• The U.S. Trump administration stepped back from guaranteeing minimum prices for critical minerals projects, causing Australian rare earth stocks like Lynas to drop over 4% as markets repriced policy support risk.
• Australia maintains its A$1.2 billion strategic minerals reserve won't be derailed, though the U.S. price floor was only ever applied to one specific project, not the entire sector as markets had anticipated.
• The episode exposes how fragile non-China rare earth supply chains remain when policy support wavers, with inconsistent signaling raising capital costs and demanding proof through contracts and execution rather than headlines.

While the U.S. has apparently stepped back from guaranteeing minimum prices for critical minerals projects — spooking markets and sending Australian rare-earth stocks lower as a result —Australia says this won’t derail its strategy. That may be true, but the episode exposes how fragile non-China rare earth supply chains still are when policy support hesitates.

What Reuters Reported—and Why Markets Flinched

According to a Reuters entry, the Trump administration has retreated from plans to broadly guarantee minimum prices for U.S. critical minerals projects, citing a lack of congressional funding and the difficulty of setting market prices. The news hit sentiment fast. Shares of Australian rare earth miners slid, with Lynas Rare Earths—the world’s largest producer outside China—down more than 4% at one point.

This reaction wasn’t about fundamentals changing overnight. It was about policy signal risk.

What’s Solid: The Price Floor Was Always Narrow

Here’s where the reporting is accurate and important. Australia’s resources minister correctly noted that the U.S. had applied a price floor to one specific project, not the entire sector. That aligns with what Rare Earth Exchanges™ has flagged repeatedly: talk of “universal” Western price floors has often outpaced legislative reality.

Markets, however, priced in optionality that never fully existed. The pullback didn’t remove a broad support mechanism—it clarified that one never truly materialized.

The Subtle Spin: “Won’t Derail” vs. “Won’t Hurt”

Australia says the U.S. decision won’t derail its A$1.2 billion strategic minerals reserve, slated to include antimony, gallium, and rare earths by late 2026. That’s plausible. Canberra has tools: offtake agreements, targeted stockpiling, and selective pricing support.

But there’s a gentle optimism embedded in the narrative. Price floors likely matter because rare earth markets are thin, volatile, and easily distorted by China’s scale.

Even the possibility of a U.S. floor lowered perceived risk for non-China producers. Removing that expectation raises the cost of capital—quietly but meaningfully. But as Rare Earth Exchanges also reported, given myriad laws, rules, and market norms and mores, a universal price floor in the West is not that easy to accomplish.

Why This Matters for the Rare Earth Supply Chain

This episode underscores a recurring truth: industrial policy credibility is as important as industrial policy itself. Strategic reserves help. Offtakes help. But inconsistent signaling reintroduces the very volatility these policies aim to suppress.

Australia may stay the course. Investors will now demand proof—contracts, cash flow, and execution—definitely not headlines.

Source: Reuters, Jan. 30, 2026.

• Australian rare earth equities, including Lynas and Iluka, fell by double digits after unconfirmed reports suggested the U.S. may abandon its proposed NdPr price floor near $110/kg, though no formal policy rescission has occurred.
• The sell-off reveals markets are conflating price signals with value creation—price floors alone don't resolve rare earth supply chain bottlenecks without critical midstream infrastructure for separation, metal making, and magnet manufacturing.
• Popular rare earth ETFs include Chinese companies, causing indiscriminate capital rotation during volatility and punishing Western miners while China's vertically integrated system remains insulated from policy speculation.

A sharp sell-off in Australian rare earth equities this week reveals less about geology—and more about how fragile sentiment becomes when supply chains hinge on policy interpretation. Shares of Lynas Rare Earths and Iluka Resources fell by double digits following unconfirmed reports that the U.S. government may retreat from a proposed price floor for neodymium–praseodymium (NdPr). Markets reacted fast. Fundamentals did not.

The Signal Beneath the Noise

The reporting is directionally correct: the U.S. Department of Defense outlined a preliminary NdPr price floor near $110/kg in mid-2025, catalyzing a sharp NdPr price rally and a surge in upstream equities. NdPr matters because it anchors the permanent magnet economy. A credible floor would meaningfully de-risk upstream projects long impaired by price volatility.

What’s missing is context. No formal rescission has occurred. More plausibly, as REEx noted yesterday, this looks like a policy adjustment to legal, budgetary, and procurement realities—not an ideological rejection of floors. Designing durable price support inside U.S. acquisition law, WTO exposure, and Congressional appropriations is complex. Iteration is expected. Markets, however, priced rumors as reversals.

Where Valuations Actually Break

The sell-off exposes a deeper flaw in coverage: conflating price signals with value creation. NdPr miners trade on upstream optionality, but price floors alone do not resolve the bottleneck. Separation, metal making, alloying, and magnet manufacturing—the midstream—determine durable margins. REEx rankings consistently show that upstream exposure without midstream leverage is a valuation trap during policy ambiguity.

This explains why Arafura, Hastings, Meteoric, and Lindian moved in sympathy. Capital is reacting to narrative risk, not differentiated supply-chain position.

The ETF Illusion Investors Miss

Passive exposure compounds the volatility. Popular rare earth funds, including the VanEck rare earths ETF, include Chinese companies. These are not ex-China instruments. When sentiment wobbles, capital rotates indiscriminately—punishing Western miners while China’s vertically integrated system absorbs the shock.

The Bias to Watch

The quiet bias is policy determinism: the belief that a single mechanism—price floors—can stabilize a fragmented value chain. It cannot. Floors help. They do not substitute for synchronized midstream build-out. Without that, equities will keep trading on headlines instead of throughput.

Why This Matters

This episode reinforces a core REEx lesson: rare earth valuations must be read through a supply-chain lens, not a press-release one. Adjustments are not abandonment. Until investors separate rumor from structure—and upstream from midstream—markets will keep mistaking policy calibration for strategic retreat.

Source: Sharecafe, January 29, 2026.

• Cobra Resources completes assignment of exploration licenses 6742, 6774, and 6780 at Boland Project.
• Drilling and metallurgical testing are being accelerated with ISR results expected in February 2026.
• The company pursues a first-of-its-kind in-situ recovery (ISR) method for ionic rare earths, offering a potentially low-cost, low-disturbance alternative to Chinese operations amid tightening export controls.
• Stock trades at 4.2p as a high-risk exploration play with near-term catalysts expected in Q1-Q2 2026.
• Key risks include the absence of a JORC resource and an unproven field-scale ISR pilot until late 2026.

Cobra Resources PLC ( (opens in a new tab)LSE: COBR, 4.21 GBX) has completed the formal assignment of new exploration tenements at its Boland Ionic Rare Earth Project in South Australia, removing a key regulatory bottleneck and enabling the company to accelerate drilling, metallurgical testing, and pilot-scale planning. The update lands amid heightened global concern over China’s tightening control of heavy rare earth supply, making any credible ex-China ionic rare earth pathway strategically relevant for investors.

What’s New—and What’s Material

The completion of Exploration Licenses 6742, 6774, and 6780 materially expands Boland’s land position and consolidates Cobra’s control over priority targets, including Head, Gillespie, and Stokes. Native title agreements are already in place, and environmental and regulatory applications are being expedited to allow drilling ahead of the late-April cropping season—reducing a common source of timeline risk for Australian juniors.

On metallurgy, Cobra reports that ISR (in-situ recovery) diagnostic tests on historical samples have been completed, with results expected in February 2026. A 65-kg ISR column leach study is advancing toward an optimized Mixed Rare Earth Carbonate (MREC) product, also targeted for February, to support preliminary offtake discussions. The development sequence—tenure → drilling → metallurgy → offtake—is coherent and technically logical.

ISR Claims: Credible, but Still Unproven at Scale

Boland’s core thesis is that a confined aquifer ISR model, adapted from uranium mining, could enable low-cost, low-disturbance recovery of heavy rare earth–rich ionic clays, potentially differentiating it from environmentally problematic Chinese operations. Bench-scale ISR test work supports the concept, and the focus on controlled aquifer chemistry is technically sound.

However, key risks remain:

• No JORC-compliant resource estimate yet
• No field-scale ISR pilot until late 2026 (target)
• Metallurgical results pending, not finalized

This is best viewed as optionality on technical success, not a de-risked development asset.

Stock Context: Optionality, Not Fundamentals—Yet

At roughly 4.2p, Cobra trades as a high-risk exploration stock rather than on reserves or cash flow. The market appears to ascribe limited value to the ISR thesis pending hard data on grades, recoveries, and hydrology. Near-term catalysts are clear (Q1–Q2 2026 drilling and metallurgy), but dilution risk remains typical for this stage.

Why This Matters for the U.S. and Allies

With China controlling roughly 90% of the heavy rare earth supply and tightening export oversight, any scalable, environmentally defensible ionic REE pathway outside China is strategically important. Boland does not yet solve the supply-chain challenge, but it aligns directionally with what the U.S. and allies must rebuild: allied-nation heavy rare earth production using lower-impact methods.

Critical Questions Investors Should Ask

• Can ISR deliver commercial recoveries across variable clay chemistry?
• Will regulators approve a world-first rare earth ISR pilot without delay?
• How competitive can MREC pricing be versus Chinese supply in weaker pricing cycles?

Source: Cobra Resources PLC RNS, 26 January 2026

• Lynas Rare Earths reported a 74% price increase to A$85.60/kg in Q2 FY26 driven by benchmark pricing gains and growing off-index contract share, signaling measurable movement away from China-dominated pricing mechanisms.
• Heavy rare earth production reached 26 tonnes of Dy/Tb, but operations faced setbacks from Kalgoorlie power disruptions and Malaysian maintenance, raising execution risk concerns until energy reliability is secured.
• U.S. Seadrift facility remains uncertain with ongoing DoD contract negotiations and no confirmed offtake agreement, leaving critical questions about project timeline, capex, and go/no-go milestones unanswered.

A rare earth price break from China’s grip? Lynas Rare Earths’ quarterly report (opens in a new tab) for the period ended 31 December 2025 (dated 21 January 2026) shows a sharp uplift in realized pricing and a notable shift toward contracts “independent of the market index.” The company reports an average selling price of A$85.60/kg in Q2 FY26, versus A$49.2/kg in Q2 FY25, alongside commentary that pricing improved due to “increased benchmark pricing” and a growing share of sales priced off-index.

REEx investor takeaway: this does not prove full “decoupling” from China—but it does document a measurable increase in non-index-linked pricing.

Heavy Rare Earths: Real Output, Still Small

Lynas reports “Ready for Sale” Dy & Tb production of 26 tonnes in Q2 FY26.

The company also discloses that this number includes drawdown of all work-in-progress (WIP) from the prior quarter, alongside new production.

Disclosure gap to flag: the report does not clearly state whether “Dy & Tb” is reported strictly as oxide, a blended product stream, or another basis material for pricing and margin interpretation.

Operations Red Flag: Power Reliability

The report attributes lower quarter production to Kalgoorlie power disruptions and major maintenance in Malaysia, noting increased outage frequency/duration in November and stating supply “stabilised from December onwards,” while the company evaluates off-grid solutions to ensure energy stability.

REEx view: repeated power interruptions at a critical processing node are a legitimate execution risk until permanently engineered out.

U.S. Strategy: Seadrift Still Unsettled

Lynas states it has an expenditure-based contract with the “U.S. Department of War (DoW)” for a Heavy Rare Earth processing facility at Seadrift, Texas, and adds that “significant uncertainty remains” on whether the project proceeds and in what form; it also notes ongoing negotiations toward an offtake agreement.

Critical Questions for Investors

• What is the exact product basis for Dy/Tb (oxide grade, purity, and pricing mechanism)?
• What is the timeline and capex for Kalgoorlie off-grid reliability—months or years?
• What are the go/no-go milestones for Seadrift, and what off-take terms unlock it?

Comments from experts in REEx: Off-index pricing is emerging, but infrastructure reliability and U.S. project clarity remain the gating factors, and the Chinese are not sitting still.

Source: Lynas Rare Earths Ltd., Quarterly Report for the period ended 31 December 2025 (21 January 2026).

• India and Japan launched an AI Dialogue and Joint Working Group on Critical Minerals.
• The initiative aims to coordinate on technology, security, and supply-chain resilience amid China's rare earth dominance.
• The bilateral initiative signals strategic intent to cooperate on sourcing, recycling, and downstream technologies.
• The initiative combines Japan's technical expertise with India's demand growth.
• The announcement lacks crucial investment details, including:
  • Mineral priorities
  • Processing plans
  • Private sector involvement
  • Capital commitments
  • Timelines
• The initiative is viewed as geopolitical signaling rather than actionable supply chain progress.

India and Japan have announced the launch of an Artificial Intelligence (AI) Dialogue and a Joint Working Group (JWG) on Critical Minerals, according to a January 17, 2026 report by ANI. The move fits a broader Indo-Pacific narrative of democratic allies coordinating on technology, security, andsupply-chain resilience. For rare earth investors, however, this isstrategic alignment—not operational progress.

At a high level, the announcement is directionally sound. Both countries depend heavily on imported critical minerals and share concerns about China’s dominance in rare earth mining, processing, and magnet manufacturing. A formal JWG signals intent to cooperate on sourcing, recycling, and downstream technologies—areas where Japan brings technical depth and India offers long-term demand growth.

Japan has experience diversifying rare earth supply chains post-2010; India has publicly committed to building domestic critical mineral capacity; and bilateral frameworks are increasingly favored over multilateral efforts. All true. All important. None is immediately investable.

