do not equal recoverability.
• Market viability is implied, not proven, especially given energy, environmental, and capex constraints.

The most controversial risk is over-interpretation: geochemical promise does not equal strategic independence.

Conclusion—A Geological Opportunity, Not a Strategic Shortcut

Wakila et al. add valuable data to Indonesia’s critical minerals map, highlighting manganese deposits as a credible LREE host. But the larger lesson is global: until processing capacity diversifies beyond China, new discoveries shift options—not power. Indonesia’s rocks may be ready; the supply chain is not.

Citation: Wakila, M.H., Chalik, C.A., Thamsi, A.B., Jafar, N., Harwan, Umar, E.P. (2025). Mineralogy and Geochemistry of Rare Earth Elements in Manganese Deposits in the Anabanua District, Barru Regency, South Sulawesi Province, Indonesia. Journal of Geoscience, Engineering, Environment, and Technology, 10(4). DOI: 10.25299/jgeet.2025.10.4.24882

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• New study reveals China's structural vulnerability: 90% of HREE imports come from Myanmar, creating severe concentration risk for dysprosium and terbium supplies critical to EVs and wind turbines.
• Recycling from tailings could offset 58% of dysprosium needs, but requires heavy investment and policy support.
• End-of-life magnet recycling won't peak until 2037, too late for current supply shocks.
• If China cannot insulate itself from HREE supply disruptions despite its scale and control, global diversification efforts face even steeper challenges in securing the energy transition's tightest bottleneck.

A new peer-reviewed study (opens in a new tab) in Environmental Impact Assessment Review (January 2026) pulls back the curtain on a quiet contradiction at the heart of the global rare earth system. While China dominates heavy rare earth element (HREE) processing, it remains structurally exposed—particularly to Myanmar—for the most critical inputs that power magnets, EVs, and wind turbines.

Authors include Chen Zhong, Wendong Wei, both with Shanghai Jiao Tong University and colleagues.

The Science Is Solid—And Uncomfortable

The authors apply a dynamic material flow analysis (dMFA) across nine HREEs from 2011–2020—the first integrated accounting of its kind. The findings are robust and credible:

• Dysprosium and terbium emerge as high-criticality bottlenecks with chronic supply gaps.
• China sourced ~90% of imported HREE compounds from Myanmar in 2020, a striking concentration risk.
• Nearly half of the HREE supply gaps were historically filled by unregistered mining, particularly before regulatory crackdowns.

These conclusions align with long-standing industry intelligence. China’s control has never meant self-sufficiency; it has meant leverage through processing, not security through supply.

Recycling: Silver Bullet or Slow Burn?

Is the optimism outrunning the calendar? The paper highlights recycling from tailings as an “immediately available” secondary supply, potentially substituting 58% of dysprosium and 46% of terbium concentrates. This is directionally correct—but context matters.

Tailings recovery is real, but it is site-specific, capex-heavy, and policy-dependent. Meanwhile, recycling from end-of-life magnets is projected to peak around 2037—useful for planners, irrelevant for today's supply shocks. Calling this a near-term fix risks overstating readiness.

Wendong Wei, Associate Professor

The Quiet Narrative Tilt

The paper frames China’s challenge largely as a domestic management problem—efficiency, governance, circularity. Less examined is the geopolitical reality: Myanmar’s instability, cross-border armed groups, and the strategic vulnerability this creates for everyone downstream, including the U.S., Europe, India, and Japan.

This isn’t misinformation—but it is a selective lens.

Why This Matters Outside China

So what’s the real takeaway for global investors? If China—with scale, capital, and policy control—cannot insulate itself from HREE shocks, no downstream nation should assume easy diversification. This study reinforces a hard truth: heavy rare earths are the tightest choke point in the energy transition, and recycling alone will not save the decade.

Citation: Zhong C. et al., Environmental Impact Assessment Review, Vol. 116 (2026), 108125. Elsevier.

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• Myanmar's poorly regulated heavy rare earth mining, tied to militia groups, has contaminated Thailand's waterways with arsenic, exposing the environmental cost of the green transition that downstream consumers rarely see.
• China controls 90% of global rare earth processing and sources heavily from Myanmar, but the pollution crisis stems from multiple failures—not just Chinese demand—including local governance collapse and non-state armed actors.
• Real change requires building credible alternatives to China's processing monopoly with transparent, financeable supply chains; MOUs and diplomacy alone cannot address the midstream choke point that perpetuates harm.

A widely read 2025 commentary (opens in a new tab) from Southeast Asia argues that Thailand is paying the environmental price for an unregulated rare earth mining boom in neighboring Myanmar—one driven, indirectly, by China’s dominance of the global rare earth supply chain. Published by researchers at ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute (opens in a new tab), Eugene Mark and Kyi Sin, and amplified via regional outlets, the piece is emotionally compelling. It is also only partially aligned with supply-chain realities that investors should understand.

