• Geographer Julie Klinger argues the U.S. could meet rare earth demand through recycling mine waste and electronics rather than opening new mines.
• Her case overlooks critical scale and timing challenges.
• Recycling rates remain below 1% globally, and recovered materials still require the same processing infrastructure dominated by China.
• Recycling is a complement to, not a replacement for, domestic refining capacity.
• The real solution requires unglamorous capital investment in processing capacity first.
• This should be paired with recycling and selective mining.
• Waste recovery should not be treated as a shortcut past the supply chain’s hardest step.

In a February 6 opinion essay (opens in a new tab) in The New York Times, geographer Julie Michelle Klinger (opens in a new tab) contends that fears of China’s rare-earth dominance are exaggerated. She argues that the United States could meet most of its demand by recovering rare earths from mine waste, industrial scrap, and discarded electronics, rather than opening new mines. Mining, she suggests, is slow, environmentally risky, and often unnecessary; recycling and domestic processing should take priority.

Where the Essay Is Solid

Several core points are accurate. Rare earths are not geologically scarce. China’s dominance is concentrated in processing, not in exclusive access to ore. Western nations did, over decades, outsource hazardous and capital-intensive refining to China, eroding domestic expertise. And recycling rates for rare earths remain below 1% globally, an undeniable inefficiency.

Klinger is also right to puncture repeated mining hype—from Greenland to the deep seabed—that has produced headlines rather than durable supply.

Where the Case Breaks Down

The problem is scale and timing. Recycling and waste recovery are necessary—but nowhere near sufficient in the near-to-medium term. Rare earths are used in tiny quantities, embedded in complex products, and locked into magnets and alloys that are expensive and chemically intensive to separate. The U.S. lacks industrial-scale collection, disassembly, and solvent-extraction infrastructure to turn theory into tonnage.

Claims that the U.S. could meet “most” of its needs through waste recovery rest on theoretical resource estimates, not operating systems. “Recoverable” does not mean recoverable economically, at purity, at scale, and on schedule—especially for heavy rare earths such as dysprosium and terbium, which are essential for defense systems and EV drivetrains.

The Missing Middle Everyone Avoids

Ironically, the essay concedes the key truth and then glides past it. Processing is the bottleneck—and recycling does not bypass it. Scrap still must be separated, refined, metallized, and qualified. Without domestic solvent extraction, metal-making, and magnet manufacturing, recycling simply feeds the same choke point China already dominates.

REEx Take

Recycling is a pillar, not a panacea. Treating it as an alternative to mining and processing risks repeating the very mistake that created today’s dependency: confusing material abundance with supply security. The real solution is unglamorous and capital-intensive—processing capacity first, paired with recycling and selective mining.

The New York Times is right to challenge mining mythology. It is wrong to suggest the hardest step can be skipped.

Source: The New York Times, Opinion

• The Trump administration has elevated critical minerals to a core national security priority, backing it with the $12 billion Project Vault and new initiatives like FORGE to build a geopolitically selective mining ecosystem with allies.
• Chatham House warns that the biggest risk isn’t production capacity but policy credibility across administrations—mines take 10-15 years to mature, and investors need assurance that strategies will outlive presidencies.
• Proposed price floors and preferential trade zones aim to protect allied producers from predatory pricing, creating a hierarchical system favoring close security partners like Japan and Australia over higher-risk resource-rich nations.

The United States has launched its boldest effort yet to break dependence on China’s critical minerals, but a new analysis (opens in a new tab) from British thinktank Chatham House argues the real challenge is time. Speaking after the February 4 Critical Minerals Ministerial in Washington, senior fellow Christopher Vandome says the Trump administration has proved it is serious—but not yet that its policy will last long enough for investors to commit billions to projects that take 10–15 years to mature.

What the U.S. Is Getting Right

Vandome’s assessment is clear-eyed on one point: this is not a race to out-produce China. The U.S. is instead trying to build a geopolitically selective mining and processingecosystem, prioritizing access over volume. Invitations at the summitexplicitly urged allies to join a preferential trade zone guaranteeing American access to critical minerals across the bloc.

That framing reflects reality. With more than 30 national critical-minerals strategies worldwide, the U.S. is the first to elevate minerals to a core foreign policy and national security priority, backing rhetoric with real money—most notably the $12 billion Project Vault stockpile and expanded use of export-credit and development finance.

Where the Risk Creeps In

The article’s central warning is about credibility across administrations. Mines and separation plants outlive presidencies. Vandome argues that public criticism by J. D. Vance and Marco Rubio of Biden-era policies risks signaling that a future government could unwind Trump’s interventions—exactly thescenario that spooks capital and strands assets.

 This is not speculation; it is standard mining economics. Investors price political durability as heavily as geology.

FORGE, Price Floors, and a ‘Club’ with Rules

The new FORGE initiative (Forum on Resource Geostrategic Engagement) and proposed mineral price floors as reported by Rare Earth Exchanges™ aim to stabilize flows and protect allied producers from predatory pricing. Vandome rightly notes this will create a hierarchical club: closest U.S. security partners—Japan, Australia, South Korea—will see deeper processing investment than higher-risk jurisdictions like the DRC, even if the latter hold vast resources.

That may offend purists. It may also be unavoidable.

 Why This Matters for Rare Earths

Rare earths are downstream-dominated. Redirecting supply without building separation, metals, and magnet capacity simply reshuffles dependency. Vandome’s analysis reinforces a core REEx view: policy scale matters, but bureaucratic permanence matters more. Agencies, mandates, and interlocking interests are what make strategies survive elections.

REEx Take

The U.S. has moved from talk to architecture. The next test is endurance. In rare earths, credibility compounds—or collapses—slowly. Washington has lit the furnace. Investors are watching to see if it stays on.

Profile

Chatham House—formally The Royal Institute of International Affairs—is a century-old London think tank founded in 1920 and headquartered at 10 St James’s Square. It is best known globally for the “Chatham House Rule,” a non-attribution convention designed to encourage frank discussion by allowing participants to use information shared in meetings without identifying speakers. Today it operates as a membership-based institution (roughly 6,000 members) with research programs spanning global economy and finance, international security, international law, climate/environment, and regional geopolitics. It is widely regarded as an influential convening platform for government, business, and civil-society leaders—while also drawing periodic criticism for perceived establishment alignment and questions about funding transparency.

Source: Chatham House (UK)

• MST Access reports Energy Fuels' acquisition of Australian Strategic Materials could create one of the most complete ex-China rare earth supply chains by combining U.S. separation assets with proven metallization capabilities.
• The deal addresses China's downstream dominance in rare earth processing—separation, metallisation, and alloying—rather than upstream mining, creating a credible 'mine-to-metals' Western alternative.
• Expansion plans target 6,000 tonnes per year of NdPr by 2028-2029, though execution risks include high capital intensity, regulatory approvals, and China's continued market influence through pricing controls.

In a detailed February 2026 research report (opens in a new tab), analyst Chris Drew of MST Access examines Energy Fuels’ agreement to acquire Australian Strategic Materials (ASM (opens in a new tab))—a transaction the author argues could create one of the most complete ex-China rare earth supply chains in the Western world. The deal, structured as a Scheme of Arrangement and expected to close by mid-2026, combines Energy Fuels’ U.S. feedstock and separation assets with ASM’s proven metallization and alloying capabilities, directly targeting China’s long-standing dominance in rare earth processing

How the Study Was Conducted

MST Access’s report is an equity research analysis rather than a laboratory study. It synthesizes company disclosures, feasibility studies, balance-sheet data, and project timelines to assess the strategic logic and risks of the acquisition. The analysis tracks assets across the full rare earth value chain—mining, separation, metallisation, and alloying—and evaluates whether the combined entity can realistically deliver at scale outside China.

Key Findings: Where the Leverage Really Lies

The report’s central conclusion is straightforward: China’s advantage is downstream, not upstream. While rare earth ores exist globally, China controls the most difficult stages—separation, metallisation, and alloy production. Energy Fuels provides feedstock supply and separation capacity at its White Mesa Mill in Utah, which currently produces light rare earths and is piloting heavy rare earth separation. ASM contributes something far rarer in the West: commercial-scale metallization and alloying, already operating at its Korean Metals Plant and planned for duplication in the United States.

According to MST, this combination creates a “mine-to-metals” platform capable of delivering rare earth metals and alloys without relying on Chinese processors—an industrial configuration few Western firms can currently match.

Implications for the China Monopoly

For policymakers and investors, the implication is not that China’s monopoly is broken—but that a credible alternative pathway is emerging. The report highlights planned expansions at White Mesa, including a Phase 2 project targeting up to 6,000 tonnes per year of NdPr and meaningful quantities of dysprosium and terbium, contingent on financing and construction timelines. If executed, this would materially reduce Western exposure at the most sensitive processing stages.

Limitations and Open Risks

The analysis is candid about constraints. Most expansion plans extend to 2028–2029, underscoring that rare earth processing capacity cannot be built overnight. Capital intensity is high, regulatory approvals remain pending, and China retains the ability to influence markets through pricing and export controls. The report also notes that the successful integration of ASM’s assets and the completion of the acquisition are critical execution risks.

Conclusion

MST Access’s study does not claim a silver bullet. Instead, it documents a structural response to China’s dominance in rare earths: vertical integration across feedstock, separation, and alloying within allied jurisdictions. If delivered as outlined, the Energy Fuels–ASM combination would mark one of the most tangible Western efforts yet to compete where China has been strongest for decades.

Source: MST Access, “Fueling Up: Energy Fuels to Acquire ASM,” February 4, 2026

• U.S. rare earth production surged from 4,300 to 8,900 metric tons in 2025, but import reliance rose to 67% despite domestic gains, signaling continued fragility.
• Heavy rare earths like dysprosium and terbium remain 100% import-dependent with no commercial-scale U.S. production, creating a strategic bottleneck for defense and EV applications.
• Record concentrate production of 51,000 metric tons masks the real challenge: downstream separation, metal-making, and magnet manufacturing capacity remain critically underdeveloped.

The U.S. rare earth story is finally moving in the right direction, and the latest U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) Mineral Commodity Summaries 2026 data (opens in a new tab) reinforce that. But the same tables also deliver a sobering message for investors and policymakers: the U.S. is building capacity—not yet command. The headline numbers look encouraging, yet the most strategic segments of the supply chain remain thin, import-exposed, and vulnerable to shocks. Note American treasure trove MP Materials is producing the vast bulk of the output as of the end of 2025.

What the USGS Numbers Say—and What They Don’t

USGS reports a sharp jump in U.S. production of rare-earth compounds and metals (expressed in rare-earth oxide equivalent) from 4,300 metric tons in 2024 to an estimated 8,900 metric tons in 2025. That is meaningful progress. It reflects years of capital, permitting, and operational learning, finally showing up in national statistics.