Rare Earth Exchanges™ suggests that the ANI report provides no detail on which minerals are prioritized, whether processing and separation are included, if private companies are involved, or whether capital, offtakes, or timelines exist. Without these specifics, the initiative functions more as geopolitical signaling than a roadmap for new supply.

The quiet bias is diplomatic optimism—treating dialogue as progress. For investors, the risk is mistaking alignment for execution.

Source: ANI News, January 17, 2026

© 2026 Rare Earth Exchanges™ – Accelerating Transparency, Accuracy, and Insight Across the Rare Earth & Critical Minerals Supply Chain.

• Energy Fuels announces $410M Phase 2 expansion at White Mesa Mill to dramatically increase NdPr and heavy rare earth processing capacity.
• The expansion could potentially supply 45% of U.S. demand by 2029.
• The AACE Class 3 feasibility study shows lower capital costs than expected.
• The company's debt-free balance sheet and existing permits provide strong execution advantages.
• Success hinges on unproven assumptions, including securing feedstock from uncommitted international sources.
• Maintaining favorable rare earth prices amid potential Chinese supply adjustments is also crucial.

Shares of Energy Fuels (NYSE: UUUU | TSX: EFR) rose ~4%+ on the day, reflecting enthusiasm around a company press release concerning the expansion of the company’s processing capability.  It’s this processing as well that Rare Earth Exchanges has reported represents its potential to be a key rare earth refining hub.

What Was Announced

Energy Fuels says a new Bankable Feasibility Study (BFS) supports a $410 million expansion of rare earth processing at its White Mesa Mill in Utah. If built, this “Phase 2” circuit would significantly increase production of NdPr (used in EV motors and wind turbines) and add capacity for scarce heavy rare earths like dysprosium (Dy) and terbium (Tb)—materials the U.S. largely imports today.

The company claims the expanded facility could eventually supply a large share of U.S. demand at globally competitive costs, helping ease America’s most serious rare earth bottleneck: downstream processing, not mining.

What Looks Solid

From an investor standpoint, several elements are credible:

• The study is AACE Class 3, meaning detailed engineering and cost work has been done.
• Capital costs came in lower than earlier estimates.
• White Mesa is already permitted and operating, which matters enormously in the U.S. regulatory environment.

If executed as modeled, the project would materially strengthen domestic rare earth separation capacity—something U.S. industrial policy badly needs.

Where the Promotion Creeps In

The press release leans heavily into bold claims—“first-quartile costs,” “world-leading,” and supplying up to 45% of U.S. demand. These outcomes depend on several unproven assumption such as thefollowing:

• Feedstock certainty: The model assumes large volumes of monazite concentrate from projects in Madagascar, Australia, Brazil, and third parties. These are not all built, permitted, or contractually locked in.
• Timing risk: Regulatory approval by 2027 and commissioning by 2029 leave little room for delays. And scaling up rare earth in refining, according to Rare Earth Exchanges' estimates, could be delayed by 30% or more.
• Price sensitivity: Economics rely on future rare earth price forecasts, which can change quickly—especially if China adjusts supply.

Stock Check: How to Think About UUUU

Fundamentally, Energy Fuels stands out with no debt, strong liquidity, and an existing uranium business that helps fund optionality. That financial flexibility supports investor optimism.

Technically, today’s price jump reflects headline momentum, not finished execution. Sustained upside will likely require proof: binding feedstock deals, permitting milestones, and visible progress toward construction.

Bottom Line

REEx Assessment: The announcement is directionally accurate and strategically important, but clearly optimistic in tone. Energy Fuels is one of the few U.S. companies positioned to scale rare earth processing—but investors should treat today’s rally as a vote of confidence, not a finished victory.

• Amanda Lacaze to retire as Lynas Rare Earths CEO after 12 years.
• During her tenure, Lacaze transformed the company from financial distress to a A$15 billion market cap and global leadership outside China.
• The leadership transition follows completion of the 'Lynas 2025' investment program and launch of the 'Towards 2030' strategy.
• A global search is underway for her successor.
• Lynas remains central to Western rare earth security strategies as the #1 ex-China upstream light rare earth producer.
• The company faces execution risks around sustained expansion and processing goals.

Lynas Rare Earths Ltd has announced (opens in a new tab) that Chief Executive Officer and Managing Director Amanda Lacaze will retire after 12 years in the role, marking a significant leadership transition for the world’s largest rare earths producer outside China. Ms. Lacaze will remain with the company until the end of the current financial year to support an orderly handover while the Board conducts a global search for her successor, considering both internal and external candidates.

Ms. Lacaze assumed the CEO role in 2014 when Lynas was under financial and operational stress. Over her tenure, the company stabilized its balance sheet, expanded production capacity, and built an integrated mining and processing footprint spanning Mt Weld, Kalgoorlie, and Malaysia. Lynas’ market capitalization increased from approximately A$400 million in 2014 to nearly A$15 billion by early 2026, reflecting its emergence as a strategically important supplier to global manufacturers and governments seeking diversified rare earth supply chains.

The company recently concluded its “Lynas 2025” capital investment program and launched its “Towards 2030” growth strategy, which management has framed as the natural inflection point for leadership transition. Board Chair John Humphrey credited Ms. Lacaze with transforming Lynas into a globally relevant producer with operational scale and technical capability. The company is #1 on the Rare Earth Exchanges ex-China upstream light rare earth producer ranking.

Market reaction was modestly positive, with Lynas shares rising in line with broader sector gains following the announcement, according to reporting by Reuters. Analysts and investors cited continuity of strategy and the planned transition period as stabilizing factors.

From a Rare Earth Exchanges™ perspective, the CEO transition comes at a time when Lynas remains central to Western rare earth security strategies. Execution risk now shifts toward leadership selection and sustained delivery on expansion, processing optimization, and downstream integration goals as global competition intensifies.

• Australia launches $1.2 billion Critical Minerals Strategic Reserve to supply antimony, gallium, and rare earth elements for allied clean-energy, tech, and defense needs.
• The CMSR uses a hybrid model—securing production rights and strategic stockpiling—to stabilize markets and diversify supply chains away from concentrated sources.
• Funding includes $1 billion via the Critical Minerals Facility and $185 million for stockpiling, with new legislation empowering Export Finance Australia to execute the plan.

The Albanese Government has unveiled new details (opens in a new tab) of its $1.2 billion Critical Minerals Strategic Reserve (CMSR), positioning Australia as a cornerstone supplier for allied clean-energy, technology, and defense supply chains. Treasurer Jim Chalmers will brief partners in Washington this week, following G7+ engagements led by Resources Minister Madeleine King.

The CMSR will initially prioritize antimony, gallium, and rare earth elements, materials essential for permanent magnets, semiconductors, batteries, and advanced military systems. Rather than traditional stockpiling alone, the Reserve will secure production rights to Australian-made minerals and on-sell them to meet allied demand, supporting market stability and project financing.

Minister for Trade and Tourism, Special Minister of State, Senator the Hon Don Farrell

Funding includes $1 billion in transactions via the expanded Critical Minerals Facility and $185 million for selective stockpiling and implementation. New legislation will empower Export Finance Australia to support execution.

For the U.S., Japan, Korea, Europe, Canada, and the UK, the CMSR reinforces diversification away from concentrated supply chains. For Australia, it cements a strategic role at the heart of global critical minerals security. But Rare Earth Exchanges™ raises a critical question: Is this government moving fast enough? Are they thinking big enough?

©!-- /wp:paragraph -->

• Taiwan People's Party Chairman Huang Kuo-chang leads delegation to Washington demanding transparency on Taiwan's $36.6 billion special defense budget amid insufficient documentation from the DPP government.
• Visit addresses unresolved U.S. tariffs on Taiwanese goods, including a 20% levy initially characterized as temporary but still in effect entering 2026, threatening Taiwan's export-dependent economy.
• Mission highlights Taiwan's strategic importance in global semiconductor and critical minerals supply chains, with opposition parties seeking independent channels to assess U.S.-Taiwan defense and trade alignment.

The Taiwan People’s Party (opens in a new tab) (TPP) has dispatched a senior delegation to Washington this week, led by party chairman Huang Kuo-chang (opens in a new tab), underscoring growing political unease in Taipei over U.S. defense procurement terms and unresolved trade tariffs. 

Speaking before his departure, Huang said the delegation aims to secure direct, first-hand clarification from U.S. officials on Taiwan’s proposed NT$1.25 trillion (US$36.6 billion) special defense budget, arguing that Taiwan’s legislature has received insufficient detail from the ruling Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) government to properly evaluate the spending. Huang criticized the Executive Yuan for providing minimal documentation, calling the information gap “hard to even describe.”

Huang Kuo-chang, TPP Chairman

The visit also highlights persistent friction over U.S. tariffs on Taiwanese goods, including a 20% levy that Taipei previously characterized as temporary. More than a year later, and now entering 2026, Huang said no meaningful update or resolution has been communicated, raising concerns about longer-term trade exposure for Taiwan’s export-dependent economy.

While the trip was only publicly disclosed shortly before departure, Huang indicated discussions with U.S. counterparts had been underway for some time, emphasizing the TPP’s desire for face-to-face engagement rather than indirect messaging. He did not clarify whether the visit was formally invited by Washington or initiated by the party.

From a Rare Earth Exchanges™ perspective, the visit is notable beyond party politics. Defense procurement, tariff policy, and U.S.–Taiwan relations directly shape critical minerals, advanced manufacturing, and defense supply chains, including rare–earth–dependent systems. As Washington recalibrates trade and security policy in Asia, Taipei’s opposition parties are increasingly seeking independent channels to assess risk, cost, and strategic alignment.

Huang is expected to return to Taiwan on Wednesday.

The United States does not have a formal embassy in Taiwan, but it maintains de facto diplomatic relations through the American Institute in Taiwan (AIT), which functions in practice like an embassy by handling diplomacy, security coordination, trade, visas, and cultural exchanges. AIT is legally a non-profit corporation rather than an official diplomatic mission because, in 1979, the U.S. switched formal recognition from the Republic of China (Taiwan) to the People’s Republic of China under the One China policy.

To preserve substantive ties with Taiwan despite this shift, Congress enacted the Taiwan Relations Act, (opens in a new tab) which provides the legal framework for ongoing unofficial relations, including defense cooperation, with AIT headquartered in Taipei in a modern compound comparable to standard U.S. embassies.

Note Taiwan's semiconductor industry is critically important to the world, producing the vast majority (around 90-92%) of the world's most advanced logic chips, essential for everything from AI and smartphones to cars, with Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC) dominating global foundry services, making the island's chip output indispensable to global tech and a significant geopolitical factor. This dominance makes the global supply chain extremely vulnerable to disruptions, highlighting Taiwan's strategic role in the world economy and security. 

Source: Taipei Times / CNA. This brief reflects publicly reported statements and should not be interpreted as an official U.S. or Taiwan government position.

©!-- /wp:paragraph -->

• In early 2026, Western rare earth projects progressed from ambition to execution, marked by:
  • MP Materials securing a $400 million investment from the Department of Defense (DoD) and evaluating a $1.2 billion magnet campus in Texas.
  • Lynas projecting a 53% production growth despite power disruptions in Kalgoorlie.
• Strategic capital is actively flowing through the sector:
  • Gina Rinehart increased her stakes in Arafura (~15.7%) and MP Materials.
  • Government backing intensified with Australia's $1.65 billion loan to Iluka and growing U.S. defense commitments across various players.
• Midstream capacity is expanding, yet remains fragile:
  • Energy Fuels operates commercial NdPr refining at White Mesa.
  • Neo opened Europe's first mass-production magnet facility in Estonia.
  • France's Carester targets late-2026 commissioning, yet the non-Chinese ecosystem is still in transition and not entirely secure.

The first full trading week of 2026 underscored a decisive shift in the global rare earth and magnet supply chain: capital is flowing (although not at the velocity we would like), governments are intervening directly, and Western projects are moving—sometimes unevenly—from ambition toward execution.

From Lynas grappling with commissioning realities even as heavy rare earth production expands, to MP Materials leveraging unprecedented U.S. defense backing for magnet manufacturing, the week highlighted both progress and fragility across the non-Chinese ecosystem.

Key developers including Iluka, Arafura, Hastings, and Vital advanced financing, partnerships, or technology pivots, while midstream players such as Neo, Ucore, Energy Fuels, and ASM reinforced the strategic importance of processing and magnet capacity. Collectively, the developments as we move into 2026 illustrate a supply chain still in transition—no longer theoretical, but not yet secure.

Rare Earth Exchanges™ provides selected updates on key companies operating across the upstream (mining)and midstream (processing) segments of the rare earth supply chain.While not all companies included in the Rare Earth Exchanges rankings are covered here, the objective is to give investors in rare earth elements (REE) upstream, midstream and downstream a clear, objective snapshot of a representative cross-section of the market and its current state of development.