Where the Argument Rings True

The authors are correct on several core facts. China dominates rare earth processing, controlling close to 90% of global separation capacity, and has increasingly relied on Myanmar’s Shan and Kachin States for heavy rare earth feedstock as Rare Earth Exchanges™ has reported. Myanmar has, at times, supplied more than half of China’s imported rare earth concentrates, largely from poorly regulated ionic clay operations.

They are also right that environmental damage is real. Unregulated mining tied to armed groups—most notably the United Wa State Army (UWSA)—has contaminated waterways flowing into northern Thailand. Arsenic findings in the Kok River and reported health effects are credible and deserve scrutiny. This is the darker underside of the green transition that downstream consumers rarely see.

Where the Story Leans Too Hard

The article implies a clean causal chain: China → Myanmar militias → Thai pollution. Reality is messier. While Chinese processors are the dominant buyers, Beijing does not directly control militia-run mines, and Myanmar’s fragmented internal authority sharply limits enforceable oversight by any state. The claim that China has simply “externalized” pollution, while rhetorically powerful, compresses multiple layers of illegality, local governance failure, and non-state agency into a single villain. That’s the reality on the ground.

Similarly, the piece treats Thailand’s new memorandum of understanding with the United States as a potential lever to reshape the regional rare earth trade. That is speculative. MOUs do not create mines, processing plants, or enforcement regimes. They create optionality—not supply. And while a positive step, a lot of work is left.

The Missing Link: Processing, Not Just Mining

What the article largely omits is the midstream choke point. Environmental harm originates at extraction, but strategic leverage lives in processing. Until heavy rare earth separation capacity exists outside China—at scale and under transparent standards—raw material sourcing shifts alone will not change incentives. Myanmar’s problem persists in part because there are few alternative buyers with processing capability.

Why This Matters for the Supply Chain

The piece is notable because it surfaces a truth often ignored in Western policy debates: the green transition can export environmental harm to weak jurisdictions. But investors must separate moral clarity from industrial feasibility. Accountability will come not from river diplomacy alone, but from building regulated, financeable rare earth supply chains elsewhere—on land, with permits, capital, and oversight.

Final Take

Thailand’s river crisis is real. The supply-chain diagnosis is incomplete. The rare earth transition will not be cleaned up by diplomacy or MOUs alone, but by credible alternatives to China’s processing monopoly. Until then, pollution will continue to follow demand.

Citation: Mark, E.; Sin, K. Thailand Pays the Price for Unregulated Mining Boom. Fulcrum / ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute, Nov. 18, 2025.

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• Rare earth processing concentrates naturally occurring uranium and thorium into waste streams that trigger strict NORM/TENORM regulations, requiring:
  • Engineered containment
  • Long-term monitoring
  • Financial assurance
• These requirements directly increase capex, opex, and permitting timelines.
• Regulatory frameworks vary dramatically by jurisdiction:
  • The U.S. 0.25% exemption doesn't cover waste
  • Canada delegates disposal to provinces
  • Malaysia shows waste can become political volatility
  • Greenland's uranium ban can stop projects entirely
• Monazite-heavy deposits face:
  • Higher regulatory complexity
  • Capital intensity compared to low-radioactivity ionic clays
• Making residue management plans and disposal pathways critical bankability factors for investors evaluating rare earth projects.

Rare earths are marketed as “clean-energy metals,” but many deposits come with a less photogenic companion: naturally occurring uranium (U) and thorium (Th). The challenge isn’t that these radionuclides exist—it’s that mining and processing can concentrate them into residues that cross legal thresholds and trigger licensing, engineered containment, monitoring, and long-tail liability. In regulatory terms, the make-or-break question is blunt: when U/Th ends up concentrated in waste streams, what does the law force you to do next?

The moment “trace” becomes “regulated.”

A useful mental model is simple: geology sets the risk; processing amplifies it. Certain REE minerals—especially monazite (and often xenotime)—commonly carry higher Th/U than many bastnäsite-dominant carbonatites. Mineral sands circuits that separate monazite can generate radioactive concentrates and Th/ Th/U-bearing residues, even when the final REE product is comparatively clean.

Then comes the accelerator: cracking, leaching, purification, and solvent extraction. These steps separate REEs, but they also tend to partition Th/U (and decay products) into filter cakes, sludges, tailings, and leach solutions. That’s why regulators care about Naturally Occurring Radioactive Materials (opens in a new tab) (NORM)/ Technologically Enhanced Naturally Occurring Radioactive Materials (opens in a new tab) (TENORM)—the “enhancement” is often the flowsheet itself.