But investors should avoid a common translation error: “compounds and metals (REO equivalent)” does not automatically mean full-spectrum, separated, market-ready oxides across the board. It can include mixed or intermediate chemical forms reported as REO-equivalent for consistency. Treating the figure as proof of complete refining independence overstates what the data can support.

Import Reliance Fell—Then Rose Again

Another misunderstood talking point is “import reliance was cut in half.”  Directionally, yes: net import reliance fell from over 90% in 2023 to 53% in 2024, then rose to 67% in 2025, even as domestic output increased. That reversal matters. It suggests the system is still fragile, dependent on trade flows, and not yet structurally de-risked.

USGS also flags a major blind spot: rare earths embedded in imported finished goods—motors, magnets, electronics—can make headline import metrics look safer than real exposure.

The Hard Wall: Heavy Rare Earths

Here is the strategic cliff: heavy rare earths remain 100% net import reliant. USGS indicates that while minerals containing heavy rare-earth elements may be mined domestically, there was no sustained commercial-scale production of heavy rare-earth compounds or metals in 2025. That’s the choke point. Dysprosium and terbium are essential for high-coercivity magnets used in defense systems, drones, EV drivetrains, and industrial motors. Progress on light rare earths does not substitute for this gap.

Concentrate Records Aren’t the Finish Line

The USGS also reports a record mineral concentrate production of 51,000 metric tons of REO in 2025 (up from 45,500 in 2024). That’s real momentum—upstream. But strategic leverage comes downstream: separation, metal-making, alloying, magnet qualification, and manufacturing at scale. Those layers remain the U.S. bottleneck—especially for heavies.

A Reality Check from the Ore Body

In background discussions, one major U.S. producer, our American treasure trove MP Materials,  has emphasized a blunt truth: the ore body drives the mix. Roughly ~80%+ of many concentrates can be cerium and lanthanum—high-volume but low-value products in persistent oversupply—while NdPr is the economic engine. MP Materials sells NdPr oxide (not separated Nd and Pr), because most modern magnet recipes accept NdPr oxide and the natural Nd:Pr ratio typically fits market specs. On heavies, as _Rare Earth Exchanges_™ has pointed out, the company’s SEG+ stream includes ~4% dysprosium and terbium on a total rare earth oxide basis—small by percentage, meaningful by absolute volume when paired with high head grade and third-party feedstocks.  See the company’s literature (opens in a new tab).

REEx Take

The USGS data support optimism—but only disciplined optimism. The U.S. is building a foundation it did not have five years ago. But use of the word “de-risked” is still premature. Embedded imports mask real exposure. Heavy rare earths remain the strategic cliff. And downstream capability—not concentrate tonnage—will decide whether America’s rare earth comeback becomes durable.

See the latest USGS report (opens in a new tab).

• The US launched a 54-nation summit excluding China.
• Aim: Reduce dependence on Chinese critical mineral processing.
• Methods: Preferred trading blocs, reference pricing, and new resource agreements.
• China currently holds 90% dominance in refining.
• Policy framework acknowledges urgent need for rebuilding Western processing capacity.
• Risk: Enforcing price floors across fragmented democracies may lead to higher input costs.
• Higher costs could potentially strengthen China's competitive advantage.
• Investors should focus on monitoring processing plants, magnet factories, and binding offtake agreements.
• Political announcements are less significant compared to the real indicators.
• Supply security is incomplete without engaging the dominant processor.

By February 4, 2026, the United States unveiled a sweeping plan to reduce dependence on China for critical minerals by forming a preferred trading bloc with allies, introducing reference prices and potential price floors, and signing new resource agreements. The goal: protect Western supply chains from low-cost competition and improve long-term security. The idea is bold—but execution remains uncertain, especially given China’s near-total dominance in mineral processing.

At the Washington summit—attended by representatives from 54 countries and the EU—China was absent. That absence may be symbolic, but it is also the plan’s central vulnerability.

Where Reality Backs the Rhetoric

The factual core is solid. China dominates roughly 60% of global rare earth mining and close to 90% of separation, refining, and downstream processing. This is not merely a mining issue; it is an industrial one. Western nations, particularly in Europe, have allowed processing capacity to atrophy—an erosion explicitly flagged by the European Court of Auditors.

Matthias Rüth, Managing Director of TRADIUM GmbH (opens in a new tab)

In this context, comments from Matthias Rüth, Managing Director of TRADIUM GmbH (opens in a new tab), align with industry reality: processing expertise accumulated over decades cannot be rebuilt on a political timetable.

Where Policy Starts Floating Free of Hardware

Minimum price mechanisms and reference pricing sound orderly, but commodity markets are neither static nor obedient. Enforcing price floors across multiple value-chain stages would require sustained coordination, compliance, and enforcement—historically rare in fragmented democracies.

Tariffs as an enforcement backstop risk collateral damage. Higher input costs for downstream manufacturers may undermine the very industries the policy aims to protect, inadvertently reinforcing China’s competitive advantage in finished goods.

The Narrative Tilt No One Mentions

The proposal frames China primarily as a distortion to be countered, not a system to be reckoned with. This is a strategic choice—but also a bias. China’s absence from the summit does not reduce its leverage; it highlights it. Any near-term supply security strategy that excludes the dominant processor is, by definition, incomplete.

Why This Actually Matters

What’s notable is not the elegance of the framework—it’s the admission of urgency. Western governments are finally acknowledging that rare earth security requires industrial policy, capital discipline, and downstream rebuilding, not just new mines and friendly communiqués.

For investors, the signal is clear: watch processing plants, magnet factories, and binding offtake agreements—not speeches.

Source: TRADIUM Market Insight, February 6, 2026

• The US and UAE signed a framework to cooperate on critical minerals and rare earths.
• This partnership leverages American policy tools with Emirati investment capital to reduce dependence on China's dominance in mining and processing.
• China holds 70% of the mining and 90% of the processing control over these resources.
• The agreement is strategic but currently lacks concrete projects, such as named mines, tonnage commitments, or separation plants.
• Realistic timelines for building processing capacity are estimated at 5-7 years, even with funding.
• Gulf capital's speed and flexibility could potentially change the financing landscape for Western rare earth projects.
• However, financial investments alone won't solve the chemical and capacity challenges needed to reduce China's influence.

The United States and the United Arab Emirates have signed a framework to cooperate on critical minerals and rare earths, aiming to reduce reliance on China. Announced during a Washington ministerial hosted by U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio, the deal links U.S. tools, such as stockpiles, to the UAE’s strategic reserves and investment capacity. It builds on Pax Silica, a U.S.-led alliance focused on AI-related supply chains that the UAE joined earlier this year. In short, Washington brings policy, Abu Dhabi brings capital, and both hope to speed up non-Chinese supply chains.

What’s Real—and Worth Noting

This is a framework, not a treaty or project announcement. That matters. The agreement commits the two governments to coordinate policy, align public and private investment, and use existing tools to accelerate supply and processing. There are no named mines, no tonnage commitments, and no new separation plants—yet.

Still, the strategic intent is accurate and significant. China remains dominant—roughly 70% of rare earth mining and about 90% of processing—and U.S.officials now openly frame this as a national security risk. TheUAE’s role is not as a miner but as a financial and logistics hub, capable of deploying large, patient capital where Western projects often stall.

Where Optimism Runs Ahead of Physics

What the coverage gets right—but could emphasize more—is the time problem. Processing and separation capacity cannot be conjured by frameworks. Even with capital, building refineries, training operators, and achieving stable yields typically takes five to seven years. Stockpiles and forums buy time; they do not replace chemistry.

The newly announced FORGE initiative (Forum on Resource Geostrategic Engagement) sounds muscular, but enforcement mechanisms remain undefined. Without downstream buildout, coordination risks becoming declarative.

Why This Matters in Rare Earth Terms

The notable shift is in who shows up with money. Gulf capital—fast, flexible, and comfortable with long-duration bets—could shorten timelines for allied projects if paired with processing assets in the U.S. or friendly jurisdictions. That does not end China’s dominance, but it changes the financing equation, which has quietly been the West’s weakest link.

About the Source

The National is an Abu Dhabi–based English-language daily with strong access to Gulf policy and investment circles. Its reporting is generally pro-development and establishment-aligned—useful for understanding intent, while warranting scrutiny on execution.

REEx Take

This pact won’t crack China’srare earth grip overnight. But it signals something new: serious capital stepping onto the board. In rare earths, money doesn’t solve chemistry—but it decides who gets the chance to try.

Source: The National (UAE)

• U.S. proposes multilateral price floors for critical minerals to keep non-Chinese producers viable after China's 2024 export restrictions exposed supply chain vulnerabilities across defense, automotive, and semiconductor sectors.
• China controls over 90% of global rare earth processing capacity, with refining infrastructure requiring 5-7 years to build—making price defenses a time-buying measure rather than a structural solution.
• A temporary accommodation between U.S. and China on rare earth access is approaching expiration, with uncertain prospects for extension as Washington pushes allies like South Korea toward a more binding commercial framework.

After China temporarily restricted rare earth exports last year—jolting U.S. defense, automotive, semiconductor, and battery supply chains—Washington is proposing a multilateral trade bloc to blunt Beijing’s leverage. At a February 4 ministerial hosted by Secretary of State Marco Rubio, U.S. officials outlined a plan to defend minimum prices for critical minerals among allies, using tariffs or other measures if China undercuts markets. The objective is straightforward: keep non-Chinese producers economically viable long enough to scale.

What’s Firm—and What’s Still Vapor

Vice President J. D. Vance was unusually direct, arguing that volatile prices and alleged predatory underselling have made Western investment uneconomic. The proposal envisions price floors across production stages, triggered when market prices fall below agreed thresholds. Rubio linked the idea to complementary tools—strategic stockpiles such as Project Vault and coordinated public finance—to give the concept institutional weight.

These signals are real. So is the motivation: China’s export controls exposed how dependent the U.S. remains on rare earth inputs. What remains undefined are the mechanics—specific floor levels, enforcement rules, loss-sharing, and timelines aligned with industrial reality.

The Choke Point Everyone Knows—but Few Can Fix

Hankyoreh gets the central constraint right: refining and separation, not mining. China controls over 90% of global rare earth processing, built on decades of solvent-extraction expertise, precise temperature control, and skilled labor. The reporting notes that building refineries and achieving consistent yields typically takes five to seven years, making hopes for rapid stabilization optimistic at best. Price defenses can buy time; they cannot substitute for chemistry, engineers, and IP.

Allies in the Middle

South Korea’s position (opens in a new tab) captures the dilemma. Closer alignment with a U.S.-led bloc could reduce dependence on China and add resilience, but it carries economic and diplomatic trade-offs. Rubio praised Seoul’s leadership in the Minerals Security Partnership (MSP)—now potentially giving way to a more binding commercial framework—signaling Washington’s intent to move from coordination to enforcement.