MP Materials (opens in a new tab) (USA) (NYSE: MP) $62.38 ytd +22.72%, market cap $10.9b*

MP Materials, America’s rare earth treasure trove,  is accelerating downstream magnet ambitions with unusually direct U.S. government backing. The company’s Mountain Pass ranks #2 worldwide ex-China via Rare Earth Exchanges. In July 2025, MP announced a DoD partnership including a $400m investment, a 10-year price floor for Neodymium-praseodymium (NdPr), and long-term purchase commitments tied to a new “10X” facility. In the Jan 5–10, 2026 window, the key “deal watch” item is North Texas: MP is evaluating Northlake, Texas for a $1.2b magnet campus (opens in a new tab); local officials are considering incentives. Note: MP’s Fort Worth site is often described locally as “opened in 2023,” but MP’s own disclosures indicate the facility’s ramp has been staged (precursors first, finished magnets later). Mountain Pass remains America’s only active rare earth mining and processing operation of scale, and MP reported >45,000 metric tons REO contained in concentrate in 2024.  As Rare Earth Exchanges has reported, MP must find ways to produce heavy rare earth elements, and while public disclosures suggestfeasible, private chatter implies a steep climb in the short term atleast.  Rare Earth Exchanges monitors carefully. MP Materials' biggest shareholders include Gina Rinehart's Hancock Prospecting, Vanguard, BlackRock, State Street, and CEO James Litinsky, with Rinehart becoming the largest individual investor as of late 2025; the U.S. Department of Defense also agreed to become a significant shareholder through a preferred stock investment in mid-2025, aligning with national interests in domestic rare earth supply.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     * While MP Materials’ valuation multiple may appear elevated on conventional metrics, the company sits at the apex of the U.S. response to China’s rare earth element dominance. As a result, the market is likely to continue assigning a strategic security premium, with a credible case that MP Materials is effectively “too strategic to fail.” At the same time, that positioning raises the bar: expectations to execute across multiple fronts—scaling domestic refining capacity, including heavy rare earths, and delivering commercial magnet production—are intensifying rather than easing.

Lynas Rare Earths (opens in a new tab) (Australia/Malaysia) (LYC.AX) 14.10, ytd +13.34%, market cap $9.51b

Lynas, #1 on the light rare earth Rare Earth Exchanges ex-China list is positioned for a stronger FY2026 as new capacity ramps. Visible Alpha consensus cited by S&P Global projects total rare earth oxide production rising ~53% YoY to ~16.1k tonnes in 2026. Lynas is also broadening its product mix: it expects to start samarium production in 1H 2026, tied to expansion work on its heavy rare earth separation circuit in Malaysia. To fund growth, Lynas completed a A$750m equity raise in late Aug 2025. A near-term operational headwind remains reliability at its Kalgoorlie facility: repeated power disruptions in 2025 (notably November) led Lynas to warn of a shortfall equating to about one month’s worth of production in the quarter, with downstream impacts expected for Malaysia; Lynas said it is evaluating off-grid power and working with the WA government and Western Power.  The shareholder register is led by large, long-term institutional and strategic investors, indicating strong mainstream and strategic backing. AustralianSuper is the largest holder with about 94.3 million shares (9.37%, ~$895 million), followed by mining billionaire Georgina Rinehart with 76.8 million shares (7.63%, ~$728 million). Other major positions are held by Australian fund managers Ausbil Investment Management, Greencape Capital, and Challenger Ltd., each owning around 4–5%. Strategic and global exposure is reinforced by Japan Australia Rare Earth BV and major index managers BlackRock and State Street Global Advisors, together underscoring a diversified, institutionally anchored ownership base.

USA Rare Earth (USA) (NasdaqGM. USAR), $17.28, ytd 45.21%, market cap $2.4b

USA Rare Earth is pursuing a vertically integrated mine-to-magnet strategy designed to establish a fully domestic U.S. rare earth permanent magnet supply chain independent of China, and by the end of 2025 the company had moved from concept to early execution. Upstream, USA Rare Earth controls the Round Top project in Texas, a large, polymetallic deposit rich in heavy rare earth elements (including dysprosium and terbium) as well as lithium, gallium, and other critical materials, positioning it as a long-life strategic resource pending further development and permitting. The project has faced delays due to technical hurdles in extraction/processing, complex environmental regulations (NEPA), financial challenges, and earlier struggles with outdated magnet production equipment, though USAR recently announced plans to accelerate production to 2028 by integrating parallel processing at their Coloradofacility. The project's multi-decade development involves complex stepsfrom mining to magnet production, battling issues like extracting valuable elements from complex ores and managing co-located uranium, plus investor scrutiny over past performance. Downstream, the company has made its most tangible progress, commissioning and scaling a sintered NdFeB magnet manufacturing facility in Stillwater, Oklahoma, which by late 2025 was producing magnets and qualifying materials for defense, automotive, and industrial customers. The firm acquired Less Common Metals, producer and supplier of rare-earth metals, specialty alloys (like NdFeB for magnets), and advanced materials, acting as a crucial midstream link in the supply chain for electric vehicles, defense, aerospace, and clean energy tech, offering custom alloy development, recycling, and research support, with a focus on sustainable, non-China production. While Round Top remains a longer-dated asset, by the end of 2025 USA Rare Earth had established itself as one of the few U.S. companies with credible, operational magnet-making capability and a clear pathway toward full vertical integration as domestic separation and mining advance.

Iluka Resources – Eneabba Rare Earth Refinery (Australia) (ILU.AX); 6.18, ytd 6.74%, market cap $1.82b

Iluka is building Australia’s first fully integrated rare earth refinery at Eneabba. Iluka states it has a $1.65b non-recourse loan under the Australian Government’s Critical Minerals Facility. The additional funding package announced in Dec 2024 (bringing the total to $1.65b) was explicitly conditional on securing offtake agreements consistent with community benefits principles. The refinery remains publicly described as on track for commissioning in 2027.  The firm’s biggest shareholders are primarily large investment firms, with Cooper Investors, Norges Bank Investment Management, Aware Super, Vanguard, and Van Eck.

Arafura Rare Earths – Nolans Project (Australia) (ARU.AX) 0.2950 ytd 9.26%, market cap $903.6m

Arafura has signaled FID in early 2026 for Nolans, with market attention high around that milestone. The company raised A$475m (plus an additional A$50m SPP) in late 2025; Gina Hancock’s firm Hancock Prospecting committed A$125m, lifting its stake to ~15.7%.  Arafura has strong potential due to its Nolans Project, Australia's first integrated mine-to-oxide rare earth facility, offering a secure, non-Chinese supply of critical NdPr for EVs/wind turbines, backed by government funding, major offtake agreements (Hyundai, Siemens Gamesa), strong ESG alignment, a large resource, and its unique ability to bypass China's processing dominance by producing separated oxides directly. Its strategic positioning addresses global supply chain vulnerabilities, attracting significant government interest and industry confidence. REEx suggests investors to watch this one carefully. The Australian company’s largest shareholders include Hancock Prospecting (Gina Rinehart) significantly increasing its stake, alongside major institutional holders like Vanguard Group, Sprott, and Dimensional Fund Advisors, with large index funds holding significant portions, though precise percentages fluctuate with placements. As cited above, Hancock Prospecting, following recent capital raises, holds a substantial interest, with figures around 8.6% to 15.7% cited, while Vanguard funds hold millions of shares. 

Brazilian Rare Earth (BRE.XA) 4.17, ytd 5.53%, market cap $760m

Brazilian Rare Earths is advancing its strategy to become a significant rare earth producer by developing Brazil’s high-grade rare earth assets (including heavies) and building downstream processing capacity. In 2025 the company struck a strategic 10-year partnership with Carester SAS, under which it will supply up to 150 tonnes per year of heavy rare earth feedstock (notably dysprosium and terbium) to Carester’s planned European separation and recycling complex, while Carester will also provide engineering and technical support for Brazilian Rare Earths’ own integrated rare earth separation plant at theCamaçari Petrochemical Complex in Bahia, Brazil. This long-termofftake and collaboration is designed to accelerate BRE’s refinery development, connect Brazil into global rare earth supply chains, and help address the strategic shortage of heavy rare earths used in high-performance permanent magnets.

The biggest shareholders in Brazilian Rare Earths include Kuda Huraa Mining Ventures & Global Investments Corp as the largest, followed by Whitehaven Coal, and key figures like Chairman Todd Hannigan, while mining magnate Gina Rinehart's Hancock Prospecting also holds a substantial stake, reflecting strong insider and strategic resource investor backing. 

Ucore Rare Metals (USA/Canada) (UURAF), 5.16 ytd 29.32%, market cap $571.74m

Ucore continues to position RapidSX for commercialization in Louisiana. In Dec 2025, Ucore stated it had completed ~5,700 hours of processing at its Kingston, Ontario demonstration facility in a simulated 24/7 environment, producing multiple REE product groups.  Big question—how does RapidSX perform at scale? Ucore acquired Innovation Metals Corp. (IMC), the developer of the RapidSX technology, for approximately C$5.8 million (about $4.1 million USD at the time) in 2020, paying with a combination of shares and cash, with funding also coming from a concurrent debenture. This acquisition brought the critical metals separation technology into Ucore's portfolio, supporting their strategy for a US supply chain.  Ucore Rare Metals' biggest shareholders are primarily insiders, with Randy Johnson (Director) and Orca Holdings, LLC being significant holders, both holding around 9-10% each, alongside CEO Patrick Ryan, though overall institutional ownership is very low, with Org Partners LLC holding a small portion, reflecting a mix of individual insiders and significant private company/entity ownership.

Neo Performance Materials (Canada, Europe) (NEO.TO) 18.78, ytd 20.77%, market cap $563.3m

Neo reported a notable legal/financial update right in the window: on Jan 2, 2026, Neo announced (opens in a new tab) a settlement in European patent litigation with Rhodia (Solvay), including a €7.1m payment in Q1 2026 and mutual release/withdrawal of proceedings. Neo also opened its Estonia permanent magnet facility in Sept 2025; Mining.com described it as Europe’s first to mass produce rare earth magnets.  Revenue generating and profits at EBITDA Neo remains an important player. NEO set up Europe's largest rare earth permanent magnet manufacturing facility in Narva, Estonia, to supply magnets for electric vehicles (EVs), wind turbines, and other clean energy tech, aiming to reduce Europe's reliance on China for these critical materials, with production just starting. The plant, a crucial part of Europe's supply chain for the green transition, features sintered NdFeB magnet production and Europe's first dysprosium/terbium oxide line, becoming operational in less than 500 days They continue to manage a couple magnet plants in China and are traded on Canada exchange. NEO’s largest shareholders include Canada and Singapore-based Mawer Investment Management Ltd. (around 9-12%), Hastings Technology Metals (via Wyloo/HTM, ~20%), and significant holdings by retail/individual investors, with Mackenzie Financial Corp and others like RobecoSAM AG also holding notable stakes, though the single largest is often cited as Hastings/Wyloo or general public investors depending on the report date.

Aclara Resources (Chile & Canada) (ARA.TO) 2.61, ytd 21.96%, market cap $412.4m

Aclara Resources made steady, credibility-building progress over the pastmonth, centered on permitting de-risking, stakeholder engagement, anddownstream positioning, with no negative surprises in early January 2026. In Chile, Aclara advanced the Penco Module by formally relinquishing all water rights—an important step to strengthen its Environmental Impact Assessment and community acceptance—while hosting a high-profile visit from European Union ambassadors, underscoring strategic Western interest in its rare earth supply. In Brazil, pilot-scale work at the Carina Module continued, supporting the company’s ionic clay processing model and longer-term separation plans. No material new disclosures were released during Jan 5–10, 2026, but December developments remain operative. Strategically, Aclara benefits from two anchor corporate mining investors: CAP S.A., which provides domestic industrial credibility, local operating expertise, and alignment with Chilean regulators; and Hochschild Mining, which brings mine-building, permitting, and capital-markets discipline. Together, these partners materially reduce execution risk as Aclara pushes toward development decisions in 2026. Company is ambitious, thinking big with separation/refining pilot at Virginia tech and targeted production refining in Louisiana. Still early days but lots of potential.

Pensana Rare Earths PLC – Longonjo (UK, Angola) & Refinery Strategy (PRE.L) 88.80, ytd 0.45%, market cap $405.3m

Pensana Rare Earths PLC (Pensana) trades on multiple markets using different instruments. The company’s primary listing is on the London Stock Exchange (LSE) under the symbol PRE.L, where the shares trade in pence sterling (GBX) and represent the company’s ordinary shares. The OTC Markets ticker (OTCMKTS: PNSPF) is a secondary, unsponsored U.S. over-the-counter quotation that allows U.S. investors to trade Pensana without accessing the LSE directly. OTC shares typically reflect the same underlying equity but are priced in U.S. dollars, adjusted for FX rates, liquidity, market depth, and timing differences. Because OTC trading is usually much less liquid, prices can diverge from the LSE listing due to wider bid–ask spreads, delayed arbitrage, currency conversion effects, and lower trading volumes. In short, PRE.L is the price-setting market, while PNSPF is a convenience mirror for U.S. investors—so the two prices are linked economically but rarely identical at any given moment/

Pensana pivoted from the Saltend (Hull) refinery plan in Oct 2025 and publicly redirected its focus to the U.S., explicitly citing the funding environment; The company intended to pivot toward U.S. support. Multiple outlets also reported the UK government offer was £5m, far below the overall capex need.  Rare Earth Exchanges has pointed to the localization model in South America and focus on North American partnerships. Management is savvy, comprehensive strategy and the usual risks—seeking connectivity downstream for monetization. Pensana has a diversified but clearly institutional-anchored shareholder base, led by nominee and custody accounts alongside a mix of specialist investors and high-net-worth individuals. The largest holder is HSBC Custody Nominees (Australia) with approximately 16.5 million units (10.8%), reflecting broad custodial and institutional participation. This is followed by Selection Capital Limited (8.7 million units, 5.7%) and Richard Arthur Lockwood (5.2 million units, 3.4%), indicating meaningful cornerstone and insider-style support. Other notable holders include JP Morgan Nominees Australia, Ashanti Investment Fund, Ponderosa Investments, and Citicorp Nominees, underscoring strong representation from funds, superannuation vehicles, and nominee structures. Collectively, the top 20 holders control about 45.4% of Pensana’s CHESS Depositary Interests, suggesting a balanced register with sufficient liquidity alongside a solid long-term ownership core.