From an operator standpoint, the exposure pathways are predictable: dust control (alpha-bearing particulates), water/leachate management, and tailings impoundment integrity. From an investor standpoint, those same pathways map directly onto REEx scoring logic: more radiation complexity usually means harder licensing, higher capex/opex, longer permitting tails, and bigger closure obligations—a direct hit to “Mineralogy—Impurities” and “ESG—Environmental.”

The global baseline: “contain, control, and pay for the endgame.”

Across most jurisdictions, the regulatory spine looks familiar, even if thresholds and agencies differ:

• Characterize radionuclides in ore, intermediates, residues, and effluent (with defensible QA/QC).
• License/permit operations when thresholds are exceeded.
• Control pathways (dust/air, water, worker dose; radon where relevant).
• Engineer storage/disposal (lined repositories, caps, leachate controls, stability).
• Fund long-term stewardship (closure plans, monitoring, financial assurance).

The International Atomic Energy Agency (opens in a new tab)(IAEA) guidance broadly supports a “contain and control”approach for radioactive residues: isolate them from the biosphere and manage them over the timescales the hazard persists.

What changes—country to country—is whether the system is single-window or fragmented, whether disposal pathways are mature, and whether politics can abruptly rewrite “permission to operate.”

The jurisdictions that matter (and what they really signal)

United States: the 0.25% line is not a get-out-of-jail card

In the U.S., the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) “source material” framework matters when thorium/uranium concentrations cross key triggers—and there is a well-known exemption for rare earth metals/compounds/products containing ≤0.25% by weight U/Th (or combination).  Commonly referred to in NRC regulations as ‘unimportant quantities of source material’ (opens in a new tab) under 10 CFR Part 40).

But the nuance is crucial: NRC guidance (opens in a new tab) has long emphasized that this exemption applies to certain rare earth products and does not apply to incoming ore or waste streams—meaning residues can still force stricter handling or disposal. Environmental pathways (air/water/tailings) also commonly route through state agencies plus federal regimes depending on project specifics.

Investor takeaway: U.S. projects can be financeable, but “low thorium” marketing doesn’t eliminate regulatory friction—especially once you model waste volumes, residue classification, and closure.

Canada: provinces hold the keys to disposal

Canada often sounds “straightforward” until you follow the waste. Canada is explicit (opens in a new tab) that handling/disposal of NORM within Canada is regulated by provinces/territories, while transport/import/export must follow CNSC requirements.  That means the hardest part—where the waste goes, under what conditions, and who signs off—can be provincial and locally political, not just technical. Social license and indigenous consultation can become schedule-critical, even when geology is strong.

Investor takeaway: Canada isn’t one regulatory environment; it’s a federation of them. “Location” scoring should reflect province-level realism, not just country flags.

Brazil: a nuclear lens layered onto mining reality

Brazil’s framework is widely described as graded by activity concentration, with tighter requirements as radioactivity rises (radiation protection programs, monitoring, and stricter waste controls). Even if REEs are the primary commodity, Th/U pushes projects into a dual world: conventional mining permitting plus CNEN-linked radiological rules—while tailings governance remains sensitive nationally.

Investor takeaway: Monazite-heavy flowsheets can become capital-intensive quickly. Brazil can be a contender, but the “waste endgame” must be bankable from day one.

Chile: world-class tailings discipline, case-by-case radiological oversight

Chile’s comparative advantage is not just geology—it’s a mature culture of tailings engineering and permitting. For REEs, radiological handling is typically case-by-case, driven by characterization, environmental approvals, and any permissions needed around radioactive substances or transport.

Chile’s ionic-clay narrative—“little to no radioactivity”—can be a real advantage if independently validated because it reduces both technical and political exposure.

Investor takeaway: Chile may reward “clean” deposits, but if radioactivity shows up later in residues, public perception can turn fast even in a strong engineering jurisdiction.

Australia: strict but investable

Australia is often the template for “strict but financeable.” The anchor reference is ARPANSA’s Radiation Protection Series No. 9 (RPS 9) (opens in a new tab) for radiation protection and radioactive waste management in mining and mineral processing.

States implement via mining/environment and radiation regulators; serious radiation and residue plans are expected in approvals and closure design.

Investor takeaway: Australia doesn’t ban the problem; it prices it in. Credible engineered containment and closure planning can clear the bar—at a cost.

Malaysia: Lynas shows how “waste” becomes politics

Malaysia is the global case study because it hosts the most scrutinized ex-China REE processing operation. Legally, Malaysia’s Atomic Energy Licensing Act (opens in a new tab) requires authorization for the disposal of radioactive waste.