About the Source

Hankyoreh is a major South Korean daily newspaper known for detailed foreign policy reporting and a progressive editorial stance. Its coverage often reflects allied concerns while scrutinizing U.S. strategy—useful context for readers weighing tone and emphasis.

REEx Take

This initiative is a credible counterpunch—but it risks overestimating what pricing policy can achieve without midstream muscle. Price floors buy time; processing capability wins markets. Until the West closes the refining gap, China’s dominance remains structural, not tactical.

At present, the United States and China are operating under a temporary accommodation on rare earths, following a limited reprieve granted by Beijing after last year’s export controls disrupted global supply chains. This arrangement has eased immediate pressure on select U.S. industries, but it is explicitly time-bound. As the deadline on this reprieve approaches, the path forward remains uncertain. Whether China extends, modifies, or withdraws this accommodation will have significant implications for pricing, availability, and downstream manufacturing resilience. Rare Earth Exchanges™ will monitor developments closely as the expiration window narrows and strategic signals from both governments emerge.

Source: Hankyoreh (South Korea)

• Baogang Group held key meetings signaling intensified Chinese Communist Party control over strategic rare-earth and steel industries through expanded anti-corruption enforcement and political supervision mechanisms.
• Leadership mandated embedding Xi Jinping's financial policies and party ideology across operations, treating discipline inspection as corporate governance rather than mere compliance.
• Western policymakers must recognize Chinese industrial suppliers as extensions of state power, where supply-chain risk is inseparable from CCP governance and national strategy execution.

China’s state-owned steel and rare-earth conglomerate Baogang Group has convened two senior leadership meetings that—taken together—signal a renewed push to tighten Chinese Communist Party (CCP) (opens in a new tab) control over a strategically important industrial platform with direct relevance to global rare-earth and heavy industry supply chains.

Anti-Corruption as a Governance Mechanism—Not Just Compliance

On February 5, Baogang held the 4th plenary session of its 9th Discipline Inspection Commission, combined with a 2026 party discipline, “clean governance,” anti-corruption work meeting, and a warning/education conference. The company’s messaging framed anti-corruption as an operational necessity for “high-quality development,” but the language and structure reflect something broader: discipline inspection as corporate governance and political command.

Baogang’s Party Secretary and Chairman Meng Fanying emphasized raising “political standing,” aligning thought and action with the central leadership’s assessment of conditions and priorities, and “putting power into the cage of a system of governance”—a well-known CCP governance phrase meaning tighter institutional constraint and control over decision-making. She also stressed advancing (full strict governance of the Party) as the condition for meeting the company’s goals in the “15th Five-Year” era.

The internal watchdog—Baogang’s Discipline Commission leadership—signaled that 2026 will bring deeper political supervision, expanded inspection mechanisms, and sustained “high-pressure” anti-corruption posture. In practice, that language typically denotes more enforcement leverage, more internal oversight, and less managerial autonomy in politically sensitive enterprises.

Ideology Moves Into Finance and Operations

A separate Baogang Party Standing Committee meeting the same day focused on implementing Xi Jinping’s recent speeches and policy guidance, including the “Chinese-style path to financial development” and building a “financial powerhouse.” Baogang’s leadership was directed to embed financial thinking into corporate management, while keeping CCP leadership “comprehensively” present across the business.

The meeting also reiterated priorities that look like ordinary modernization—intelligent manufacturing, digital transformation, and “new quality productive forces”—but anchored them in political compliance and centralized policy execution. The agenda also included strict emphasis on safety management and cadre selection, reinforcing that personnel, risk, and operational discipline remain inseparable from party control.

Why This Matters to the West

These meetings do not announce a new rare-earth export rule or a new quota. What they signal is arguably more important: China’s strategic suppliers are being further fused into the Party-state command structure. And this should be noted in the West and in America.

For U.S. and allied investors and policymakers, the implications are clear:

• Key Chinese industrial actors should be treated as extensions of state power, not purely commercial firms.
• “Anti-corruption” functions as control architecture—not merely transparency reform.
• Industrial upgrading, finance, safety, and personnel decisions are increasingly executed as policy instruments tied to national strategy.

As Western economies attempt to de-risk rare-earth dependence, Baogang’s messaging reinforces a hard reality: supply-chain risk is inseparable from CCP governance.

Disclosure / Disclaimer: This news item is derived from media published by a Chinese state-owned enterprise. All claims, priorities, and implications should be independently verified using non-state, third-party sources before being relied upon for investment, policy, or national-security analysis.

• Brazil's Serra Verde secured $565M DFC financing to expand its Pela Ema ionic clay project from 5,000 to 6,500 tpa TREO capacity, with a U.S. government equity option included.
• Serra Verde ended long-term Chinese offtake agreements in December 2025, joining MP Materials in reducing dependence on Shenghe Resources and pivoting to Western buyers.
• The project represents a rare Western de-risking win: already in commercial production with heavy rare earths (Dy, Tb, Y) critical for defense and EVs, outside Chinese control.

Brazil’s Serra Verde (opens in a new tab) has crossed a strategic threshold that many Western rare-earth projects never reach: commercial production, sovereign-backed financing, and a clean exit from long-dated Chinese offtake. This week, the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation (DFC) (opens in a new tab) confirmed a $565 million financing package for Serra Verde’s Pela Ema ionic clay project in Goiás, Brazil, including an option for the U.S. government to acquire an equity stake. Proceeds will refinance existing loans and fund Phase I optimization and expansion, lifting total rare earth oxide (TREO) capacity from 5,000 tpa to ~6,500 tpa by end-2027. Pela Ema entered commercial production in 2024.

Why This Deal Matters

This is not a greenfield promise. Pela Ema (opens in a new tab) already produces mixed rare earth carbonate (MREC) enriched in dysprosium (Dy), terbium (Tb), and yttrium (Y)—critical inputs for defense systems, EV traction motors, wind turbines, and advanced electronics. Ionic clay deposits are typically lower grade than hard-rock peers, but they offer faster ramp-up, simpler metallurgy, and steadier operating profiles—attributes increasingly prized by Western buyers seeking reliability over theoretical peak output.

From China to the Western Stack

The most consequential signal predates the financing. In December 2025, Serra Verde renegotiated and dramatically shortened its Chinese offtake agreements—originally expected to run roughly a decade—so that they now expire at the end of 2026. That move places Serra Verde alongside MP Materials (and more recently VHM Ltd) in stepping away from long-term dependence on Shenghe Resources. Over the past year, that shift has become a defining pattern as Western capital offers more attractive financing and faster downstream alignment.

What the U.S. Gets

For Washington, this is near-term leverage, not a ten-year option. Serra Verde delivers existing, scalable heavy rare earth supply outside China—precisely where U.S. vulnerabilities are most acute. With Chinese offtake ending this year, industry expectations are that new offtake agreements will be signed in 2026, likely with U.S. buyers or with processors in jurisdictions that already host separation capacity (e.g., Malaysia, Australia, Estonia, France).

Context: China Still Moves the Board

The backdrop underscores the stakes. Even as Western-backed projects consolidate, Shenghe finalized its acquisition of Peak Rare Earths and the Ngualla project in Tanzania in September 2025—a reminder that China continues to lock up upstream optionality even as some downstream contracts unwind.

REEx Take

This is what a credible rare-earth “de-risking” win looks like: producing asset, heavy rare earth mix, shortened China exposure, and Western capital with optional equity. Serra Verde won’t end China’s dominance—but it meaningfully narrows the gap where it matters most.

• In 2025, Baogang Electric delivered over 1,700 rare-earth permanent-magnet motors, marking China's shift from pilot programs to scaled industrial production in high-efficiency electric machinery.
• The company completed 39 motor models across seven product families.
• A new assembly workshop was opened, enabling standardized, professionalized manufacturing with full Chinese certifications for regulated markets.
• China demonstrates end-to-end rare-earth integration—from upstream resources through midstream materials to scaled downstream motor manufacturing—while Western nations still focus on rebuilding mines and processing.

China’s state-owned Baogang Group says its electrical equipment subsidiary, Baogang Electric (Sendi), delivered more than 1,700 rare-earth permanent-magnet motors in 2025, a clear sign that China is moving beyond pilot programs to scaled, repeatable industrial production in high-efficiency electric machinery.

The company frames the milestone as new momentum for China’s “two rare-earth bases” strategy—policy shorthand for locking in leadership not only in rare-earth materials, but in downstream manufacturing and deployment. For business audiences, the key takeaway is operational: this is not R&D hype, but a step-change in output.

What Changed—and Why It Matters

During China’s 14th Five-Year Plan, Baogang Electric aligned with national “dual-carbon” targets (carbon peaking and neutrality), forming a new-energy division focused on wind, solar, hydrogen, energy storage, and permanent-magnet motor systems. The company reports completing seven product families spanning 39 motor models, alongside small-batch production of wind-power generators.

The inflection point came in 2025, when a new permanent-magnet motor assembly workshop reached full operation, enabling standardized, professionalized, and scalable manufacturing. That facility underpinned the jump to 1,700 annual deliveries—an output level that typically requires stable customers, supply reliability, and quality controls.

Technology, Certification, and Market Access

Rare-earth permanent-magnet motors are prized for high efficiency, energy savings, and reliability, making them central to industrial decarbonization. Baogang Electric reports obtaining multiple Chinese certifications for high- and low-voltage three-phase permanent-magnet synchronous motors, with at least one product line passing China’s mandatory 3C certification. This opens regulated markets including coal mining, petrochemicals, metallurgy, and heavy industry.

Commercial deployments include crushers, mixers, rolling-mill hydraulic systems, fans, and pumps—use cases where energy efficiency translates directly into operating-cost savings.

Why the West Should Pay Attention

The significance is less about the headline number than the integration it represents. Baogang sits atop upstream rare-earth resources, feeds midstream magnet materials, and now demonstrates scaled downstream motor manufacturing. That end-to-end capability is precisely what the U.S. and Europe are attempting—slowly—to rebuild.

As Western policy focuses on mines and processing, China is already turning rare earths into finished industrial machines, tightening its competitive grip in electrification and clean-industry equipment.

What’s Next

Baogang Electric says it will expand regionally, promote a “manufacture–remanufacture–reuse” green model, and push permanent-magnet motors from targeted applications toward broader industrial adoption.

Disclosure / Disclaimer: This news item originates from media affiliated with a Chinese state-owned enterprise. All production figures, certifications, and market claims should be independently verified using non-state and third-party sources before being relied upon for investment, policy, or strategic decisions.