Australian Strategic Materials (ASM.AX) 0.75, ytd 7.91% market cap: $201.04m

Australian Strategic Materials (ASM) is an integrated critical-minerals company focused on building a secure, non-Chinese supply chain for rare earths and specialty metals. Its flagship Dubbo Project in New South Wales hosts a long-life, polymetallic resource (including rare earths, zirconium, niobium, and hafnium), while itsKorean Metals Plant (KMP) in South Korea represents a strategicdownstream asset producing high-purity oxides and metals closer to end-users. ASM’s strategy emphasizes vertical integration, advanced metallurgical processing, and partnerships with Western governments and manufacturers seeking resilient supply chains for clean energy, defense, and advanced manufacturing applications. Last July the company reported the first commercial sales of 2 kg Tb metal and 2 kg Dy metal (to Neo’s Magnequench) from its Korean metallization plant, plus 10 tonnes NdPr metal.  The biggest shareholders of Australian Strategic Materials Ltd (ASM.AX) include the Gandel Family (commercial real estate) (around 13.6%), with other significant holdings by Fidelity International Ltd, and entities like Magnabay Pty Ltd, Lilycreek Pty Ltd, and Auburnvalley Pty Ltd, alongside various Dimensional Fund Advisors (DFA) institutional funds holding smaller but notable percentages, with insiders holding around 16.4% of the company. 

Rainbow Rare Earths – Phalaborwa (South Africa, Guernsey) (RBWRF) 0.2102, ytd 4.51%, market cap $160.23m

Rainbow continues advancing the Phalaborwa phosphogypsum reprocessing project; a key correction here is timing specificity: Rainbow’s LSE filing (Oct 2025 results) guided to the DFS being completed in Q1 2026, after a quarter of pilot testing to confirm the proposed flowsheet. The company’s share register is anchored by a small group of strategic and insider-aligned holders, providing a relatively stable ownership base. Adonis Pouroulis (seasoned mining entrepreneur, investor, and qualified mining engineer) is the largest shareholder with approximately 89.5 million shares, representing 13.9% of issued capital, followed by critical mineral investor TechMet Limited with 75.2 million shares (11.7%), underscoring strong institutional and strategic interest. George Bennett, CEO holds 40.5 million shares (6.3%), while Caden Holdings controls nearly 37.0 million shares (5.7%). Collectively, these four shareholders control roughly 38% of the company, indicating meaningful concentrated ownership and potential long-term strategic alignment.

Hastings Technology Metals – Yangibana Project (Australia) (HAS.AX) 0.59 ytd 14.56%, market cap $87.62m

Last February Hastings executed binding documentation (opens in a new tab) to sell 60% of Yangibana to Wyloo and form a JV, materially de-risking funding requirements. Company has a two-stage plan including a mine, beneficiation plant, and hydrometallurgical facility. The restructure included cancellation/offset of ~A$135m in Hastings exchangeable notes via a related arrangement (reported by Wyloo and market coverage).  Major holders, as of early 2024 reports, included CITICORP NOMINEES PTY LIMITED (around 13.95%), EQUATOR CAPITAL MANAGEMENT LTD (around 12.59%), and BNP PARIBAS NOMINEES PTY LTD (around 12.36%), with these top shareholders controlling a significant majority (around 77.90%) of the company's capital, alongside significant individual investors like Foon Lew and institutional players like L1 Capital. 

Vital Metals – Nechalacho/Tardiff Project (Canada) (VML.AX) 0.19, ytd -11.76%, market cap $52.3m

Vital is pivoting from its earlier Nechalacho pilot history toward the larger Tardiff opportunity and testing Dry Field Force Extraction (DFFE). In Aug 2025, Vital announced a A$6.8m strategic placement backed by Strategic Resources LLC to fund a PFS and expand DFFE testing.  The biggest shareholders of Vital Metals (include Strategic Resources, LLC, holding around 20% through Director David Dikken, and Cany Capital Fund Llc, also with roughly 20%, alongside key strategic investor Shenghe Resources (a major Chinese rare earth player) with nearly 10%, though recent filings and strategic investments suggest a mix of significant insiders and funds own large chunks.

MidStream

Midstream in the REE supply chain is the crucial, complex stage of separating and refining mined REE concentrate into individual, high-purity oxides or metals, making them usable for high-tech applications like magnets, electronics, and defense systems; it's a significant choke point dominated by China, requiring substantial investment for new domestic facilities in the West to achieve supply chain independence

Notably, Lynas Rare Earths, MP Materials, and USA Rare Earth are each pursuing—at different stages and with differing levels of maturity—integrated mine-to-magnet strategies, positioning them among the limited group of Western companies seeking end-to-end control from resource extraction through rare earth separation and permanent magnet manufacturing. Other refining players cited above include Iluka Resources.

Energy Fuels (USA) (UUUU) $18.25 ytd +27.80%, market cap $4.31b

On Jan 8, 2026, Energy Fuels, a uranium processor, issued an updated feasibility study for its Madagascar mineral sands/rare earth project (branded Vara Mada / Toliara), highlighting $1.8b NPV (10% discount) and large-scale projected output including ~24,000 tpa monazite alongside ilmenite/zircon.  Rare Earth Exchanges suggests potential for Energy Fuels as significant American refining player in future but consistent feedstock and the poof at scale is yet to come. Just over 16% of investors have short positions.

As of theend of 2025, Energy Fuels has commercial rare earth oxide refiningcapacity at its White Mesa Mill in Utah, primarily producing separated NdPr oxide at scale with an annual design capacity of approximately 850–1,000 tonnes per year, making it one of the few U.S. domestic producers of separated rare earth oxides. Additionally, the company has moved into pilot-scale production of heavy rare earth oxides, notably dysprosium (Dy) oxide at high purity (99.9%), producing quantities on the order of kilograms per week as part of initial test runs, with plans to expand to terbium and other heavy elements. Full commercial heavy rare earth production is being targeted with expanded infrastructure by late 2026, but as of 2025 the focus remains on commercial NdPr output and pilot heavy rare earth volumes.

By late last year, the shareholder base is dominated by large global asset managers and ETF sponsors, signaling strong institutional conviction. Alps Advisors is the largest holder with 13.47 million shares (5.67%, ~$245 million), followed closely by BlackRock (12.75 million shares,5.37%, ~$232 million), Mirae Asset Global ETFs (12.25 million shares,5.16%, ~$222 million), and Vanguard (11.88 million shares, 5.01%, ~$216 million). VanEck also holds a significant position with 10.19 million shares (4.30%, ~$185 million), reinforcing the ETF-driven ownership profile. Active managers and financial institutions—including T. Rowe Price, Susquehanna, State Street, Bank of America, and BNP Paribas—collectively add further depth, bringing broad-based institutional ownership well beyond 30% of outstanding shares, a structure typically associated with liquidity, benchmark inclusion, and sustained market attention.

ReElement Technologies (USA)(privately held but up to $80m loan from U.S. government and $200 million private equity investment).

n 2025, ReElement Technologies advanced its effort to establish a domestic U.S. rare earth and critical-minerals refining platform, making progress across partnerships, infrastructure, technology validation, and government engagement. The company deepened collaboration with Vulcan Elements toward a long-term U.S. NdFeB magnet supply chain and entered strategic offtake and cooperation agreements with POSCO International America for phased deliveries of separated rare earth oxides. ReElement also expanded its recycling pipeline through a partnership with Electronic Recyclers International, enabling recovery of rare earths from e-waste and end-of-life magnets, and completed a demonstration run producing 99.9%-pure neodymium, praseodymium, and dysprosium from recycled wind-turbine magnets.

Operationally, ReElement continued scaling its modular refining platform in Indiana, moving from pilot toward early commercial throughput measured in the low hundreds of tonnes per year while retaining flexibility across feedstocks including magnets, batteries, and mineral concentrates. The company expanded international cooperation, including work related to tungsten processing in Uzbekistan, joined the defense-focused CREATE consortium, and secured amix of private capital and early U.S. Department of Defense support. Itspatented, chromatography-based separation technology—licensed from Purdue University—is positioned as a lower-waste, lower-water alternative to conventional solvent extraction. The year concluded with multiple patent filings and formal recognition from the Krach Institute for Tech Diplomacy, underscoring ReElement’s growing strategic relevance.

By year-end 2025, ReElement was actively producing high-purity rare earth and specialty oxides at its expanded Noblesville, Indiana facility, demonstrating separations of elements including Nd, Pr, Dy, and Y at purities of roughly 99.9% to 99.999%, though it had not yet reached sustained large-scale commercial capacity. In parallel, the company was developing its larger Marion, Indiana “Supersite,” with Phase 1 designed to support approximately 2,500–3,500 metric tons per year of magnet-grade rare earths, battery materials, and antimony once installation and staged commissioning are completed. Together, the Noblesville and Marion sites reflect ReElement’s incremental, modular scale-up strategy, bridging demonstrated refining capability with near-termexpansion rather than relying on long-dated, fully financed scale-outassumptions.

Saskatchewan Research Council (SRC) (Canada)—government-owned entity

As of today SRC is operating its Rare Earth Processing Facility in Saskatoon, but it has not yet reached its full planned commercial capacity; it continues to ramp up production with further commissioning and expansion planned through 2026–2027. The facility previously demonstrated output at commercial scale — producing about 10 tonnes per month of NdPr metal, with plans to increase toward roughly 40 tonnes per month as machinery and separation technologies come online, which would equate to around 400 tonnes per year of NdPr metals once fully operational. Initial construction delays have slowed progress, and the facility expects to reach its full design output — including significant quantities of NdPr metal plus dysprosium (Dy) and terbium (Tb) oxides — by late 2026 into early 2027.

Carester SAS (France) (privately held)

Carester SAS is a France-based rare earth processing, refining, and recycling specialist focused on establishing non-Chinese industrial capacity across both light and heavy rare earth elements. Headquartered near Lyon, Carester combines separation technology and engineering services with recycling know-how, operating through its industrial arm. The team consists of experts previously at Solvay.

Its flagship project is the Caremag separation and recycling facility in Lacq, southwest France, supported by French state funding and Japanese partners (about €216 million in total). As of January 2026, the Lacq plant remains under construction with no commercial production yet; initial commissioning and test runs are expected late in 2026.

Publicly stated capacities—subject to ramp-up risk—include processing up to ~5,000 tonnes per year of rare earth concentrate, recycling ~2,000 tonnes per year of NdFeB magnets, and producing on the order of ~800 tpa of NdPr oxides and several hundred tonnes per year of heavy rare earth oxides (primarily dysprosium and terbium) once stabilized.

Carester’s near-term strategy is deliberately phased. In 2026, priorities center on commissioning, early deliveries, and qualifying output with industrial customers rather than achieving nameplate volumes. In 2027, management has indicated an intention to scale operations progressively toward steady-state throughput, expand magnet recycling inputs, and deepen technical services for integrated supply chains.

A key pillar is its October 2025 binding 10-year partnership with Brazilian Rare Earths Limited, under which Carester will purchase up to ~150 tonnes per year of contained Dy/Tb oxides from BRE’s planned Bahia separation plant and provide engineering and commissioning support. The arrangement offers Carester a credible, non-Chinese heavy-REE feedstock pathway while linking Brazilian upstream resources to European midstream capacity. In a global context where China still dominates rare earth processing (especially heavies), Carester is positioning Caremag as a strategically important—but still emerging—Western refining and recycling node, with execution and ramp-up over the next two years determining its ultimate impact.

SolvaySA (Belgium) (SOLB.BR), 27.00, ytd -1.17%, market cap $2.83b

Solvay is a Belgian multinational chemical group with roots dating back to 1863, specializing in essential chemistry across a range of industrial sectors including: chemicals, materials, and performance products, and is listed on Euronext Brussels. In the rare earth element arena, Solvay is one of the few non-Chinese companies with advanced rare earth separation and purification capabilities, leveraging more than 75 years of expertise to serve markets such as automotive, electronics, medical technologies, and hydrogen applications.

Its historic La Rochelle, France facility—once a major global processor—has been reinvigorated to produce and expand commercial rare earth oxide outputs, especially NdPr and other materials for permanent magnets, with capacity currently scaled for early commercial deliveries and further ramp-up planned toward meeting a significant share of European demand.

Solvay has also entered supply agreements with U.S. magnet makers (e.g., Noveon) and partners for recycled feedstocks, and is exploring the possibility of a U.S. processing facility to complement its European base. This strategic rare earth position aligns with broader goals of reducing dependence on Chinese processing and strengthening Western supply chains for critical materials.

Initial operations in 2025 are producing a few hundred tonnes of rare earth oxides for magnets, marking the start of output for this material class. Looking ahead, Solvay has indicated that its expanded rare earth refining capacity could ultimately range from about 2,000 to 5,000 metric tons per year of rare earth oxides at full commercial scale — focusing on NdPr and related oxides — conditional on market demand and further investment decisions.