Politically, Malaysia has shown that licensing can become rolling conditionality. Reuters has reported (opens in a new tab) that Malaysia amended Lynas’ operating license to allow importing NORM-bearing raw materials and processing until March 2026, amid ongoing scrutiny of residue handling (including the government’s “thorium extraction” framing).

Malaysia also illustrates the federal–state reality: national licensing authority exists, but land-use decisions for siting are politically sensitive and practically require state alignment. The IAEA’s public review remains foundational in how Malaysia framed risk.

Investor takeaway: Malaysia proves radioactive residue can be less of a technical risk than a legitimacy risk. “Location” scoring should reflect that volatility.

China: unusually direct statutory duty—build the repository

China’s statutory language is explicit (opens in a new tab): its law on prevention/control of radioactive pollution requires tailings repositories for tailings from the exploitation of uranium/thorium and associated radioactive minerals, with monitoring/reporting obligations.

Investor takeaway: China’s rulebook supports tight control; investors still price enforcement consistency and transparency. As always, enforcement consistency, transparency, and broader political considerations materially affect investor risk assessment in this nation.

Indonesia: big monazite opportunity, disposal still maturing

Indonesia’s REE thesis often points to monazite in tin-tailings. BAPETEN rules commonly cited as Regulation No. 16/2013 (opens in a new tab) address radiation safety in TENORM storage, and IAEA-linked materials discuss implementation and remaining gaps. This framework is discussed in IAEA conference proceedings (opens in a new tab) on the implementation of NORM regulation in Indonesia.

A persistent issue: policy has historically focused on temporary storage, while final disposal frameworks remain under development or split across institutions.

Investor takeaway: upside is real, but the bankability hurdle is the radioactive residue endgame.

Vietnam: building a governed rare earth state

Vietnam has moved toward tighter state-directed control. Rare Earth Exchanges reported that on Dec. 11, 2025, Vietnam approved revisions restricting exports of refined rare earths and reaffirming the ban on ore exports, aiming to build domestic processing and a modern industrial ecosystem.

Investor takeaway: governance is tightening; timelines may lengthen; early monetization may be constrained by policy.

Greenland/Denmark: the outlier where radioactivity can stop the project

Greenland’s uranium policy (opens in a new tab) has been widely reported as banning development above 100 ppm uranium, impacting Kvanefjeld-type REE deposits; it remains politically contested with legal dispute overhang.

Investor takeaway: Greenland shows the extreme: the regulatory answer can be “don’t produce it.” Location risk can be binary.

Some implications for REEx rankings

If you want one sentence to anchor the scoring model: radioactivity is the impurity that drags permitting, capex, and politics into the same room.

• Monazite/xenotime-heavy projects should be treated as regulatory-capex intensive unless the residue plan is already bankable and permitted.
• Low-radioactivity clays can score better—but only if residue chemistry and monitoring plans are validated and disclosed.
• The highest risk isn’t whether a country has laws; it’s whether the jurisdiction has credible disposal pathways, institutions that execute, and political durability (Malaysia/Greenland are the cautionary bookends).

Disclaimer (Legal / Regulatory)

Rare Earth Exchanges™ provides news, analysis, and investor-oriented commentary for informational purposes only. Nothing in this article should be construed as legal advice, regulatory advice, environmental compliance guidance, or a substitute for professional counsel. Rare earth and critical mineral projects—especially those involving naturally occurring radioactive materials (NORM/TENORM)—are governed by jurisdiction-specific laws, permits, licensing requirements, and enforcement practices that can change rapidly and vary by region, agency, and project design. Readers and project stakeholders should consult qualified legal counsel, permitting and licensing specialists, radiological experts, and environmental compliance professionals in the relevant jurisdiction(s) before making decisions or taking action.

REEx’s mission is to help accelerate the emergence, dynamism, and success of ex-China rare earth element—and by extension critical mineral—supply chains, supporting a more balanced, resilient, and transparent global materials ecosystem.

© 2025 Rare Earth Exchanges™ – Accelerating Transparency, Accuracy, and Insight Across the Rare Earth & Critical Minerals Supply Chain.

• In 2025, Western rare earth strategy evolved from PowerPoints to funded infrastructure:
  • Upstream mines like MP Materials and Lynas became state-backed assets.
  • Midstream separation plants in the U.S., Europe, and Australia secured billions in financing and broke ground.
  • Downstream magnet facilities began commercial production for the first time this century.
• Heavy rare earths (Dy/Tb) remain the critical bottleneck:
  • Malaysia emerged as a strategic battleground.
  • New processing facilities from ReElement, Ucore, Carester, and ANSTO raced to break China's 85% control of global refining capacity.
• Despite aggressive U.S. policy momentum and President Trump's optimistic 2026 timeline:
  • Structural gaps in refining capacity, feedstock availability, and permitting suggest true supply-demand balance for non-China magnets won't arrive until 2028–2030.
  • This leaves defense, EV, and clean energy sectors exposed to sustained supply risk.