• China's National IP Administration has designated Baogang Group Mining Research Institute as a National IP Demonstration Enterprise, placing it into a three-year program focused on strengthening patent creation, protection, and commercialization in strategic mining technologies.
• The institute controls patents across mineral separation, rare earth processing, industrial waste recycling, and environmental compliance—signaling China's strategy to dominate not just mineral supply but the IP infrastructure governing future materials processing.
• This designation reflects China's integration of mining R&D with IP ownership and standards-setting, potentially creating patent density and licensing barriers for Western firms pursuing alternative processing pathways.

China’s National Intellectual Property Administration (opens in a new tab) has named the Baogang Group Mining Research Institute a National Intellectual Property Demonstration Enterprise (Cultivation Track)—a designation reserved for organizations Beijing considers strategically important to its innovation-led industrial policy.

The designation places Baogang’s mining research arm into a three-year national development program focused on strengthening intellectual property creation, protection, management, and commercialization across the full innovation lifecycle. In Chinese policy terms, this signals entry into a nationally prioritized technology cohort, typically associated with regulatory support, preferential policy treatment, and elevated visibility within state-backed industrial and standards-setting initiatives.

What Baogang Is Being Recognized For

The institute serves as the core research engine supporting Baogang Group’s mining and materials operations, including work linked to Bayan Obo, the world’s largest known rareearth deposit. According to the announcement, the institute has built aconcentrated intellectual property portfolio covering:

• Mineral separation and beneficiation technologies
• Integrated utilization of complex and polymetallic ores
• Industrial solid-waste recycling and secondary resource recovery
• Environmental protection and pollution-control processes

Beyond patent ownership, the institute plays a more strategic role in China’s IP system. Its researchers have participated in drafting national guidelines and standards for patent pools, patent valuation, and IP commercialization frameworks. Several so-called “high-value patents” have reportedly been transferred from the lab into operational industrial use—an outcome Beijing increasingly prioritizes over headline patent counts.

The Strategic Signal to the West

This designation is not merely symbolic. It reflects China’s continued effort to embed intellectual property control into upstream and midstream mining and materials technologies, including processing, waste recovery, and environmental compliance.

For the United States and allied economies, the signal is clear:

• China is tightly integrating mining R&D, IP ownership, standards participation, and industrial deployment.
• Competitive advantage is shifting toward how minerals are processed, not just where they are mined.
• Western firms pursuing alternative rare-earth processing or recycling pathways may increasingly encounter patent density, licensing complexity, or standards-based barriers linked to Chinese institutions.

What Comes Next

The institute will now enter a formal three-year construction and evaluation phase, during which it is expected to expand its patent portfolio, strengthen IP governance, improve protection mechanisms, and accelerate commercialization. Successful completion would qualify it for full National Intellectual Property Demonstration Enterprise status following government review.

Bottom line: China is reinforcing leadership not only in critical mineral supply, but in the intellectual property infrastructure that governs future materials processing and industrial standards.

Disclosure / Disclaimer: This news item originates from Chinese media affiliated with a state-owned enterprise. All claims, achievements, and strategic implications should be independently verified using non-state and third-party sources before being relied upon for investment, policy, or national-security analysis.

• Chinese researchers built a 2,000-sample database and used AI-assisted machine learning to optimize sintered NdFeB permanent magnet production, aiming to reduce iteration costs and development time.
• The team developed an 'intelligent' process framework bridging industry's focus on cost-stability and academia's pursuit of peak performance, including quantum kernel methods for data-efficient modeling.
• This advancement signals China's strengthening manufacturing advantage in magnet processing know-how— a strategic capability as important as raw material access for Western supply chains.

Researchers from the Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS) Computer Network Information Center (opens in a new tab), working with the CAS Ganjiang Innovation Research Institute (opens in a new tab), report progress on using data and artificial intelligence to accelerate process optimization for sintered neodymium-iron-boron (NdFeB) permanent magnets. According to the release, the team built an “industry–academia dual-domain” database containing nearly 2,000 samples and used high-performance computing (HPC)–assisted machine learning to systematically evaluate data-selection strategies in a virtual experimental environment—an approach aimed at reducing the cost and time required for iterative process improvement.

Chinese Academy of Sciences: Computer Network Information Center

The team further claims it quantified a fundamental design tension: industry tends to prioritize cost and stability, while academia tends to optimize for peak performance. To bridge that gap, the researchers propose a continuous, “intelligent” process-iteration framework linking composition–process–performance relationships. They also describe a methodological blueprint for integrating quantum kernel methods into a more data-efficient modeling workflow—an advanced technique that, if validated, could improve prediction performance when high-quality labeled data are limited.

The work was published in npj Computational Materials and supported by major Chinese funding streams, including national key R&D programs, the National Natural Science Foundation of China, and CAS strategic initiatives.

Why this matters as business news

This is not a headline about new mines or new rare earth deposits. It is a signal about manufacturing advantage—the downstream capability that turns materials into magnets at scale. Two updates make the item noteworthy:

1. a structured dataset designed to connect factory constraints with academic optimization, and
2. a clear focus on data efficiency—the practical lever that can reduce scrap, shorten development cycles, and raise yields.

Implications for the U.S. and allies

If these methods translate from “virtual experiments” into real production lines, the impact could be meaningful: faster iteration on sintering and processing parameters can improve consistency, yield, and performance per dollar—the exact operational edge that reinforces China’s dominance in magnet manufacturing know-how. For Western supply chains, the competitive lesson is blunt: processing and process IP can be as strategically important as access to ore.

Limitations and what to watch

This is a progress report, not a full independent validation. The release does not specify the database’s sourcing, representativeness across factories, or whether results were demonstrated in live production. “Quantum kernel” integration is also a methodological claim that can sound bigger than it proves in practice; performance gains and deployment complexity should be assessed in the published paper and, ideally, replicated by third parties.

Disclaimer: This news originates from Chinese state-affiliated institutions/media. The technical claims and any implied manufacturing or performance impacts should be verified through independent sources, replication studies, or corroborating industry disclosures before being treated as established fact.

• The US has proposed a critical minerals trading bloc with Japan, the EU, and Mexico.
• The bloc features coordinated trade rules, potential price floors, and project support to counter China's 90% control of rare earth processing.
• Vice President J.D. Vance advocates for enforceable price floors backed by adjustable tariffs to address market volatility.
• Market volatility has made non-Chinese investment 'nearly impossible' in the sector.
• The real bottleneck is midstream processing—not mining—requiring parallel investment in separation, metallurgical expertise, and manufacturing capacity.
• These investments are needed to create a durable industrial strategy beyond stockpiles.

The United States has opened a new front in the critical minerals contest—this time not with tariffs alone, but with a proposal to build a preferential trading bloc among allies aimed at stabilizing prices and weakening China’s grip on supply chains. Unveiled at a Washington ministerial hosted by Secretary of State Marco Rubio, the plan brings Japan, the European Union, and Mexico into early talks on coordinated trade rules, potential price floors, and project support. Singapore’s Foreign Minister Vivian Balakrishnan (opens in a new tab) attended and struck a familiar note—support for open, rules-based trade and resilient supply chains—underscoring both the ambition and the caution surrounding the effort.

At its core, the initiative acknowledges a reality long glossed over: China’s leverage is not just geological. While China accounts for roughly 60% of the rare earth supply upstream, it controls close to 90% of the processing that turns mined material into usable inputs like magnets. That downstream choke point—not ore—confers power. Vice President J. D. Vance was unusually blunt, arguing that volatile prices and alleged market flooding have made non-Chinese investment “nearly impossible.” His prescription—enforceable price floors backed by adjustable tariffs—aims to restore predictability so capital will flow.

There are concrete signals beneath the diplomacy. U.S. trade officials say the U.S., Japan, and the EU intend to conclude a memorandum of understanding within 30 days to jointly support mining, refining, processing, and recycling projects, with a parallel U.S.–Mexico plan to follow within 60 days. Those timelines suggest urgency, not just symbolism.

Yet much remains aspirational. Price floors are politically sensitive and historically fraught; past commodity schemes collapsed when governments promised stability without enforcing discipline or coordinating demand. Details on floor levels, enforcement, and loss-sharing are conspicuously absent. And while more than 50 countries attended, most have not publicly committed—an important distinction, as enthusiasm does not equal alignment, suggests Reuters and Singapore’s The Straits Times (opens in a new tab).

Media coverage has largely framed the proposal as a mining story. That’s misleading. The bottleneck is midstream processing—separation, metallurgical expertise, and downstream manufacturing capacity. Without parallel investment in these segments, a trading bloc risks becoming a talking shop with stockpiles attached, rather than a durable industrial strategy.

Why this moment still matters: senior U.S. officials have now said out loud what investors already know—that price volatility, not geology, is killing Western supply chains. If the next steps deliver enforceable mechanisms and sustained midstream buildout, this could mark a genuine pivot. For now, it’s a credible opening bid—ambitious, necessary, and unfinished.

• Hallgarten's 2026 report argues the U.S. has lost its mining empire, remaining structurally dependent on foreign capital and processing capacity despite political rhetoric around reshoring critical minerals.
• The analysis reveals that owning raw minerals means nothing without control of downstream processing—China's true advantage lies in refining and metallurgical capabilities, not just mining.
• Strategic stockpiles may buy time, but without deep investment in midstream processing, workforce skills, and sustained capital, the West risks confusing symbolic activity with actual supply-chain sovereignty.

In a forceful January 2026 market review, veteran mining analyst Christopher Ecclestone, editor of Hallgarten & Company (opens in a new tab), argues that the United States has quietly lost its mining “empire”—and may be mistaking noise for progress in critical minerals. In The End of Empire (opens in a new tab), Ecclestone contends that despite political rhetoric around reshoring, stockpiling, and strategic minerals, the U.S. remains structurally dependent on foreign capital, foreign operators, and—most critically—foreign processing capacity, particularly in rare earths and specialty metals.

What Hallgarten Examined—and How

Hallgarten’s report is not a laboratory study but a market strategy analysis, blending commodity price data, historical case studies, capital-market behavior, and geopolitical context. Across more than a dozen pages, the review surveys metals markets (tin, tungsten, precious metals), U.S. mining capacity, and recent government initiatives such as strategic stockpiles and proposed price supports. Charts and tables—such as tin prices exceeding $50,000/tonne (page 6) and a breakdown of the proposed $12 billion U.S. “Project Vault” stockpile (page 10)—anchor the argument in observable market data.

Key Findings

Hallgarten’s core claim is blunt: the West confuses ownership of minerals with control of supply chains. According to the report, most meaningful mining and processing activity in the U.S. is carried out by Canadian, Australian, or UK-listed firms, while rare earth ventures touted as “national champions” remain financially fragile and operationally immature.

On stockpiling, Ecclestone is cautiously supportive but skeptical of public theatrics. He argues that strategic reserves work best when built quietly—citing Japan’s long-standing model—rather than when broadcast to markets, which can inflate prices and reward speculative projects over resilient supply chains.