The company also aims to supply a meaningful portion of European demand for permanent-magnet rare earths (20–30 %) by 2030, which implies continued capacity growth beyond these initial projections.

Koch Modular Process Systems (USA) privately held

Koch Modular Process Systems was created as a joint venture with Koch-Glitsch, and Koch-Glitsch’s parent company is Koch Industries, one of the largest privately held corporations in the U.S.

Koch Modular itself operates as a separate entity formed through that joint venture rather than a standard Koch Industries subsidiary.  They are a U.S.-based engineering and modular construction firm with decades of experience in chemical process design, pilot testing, and modular plant delivery, now applying its expertise to REE refining and critical mineral separations. The company’s core capability lies in advanced liquid-liquid extraction and solvent extraction technologies (e.g., SCHEIBEL® and KARR® columns) that efficiently separate targeted rare earths and critical metals from aqueous solutions, replacing traditional mixer-settlers with more compact, cost-effective, and controllable modular systems. These technologies can be validated at Koch Modular’s expanded pilot plant in Houston, Texas, where bench- and pilot-scale testing generates the data required to scale to commercial operations with performance guarantees.

Koch Modular’s rare earth development offering spans pilot-to-plant programs that validate extraction performance, optimize throughput, and de-risk investment prior to full-scale deployment, enabling clients to accelerate time to market and reduce capital and operating costs. While Koch Modular does not itself produce refined rare earth oxides, its modular extraction systems and engineering support are positioned to enable domestic and international rare earth processing facilities, including mining and recycling projects, by supplying tested and scalable separation technology crucial for commercial REE refining.

©!-- /wp:paragraph -->

• Lynas Rare Earths (ASX:LYC) surged 10% on January 7, 2026, rebounding from recent lows, driven by technical momentum and improving NdPr price sentiment rather than new contracts or operational upgrades.
• As the largest integrated rare earth producer outside China, Lynas benefits from strategic Japan partnerships (Sojitz/JOGMEC) for heavy rare earth offtake, but faces operational challenges including Kalgoorlie power disruptions affecting output and costs.
• Investors should scrutinize realized NdPr pricing versus benchmarks, Kalgoorlie reliability timelines, and whether Malaysia's heavy rare earth expansion can meaningfully improve margins amid structural volatility in rare earth equities.

Lynas Rare Earths Ltd (ASX:LYC) jumped (opens in a new tab) about 10% on Jan. 7, 2026, rebounding sharply from Jan. 2 lows near A$12.15. Is the move due to a technical snap-back and improving sentiment that rare earth prices, particularly NdPr, are stabilizing dynamics?  There was no new contract, discovery, or guidance upgrade. This was momentum—useful, but not the same as fundamentals.

Aaron Teboneras reported on the stock for The Motley Fool Australia.

The Feel-Good Story—and What It Misses

The bullish script is familiar: EV demand returns, NdPr bottoms, geopolitics re-rates non-China supply. That thesis is plausible, but incomplete. NdPr benchmarks have shown recent firmness (methodologies vary), yet realized pricing and margins matter more than spot headlines. Meanwhile, Lynas has navigated operational constraints—including reported Kalgoorlie power disruptions in late 2025—that can ripple into downstream output and costs.

Yet investors should discount exuberance until execution risks are fully de-risked.

Scale, Strategy, and Japan Ties

Lynas remains the largest integrated rare earth producer outside China, with MP Materials among the next most significant non-China players as the U.S. builds capacity. Importantly, Lynas’ Japan relationships are material: long-standing ties with  Sojitz/JOGMEC underpin offtake and financing support, including agreements covering heavy rare earths (Dy/Tb)—a strategic differentiator as magnet makers prioritize high-temperature performance.

Questions Investors Should Ask Now

• What NdPr prices is Lynas actually realizing versus benchmarks, net of contracts and costs?
• How quickly can Kalgoorlie reliability be stabilized, and at what capex/opex impact?
• Will heavy rare earth separation expansion in Malaysia materially improve product mix and margins in volatile price conditions?

StockCheck: Fundamentals vs. Charts

This move looks like a credible technical rebound from oversold levels—not proof of a cycle turn. Rare earth equities remain structurally volatile. Market quotes around the mid-teens AUD range during this period varied by venue and timing.

REEx Takeaway

If the Motley Fool piece is mostly correct, it’s also thin. Supply-chain resilience isn’t a chart pattern. The U.S. rebuild requires separation, metals, alloys, and magnets—or even best-in-class producers like Lynas remain exposed to China-set pricing.

©!-- /wp:paragraph -->

• Australia-Canada-India technology trilateral (ACITI) seeks to reduce dependence on China-dominated supply chains for clean energy and critical minerals through complementary strengths:
  • Australia's upstream mineral supply
  • Canada's capital frameworks
  • India's massive renewable demand
• The initiative correctly identifies critical minerals processing, recycling, and circularity as key cooperation areas
• Lacks concrete mechanisms—no timelines, capital commitments, offtake guarantees, or shared processing plans are detailed
• ACITI's credibility hinges on:
  • Maintaining a narrow focus on minerals and metallurgy
  • Avoiding dilution of resources across broader tech pillars like AI
  • Execution discipline to avoid joining failed multilateral dialogues

Green supply chains, critical minerals, and the hard work between vision and delivery.

The proposed Australia–Canada–India technology trilateral (ACITI) aims to reduce dependence on fragile, China-centric supply chains for clean energy and critical minerals. The idea is sensible and timely. The execution as reported by Observer Research Foundation (opens in a new tab), however, will determine whether this becomes a meaningful industrial pathway—or another well-intentioned policy forum that fades after the press releases.

The Geopolitical Soil This Grows From

The ACITI concept emerges from a world reshaped by tariffs, sanctions, and export controls. Supply chains—once optimized for efficiency—are now treated as strategic assets. China’s dominance in processing and refining lithium, cobalt, graphite, and rare earth elements is not speculative; it is structural. These materials underpin EVs, wind turbines, batteries, and grid infrastructure. When export controls tighten, vulnerabilities surface quickly.

Against that backdrop, cooperation among Australia, Canada, and India is logically attractive: Australia brings upstream mineral supply, Canada brings capital and policy frameworks, and India brings scale of demand.

Where the Argument Is Solid

The article correctly identifies critical minerals and clean energy as the most credible pillars of cooperation. Australia remains a top lithium producer. Canada is deploying public funds to de-risk clean-tech investment. India’s 500-GW renewable target by 2030 is real and resource-intensive.

Equally sound is the emphasis on recycling, recovery, and lower-impact extraction. Circularity in lithium, cobalt, nickel, copper, and rare earths is not optional if demand continues to accelerate. These are the pressure points investors already track.

Where Aspirations Outrun Mechanisms

The piece leans heavily on normative language—“tech-for-good,” “responsibility,” “embedded purpose”—without detailing binding instruments. No timelines. No capital commitments. No offtake guarantees. No shared processing or magnet-grade separation plans. This is not misinformation, but it is an omission.

Past “minilateral” efforts have struggled precisely because focus expands faster than execution. Adding AI as a pillar, while fashionable, risks diluting scarce capital and attention away from minerals, metallurgy, and infrastructure.

Why This Matters for Rare Earth Markets

If ACITI narrows its scope to critical minerals processing, recycling, and standards alignment, it could incrementally rebalance supply risk. If not, it joins a long list of strategic dialogues that never moved tonnage. 

The vision is incredible, delivery remains unproven.

Source: Analysis based on commentary from.

© 2026 Rare Earth Exchanges™ – Accelerating Transparency, Accuracy, and Insight Across the Rare Earth & Critical Minerals Supply Chain.

• China banned dual-use goods exports to Japan in January 2026 following Taiwan remarks, but rare earth shipments continue flowing—indicating strategic signaling rather than economic disruption.
• Japan sources 60% of its rare earths from China, particularly heavy rare earths used in defense-grade magnets, despite decade-long diversification efforts through Australian supply and recycling.
• Beijing hasn't specified restricted items, creating strategic ambiguity that maintains leverage while avoiding diplomatic costs of a full cutoff—accelerating friend-shoring and substitution research.

China’s dual-use ban, Japan’s defense reset, and the rare earth subtext investors can’t ignore.

China’s new ban on exporting certain “dual-use” goods to Japan is less about immediately cutting off materials and more about reminding the world who holds leverage. Even though rare earth shipments are still flowing, the move underscores a simple reality: China remains central to Japan’s supply of critical rare earth elements used in defense and high-tech manufacturing. For investors, this is not a crisis—but it is a signal that geopolitics can still shape markets overnight.

The Headline Move—and the Quiet Materials Beneath It

In January 2026, China announced a ban on exports of dual-use items—goods with both civilian and military applications—to Japan, following remarks by Japan’s prime minister regarding Taiwan. Publicly, the policy targets military end-users. Quietly, it intersects with the rare earth supply chain, which underpins drones, semiconductors, motors, and guidance systems.

Beijing did not release a list of restricted products. However, China’s existing export-control framework already covers roughly 1,100 dual-use items, including several medium and heavy rare earths such as samarium, terbium, dysprosium, gadolinium, and lutetium. This is not a new capability. It is a familiar pressure point.

Bedrock Facts vs. Diplomatic Theater

China remains Japan’s largest supplier of rare earths—about 60% of imports by most estimates, including analysis from Capital Economics. Japan has spent more than a decade diversifying through Australian supply, recycling, and strategic stockpiles, yet dependence persists, particularly for heavy rare earths used in defense-grade permanent magnets.

History matters.

China previously restricted rare earth exports to Japan during a 2010 diplomatic dispute. But recent data tell a calmer story: customs figures through November 2025 show no decline in exports to Japan; volumes actually rose sharply late in the year. If material is still shipping, the policy functions more as signaling than as an economic chokehold.

The Fog of Lists, Licenses, and Rumors

Caution is essential. China has not specified which items are affected, and Japanese officials have publicly described the move as “symbolic.” Commentary from state-affiliated social-media accounts about tighter licensing is not a formal policy. Company reports of slower license approvals may reflect routine bureaucracy, heightened compliance checks, or political friction—or a mix of all three.

This ambiguity is strategic. It preserves leverage while avoiding the economic and diplomatic costs of an overt cutoff.

Why Rare Earths Still Sit at the Center

Symbolic or not, the episode reinforces a core truth: exposure to heavy rare earths gives China geopolitical optionality. Japan’s expanding defense budget increases scrutiny of dual-use materials, from dysprosium-doped NdFeB magnets to specialty alloys and phosphors. Each flare-up accelerates friend-shoring, substitution research, and recycling—but none of these close the gap quickly.

Competing Narratives, One Dataset

Chinese state media frames Japan’s security posture as provocation; Japanese sources frame China’s response as largely performative. Both narratives serve domestic audiences. The data exports are continuing, control lists are unpublished—sit in the middle.

Source: Reuters reporting;  Channel News Asia (opens in a new tab), state commentary from Xinhua.

©!-- /wp:paragraph -->

• AMEC released a government-commissioned blueprint proposing price floor guarantees for four magnet-critical rare earths (NdPr, Dy, Tb) to de-risk investment and strengthen Australia's position in allied supply chains.
• The underwriting scheme mirrors existing capacity investment models, offering price certainty to overcome financing barriers—the main obstacle stalling Western rare earth projects despite strong demand.
• This policy signals a Western consensus shift: rare earths are now treated as a security problem requiring government intervention, not a market problem solved by competition alone.

On January 2, 2026, The Nightly via The West Australian reported (opens in a new tab) that the Association of Mining and Exploration Companies (opens in a new tab) (AMEC) released a government-commissioned blueprint proposing a rare earth production underwriting scheme. The idea is simple and politically elegant: guarantee floor and ceiling prices for four magnet-critical rare earths—neodymium, praseodymium, dysprosium, and terbium—to de-risk investment and anchor Australia deeper into allied supply chains.

This is not fringe theory. It is industrial policy, stripped of euphemism.

Four Elements That Actually Matter

AMEC’s focus on NdPr and Dy/Tb is technically sound. These elements dominate the value stack of permanent magnets used in EV drivetrains, wind turbines, missiles, drones, and submarines. Investors know this. So do defense planners. By naming only four elements, AMECavoids the common policy mistake of treating “rare earths”as a homogeneous basket.

The proposal mirrors Australia’s existing capacity investment scheme for renewables—price certainty in exchange for supply certainty. If prices fall, the government tops up. If prices spike, Canberra shares the upside. It is a hedge, not a handout.

Where the Blueprint Is Rock-Solid

From a supply-chain perspective, several claims in the article are accurate and well-grounded:

• China still dominates magnet-grade refining and downstream leverage
• Allied nations—the U.S., EU, Japan, Korea, and Canada—are actively courting Australian supply
• Projects stall not at geology, but at financing and offtake certainty
• Price volatility, not demand, is the killer of Western rare earth projects

The model echoes U.S. Department of Defense NdPr price floors already extended to MP Materials. This is not theoretical—it is already happening elsewhere.

The Quiet Leap of Faith

What the article does not interrogate deeply enough is execution risk.

Price floors do not solve:

• Heavy rare earth separation bottlenecks
• Workforce and permitting delays
• Chemical processing complexity
• The gap between concentrate and magnet-grade oxide

There is also an implicit assumption—left unchallenged—that underwriting alone can overcome China’s scale, integration, and decades of sunk capital. That is optimistic, not dishonest, but it deserves scrutiny.