In 2025, rare earths stopped being a niche “materials story” and became a full-spectrum industrial race. President Trump’s administration, while we suggest it needs to do far more to accelerate the ex-China rare earth element (REE) supply chain, deserves credit for generating what is certainly substantial momentum. The first such president to do this since the entire value chain was outsourced over the past couple of decades.  The year delivered a surge of government-initiated financings, offtakes, and build-and-buy partnerships designed to pry open supply chains long locked inside China’s midstream. The plotline wasn’t subtle: secure the mine, build the refinery, control the magnet. And if you couldn’t do all three, you partnered with someone who could.

Below is the year’s big picture

Organized by the only structure that matters in rare earths: upstream mining, midstream processing, and downstream magnets. Importantly, this was an exciting year, part of a great supply chain reawakening.

Upstream: Mines Become National Assets

MP Materials (NYSE:MP)

Went from “America’s only major rare earth mine” to a state-backed industrial anchor. The U.S. Department of Defense (DoD)struck a long-term partnership with a $110/kg NdPr price floor and support aimed at scaling magnet output and domestic capability.  The Pentagon would have access to 15% of the national rare earth “treasure trove.” Then came the geopolitical flourish: MP and Saudi national mining company Ma’aden inked a term sheet for a Saudi refining joint venture, explicitly framed as de-risking reliance on China.

The catch remains execution: scaling is brutal, and heavy rare-earth feed (Dy/Tb) is still the hard part. An early inning in a nine-inning game, at least. But has MP Materials emerged as too big to fail?

Lynas Rare Earths (LYX.AC)

The world’s largest ex-China producer raised A$750 million and continued to prove that ex-China production is possible—but not easy. Its U.S. heavy processing ambitions in Texas ran into uncertainty and cost pressure, reinforcing a core truth: midstream in the West is slow, capital-intensive, and politically exposed. Meanwhile, Lynas deepened the Malaysia footprint and backed a magnet plant partnership with Korea’s JS Link, making Malaysia not a footnote but a battleground. Lynas recently shipped some heavy rare earths to offtake partners in Japan.

Lynas and Sumitomo have a long-standing strategic partnership, backed by Japan's Organization for Metals and Energy Security (JOGMEC), to secure stable supplies of rare earths (both light REEs and increasingly heavy REEs like Dysprosium/Terbium) for Japanese industry, especially magnets for EVs and wind turbines, with Sumitomo acting as a key distributor, diversifying away from China's dominance. Sumitomo also partners with others like MP Materials and Victory for an even broader HRE supply.

Arafura Rare Earths (ARU.AX)

Pushed its Nolans project toward the brink of full construction readiness, bolstered by major financing momentum and heavyweight backing. The signal for investors: Australia is trying to turn rare earths into an export-grade industrial platform, not just a quarry.  

Arafura Rare Earths looks promising because it is advancing one of the few fully integrated rare earth projects outside China—again, the Nolans Project in Australia—with a clear pathway to produce NdPr carbonates and downstream separated oxides, supported by strategic offtake agreements, established funding, and strong technical progress; its combination of substantial, high-quality ionic clay resources, experienced management, and proximity to emerging refining infrastructure positions it to be a cornerstone supplier into Western magnet and EV supply chains.  The company needs to improve education and awareness about its’ potential.

USA Rare Earth (NASDAQ:USAR)

Aims to create a domestic "mine-to-magnet" supply chain for critical REEs for defense & green tech, leveraging its Round Top project in Texas for resources and partnering for magnet production. The key risks involve significant capital needs, complex permitting, competition from China, delays in mine development (Round Top is still exploratory), technical hurdles in refining magnet making (the group acquired Less Common Metals to mitigate some risk), and overall market volatility, despite strong government interest and potential, making it a speculative venture. 

Serra Verde (backed by Denham Capital and Energy & Minerals Group)

In Brazil delivered one of the year’s sharpest strategic moves: it shortened long Chinese offtake commitments to free up supply for Western buyers as new separation plants come online. It also had the kind of financing stamp Western governments now reserve for strategic minerals: a $465 million DFC loan. The message was blunt: heavy rare earths outside China are scarce, and those who have them get courted.

Aclara Resources (ARA.TO)

Announced plans for a $277 million heavy rare earth separation facility in Louisiana, with a timeline targeting end-2027 construction and production ramp thereafter—an explicit attempt to end the U.S. heavy rare earth dependency trap.

Iluka Resources (ILU.AX) & Lindian Resources (LIN.AX)

And in Africa-to-Australia integration, Iluka Resources (ILU.AX) secured a binding deal with Lindian Resources (LIN.AX) for 6,000 tpa of concentrate for 15 years—a rare case of upstream being contractually snapped into a midstream refinery plan.