Crucially for rare earths, the report underscores that China’s advantage lies downstream. Mining alone does not confer power; processing, refining, and metallurgical know-how do. Without rebuilding these capabilities, Western stockpiles risk becoming symbolic buffers rather than strategic leverage.

Implications for the China Monopoly

The takeaway is simple: you cannot break a monopoly by buying raw materials if your rival controls the factories that turn them into usable products. Hallgarten’s analysis implies that U.S. and allied policy remains fragmented—focused on upstream mining while neglecting midstream processing, workforce skills, and capital markets capable of sustaining cyclical commodity businesses.

Limitations and Controversial Notes

The report is intentionally provocative and openly opinionated. Some characterizations—particularly of U.S. rare earth companies and political figures—reflect Ecclestone’s long-held skepticism rather than neutral consensus. The analysis also downplays emerging industrial-policy tools (e.g., EXIM and DFC financing) that may yet alter outcomes. Readers should treat the work as a strategic critique, not a forecast certainty.

Conclusion

Hallgarten’s End of Empire is less an obituary than a warning. Strategic stockpiles may buy time, but without deep investment in processing, pricing discipline, and talent, the West risks confusing activity with capability. As Rare Earth Exchanges has repeatedly argued, supply-chain sovereignty is built—slowly, expensively, and unglamorously—not declared.

Source

Ecclestone, C. Monthly Resources Review: The End of Empire (Hallgarten & Company, Feb. 5, 2026)

Portfolio_January2026

• Landmark Nature Communications study overturns long-held assumption: magnetic strength in rare-earth magnets is governed by atomic-scale structures within crystal grains, not grain boundaries as previously believed.
• Researchers discovered ultra-thin copper-rich layers (1-2 atoms thick) act as 'perfect defects' that enhance magnet performance under extreme heat and stress, informing development of more powerful VACOMAX® samarium-cobalt alloys.
• Findings underscore that rare-earth magnet dominance depends on atomic-scale manufacturing intelligence rather than raw material access alone, with implications for U.S.-China technological competition and industrial policy.

In a landmark paper published in Nature Communications (opens in a new tab), lead author S. Giron and an international team spanning German universities, UK collaborators, and industrial partner VACUUMSCHMELZE GmbH & Co. KG (VAC) (opens in a new tab) overturn a long-held assumption about high-performance rare-earth magnets. Working within Germany’s Collaborative Research Center SFB/TRR 270 (opens in a new tab) (“HoMMage”), the researchers show that magnetic strength and thermal stability are governed less by grain boundaries—and more by atomic-scale structures and elemental distributions inside the grains themselves. The insight has already informed the rollout of more powerful VACOMAX® samarium-cobalt (SmCo) alloys, with implications that extend from factory floors to geopolitics.

The CRC 270 HoMMage team in Germany

How the Study Worked

Rare-earth magnets are the quiet workhorses of electric vehicles, drones, wind turbines, and defense systems. The team focused on a high-temperature SmCo magnet—Sm₂(Co, Fe, Cu, Zr)₁₇—and combined advanced magnetic measurements with multiple electron-microscopy techniques and micromagnetic simulations. This toolkit allowed the scientists to visualize how atoms are arranged and how magnetic domains behave at the nanoscale.

Crucially, they compared magnets that appeared similar under conventional microscopes but performed very differently in practice—differences that only emerged when examined atom by atom.

Stefan Giron, First Author, Institute of Materials Science, Technische Universität Darmstadt

What They Found: The Power Is in the “Defects”

The discovery is counterintuitive. Grain boundaries—the borders between crystal regions—were long thought to be the weak points where demagnetization begins. This study shows they are not the primary culprit.

Rather, the strongest magnets contain ultra-thin, copper-rich layers just one to two atoms thick embedded within the crystal grains. These features act as pinning centers, impeding the motion of magnetic domains and preserving performance even under extreme heat and stress.

The team describes these as “perfect defects”: imperfections so precisely arranged that they enhance performance. Tiny shifts in atomic placement or elemental distribution can yield outsized gains in strength and reliability.

Why This Matters for the China Question

China’s dominance in rare-earth magnets is not just about access to ore; it reflects mastery of process know-how—the industrial craft of translating materials science into repeatable, high-yield production. This study underscores that the true bottleneck is no longer mining alone, but atomic-scale manufacturing intelligence, protected by patents, talent pipelines, and close industry–academia integration.

For the U.S. and its allies, the implication is stark: stockpiles and trade deals are necessary but insufficient. Durable advantage will accrue to those who own the science of nanostructure design—and can industrialize it at scale.

Limitations and Open Questions

The work centers on samarium-cobalt magnets, prized for thermal and chemical stability but used in more specialized applications than mass-market NdFeB magnets. Extending these insights across magnet classes will require further research. Questions of scalability, cost, and intellectual-property access also remain—and could become points of contention in a more competitive global landscape.

Conclusion

The study makes a simple truth unavoidable: rare-earth sovereignty is engineered, not excavated. Control at the atomic level may prove more decisive than access to raw materials, reshaping how nations think about industrial policy, alliances, and technological independence.

Citation

Giron et al., Nature Communications 16, 11335 (2025). DOI: 10.1038/s41467-025-67773-7

• Tokyo Chemical Industry bridges a critical gap between industrial rare earth production and life sciences research by providing ultra-pure, research-grade lanthanide compounds that scientists need to study bacterial rare earth metabolism and develop bio-extraction technologies.
• Founded in 1894, TCI manufactures over 30,000 specialized research chemicals with exclusive rare earth reagents unavailable elsewhere, serving researchers developing lanthanide-dependent enzymes, biosensors, and pharmaceutical applications.
• TCI's custom synthesis capabilities and global distribution infrastructure make them indispensable to the emerging rare earth biotechnology field, enabling innovations that could transform sustainable rare earth extraction and recovery.

A Critical Bridge Between Mining and Life Sciences

In the rapidly evolving landscape of rare earth elements, where massive mining operations and industrial-scale production dominate headlines, one Japanese company quietly occupies an irreplaceable niche that makes cutting-edge biotechnology research possible. Tokyo Chemical Industry (opens in a new tab) (TCI) doesn't mine rare earths, refine ores, or manufacture magnets, yet without their specialized products, the revolution in rare earth biochemistry simply couldn't happen.

TCI transforms raw, rare-earth materials into the ultra-pure, research-grade reagents that scientists need to unlock the biological secrets of these elements. While others move tons of material for industrial applications, TCI moves grams and kilograms with precision: serving the researchers who are discovering how bacteria harness lanthanides for metabolism, developing enzymes that can selectively extract specific rare earths, and pioneering biotechnological solutions to mining's environmental challenges.

The Company: 130 Years of Chemical Excellence

Founded in 1894 as Asakawa Shoten, TCI has evolved from a pharmaceutical wholesaler into a global manufacturer specializing in research chemicals. Headquartered in Tokyo with operations spanning Asia, Europe, and North America, the company manufactures over 30,000 research chemical products and provides custom synthesis services.

What sets TCI apart is not scale, but specificity. Their facilities in Portland, Oregon; Shanghai, China; and throughout Japan are optimized for producing chemicals that meet the exacting standards of academic research and pharmaceutical development. When a biochemist needs a lanthanide compound with 99.99% purity, documented provenance, and consistent batch-to-batch quality, TCI delivers.

The Gap That TCI Fills

The rare earth supply chain has always been optimized for industrial applications. Mining companies extract mixed ores. Refineries separate elements for use in permanent magnets, catalytic converters, and phosphors. These operations handle thousands of metric tons annually, with specifications tailored to manufacturing tolerances.

But life sciences research operates in a completely different world. A biochemist studying lanthanide-dependent enzymes doesn't need a ton of neodymium oxide, they need 50 grams of neodymium chloride with analytical-grade purity, proper documentation, and a molecular structure suitable for dissolving in aqueous solutions. A pharmaceutical researcher developing lanthanide-based diagnostics needs cerium compounds in specific oxidation states, not bulk industrial material.

TCI bridges this critical gap. They take rare earth materials and transform them into the specialized chemical forms that researchers can actually use: halides, acetates, nitrates, specialized chelates, and custom derivatives. Each batch is tested, documented, and packaged for laboratory use.

The Rare Earth Life Sciences Revolution

Until 2011, rare earth elements were considered biologically inert, interesting for materials science, but irrelevant to living systems. That changed dramatically with the discovery that certain bacteria use lanthanides as essential cofactors in metabolic enzymes.

Researchers found that methylotrophic bacteria possess specialized methanol dehydrogenase enzymes (XoxF) that require lanthanides like cerium, lanthanum, or neodymium rather than calcium. These bacteria actively scavenge rare earths from their environment, incorporating them into enzymes that oxidize methanol, a critical step in the global carbon cycle.

This discovery opened a new frontier. Scientists identified bacterial proteins, such as lanmodulin, that bind lanthanides with extraordinary selectivity. They found enzyme cofactors, such as pyrroloquinoline quinone (PQQ), that preferentially extract specific rare earths from mixed solutions. Researchers began engineering designer enzymes that use lanthanide catalysis for pharmaceutical synthesis.

Every one of these breakthroughs required high-purity lanthanide compounds for laboratory experiments. And for many researchers worldwide, TCI was the supplier that made their work possible.

What Makes TCI Irreplaceable

1. Specialized Product Portfolio

TCI manufactures rare earth reagents in forms specifically designed for biochemical research. Their catalog includes lanthanide salts, coordination complexes, and specialized derivatives that simply aren't available from industrial suppliers. Many of these compounds are exclusive to TCI: if you need them, there's no alternative source.

They also produce TODGA (tetraoctyl diglycolamide), a specialized extractant compound effective for separating rare earths used both in nuclear waste processing and in research on selective lanthanide recovery.

2. Research-Grade Purity Standards

Life science research demands reproducibility, which requires reagents of consistent, documented purity. Industrial-grade rare earth oxides may be 95% pure, which is adequate for magnet manufacturing, but catastrophic for enzyme studies where trace contaminants can confound results. TCI's rare earth compounds meet analytical-grade standards, with detailed certificates of analysis for each batch.

3. Custom Synthesis Capabilities

With over 60 years of synthesis experience, TCI can produce rare earth compounds that don't exist in its catalog. When researchers need a novel lanthanide complex for a specific application, TCI's chemists can design and synthesize it. This custom capability is crucial for cutting-edge research where off-the-shelf chemicals don't exist.

4. Global Distribution Infrastructure

TCI operates strategically located distribution centers in Japan, the United States, Europe, China, and India. This infrastructure ensures that researchers worldwide can obtain rare earth reagents quickly and reliably. This proves critical when experiments are time-sensitive or when establishing new research programs.

5. Integration with Life Sciences Ecosystem

TCI's rare earth products sit within a comprehensive life sciences catalog, including enzymes, nucleotides, amino acids, and biochemicals. Researchers can source lanthanide compounds alongside all their other laboratory chemicals, simplifying procurement and ensuring quality consistency across their supply chain.