A Gentle Tilt Toward Boosterism

The reporting leans sympathetically toward government and industry voices, with limited counterweight from fiscal skeptics or downstream buyers. This is not misinformation—but it is directional framing. Rare Earth Exchanges™ notes that underwriting schemes can stabilize projects, but they do not guarantee global competitiveness without parallel investment in midstream processing and magnet manufacturing.

Why This Actually Matters

This blueprint signals something bigger than Australia's policy. It reflects a Western consensus forming in real time: rare earths are no longer a market problem—they are a security problem. Price discovery is being subordinated to supply assurance.

That is the real story.

China did not lose dominance.

But the West stopped pretending the market alone would fix it.

Citation: Katina Curtis, The Nightly, (The West Australian) January 2, 2026

©!-- /wp:paragraph -->

• Researchers at Curtin University demonstrated that acid crack leach residue—currently discarded waste—can recover approximately 65% of remaining rare earths using recyclable organic acids instead of harsh chemicals.
• The study reveals that processing waste contains rare earth concentrations comparable to fresh ore, exposing inefficiencies in conventional extraction and offering a path to improve supply security.
• By reprocessing tailings rather than mining new ore, Western producers can reduce environmental impact and challenge China's rare earth processing monopoly through smarter flowsheets.

A new open-access study led by K. Yamini of Curtin University’s Western Australian School of Mines (opens in a new tab), working with Laurence Dyer, Jonah Gamutan, and Bogale Tadesse, tackles one of the rare earth industry’s quiet inefficiencies: the loss of valuable rare earth elements (REEs) in processing waste.

Published in Resources, Conservation and Recycling (February 2026), the paper (opens in a new tab) demonstrates that acid crack leach (ACL) residue—a byproduct of conventional rare earth extraction—can be reprocessed to recover roughly 65% of remaining rare earths, using recyclable organic acids rather than harsh mineral reagents.

Curtin University’s Western Australian School of Mines

For readers unfamiliar with rare earth processing, the significance is simple: material that is currently discarded as waste often contains rare earth concentrations comparable to fresh ore. Recovering it improves supply security, lowers environmental impact, and slightly loosens the global chokehold created by China’s dominance in rare earth processing.

How the Study Works

Conventional rare earth extraction uses sulfuric acid roasting and leaching to dissolve rare earths from ores such as monazite. What’s left behind—ACL residue—is rich in iron phosphate and sulphates and still contains meaningful rare earth content (about 2.8% total REE in this study).

Instead of sending this residue to tailings, the researchers applied a two-stage “technospheric mining” process:

1. Oxalic acid leaching is used to break down the residue and mobilize rare earths.
2. EDTA leaching to selectively complex and recover rare earths that reprecipitate or remain trapped.

By carefully controlling acid concentration and dosing—sometimes adding oxalic acid gradually rather than all at once—the team reduced contamination from iron and phosphorus and improved selectivity. The result: overall rare earth recovery of ~65%, the highest reported for this specific waste stream.

Key Findings That Matter

• Waste is not waste: ACL residue contains rare earth grades comparable to some mined ores, revealing systemic inefficiencies in today’s flowsheets.
• Organic acids can work at scale—on paper: Oxalic acid and EDTA are recyclable, offering a lower-toxicity alternative to traditional reagents.
• Process behavior is kinetic, not simple chemistry: Recovery depends heavily on dosing strategy and timing, not just equilibrium chemistry.
• Flexibility beats bespoke designs: The flowsheet proved adaptable across different residues, suggesting broader applicability beyond a single mine.

Why This Matters in a China-Dominated Supply Chain

China still controls the overwhelming majority of global rare earth processing capacity, not because it mines the most ore, but because it extracts and separates material more completely. This study underscores a critical point: processing efficiency is power.

If Western producers can recover more rare earths from existing waste streams, they will reduce reliance on new mining, cut costs, and marginally weaken China’s processing monopoly. Tailings reprocessing won’t replace primary supply—but it can meaningfully stretch each ton of ore further.

Limitations and Open Questions

This is not a silver bullet.

• Recovery is not 100%: About one-third of rare earths remain unrecovered.
• Reagent intensity remains high: Although recyclable, oxalic acid consumption is substantial and must be optimized for commercial scale.
• Pilot-scale economics are untested: Laboratory success does not guarantee industrial viability without cost and throughput validation.
• Industry funding disclosed: The research received support from Lynas Rare Earths and Western Australian institutions—transparent, but worth noting.

The Bottom Line

This study shows that closing the loop in rare earth processing is technically feasible today, not decades away. By mining the waste of yesterday’s extraction plants, producers can improve sustainability, economics, and supply resilience—critical goals in a world racing toward electrification and clean energy.

China’s advantage in rare earths has always been about processing discipline. This paper is a reminder that smarter flowsheets—not just new mines—are where the next gains will be found.

Citation: Yamini, K., Dyer, L., Gamutan, J., & Tadesse, B. (2026). Closing the loop in conventional rare Earth extraction: Treatment of acid crack leach residue using organic acids. Resources, Conservation and Recycling, 226, 108678. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.resconrec.2025.108678 (opens in a new tab)

©!-- /wp:paragraph -->

• China Minmetals is building sophisticated international legal and mediation infrastructure to protect overseas mining operations and reduce vulnerability in contested jurisdictions.
• The state-owned giant is prioritizing technology breakthroughs in refractory ore extraction, high-purity metals, and advanced materials processing to dominate supply chains beyond just mining.
• Coordinated central-local integration and continued global asset expansion signal Beijing's long-term strategy to control pricing power and availability across critical minerals markets.

A series of late-December updates (opens in a new tab) from China Minmetals Corporation offers a clear window into how Beijing is positioning one of its most powerful industrial champions ahead of China’s 15th Five-Year Plan (2026–2030). Taken together, the announcements point to a coordinated strategy: tighten control over critical minerals, deepen local-central integration, harden legal and governance infrastructure overseas, and accelerate technology-led self-reliance.

For Western investors and policymakers, these moves are not bureaucratic routine—they shape global supply, pricing power, and geopolitical leverage across metals markets.

Why China Minmetals Matters

China Minmetals is not just another mining company. It is a state-owned “national team” responsible for securing China’s supply of non-ferrous metals, iron ore, rare and strategic minerals, and advanced materials. Its footprint spans 60+ countries, covering mining, smelting, engineering construction, trading, logistics, and finance. In effect, Minmetals sits at the intersection of resource ownership, processing capability, and state policy execution—the very layers where China has built durable advantages over Western competitors.

Key Themes From the December Updates

1. Legal Infrastructure for Global Operations

Chairman Chen Dexin’s meeting with Teresa Cheng Yeuk-wah (opens in a new tab), Secretary-General of the International Organization for Mediation (IOMed), highlights a less-discussed but critical vector: legal preparedness for outbound expansion. As China Minmetals expands abroad, disputes over contracts, environmental standards, and host-country regulations are inevitable. Building an international mediation ecosystem signals that Beijing expects friction—and is proactively insulating its champions.

Western relevance: This undercuts the assumption that Chinese firms will remain legally vulnerable overseas. Expect more sophisticated dispute management, fewer forced asset write-downs, and stronger staying power in contested jurisdictions.

2. Central–Local Resource Lock-In

Meetings with Hengyang (Hunan) and Pingliang (Gansu) officials reinforce Minmetals’ role as a central SOE anchoring local mineral ecosystems. Projects span copper, lead, zinc, gold, silver, fluorochemicals, iron ore, and salt-lake resources. The message is explicit: resource development, smelting, and downstream value-add will be vertically integrated and regionally embedded.

Western relevance: This reduces China’s domestic supply risk while increasing export optionality. It also means fewer distressed assets available for foreign acquisition inside China.

3. Technology as the New Bottleneck

The Science and Technology Committee’s plenary meeting is arguably the most consequential update. Minmetals is prioritizing breakthroughs in refractory ore extraction, beneficiation, high-purity metals, and advanced materials, supported by pilot-scale smelting platforms and even satellite systems. The framing is blunt: “success or failure depends on scientific and technological innovation.”

Western relevance: The competitive frontier is no longer just mining—it is processing know-how. This reinforces why China dominates rare earths, battery materials, and specialty metals, even where it lacks the largest reserves.

4. Overseas Asset Expansion Continues

References to the Khumaga Copper Mine in Botswana, the Huahonggou iron prospect in Liaoning, and China Salt Lake in Qinghai Province confirm that Minmetals is still expanding its resource base at home and abroad, even amid tighter geopolitics.

Western relevance: Supply diversification away from China remains difficult when Chinese SOEs are simultaneously consolidating upstream assets globally.

5. Alignment With National Economic Strategy

The Party Group’s study of the Central Economic Work Conference underscores that Minmetals’ priorities—resource security, industrial upgrading, reform of SOEs, and risk control—are directly synchronized with Beijing’s macro agenda. This is not an optional strategy; it is policy execution.

Western relevance: Expect consistency, not market-driven volatility. China Minmetals will act counter-cyclically if needed to secure long-term strategic metals.

Bottom Line

These updates collectively signal that China Minmetals is hardening its role as a global critical-minerals powerhouse—legally, technologically, and institutionally. For Western markets, this matters because pricing, availability, and bargaining power in copper, base metals, rare earths, and advanced materials will increasingly be shaped upstream and midstream, where Minmetals operates with state backing. Ignoring these signals risks underestimating how coordinated—and durable—China’s minerals strategy has become.

©!-- /wp:paragraph -->

• Rare earth permanent magnets—not mined ore—are the decisive supply chain chokepoint across EVs, wind, robotics, and defense.
• The chokepoint is constrained by process control and qualification rather than geology.
• India's late-2025 approval for integrated magnet production signals ambition.
• Execution timelines, Tier-1 qualification, and audited milestones will determine whether policy intent becomes industrial capacity.
• Australia-India cooperation holds potential in the supply chain.
• Supply chain power is measured in shipped, qualified magnets with bankable offtake, not just MoUs or policy frameworks alone.

Rare Earth Exchanges analysis of a December 27, 2025 essay in Eurasia Review (opens in a new tab)

Eurasia Review frames rare-earth permanent magnets as a quiet but decisive chokepoint across EVs, wind, robotics, and defense. On that central diagnosis, the essay is largely right—and notably concrete. Where it risks overreach is in assuming that policy intent, once announced, will translate smoothly into shipped, qualified magnets.

Where the Analysis Lands Cleanly

The piece gets the hierarchy right by moving from ore to output. The strategic asset is not mined tonnage but repeatable conversion capacity: separation, metallization, alloying, and magnet fabrication at automotive-grade quality. That distinction is critical. Historically, magnet-grade NdFeB is constrained by process control, QA, and qualification—not geology. The focus on “permissioned trade” also holds. Export governance and licensing can ration supply without headline bans, driving inventory risk, delaying capex, and unsettling downstream planning.

India’s Ambition: Signal Meets the Stopwatch

The essay notes India’s late-2025 approval to build an integrated sintered-magnet ecosystem spanning oxides to finished magnets. Framing magnets as industrial sovereignty rather than procurement is the right move. The hard constraint is execution. New entrants most often stumble at commissioning and Tier-1 qualification. Policy signals help; audited milestones decide outcomes. The analysis would strengthen with timelines, named counterparties, and capacity targets tied to FID—metrics that investors can verify.

Australia’s Role: Partner, If the Middle Gets Built

Australia’s upstream credibility and “trusted partner” narrative align with India’s demand growth. But frameworks don’t ship magnets. The decisive terrain remains the midstream and downstream—separation, metals, alloys, QA, and certification corridors recognized by automotive buyers. Without bankable offtake and magnet-grade QA pathways, cooperation risks becoming persuasive copy rather than industrial capacity.

What’s Missing—and What’s Implied

Accurate: magnets are the chokepoint; licensing is the new valve; the midstream is the center of gravity.

Speculative: that announced programs will compress qualification timelines fast enough to matter before the next shock.

Bias watch: a quiet policy optimism—assuming cross-ministry coherence and capital discipline—without stress-testing price cycles, permitting drag, or ESG friction.

Why This Matters Now

Supply-chain power is measured in shipments, not MoUs. The next disruption won’t ask who aligned; it will ask who delivered qualified magnets on time. Investors should watch commissioning dates, QA certifications, and offtake terms—not speeches.

Citation: “The Magnet Weapon: Can India And Australia De-Risk EV Supply Chains Before The Next Shock?” Eurasia Review, Dec. 27, 2025.

© 2025 Rare Earth Exchanges™ – Accelerating Transparency, Accuracy, and Insight Across the Rare Earth & Critical Minerals Supply Chain.

• The 2025 commodities rally drove rare earth stocks higher on geopolitical anxiety, but price action shouldn't be confused with actual supply-chain transformation or operational progress.
• The critical bottleneck remains midstream: without scalable refining, separation capacity, and manufacturing infrastructure, exploration rallies are speculative instruments, not industrial milestones.
• Markets repriced rare earth optionality and future strategic value rather than current margins, but discipline in distinguishing liquidity-driven moves from fundamentals will determine who survives 2026.

Bill McConnell’s “Dollar Bill” in The West Australian column captures the mood of 2025 perfectly: small caps roaring back to life, brokers swapping multi-bagger war stories, and commodities rediscovering swagger. Gold exploded. Silver doubled. Defense, AI-adjacent metals, and rare earths were swept into the same speculative current. For market psychology, the piece is spot-on. For supply-chain truth, it blends signal with noise.

What’s notable for rare earth investors is how easily geopolitics and price action were conflated with operational progress.