Pensana Plc (PRE.L)

In 2025, they accelerated its Longonjo rare earth project in Angola while pivoting hard toward a U.S.-aligned “mine-to-magnet” strategy: it advanced mine development and construction planning, announced downstream partnerships to anchor future demand (including an MoU with rare earth recycling and refining specialist ReElement Technologies tied to potential U.S. refining integration and large-volume mixed rare earth carbonate offtake discussions), pursued U.S. government-linked financing via EXIM under supply-chain resiliency frameworks (explicitly positioning Longonjo output to qualify for U.S.-backed debt support), signed a magnet supply-chain linkage through a VAC/eVAC-related arrangement to connect Longonjo product into U.S. magnet manufacturing, and capped the year by securing a US$100 million strategic equity investment to fund drilling, mine development momentum, and the broader U.S. supply-chain pivot—steps that collectively signaled Pensana’s shift from a UK-centered refinery narrative toward U.S.-supported industrial policy gravity.

Brazilian Rare Earths (BRE.XA)

In 2025, they made significant strides in advancing its Monte Alto rare earth project by securing approximately A$120 million in financing to fund exploration, development, and early works, bolstering its financial position as one of the better-capitalized rare earth juniors.

A cornerstone of BRE’s year was a strategic long-term partnership with French processor Carester, under which BRE agreed to supply heavy rare earth concentrate (with a focus on dysprosium and terbium) to Carester’s new Caremag separation plant in France for up to 10 years, effectively anchoring future processing of Brazilian product into a European midstream facility and de-risking future offtake. In return, Carester agreed to assist BRE in advancing its own refinery plans in Brazil and provided technical and commercial collaboration across the value chain, positioning BRE as a key supplier into European and allied rare earth supply networks outside China.

Others

A partially American-owned startup called DTEC MMT arrived in Malaysia to secure upstream products paired with innovative refining options. What plans will the venture disclose in 2026?

What about rare earth mining veteran James Kennedy and the Pea Ridge mine?  Supposedly, substantial heavy rare earth can be derived from the tailings. Can Caldera Holding secure the capital to exploit the asset?

Midstream: Separation Plants Finally Leave the PowerPoint Stage

2025’s defining shift: processing ceased to be a “someday” ambition and became funded steel, poured concrete, and signed feedstock.

In the U.S., the year’s most consequential announcements attached real money to real capacity: Vulcan Elements + ReElement Technologies landed a substantial public-private package (700 million in direct U.S. Department of War (OSC) loans, $50 million in Commerce CHIPS Act incentives, and over $550 million in private capital) aimed at building domestic NdFeB magnets and expanding recycling and processing—an industrial chain from scrap to magnet.

ReElement Technologies

Touts an advanced chromatographic separation and purification platform—derived from patented research at Purdue University—to refine rare earth elements and critical battery metals from both virgin ores and recycled feedstocks such as end-of-life permanent magnets, lithium-ion batteries, and manufacturing waste. If this works at scale, this chromatography-based process could replace traditional solvent extraction, enabling high-purity rare earth oxides and critical elements with higher efficiency, lower energy use, drastically reduced waste, and a smaller environmental footprint compared with conventional methods, while also purportedly being modular, scalable, and deployable on smaller footprints or co-located with mine or manufacturing sites.

MP Materials

As cited above, secured $150 million from the government to develop heavy REE processing.

Energy Fuels (UUUU)

In 2025, they achieved significant rare earth refining milestones at its White Mesa Mill in Utah, focusing on establishing a fully domestic supply chain for magnet materials. Key accomplishments include the pilot production and qualification of heavy rare earth oxides (HREEs) and the successful use of its light rare earth oxide (LREE) product in commercial magnets.  While mostly focused on processing uranium, the company’s refining focus positions it well for organic American REE refining growth.

Ucore Rare Metals

Major 2025 milestones centered on advancing its U.S. heavy rare earth processing in Louisiana, securing significant funding (including an $18.4M DoD award), breaking ground on the Strategic Metals Complex (SMC) in May, and achieving key technology validations with the US DoD for HREE separation. Is the company positioned to build one of North America's first HREE separation facilities based on its RapidSX™ (opens in a new tab) technology?

European Rare Earth Refining

In 2025, notable developments were seen involving Solvay and Carester, both working to strengthen Western processing capacity outside China. Solvay expanded and inaugurated a rare earth production line at its La Rochelle, France, facility in April 2025, beginning commercial production of materials for permanent magnets and later securing contracts to supply key rare earth oxides to U.S. magnet makers, underscoring its growing role in Western supply chains.