Market Position and Strategic Importance

TCI occupies a unique position in the rare earth value chain. They're not competing with mining giants or industrial processors. They're enabling a completely different market segment that those players can't efficiently serve.

The biotechnology applications of rare earths represent a small but scientifically critical market. Researchers developing lanthanide-based biosensors, engineering bacteria for selective rare earth extraction, creating PQQ-based separation technologies, or designing novel pharmaceutical catalysts all depend on suppliers like TCI.

As the rare earth biotechnology field matures, potentially offering solutions to mining's environmental challenges through bio-extraction and selective recovery, TCI's role becomes even more strategic. They're not just supplying today's research; they're enabling the innovations that could transform tomorrow's rare earth supply chain.

The Path Forward

Several trends suggest TCI's importance will continue growing:

Expanding biotechnology research: Government agencies like DARPA are funding projects to develop bacterial systems for rare earth extraction. Academic institutions worldwide are establishing programs in lanthanide biochemistry. Each new research group needs reliable suppliers of specialized compounds.

Pharmaceutical applications: TCI's original lanthanide fluorescent labeling reagents for biochemical research point toward broader pharmaceutical applications. As drug developers discover new uses for lanthanide chemistry, demand for specialized compounds will increase.

Bio-extraction technologies: If bacterial or enzymatic methods for rare earth extraction prove commercially viable, the development phase will require massive amounts of research-grade lanthanide compounds for optimization and validation.

Academic-industrial collaboration: As rare earth biochemistry moves from pure research toward applied technology, companies will need the same specialized reagents that academic labs use. TCI's dual capability in catalog products and custom synthesis positions them perfectly for this transition.

Conclusion: The Indispensable Specialist

Tokyo Chemical Industry exemplifies a principle often overlooked in commodity markets: sometimes the most valuable companies aren't the biggest, but the most specialized. While rare earth mining and processing grab headlines with their scale and geopolitical importance, TCI quietly serves a niche that makes scientific progress possible.

They've built their position through decades of expertise in synthesis, a commitment to quality, and an understanding of what researchers actually need. For scientists exploring the biological roles of rare earths, developing biotechnological extraction methods, or engineering lanthanide-based pharmaceuticals, TCI isn't just a supplier: they're an essential partner without whom the work simply couldn't proceed.

In an industry often dominated by discussions of mine development, refining capacity, and supply security, TCI reminds us that value chains have many critical nodes. The company that enables research leading to breakthrough technologies may be just as important as the one that extracts the raw material.

As rare earth biotechnology evolves from laboratory curiosity to potential industrial solution, TCI's role will only become more vital. They've already proven indispensable to the researchers making today's discoveries. Tomorrow's innovations in sustainable rare earth extraction and recovery will likely depend on them as well.

COMPANY SNAPSHOT

Founded: 1894 (as Asakawa Shoten)

Headquarters: Tokyo, Japan

Product Portfolio: Over 30,000 research chemicals

Global Presence: Operations in Japan, USA, China, India, and Europe

Specialty: Research-grade chemicals for synthetic chemistry, life sciences, materials science, and analytical chemistry

Key Differentiator: Custom synthesis capabilities and exclusive reagents available nowhere else

Sources for TCI Rare Earth Elements Assessment

TCI Company Information

1. TCI Rare Earth Elements Product Category https://www.tcichemicals.com/US/en/c/12477 (opens in a new tab)
2. TCI TODGA Extractant Information https://www.tcichemicals.com/OP/en/support-download/tcimail/application/182-17b (opens in a new tab)
3. TCI Homepage https://www.tcichemicals.com/US/en/ (opens in a new tab)
4. Tokyo Chemical Industry - Wikipedia https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tokyo_Chemical_Industry (opens in a new tab)
5. TCI - LinkedIn https://www.linkedin.com/company/tci-tokyo-chemical-industry (opens in a new tab)
6. Tokyo Chemical Industry (TCI) - Fisher Scientific https://www.fishersci.com/us/en/brands/JID7VMYA/tokyo-chemical-industry-tci.html (opens in a new tab)
7. TCI (Tokyo Chemical Industry) - PubChem Data Sourcehttps://pubchem.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/source/TCI%20(Tokyo%20Chemical%20Industry) (opens in a new tab)

Rare Earth Biotechnology & Scientific Background

8. Role of rare earth elements in methanol oxidation - ScienceDirecthttps://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1367593118300954 (opens in a new tab)
9. Role of rare earth elements in methanol oxidation - PubMed https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/30308436/ (opens in a new tab)
10. The Chemistry of Lanthanides in Biology - ACS Central Sciencehttps://pubs.acs.org/doi/10.1021/acscentsci.9b00642 (opens in a new tab)
11. Rare earth element alcohol dehydrogenases widely occur - PMChttps://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC6775964/ (opens in a new tab)
12. Rare earth element alcohol dehydrogenases - PubMed https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/30952993/ (opens in a new tab)
13. Lanthanides: New life metals? - PubMed https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/27357406/ (opens in a new tab)
14. The Chemistry of Lanthanides in Biology - PubMed https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/31572776/ (opens in a new tab)
15. Bacteria: Radioactive elements replace essential rare earth metals - ScienceDailyhttps://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2023/05/230511164542.htm (opens in a new tab)
16. Perspective: Roles of rareearth elements in Bacteria - ScienceDirecthttps://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2950155525000242 (opens in a new tab)
17. Essential and Ubiquitous: The Emergence of Lanthanide Metallobiochemistry - Wileyhttps://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/anie.201904090 (opens in a new tab)

Additional Technical Reference

18. Determination of the Kinetic Rate Law of Rare-Earth Solvent Extraction - Journal of Physical Chemistry Chttps://pubs.acs.org/doi/10.1021/acs.jpcc.5c06366 (opens in a new tab) (References TCI as supplier of PC88A extractant compound)

• U.S. partners with the EU, Japan, and Mexico on coordinated trade rules and price floors to reduce critical minerals dependence on China for defense and tech manufacturing.
• Vice President JD Vance acknowledges 'the market is failing,' signaling a shift toward binding plurilateral agreements and rule-based mineral coordination.
• Price floors could de-risk Western mining projects, but success requires synchronized midstream build-out, workforce programs, and allied financing beyond stockpiles.

The U.S. says itwill work with the European Union, Japan, and Mexico to reduce dependence on China for critical minerals used in defense, energy, and high-tech manufacturing. Announced at a Washington ministerial hosted by JD Vance and Marco Rubio, the plan includes coordinated trade rules, possible price floors, and fast-tracked agreements—building on President Trump’s proposed $12 billion minerals stockpile. The goal: stabilize prices, unlock investment, and rebuild supply chains outside China.

Solid as a Rock—and Why It Matters

According to Rare Earth Exchanges™ (REEx) yesterday, plus Reuters and Bloomberg, U.S. Trade Representative Jamieson Greer confirmed plans with the European Commission and Japan to develop “action plans” for resilience, including border-adjusted price floors. This is notable. REEx has long argued that price volatility—not geology—is the main killer of Western projects. Price floors, if real, could finally de-risk capital across mining, processing, and manufacturing.

Vice President JD Vance—Recognizing the “Market” is Not Enough

Equally important is the language around a binding plurilateral agreement. That signals a shift from ad-hoc deals to rule-based coordination—something China has practiced for decades.

Where the Fog Creeps In

Details remain thin. Which minerals? What floor levels? Who funds losses if markets fall? Mexico’s 60-dayaction plan gestures toward joint projects but names none. Canada’s absence—despite attending—raises questions about North American coherence ahead of the USMCA review.

There’s also a subtle media bias toward treating the stockpile as a solution. REEx’s view: stockpiles buy time; industrial policy builds power. Without synchronized midstream build-out, workforce programs, IP protection, and allied financing, price floors risk becoming political slogans.

Why This Moment Is Different

Vance’s blunt admission—“the market is failing”—matters. It legitimizes intervention. If followed by enforceable pricing mechanisms and multinational execution, this could mark the real start of a Western critical-minerals bloc.

• EXIM approved $10 in long-term loans to launch Project Vault, a public-private partnership creating a U.S. Strategic Critical Minerals Reserve with early participants including GE Vernova, Boeing, Clarios, and Western Digital.
• Project Vault provides strategic insurance against supply shocks but stockpiles alone cannot solve chronic supply deficit without comprehensive industrial policy addressing upstream mining, mid-separation/refining, and downstream manufacturing.
• REE advocates that true sovereignty requires a full-spectrum strategy: pricing support, midstream buildout, downstream IP, workforce development, regulatory reform, and allied financing—not storage alone.

The Export-Import Bank of the United States has approved up to $10 billion in direct lending to launch Project Vault, establishing a U.S. Strategic Critical Minerals Reserve through a public-private partnership. Announced alongside President Trump, the initiative aims to buffer U.S. manufacturers from supply shocks, reduce dependence on foreign-controlled supply chains, and anchor domestic production and processing. Early OEM participants include GE Vernova, Boeing, Clarios, and Western Digital, with suppliers such as Traxys, Mercuria Americas, and Hartree Partners. EXIM says the structure targets taxpayer-positive returns while strengthening U.S. manufacturing jobs and national security.

Project Vault — Q&A

Why A Stockpile is not Enough

A stockpile like Project Vault is necessary—but on its own, it is strategic insurance, not strategic power. Rare Earth Exchanges has argued consistently that without a comprehensive industrial policy, a reserve risks becoming a static warehouse in a dynamic geopolitical war.

First, stockpiles do not create supply. They smooth shocks, but they don’t solvechronic upstream deficits. Without aligned incentives for mining—price floors, offtake guarantees, or risk-sharing capital—new projects won’t reach FID. Capital flees volatility, and critical minerals remain among the most volatile commodities on Earth.

Second, midstream is the real choke point. Separation, refining, alloying, and magnet-making are where China dominates. A stockpile of oxides is useless if the U.S. and allies lack scalable, cost-competitive processing. That requires long-term pricing support and coordinated demand signals across OEMs—not one-off loans. If not, nascent magnet makers will fall prey to market forces within a couple of years---and this could be disastrous—they essentially can’t keep up with Chinese pricing, go out of business, and/or become acquired by the Chinese.

Third, downstreammanufacturing and IP matter as much as tonnage. Without sustainedR&D, patent protection, and allied standard-setting, the West risks subsidizing inputs while China captures value in finished components. China now focuses on Two Ear Earth Base China and owning the future of the industry downstream.  Industrial policy must reward innovation, not just extraction.

Fourth, talent and workforce are missing links. Processing engineers, metallurgists, magnet designers, and industrial chemists cannot be conjured overnight. REEx has stressed the need for allied training pipelines—U.S., EU, Japan, Australia, Canada—treated as a shared strategic asset.