What the Column Gets Right

The macro setup is directionally accurate. A weaker U.S. dollar, rate-cut expectations, and renewed trade-friction expectations tied to a potential second Trump administration pushed critical minerals into the geopolitical spotlight. Rare earths benefited from policy anxiety, not end-market acceleration. That distinction matters.

It’s also fair to note that large-cap producers like Lynas Rare Earths surged alongside gold equities. Markets were repricing optionality—future strategic value—rather than current margins. That pattern aligns with 2025’s capital flows.

Where Enthusiasm Runs Ahead of Evidence

The column’s weakest moments come when share-price explosions are treated as proof of supply-chain transformation. Claims tied to microcaps—some rising thousands of percent on “nearology,” presidential comments, or thinly substantiated rare earth exposure—deserve more skepticism.

Price action is not production. Ground adjacent to a deposit is not a mine. A resource is not a refinery. And none of these are magnets. While the column nods to excess, the tone risks normalizing liquidity-driven moves as fundamentals.

This matters because rare earths are not gold. Their value is trapped midstream. Without separation capacity, metallurgical validation, permits, offtake, and financing, rallies remain speculative instruments, not industrial milestones.

The Supply-Chain Reality Check

What’s missing is the chokepoint: refining and manufacturing. Rare earths rose in sympathy with geopolitics, but the West still lacks scalable midstream capacity. That constraint—not exploration excitement—will determine who survives the next cycle.

Investors should read 2025 not as a rediscovered golden age, but as a stress test: capital returned, yes—but discipline will decide 2026.

Bottom Line

“Dollar Bill” nails the vibe. _Rare Earth Exchanges_™ insists on the math. The ASX partied in 2025. Rare earth supply chains did not magically mature. The difference will define who keeps their gains when the music fades.

Citation: The West Australian, Dec 25, 2025.

© 2025 Rare Earth Exchanges™ – Accelerating Transparency, Accuracy, and Insight Across the Rare Earth & Critical Minerals Supply Chain.

• Hancock Prospecting, controlled by Gina Rinehart, increased its stake in Arafura from 10.01% to 15.60%, providing strategic cornerstone backing as the Nolans Project approaches final investment decision.
• Arafura completed a A$481.4M capital raise through institutional placement and SPP, but attracted only A$7M of a targeted A$50M retail raise, leaving approximately A$43M in unresolved equity funding needs.
• The company reset executive incentives by cancelling 36.3M performance rights and issuing 41.3M new ones aligned with construction and operational milestones, including 10.6M rights to CEO Darryl Cuzzubbo.

Arafura Rare Earths Ltd. (ASX: ARU) has disclosed a series of capital markets, ownership, and incentive-plan updates that materially reshape its shareholder register and internal alignment as the company advances toward a final investment decision (FID) on the Nolans Project in Australia’s Northern Territory. 2026 should be a big year for the Australian rare earth mining company.

Hancock Prospecting Strengthens Cornerstone Position

The most consequential disclosure is a Form 604 notice confirming that Hancock Prospecting Pty Ltd (HPPL)—controlled by Gina Rinehart—has increased its voting power in Arafura from 10.01% to 15.60%, representing 726,487,213 fully paid ordinary shares.

The increase reflects HPPL’s repeated participation in equity placements over time, culminating in a 392,857,143-share subscription at A$0.28 per share on 12 December 2025, aligned with Arafura’s most recent institutional financing. The result is a substantially larger cornerstone position by one of Australia’s most financially capable resource investors, reinforcing long-term strategic backing as Nolans moves closer to execution.

Share Purchase Plan Completed

Arafura also confirmed the completion of its Share Purchase Plan (SPP), which attracted 748 applications totaling A$7.1 million. Approximately A$0.7 million of applications from ineligible shareholders were rejected, resulting in the issuance of 23,119,844 new ordinary shares at A$0.28 per share. The SPP shares were subsequently quoted on the ASX.

Importantly, the company confirmed it will not place any SPP shortfall, signaling confidence in its funding pathway and a preference to avoid incremental retail dilution. Combined with the earlier institutional placement, total funds raised under the placement and SPP reached A$481.4 million (before costs), positioning Arafura with substantial capital coverage as it works toward FID.

Unresolved Funding Questions

Notably, the SPP also highlights an unresolved funding question. While Arafura structured the SPP to raise up to A$50 million from retail investors, it attracted only around A$7 million, leaving an effective A$43 million gap relative to the company’s original retail funding ambition, even if not formally described as a shortfall.

Does this gap introduce any uncertainty around how the remaining equity will ultimately be sourced?

One possibility is further participation from Hancock Prospecting, which can increase its stake to just under 20% under Australian takeover rules before triggering a mandatory bid. However, any additional equity could require pricing at or below the recent A$0.28 placement, particularly with the share price now hovering near A$0.22, despite Hancock having previously invested at A$0.37 and A$0.28.

The funding overhang may help explain the current short interest and share-price weakness, as Arafura must still secure roughly A$43 million to fully bridge its equity requirements. Additional debt from the German-backed lender appears constrained absent incremental offtake, which itself seems limited, leaving open the prospect of another discounted capital raise, a new strategic investor, or—given Nolans’ strategic importance—potential intervention by the Australian or U.S. government to help carry the project into execution.

Incentive Reset: Performance Rights Cancelled and Reissued

Alongside the equity raises, Arafura executed a meaningful reset of executive and employee incentives. The company cancelled 36,285,574 performance rights on 15 December 2025, comprising rights cancelled by agreement and a smaller tranche that lapsed after conditions were not satisfied. This was followed by the issue of 41,305,519 new performance rights on 11 December 2025, after shareholder approval at the October 2025AGM.

Key management personnel received significant allocations, including CEO Darryl Cuzzubbo (10,638,510 performance rights), reflecting a refreshed incentive framework aligned with construction, financing, and operational milestones. On a net basis, the reset results in a modest increase of roughly five million performance rights while resetting vesting conditions and timelines.

What This Means for Investors

Taken together, these disclosures point to a capital structure transitioning from project-financing mode toward execution readiness. HPPL’s enlarged position enhances register stability and strategic alignment, while the completion of the SPP without placing a formal shortfall reduces immediate retail dilution uncertainty—even as broader funding questions remain. The incentive reset further aligns management with the next phase of value creation as Nolans approaches its most capital-intensive and operationally complex stage.

Whether these structural improvements translate into timely delivery at Nolans remains the critical test. That said, ownership concentration, funding visibility, and governance alignment have clearly tightened, marking an important inflection point for Arafura as a major rare earths developer moving toward production.

© 2025 Rare Earth Exchanges™ – Accelerating Transparency, Accuracy, and Insight Across the Rare Earth & Critical Minerals Supply Chain.

• Critical Metals Corp (CRML) acquired a 300-500 kg/hour pilot plant for approximately A$3M to validate rare earth separation processes for its proposed Romania refinery joint venture, with commissioning targeted for Q2 2026.
• The company appointed Professor Tony Tang as an independent metallurgical reviewer, addressing the chemistry and processing challenges where most Western rare earth projects fail.
• CRML is tackling downstream refining risk before completing mine development, which is a strategic reversal that addresses Europe's critical gap in proven rare earth processing capabilities rather than deposits.

Critical Metals Corp (opens in a new tab) (Nasdaq: CRML) has confirmed the acquisition of a 300–500 kg/hour proof-of-concept pilot plant, aimed at supporting a proposed refinery joint venture in Romania. The price—about A$3 million—is modest by mining standards, but the intent is not. Pilot plants are where rare earth dreams either harden into process flowsheets or quietly fail. In that sense, this announcement matters more than many glossy resource updates.

The company has also appointed Professor Tony Tang as an independent reviewer of metallurgical test work and process design. That decision, while understated, is consequential. Rare earth processing is where most Western projects stumble—not in geology, but in chemistry.

What Holds Up Under Scrutiny

The facts are straightforward and credible. A pilot plant at this scale is appropriate for validating separation pathways, reagent behavior, recoveries, and impurity management—the real bottlenecks in rare earth refining. Commissioning in Q2 2026 is realistic, not rushed. The use of an external metallurgical reviewer signals an awareness of past industry failures where internal optimism outran chemistry.

CRML’s flagship Tanbreez project in southern Greenland is legitimately large by global standards and benefits from year-round deep-water access—an underappreciated logistical advantage. Pairing a Greenland deposit with a European refining footprint aligns with EU strategic goals: shorten supply chains, reduce Chinese dependency, and keep value-added steps onshore.

Where the Narrative Runs Ahead

The announcement leans into phrases like “leading mining development company” and “reliable supplier,” language common in investor materials but premature. A pilot plant does not equal commercial separation, let alone magnet-grade output. The Romania refinery remains a JV concept, not a funded facility. Investors should read this as process validation, not production certainty.

There is also quite a conflation between lithium and rare earth narratives. While Wolfsberg is a genuine lithium asset, lithium success does not de-risk rare earth processing. These are chemically and operationally different businesses.

Why This Is Still Notable

What stands out is sequencing. CRML is not waiting to finish mine development before tackling downstream risk. In rare earths, that is backward thinking done right. Europe does not suffer from a lack of deposits; it suffers from a lack of proven processing. Pilot plants are how that gap closes—or is exposed.

©!-- /wp:paragraph -->

• ANSTO is constructing Australia's first open-access rare earth processing facility for clay-hosted deposits, scheduled for 2026.
• The facility will allow emerging companies to conduct hydrometallurgical testing without building their own plants.
• Australian Rare Earths' Koppamurra project will be the inaugural user, representing Australia's first large-scale ion-adsorption clay rare earth proposal.
• The Koppamurra project faces significant landholder opposition and lacks mining licenses.
• The taxpayer-financed facility aims to break Australia's dependence on China for midstream rare earth processing.
• Questions remain about refining capabilities, customer access, Australia-first priorities, and offtake agreements.

Australia—already the world’s fourth-largest rare earth producer—has long lived with a strategic contradiction: prodigious resources but dependence on China for midstream processing. A new development reported by ABC (opens in a new tab) marks a serious attempt to close that gap. The Australian Nuclear Science and Technology Organisation (ANSTO) (opens in a new tab) is now constructing what is believed to be the country’s first common-use processing facility for clay-hosted rare earths, scheduled to come online in 2026. This would be a taxpayer-financed rare earth refinery.

Unlike mine-specific pilot plants, this state-owned facility will operate as open infrastructure. Emerging companies can walk in, bring their clay samples, and immediately begin hydrometallurgical testwork—no bespoke plant, no long delays, and no millions spent reinventing the same machinery. ANSTO is correct in emphasizing the importance of this integrated approach; without a midstream hub, Australia cannot meaningfully compete with China’s processing dominance.

The Koppamurra Test Case—and the Fault Line Beneath It

Australian Rare Earths (AR3 (opens in a new tab)) will be the facility’s inaugural user. Its Koppamurra project—the country’s first large-scale ion-adsorption clay (IAC) rare earth proposal—sits in South Australia’s Wrattonbully region. AR3’s scoping study was approved this month, and management is open about its dependence on ANSTO to “de-risk” the path toward commercialization.

The facts here are solid: Koppamurra is clay-hosted, not hard-rock; the company does not yet have a mining license; and farmers in the project footprint are voicing significant concerns about land use, soil health, and long-term agricultural identity. These tensions are real, not speculative. As is true across the global IAC landscape, the promise of lower-impact mining is often met with skepticism on the ground—particularly in fertile regions that pride themselves on generational stewardship.

Rare Earth Exchanges (REEx) was in touch with ANSTO’s media manager Kellie McCourt who confirmed the situation.  Ms. McCourt will be sending a separate statement REEx will use for a follow up article.  REEx also sent an email to AR3 for any comments.

AR3’s insistence on regulatory compliance is factual, but it skirts around the deeper community unease: many landowners view rare earth policy momentum in Canberra and state capitals as making approval inevitable, whether or not social license keeps pace.

What is ANSTO

ANSTO (Australian Nuclear Science and Technology Organisation) is Australia's national nuclear research organization, a public body using nuclear science for health, environment, and industry, operating major facilities like the OPAL reactor and Australian Synchrotron, producing nuclear medicines, advising the government, and providing national scientific expertise and infrastructure for researchers. 

Why This Matters for Rare Earth Investors

Australia’s clay deposits—if proven economic—could become a scalable non-Chinese supply for magnet-grade rare earths. But investors should carefully interpret this announcement. The facility is real; the processing pathway is credible; the geological potential is large. Yet Koppamurra is early stage, landholder resistance is strong, and Australia has yet to deliver a commercial IAC project.

The pilot plant is a breakthrough. A mine is not yet a certainty.

What are some questions we have?

• Will they refine rare earth oxides?
• Will it be Australia first given it seems a taxpayer financed effort?
• What companies/organizations are customers?
• What about offtake agreements in place?

More to come!

© 2025 Rare Earth Exchanges™ – Accelerating Transparency, Accuracy, and Insight Across the Rare Earth & Critical Minerals Supply Chain.

• ANSTO is constructing Australia's first taxpayer-financed, common-use rare earth processing facility for clay-hosted deposits, set to open in 2026 to reduce dependence on China for midstream processing.
• Australian Rare Earths' Koppamurra project will be the inaugural user of the facility, representing Australia's first large-scale ion-adsorption clay rare earth proposal despite lacking a mining license.
• While the processing facility marks a breakthrough in Australia's rare earth supply chain, significant landholder resistance and community concerns about agricultural land use threaten project viability.