Carester’s Caremag

The project in Lacq secured €216 million in financing in March 2025 to build a large-scale rare earth recycling and refining plant that aims to produce significant volumes of heavy and light rare earth oxides by 2026, positioning Europe to capture a meaningful share of global refined output.

The two companies previously signed a strategic memorandum of understanding to collaborate on rare earth permanent magnet value-chain activities, combining Solvay’s industrial processing experience with Carester’s recycling and upstream expertise to bolster European refining autonomy.

Neo Performance Materials (NEO.TO)

The Canada-based company has made significant strides toward regional supply chain independence from China (although it still has at least two plants in China). Neo already operates Silmet, the only commercial rare earth separation plant in the EU located in Sillamäe, Estonia, and in September 2025 officially opened a new permanent rare earth magnet manufacturing facility in Narva, Estonia, marking the first large-scale production of rare earth magnets in Europe for electric vehicles and wind turbines and receiving attention from European Commission leadership as part of broader EU industrial policy support.

Saskatchewan Research Council (SRC)

In Canada, it has made significant progress toward establishing a vertically integrated rare earth refining capability in North America by constructing and advancing its state-of-the-art Rare Earth Processing Facility in Saskatoon, Saskatchewan. Since the project’s launch in 2020 with substantial provincial and federal support, SRC has developed proprietary hydrometallurgical, solvent-extraction, and metal smelting technologies in-house and has already achieved commercial-scale production of rare earth metals, notably high-purity NdPr, with plans to scale output further toward annual targets in the 400–600 tonne range—enough to support hundreds of thousands of electric vehicles.

SRC’s facility, slated for full operation by early 2027, has secured major offtake partnerships and feasibility studies for an expanded processing and metallization complex, reinforcing Saskatchewan’s role as a growing possible global hub for rare earth supply chain development and helping reduce North American dependence on overseas processors.

Iluka Resources (ILU.AX)

In Australia, the Iluka refinery strategy hardened around one key point: refineries are only as real as their feed contracts—hence the Iluka Resources and Lindian supply agreement and broader feedstock hunt.

Australian Nuclear Science and Technology Organisation (ANSTO)

Australia is hopefully set to close a critical gap in the global rare earth supply chain with the opening of its first open-access rare earth processing facility in early 2026, built and operated by Australian Nuclear Science and Technology Organisation (ANSTO) at Lucas Heights. Taxpayer-funded and designed as shared national infrastructure, the facility directly addresses the long-standing contradiction that saw Australia—one of the world’s top rare-earth producers—export 100% of its concentrates overseas, mainly to China, for refining. Purpose-built for clay-hosted and ionic adsorption deposits, the plant will enable end-to-end pilot-scale processing from desorption through impurity removal to the separation of oxides, with Australian Rare Earths’ Koppamurra project as the first test case.

Strategically, the move reflects an apparent policy shift: acknowledging that rare-earth refining, unlike mining, typically requires sustained state support. This reality underpins China’s roughly 85% control of global processing capacity. While the ANSTO facility materially de-risks metallurgy and breaks the chicken-and-egg deadlock between miners and processors, social license, permitting, and commercial viability remain unresolved, underscoring that public infrastructure can enable—but not guarantee—the success of rare earth supply chains outside China.

Other Activities

And then there’s Malaysia, where the world learned (again) that rare earths don’t just run through geology—they run through chemistry and politics. Malaysia is pushing to keep value-added at home (including a ban on raw exports), while courting foreign partners and navigating public pressure around processing footprints. Alongside Lynas, Southern Alliance Mining’s (QNS.SI) strategic entry into rare earths via MCRE underscored Malaysia’s emergence as a contested node—complete with regulatory friction and scrutiny.  Known as “SAM,” much of its business today is with Chinese buyers. Will that change in 2026?

Groundbreaking of a $400 million critical metals refinery purportedly commenced in Nigeria with privately held Hasetins Commodities Limited.

Downstream: The Magnet Renaissance Begins

If 2024 was about mines and 2025 about refineries, 2025 also quietly became the year magnets started shipping.

In 2025, the DoD struck a multibillion-dollar public-private partnership with MP Materials to accelerate a sovereign U.S. rare earth magnet supply chain anchored by a new “10X Facility,” a second domestic magnet plant expected to begin commissioning in 2028 and bring total U.S. magnet production capacity to about 10,000 metric tons per year if all goes according to plan.  Apple piled on with a $500 million commitment tied to a U.S. magnet supply chain and a new recycling facility—rare earth circularity as industrial policy.

VACUUMSCHMELZE (VAC)

The German company, through eVAC Magnetics, shipped some of the first U.S.-made commercial NdFeB magnets in this century from South Carolina—symbolism with industrial teeth.