Fifth, fragmented permitting and funding kill momentum. The U.S. still runs critical minerals through a maze of agencies, timelines, and mismatched programs. Without rationalized permitting, synchronized DoD–DOE–EXIM–DFC financing, and multinational co-investment platforms, even well-funded projects stall.

Finally, this is a coalition problem, not a national one. China’s advantage is scale across borders—mines, refineries, factories, banks, and diplomacy moving in lockstep. A stockpile without a tight, rules-based multinational alliance merely delays dependence; it does not end it.

Bottom line: Project Vault buys time. Only a full-spectrum industrial strategy—pricing support, midstream buildout, downstream IP, workforce development, regulatory reform, and allied financing—converts time into sovereignty. Rare Earth Exchanges has been clear: resilience is engineered, not stored or a series of reactions.

• Chengdu Ascend Magnetic Technology has suspended SmCo magnet production due to China's tightening export controls on rare earths, including samarium, which has required government export permission since April 2025.
• SmCo magnets are critical for aerospace, defense, and high-temperature applications due to their exceptional thermal stability (300-550°C) and corrosion resistance.
• There is far more limited global capacity for SmCo magnets compared to NdFeB magnets.
• The production halt highlights the urgent need for Western defense and aerospace industries to:
  • Diversify suppliers
  • Develop non-China SmCo capacity
  • Establish long-term offtake strategies outside China's dominance

Chengdu Ascend Magnetic Technology & Products Co., Ltd., a specialized producer of samarium cobalt (SmCo) permanent magnets, has halted its SmCo operations, according to industry sources, including Asian Metal and regional rare-earth market trackers. The suspension, reported February 5, 2025, comes amid a broader tightening of China’s export controls on rare earths—including samarium, which has required government permission for export since April 2025.

Chengdu, China

Chengdu Ascend focuses on the R&D, production, and sales of SmCo magnets, a niche but strategically important class of magnets prized for exceptional thermal stability (typically 300–550°C), corrosion resistance, and performance in harsh environments. These characteristics make SmCo magnets indispensable for aerospace, defense, oil & gas, and high-reliability industrial applications, where neodymium magnets often fall short.

Industry sources indicate the production halt aligns with wider adjustments across China’s magnet and new-energy sectors, where export licensing, compliance costs, and policy uncertainty have reshaped operating decisions. SmCo production is capital-intensive and relies on specialized furnaces and processing equipment, amplifying sensitivity to regulatory friction.

Why this matters: SmCo capacity is far more limited globally than NdFeB. Any disruption—especially from China, which dominates rare-earth processing—can tighten supply, extend lead times, and raise prices for Western buyers already navigating export controls.

Implications: Does this purported halt reinforce the case for non-China SmCo capacity, recycling, and long-term offtake strategies in allied markets? We think so. For defense and aerospace primes, it underscores the urgency of supplier diversification and qualification outside China.

Company Profile

Headquarters:                 Chengdu, Sichuan Province, China
Founded:                          Estimated 2015 (exact year not publicly disclosed)
Ownership:                      Privately held Chinese company (not publicly traded)
Corporate                        Structure: Independent operating company (not a listed subsidiary of a major SOE)

Core Business & Specialization

Chengdu Ascend Magnetic Technology & Products Co., Ltd. (often referred to as CAM-Magnet) is a specialist manufacturer of high-performance rare earth permanent magnets, with a particular focus on Samarium Cobalt (SmCo) materials. The company positions itself as a dedicated factory serving technically demanding applications that require high thermal stability, corrosion resistance, and long service life.

SmCo magnets produced by CAM-Magnet are typically used in aerospace, defense-related components, high-temperature industrial motors, oil & gas tools, and precision instrumentation, where NdFeB magnets are unsuitable due to heat or environmental constraints.

Products & Capabilities

• Primary products:
  • SmCo 1:5 and SmCo 2:17 permanent magnets
  • Custom-shaped and application-specific magnet assemblies
• Key performance attributes:
  • Operating temperatures commonly 300–550°C (grade dependent)
  • Strong resistance to oxidation and corrosion
• Manufacturing scope:
  • Powder metallurgy, sintering, machining, and magnetization
  • Small-batch, high-spec production rather than mass-volume output

Sources: Asian Metal; regional rare-earth industry trackers (Feb. 2025).

• VACUUMSCHMELZE secured EN910 certification for its Horna Streda, Slovakia facility, expanding its aerospace and space-grade manufacturing footprint beyond Hanau, Germany.
• The EN910 certification validates VAC's quality management system for the demanding aviation, space, and defense industry, enabling access to aerospace procurement pathways and prime contractor credibility.
• Plans to extend certification to permanent magnets built by VAI, building an audit-ready aerospace capability outside China’s magnet ecosystem as it moves towards a launch in an American facility.

Germany-based magnetic materials and permanent magnet producer VACUUMSCHMELZE (VAC) announced it has successfully achieved EN 9100:2018 certification for its Horna Streda, Slovakia operations, expanding its certified aviation and space manufacturing footprint beyond its longstanding certified base in Hanau, Germany. The certification, conducted by DEKRA Certification GmbH, (opens in a new tab) validates that VAC’s quality management system meets the demanding requirements expected across aerospace and space supply chains.

EN 9100:2018 (equivalent to AS9100D) is the premier international quality management system (QMS) standard for the aviation, space, and defense (ASD) industry. Based on ISO 9001:2015, it adds critical requirements for safety, reliability, and regulatory compliance, ensuring rigorous control over design, production, and supply chain processes. 

VAC reports that the Hanau scope includes development, application support, product design, production, and sales of special magnetic materials spanning crystalline and permanent magnet value chains. The newly certified Horna Streda site currently covers the crystalline value chain, with plans to extend certification to the permanent magnet value chain by 2028.

For Rare Earth Exchanges™ subscribers, the signal is clear: EN 9100 is more than a plaque—it is a gate pass. It helps a magnet manufacturer qualify for aerospace and defense procurement pathways, tighten traceability and process control, and win credibility with prime contractors.

As VAC moves toward launching a major facility in America, this certification strengthens its narrative: building not just capacity—but aerospace-grade, audit-ready capability outside China’s magnet ecosystem.

• China's strategic leverage over semiconductors stems from its control of rare earth processing, refining, and magnet production—not just mining—making midstream capabilities the real geopolitical choke point.
• India possesses significant rare earth resources but remains dependent on Chinese derivatives due to limited industrial capacity, regulatory constraints, and an underdeveloped downstream processing infrastructure.
• Allied partnerships like iCET can diversify supply chains only when paired with credible domestic industrial policy, institutional reform, and investment in processing, alloys, and recycling capabilities.

Researchers Ratnadeep Maitra, Department of International Relations and Governance Studies, Shiv Nadar University, Delhi-NCR, and Tapas Das, Kandi RajCollege, University of Kalyani, India argue in a January 2026 UNISCIJournal analysis that rare earth elements have shifted from “just minerals” into instruments of national security and geo-economic power—and that China’s near-monopoly over rare earth processing and refining, more than its mining output, is the real choke point shaping semiconductor and advanced-technology supply chains. Their core message for lay readers: countries can have rare earths in the ground and still be dependent—because the “power” lives in the refineries, separation chemistry, magnet-making, and know-how.

Overview

This is a strategic policy analysis, not a lab experiment. The authors use two well-known international-relations frameworks—“complex interdependence” (Keohane & Nye) and “multi-dimensional security” (Buzan)—to interpret how supply chains became security assets after COVID-era disruptions and amid U.S.–China technology rivalry. They then apply that lens to semiconductors and critical minerals, positioning rare earths as a prime example of “weaponizable” dependency.

Key Findings

1. Processing is the monopoly that matters. The paper emphasizes that China’s leverage stems from control of midstream and downstream nodes—separation, refining, and magnet production—allowing export restrictions to function as a strategic tool.
2. India’s bottleneck is not geology—it’s industrialcapacity. Despite significant resource potential (notably coastal mineral sands), India is described as constrained by limited private participation, environmental and waste-management complexity, and thin downstream capabilities—leading to continued dependence on Chinese rare-earth derivatives.
3. Allied frameworks help, but don’t substitute for domestic buildout. The authors argue initiatives like the Initiative on Critical and Emerging Technology (iCET) and broader partnerships can diversify supply only if paired with credible domestic institutional reform and industrial sequencing.

Implications for markets and policy

For investors, the paper reinforces a hard truth: rare earth resilience is an industrial policy project, not a mining project. India’s opportunity—like America’s—is to move from upstream extraction to processing, alloys, magnets, and recycling, where margins and leverage are higher.

Limitations and controversies

Because the article is theory-forward, it does not provide new production data, cost curves, or project-level feasibility. Some readers may view its “weaponization” framing as geopolitically loaded; others will argue it understates the practical barriers (capital, permitting, waste) to replicating China’s decades-long processing base quickly. Those debates are real—and they are precisely where policy can drift into rhetoric.

Citation: Maitra, R., & Das, T. (2026). India and the Rare Earth Conundrum: Navigating Security, Geoeconomics and Global Supply Chains. UNISCI Journal 70–71. DOI: 10.31439/UNISCI-256.

• Commerce Secretary Howard Lutnick says China is weaponizing control over rare earths and critical minerals.
• The Trump administration plans to counter through tariffs, stockpiles, and industrial policy, but execution risk and capacity gaps remain substantial.
• China's dominance in rare earth processing and magnet manufacturing accounts for 85-90% of global capacity, creating real chokepoints not at mines but in refining, metallurgy, and component manufacturing.
• U.S. policy still underweights investment in these areas.
• Despite renewed urgency, the administration lacks the industrial policy depth needed for supply-chain resilience within five years.
• Missing elements include price floors, downstream enforcement, workforce development, and a unified allied approach with Canada and traditional partners.

Commerce Secretary Howard Lutnick says China is “weaponizing” its control over rare earths and other strategic materials—and that the Trump administration intends to fight back with tariffs, pricing power, and industrial policy. Speaking at a Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) forum, Lutnick tied rare earths, semiconductors, and advanced manufacturing into a single national-security narrative. Put simply, the U.S. believes China can choke off key materials, and Washington wants domestic and allied supply chains fast.

Howard Lutnick, Secretary of Commerce

That framing resonates because it reflects real vulnerabilities as Rare Earth Exchanges™ has chronicled since our launch in late 2024. China has repeatedly tightened export controls on rare earth elements and permanent magnets, materials essential for EVs, wind turbines, missiles, and AI infrastructure. When Beijing restricts supply, prices spike, projects stall, and Western manufacturers scramble.

The Part That Rings True: Chokepoints Are Real

China’s dominance in rare earth separation and magnet manufacturing is not theoretical. It controls roughly 85–90% of global magnet processing capacity and has proven willing to use administrative tools—licenses, quotas, inspections—as leverage. Lutnick’s emphasis on “chokepoints” aligns with how supply chains actually break: not at the mine, but in refining, metallurgy, and component manufacturing.