Australia—already the world’s fourth-largest rare earth producer—has long lived with a strategic contradiction: prodigious resources but dependence on China for midstream processing. A new development reported by ABC (opens in a new tab) marks a serious attempt to close that gap. The Australian Nuclear Science and Technology Organisation (ANSTO) (opens in a new tab) is now constructing what is believed to be the country’s first common-use processing facility for clay-hosted rare earths, scheduled to come online in 2026. This would be a taxpayer-financed rare earth refinery.

Unlike mine-specific pilot plants, this state-owned facility will operate as open infrastructure. Emerging companies can walk in, bring their clay samples, and immediately begin hydrometallurgical testwork—no bespoke plant, no long delays, and no millions spent reinventing the same machinery. ANSTO is correct in emphasizing the importance of this integrated approach; without a midstream hub, Australia cannot meaningfully compete with China’s processing dominance.

The Koppamurra Test Case—and the Fault Line Beneath It

Australian Rare Earths (AR3 (opens in a new tab)) will be the facility’s inaugural user. Its Koppamurra project—the country’s first large-scale ion-adsorption clay (IAC) rare earth proposal—sits in South Australia’s Wrattonbully region. AR3’s scoping study was approved this month, and management is open about its dependence on ANSTO to “de-risk” the path toward commercialization.

The facts here are solid: Koppamurra is clay-hosted, not hard-rock; the company does not yet have a mining license; and farmers in the project footprint are voicing significant concerns about land use, soil health, and long-term agricultural identity. These tensions are real, not speculative. As is true across the global IAC landscape, the promise of lower-impact mining is often met with skepticism on the ground—particularly in fertile regions that pride themselves on generational stewardship.

Rare Earth Exchanges (REEx) was in touch with ANSTO’s media manager, Kellie McCourt, who confirmed the situation.  Ms. McCourt will be sending a separate statement that REEx will use for a follow-up article.  REEx also sent an email to AR3 for any comments.

AR3’s insistence on regulatory compliance is factual, but it skirts around the deeper community unease: many landowners view rare earth policy momentum in Canberra and state capitals as making approval inevitable, whether or not social license keeps pace.

What is ANSTO

ANSTO (Australian Nuclear Science and Technology Organisation) is Australia's national nuclear research organization, a public body using nuclear science for health, environment, and industry, operating major facilities like the OPAL reactor and Australian Synchrotron, producing nuclear medicines, advising the government, and providing national scientific expertise and infrastructure for researchers. 

Why This Matters for Rare Earth Investors

Australia’s clay deposits—if proven economically—could become a scalable non-Chinese supply for magnet-grade rare earths. But investors should carefully interpret this announcement. The facility is real; the processing pathway is credible; the geological potential is large. Yet Koppamurra is an early stage, landholder resistance is strong, and Australia has yet to deliver a commercial IAC project.

The pilot plant is a breakthrough. A mine is not yet a certainty.

What are some questions we have?

• Will they refine rare earth oxides?
• Will it be Australia's first, given it seems a taxpayer-financed effort?
• What companies/organizations are customers?
• What about offtake agreements in place?

More to come!

© 2025 Rare Earth Exchanges™ – Accelerating Transparency, Accuracy, and Insight Across the Rare Earth & Critical Minerals Supply Chain.

• ANSTO is constructing Australia's first taxpayer-financed, common-use rare earth processing facility for clay-hosted deposits, set to open in 2026 to reduce dependence on China for midstream processing.
• Australian Rare Earths' Koppamurra project will be the inaugural user of the facility, representing Australia's first large-scale ion-adsorption clay rare earth proposal despite lacking a mining license.
• While the processing facility marks a breakthrough in Australia's rare earth supply chain, significant landholder resistance and community concerns about agricultural land use threaten project viability.

Australia—already the world’s fourth-largest rare earth producer—has long lived with a strategic contradiction: prodigious resources but dependence on China for midstream processing. A new development reported by ABC (opens in a new tab) marks a serious attempt to close that gap. The Australian Nuclear Science and Technology Organisation (ANSTO) (opens in a new tab) is now constructing what is believed to be the country’s first common-use processing facility for clay-hosted rare earths, scheduled to come online in 2026. This would be a taxpayer-financed rare earth refinery.

Unlike mine-specific pilot plants, this state-owned facility will operate as open infrastructure. Emerging companies can walk in, bring their clay samples, and immediately begin hydrometallurgical testwork—no bespoke plant, no long delays, and no millions spent reinventing the same machinery. ANSTO is correct in emphasizing the importance of this integrated approach; without a midstream hub, Australia cannot meaningfully compete with China’s processing dominance.

The Koppamurra Test Case—and the Fault Line Beneath It

Australian Rare Earths (AR3 (opens in a new tab)) will be the facility’s inaugural user. Its Koppamurra project—the country’s first large-scale ion-adsorption clay (IAC) rare earth proposal—sits in South Australia’s Wrattonbully region. AR3’s scoping study was approved this month, and management is open about its dependence on ANSTO to “de-risk” the path toward commercialization.

The facts here are solid: Koppamurra is clay-hosted, not hard-rock; the company does not yet have a mining license; and farmers in the project footprint are voicing significant concerns about land use, soil health, and long-term agricultural identity. These tensions are real, not speculative. As is true across the global IAC landscape, the promise of lower-impact mining is often met with skepticism on the ground—particularly in fertile regions that pride themselves on generational stewardship.

Rare Earth Exchanges (REEx) was in touch with ANSTO’s media manager, Kellie McCourt, who confirmed the situation.  Ms. McCourt will be sending a separate statement that REEx will use for a follow-up article.  REEx also sent an email to AR3 for any comments.

AR3’s insistence on regulatory compliance is factual, but it skirts around the deeper community unease: many landowners view rare earth policy momentum in Canberra and state capitals as making approval inevitable, whether or not social license keeps pace.

What is ANSTO

ANSTO (Australian Nuclear Science and Technology Organisation) is Australia's national nuclear research organization, a public body using nuclear science for health, environment, and industry, operating major facilities like the OPAL reactor and Australian Synchrotron, producing nuclear medicines, advising the government, and providing national scientific expertise and infrastructure for researchers. 

Why This Matters for Rare Earth Investors

Australia’s clay deposits—if proven economically—could become a scalable non-Chinese supply for magnet-grade rare earths. But investors should carefully interpret this announcement. The facility is real; the processing pathway is credible; the geological potential is large. Yet Koppamurra is an early stage, landholder resistance is strong, and Australia has yet to deliver a commercial IAC project.

The pilot plant is a breakthrough. A mine is not yet a certainty.

What are some questions we have?

• Will they refine rare earth oxides?
• Will it be Australia's first, given it seems a taxpayer-financed effort?
• What companies/organizations are customers?
• What about offtake agreements in place?

More to come!

© 2025 Rare Earth Exchanges™ – Accelerating Transparency, Accuracy, and Insight Across the Rare Earth & Critical Minerals Supply Chain.

• Lindian Resources (ASX: LIN) has secured approximately A$5.0 million through underwriting of 17.8 million unexercised options at A$0.30, executed by Petra Capital with a 6% fee structure.
• The underwriting provides working capital runway for drilling and permitting activities, though it represents short-term funding rather than transformative project financing for mine construction.
• Settlement scheduled for December 18-19, 2025, with minimal share dilution under ASX Listing Rule 7.2.
• This arrangement reflects institutional engagement amid tightening funding conditions for early-stage rare earth projects.

Lindian Resources Ltd. (ASX: LIN) has announced the successful underwriting of approximately A$5.0 million in unexercised options due to expire today, marking a modest but meaningful capital reinforcement at a critical moment for the company’s rare earth ambitions. The underwriting—executed by Petra Capital Pty Ltd—covers roughly 17.8 million remaining options priced at A$0.30.

This announcement, while routine on the surface, carries strategic importance given the capital-intensive nature of rare earth project development and the increasingly selective appetite of institutional investors across the sector.

A Vote of Confidence or a Safety Net? Reading the Signal Behind the Underwriting

Lindian frames the underwriting as evidence of “market support” and opportunity for institutional investors to increase their holdings. That claim is directionally fair: an underwritten options conversion ensures the company receives the cash, even if retail or existing holders decline to exercise. But underwriting also functions as a backstop—a protective mechanism to avoid capital shortfalls.

In other words, this is both support and safety net, and investors should see both sides clearly.

The fee structure—6% (2% management, 4% underwriting)—is conventional for ASX small-cap resource companies, reinforcing that nothing here is irregular or suggestive of distress.

Why This Matters for the Rare Earth Sector

Lindian is one of several ASX-listed heavy rare earth hopefuls vying to prove they can transition from exploration success to project financing and construction. In that landscape, even relatively small capital inflows matter. A$5 million does not build a separation plant—nowhere close—but it does provide runway for drilling, engineering updates, or permitting progress.

The underwriting also signals that Lindian continues to maintain institutional relationships at a time when funding windows for early-stage rare earth projects are tightening due to geopolitical volatility and rising cost-of-capital pressures.

A Few Realities Investors Should Keep in View

• This is not project financing. It is short-term working capital, not a decisive step toward mine construction.
• Underwriting does not equal broad market enthusiasm. It reflects commitment from one institutional underwriter, not necessarily a sector-wide re-rating.
• Timing matters. With options expiring and markets volatile, underwriting avoids a capital gap that could have weighed on near-term momentum.
• Share dilution is minimal. Shares issued as part of the shortfall fall under ASX Listing Rule 7.2 (Exception 10), meaning no shareholder approval is required and placement capacity is unaffected.

Lindian’s board has authorized the ASX release, with settlement of shortfall shares scheduled for 18 December 2025 and issuance around 19 December 2025.

Conclusion: A Practical Win, Not a Transformative One

This underwriting is a stability event, not a valuation catalyst. Still, in a market where rare earth equities have struggled to raise even modest sums, Lindian securing a guaranteed A$5 million reflects credible institutional engagement. For investors, the key question remains: Can Lindian convert incremental capital wins into large-scale project funding? Today’s announcement answers only part of that equation.

© 2025 Rare Earth Exchanges™ – Accelerating Transparency, Accuracy, and Insight Across the Rare Earth & Critical Minerals Supply Chain.

• Lindian Resources (ASX: LIN) has secured approximately A$5.0 million through underwriting of 17.8 million unexercised options at A$0.30, executed by Petra Capital with a 6% fee structure.
• The underwriting provides working capital runway for drilling and permitting activities, though it represents short-term funding rather than transformative project financing for mine construction.
• Settlement scheduled for December 18-19, 2025, with minimal share dilution under ASX Listing Rule 7.2.
• This arrangement reflects institutional engagement amid tightening funding conditions for early-stage rare earth projects.

Lindian Resources Ltd. (ASX: LIN) has announced the successful underwriting of approximately A$5.0 million in unexercised options due to expire today, marking a modest but meaningful capital reinforcement at a critical moment for the company’s rare earth ambitions. The underwriting—executed by Petra Capital Pty Ltd—covers roughly 17.8 million remaining options priced at A$0.30.

This announcement, while routine on the surface, carries strategic importance given the capital-intensive nature of rare earth project development and the increasingly selective appetite of institutional investors across the sector.

A Vote of Confidence or a Safety Net? Reading the Signal Behind the Underwriting

Lindian frames the underwriting as evidence of “market support” and opportunity for institutional investors to increase their holdings. That claim is directionally fair: an underwritten options conversion ensures the company receives the cash, even if retail or existing holders decline to exercise. But underwriting also functions as a backstop—a protective mechanism to avoid capital shortfalls.

In other words, this is both support and safety net, and investors should see both sides clearly.

The fee structure—6% (2% management, 4% underwriting)—is conventional for ASX small-cap resource companies, reinforcing that nothing here is irregular or suggestive of distress.

Why This Matters for the Rare Earth Sector

Lindian is one of several ASX-listed heavy rare earth hopefuls vying to prove they can transition from exploration success to project financing and construction. In that landscape, even relatively small capital inflows matter. A$5 million does not build a separation plant—nowhere close—but it does provide runway for drilling, engineering updates, or permitting progress.

The underwriting also signals that Lindian continues to maintain institutional relationships at a time when funding windows for early-stage rare earth projects are tightening due to geopolitical volatility and rising cost-of-capital pressures.

A Few Realities Investors Should Keep in View

• This is not project financing. It is short-term working capital, not a decisive step toward mine construction.
• Underwriting does not equal broad market enthusiasm. It reflects commitment from one institutional underwriter, not necessarily a sector-wide re-rating.
• Timing matters. With options expiring and markets volatile, underwriting avoids a capital gap that could have weighed on near-term momentum.
• Share dilution is minimal. Shares issued as part of the shortfall fall under ASX Listing Rule 7.2 (Exception 10), meaning no shareholder approval is required and placement capacity is unaffected.

Lindian’s board has authorized the ASX release, with settlement of shortfall shares scheduled for 18 December 2025 and issuance around 19 December 2025.

Conclusion: A Practical Win, Not a Transformative One

This underwriting is a stability event, not a valuation catalyst. Still, in a market where rare earth equities have struggled to raise even modest sums, Lindian securing a guaranteed A$5 million reflects credible institutional engagement. For investors, the key question remains: Can Lindian convert incremental capital wins into large-scale project funding? Today’s announcement answers only part of that equation.

© 2025 Rare Earth Exchanges™ – Accelerating Transparency, Accuracy, and Insight Across the Rare Earth & Critical Minerals Supply Chain.