Permag

In 2025, American rare earth magnet makers have marked several key milestones as the U.S. works to build more resilient domestic supply chains: Permag emerged in June 2025 as a unified brand consolidating Dexter Magnetic Technologies, Electron Energy Corporation (EEC), and Magnetic Component Engineering (MCE), creating the only vertically integrated North American producer of high-performance magnets (especially Samarium-Cobalt) and advancing DFARS-compliance efforts for defense and aerospace applications. EEC, now a core part of Permag, doubled its SmCo manufacturing capacity at its Pennsylvania facility to bolster U.S. domestic production and reduce reliance on imports.

Arnold Magnetic Technologies

Expanded strategic supply agreements in 2025 to secure rare earth materials outside China and is investing in supply chain continuity and compliance with upcoming DFARS standards for NdFeB and SmCo magnets.

Noveon Magnetics

Continued scaling its Texas rare-earth magnet facility, exemplifying broader U.S. efforts to grow commercial magnet capacity.  The company has been producing American-made NdFeB magnets at commercial scale in San Marcos since 2023, and continues to actively ship finished magnets to customers.

These developments reflect a concerted industry push in 2025 to strengthen domestic rare earth magnet manufacturing across defense, automotive, and industrial sectors.

LS Cable & System (LS C&S)

The South Korean cable giant has announced its intention to invest in rare-earth magnet production in the U.S. According to the announcement, a $689 million facility in Chesapeake, Virginia, is intended to secure supply chains for EVs, defense, and aerospace. This expansion builds on their existing cable ventures and aims to create a complete rare earth value chain, from securing oxides to final magnet manufacturing. 

Vulcan Elements

Planned 10,000-ton magnet facility (with federal loans and private capital) signaled a new doctrine: the U.S. doesn’t want “some” magnets; it wants a scale platform, and this deal, while early stage, is meant to support such an endeavor.

Star Group Industrial Co.

POSCO International, a large steelmaker in Korea, and its partner Star Group  Industrial Co. are looking to develop magnet making with Arafura feedstock.

JS Link America

In 2025, the U.S. subsidiary of South Korea’s JS Link announced a $223 million investment to build a rare earth permanent magnet manufacturing facility in Columbus, Georgia, as part of broader efforts to diversify Western supply chains and reduce reliance on China. The planned 130,000 sq ft plant, to be located in Muscogee Technology Park, is expected to produce about 3,000 tons of permanent magnets annually and create over 520 jobs in engineering, production, and management, with operations slated to begin in late 2027.

The project underscores Georgia’s growing role in critical minerals and advanced manufacturing, and reflects JS Link’s strategy of linking U.S. production with its other facilities—including a magnet plant nearing completion in Yesan, Korea—while targeting supply to key sectors such as electric vehicles, wind energy, electronics, and defense systems

On the topic of magnets, the underlying truth is ruthless

Magnets are the value capture point. Whoever owns magnets owns the downstream leverage over EVs, wind, drones, missiles, robotics—modern industry’s muscle memory.

While President Trump has publicly declared that the United States will soon have “more magnets than it knows what to do with” by the end of 2026, Rare Earth Exchanges’ modeling suggests a far more constrained reality. Even with accelerated mine development, new processing capacity, and a wave of announced magnet plants, the tightest bottleneck—ex-China rare earth refining and magnet-grade material availability—remains unresolved.

According to Rare Earth Exchanges’ simulations, persistent structural gaps in heavy rare earth separation, qualified feedstock availability, workforce readiness, and permitting timelines make true supply–demand balance for domestically produced, non-China magnets unlikely before 2028—and quite possibly not until 2030 or later—leaving U.S. automakers, defense contractors, clean-energy manufacturers, and fast-scaling sectors such as drones, robotics, and advanced electronics exposed to sustained supply risk well beyond today’s political timelines.

The Year-End Takeaway

In 2025, China's rare earth strategy moved from aspiration to architecture. Upstream projects secured lifelines. Midstream refineries stopped being theoretical. Downstream magnets began to ship. But the vulnerabilities didn’t disappear—they became clearer:

• Execution risk is the tax on every Western project.
• Heavy rare earths (Dy/Tb) remain the tightest choke point, extremely tight.
• Malaysia is now a strategic arena, not a side plot.
• Vietnam declared at the end of the year its treasure trove will not be available without processing investment
• And industrial policy is back—not as ideology, but as emergency construction.
• While President Trump’s administration gets a solid A for intent, initiation, and leadership, the team unfortunately still grades lower on the necessary comprehensiveness and durability of industrial policy for rare earths and critical minerals for true resilience over the next several years. We need to work on Washington, DC, in 2026 to intensify and accelerate such efforts.

2025 didn’t end China’s dominance. It ended the West’s illusion that dominance could be competed against without building the chain.

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