His reference to gallium and yttrium is also directionally correct. Advanced semiconductors and defense systems depend on a complex bill of materials. Mining without processing is strategy theater, not security.

The Leap of Faith: From Rhetoric to Capacity

Where the story via The Washington Times (opens in a new tab) stretches is scale and speed. Achieving a 40% share of leading-edge semiconductor production within three years is an ambition, not a forecast. Similarly, a “business-focused” critical mineral stockpile sounds decisive but raises unanswered questions: volumes, pricing discipline, domestic processing requirements, and governance.

Stockpiles stabilize shocks; they do not replace mines, refineries, or trained metallurgists. Without parallel investment in separation plants and magnet factories, stockpiling risks becoming an expensive pause button. While the administration has demonstrated a commitment to the rare earth element and critical mineral supply chain in America, we are not doing nearly enough.

Reading Between the Lines

The Washington Times piece takes a clear national-security lens and largely accepts the administration's claims at face value. What it underplays is execution risk—and the history of U.S. critical minerals policy announcing urgency faster than it builds capacity.

Despite renewed urgency—signaled by this week’s critical minerals meeting in Washington—the Trump administration has not yet assembled the level of industrial policy required to achieve rare earth and critical mineral supply-chain resilience within five years, let alone several. The strategy still overweights mine permitting and approvals, mistaking mining speed for supply-chain speed, while the real chokepoints (despite the sustained need for myriad feedstock) remain midstream processing, magnet manufacturing, pricing discipline, and skilled labor—areas where China retains dominance.

Price signals that would unlock capital, such as standardized price floors or long-term offtake guarantees, remain politically uncomfortable and inconsistently applied. Stockpiles are being positioned as sa trategy rather than insurance, buying time but not building capacity.

Downstream requirements are weakly enforced, allowing value and know-how to leak offshore. And workforce realities—chemical engineers, metallurgists, and plant operators—are largely absent from policy design. Most critically, while the administration has begun convening discussions, it has not yet forged the unified trading-bloc approach necessary for success: traditional allies, especially the likes of Canada, must be joined at the hip in a coordinated industrial policy spanning mining, processing, pricing, and manufacturing. Without that allied alignment, three-year resilience remains an aspiration—not an executable supply chain.

What’s notable: Rare earths are no longer a niche mining story. They are now spoken of in the same breath as chips, tariffs, and GDP. That rhetorical elevation matters—but investors should track concrete assets, not speeches, and we must collectively understand the need for a profound shift in our approach.  President Trump, to his credit, is starting to get it.  But we have a steep climb ahead and few dare utter this publicly in Washington DC.

Source: The Washington Times, Feb. 5, 2026

• The House passed H.R. 4090, the Critical Mineral Dominance Act, with a vote of 224-195.
• The act aims to accelerate domestic mining of critical minerals on federal lands.
• It requires the Interior Department to identify priority projects within 10 days and streamline permitting processes.
• The mining industry and labor groups view the bill as essential for national security and reducing foreign dependence.
• Republicans argue the bill maintains necessary oversight despite faster approvals.
• Democrats and environmental groups oppose the measure, citing potential undermining of environmental protections and a lack of tribal consultation.
• There are warnings that the bill could benefit foreign mining corporations without ensuring minerals remain in U.S. supply chains.

The U.S. House of Representatives on Wednesday approved sweeping legislation aimed at accelerating domestic mining on federal lands, marking a major step in Congress’s push to secure U.S. supplies of minerals critical to energy, defense, and advanced manufacturing.

Lawmakers voted 224–195 to pass H.R. 4090, the Critical Mineral Dominance Act, sponsored by Rep. Pete Stauber (R-Minn.), chair of the House Natural Resources Subcommittee on Energy and Mineral Resources. Ten Democrats joined Republicans in supporting the bill; one Republican voted against it. The legislation previously advanced out of committee last year on a 26–16 vote.

What the Bill Does

The measure would codify elements of President Donald Trump’s executive actions on critical minerals and direct the Department of the Interior to aggressively identify, prioritize, and expedite mining projects on federal land, including National Forest System lands and other public lands eligible for hardrock mineral development.

Under the bill, Interior Secretary Doug Burgum would be required to:

• Report all federal mining permit applications to Congress
• Identify “priority projects” within 10 days that can be fast-tracked for approval
• Survey and prioritize federal lands with high potential for rapid, high-impact mineral development
• Suspend, revise, or rescind regulations deemed “unduly burdensome” to mining projects
• Accelerate geologic mapping to better identify domestic mineral resources

The department would also be tasked with reporting on the economic cost of U.S. dependence on imported mineral commodities, a provision supporters say underscores national security risks tied to foreign supply chains.

Support from Industry and Labor

Mining industry groups welcomed the vote, arguing the bill brings long-needed urgency to U.S. mineral policy.

Rich Nolan, CEO of the National Mining Association, said the Trump administration has already taken steps to bolster domestic mining and that congressional action is needed to lock those policies into law. Rep. Stauber framed the legislation as a signal that Congress intends to move faster on critical minerals without abandoning oversight. “Nothing in this bill greenlights any mining project without necessary scrutiny,” he said during floor debate. “We need to get serious about our critical mineral strategy.”

Sharp Opposition from Democrats and Environmental Groups

Democrats and conservation organizations blasted the bill as a rollback of environmental safeguards and public-land protections. Critics argue it prioritizes speed over consultation with tribes, local communities, and environmental stakeholders.

Ashley Nunes of the Center for Biological Diversity called the measure “a blank check to foreign-owned mining corporations,” warning that raw materials could still be exported for processing abroad, particularly to China.

Rep. Jared Huffman (D-Calif.), ranking member of the House Natural Resources Committee, argued the bill would enrich mining giants while failing to ensure domestically mined minerals remain in U.S. supply chains. He also criticized the absence of stronger guardrails to prevent foreign adversaries from benefiting from accelerated permitting.

What Comes Next

With House passage secured, the bill now heads to the Senate, where its prospects remain uncertain amid narrower margins and continued debate over environmental review, tribal consultation, and downstream processing requirements.

Still, Wednesday’s vote underscores a bipartisan—if deeply contested—recognition that critical minerals have become a central pillar of U.S. industrial and national security policy, and that Congress is increasingly willing to intervene to reshape how mining is permitted on federal land.

Source: E&E News (opens in a new tab) by POLITICO

Bill text and CRS summary: https://www.congress.gov/bill/119th-congress/house-bill/4090 (opens in a new tab)

• REalloys is merging with BLBX and has announced non-binding agreements with Kazakhstan's AltynGroup for a 10-year rare earth offtake and investment commitment to route Central Asian feedstock into North American processing.
• The company aims to build a vertically integrated platform targeting 275 tpa Dy+Tb and 3,400+ tpa NdPr output by 2027, anchored by Ohio's Euclid Magnet Facility.
• Critical investor questions remain unanswered, including:
  • Assay data for claimed Tb/Dy-bearing tailings
  • Offtake pricing formulas
  • Export logistics
  • Integration of Kazakhstan supply with the North American production timeline

REalloys—currently merging with Blackboxstocks (NASDAQ: BLBX)—announced non-binding agreements with AltynGroup Kazakhstan (owned by the Assaubayev family) to pursue a 10-year rare earth offtake and a parallel non-binding investment commitment, aiming to route Central Asian feedstock into North American processing and alloying. REEx is summarizing what’s known, what’s promotional, and what investors still need answered.

Note theAssaubayev family is a prominent, wealthy Kazakh family known for controlling major mining and natural resource companies, including AltynGroup Holdings (opens in a new tab) and formerly KazakhGold (opens in a new tab). Led by tycoon Kanat Assaubayev (opens in a new tab) and his sons, includingAidar and the late Baurzhan, they are considered one ofKazakhstan’s most influential business dynasties. 

Kazakhstan feedstock meets a U.S. “mine-to-magnet” story

The headline is geopolitically intuitive: diversify feedstock away from China by contracting supply from Kazakhstan and converting it into metals/alloys in North America. A recent press release picked up by media such as Michael Scott at OilPrice.com (opens in a new tab) claims initial feedstock may link to AltynGroup’s Kokbulak iron ore footprint via a rare-earth-bearing byproduct from tailings, including heavy rare earths like Tb/Dy (company/partner assertions; non-binding).

What’s accurate and material right now: the deal is non-binding (MoU-style), and the value hinges on whether producing mines, grades, recoveries, export logistics, and binding offtake pricing can be locked.

REalloys’ stated value proposition (and what’s “forecast”)

In its corporate materials (opens in a new tab), REalloys positions itself as building a vertically integrated platform: separation/refining + metallization + magnet manufacturing, anchored by the Euclid Magnet Facility (Ohio) and partnerships for midstream separation.

Thecompany’s corporate deck explicitly frames output as forecast (e.g., 275 tpa Dy+Tb and 3,400 tpa+ NdPr), and targets initial domestic production “by 2027.”

Key structural point for equity holders: REalloys plans a reverse takeover into BLBX targeted in Q1 2026, and protections that could materially shape dilution and downside/upside capture.

Investor vetting: the unanswered quest

for offtake tailings

What are the assay tables, REE distributions, and independent metallurgy results? (Tb/Dy claims need hard data.)

Offtake economics: Price formula, volumes, penalties, and who pays for separation/refining export permissions, transport corridors, and any sanction-adjacent risks.

Execution sequencing: How does Kazakhstan feed integrate with the company’s stated North American ramp timeline?

Stock snapshot (BLBX) + technical read

BLBX last traded around $11.39, with a wide intraday range (~$11.41–$12.99)—a reminder this is currently a volatility-driven story stock pending deal documents and merger milestones.

Source: “North American Company Deal in Kazakhstan,” Michael Scott, Feb. 4, 2026; REalloys Non-Confidential Information Memorandum / Corporate Presentation excerpts.

• Chinese researchers have solved manufacturing bottlenecks in rare-earth weathering steel production.
• This enables stable large-scale incorporation of rare earths to create longer-lasting, corrosion-resistant steel for harsh industrial environments at lower lifecycle costs.
• The material is already deployed commercially in:
  • 5G towers
  • solar mounts
  • highway guardrails
  • bridges across multiple Chinese provinces
• This development exemplifies China's broader strategy of leveraging rare-earth dominance to industrialize performance improvements across foundational materials.
• China combines resource control with R&D and standards-setting to shape future industrial ecosystems.

Chinese industry groups and researchers convened a technical exchange in eastern China to promote the expanded industrial use of rare-earth-enhanced weathering steel, positioning it as a lower-cost, longer-life solution for harsh environments such as coal storage, conveyor systems, trestle structures, and other open-air industrial facilities.

The meeting, hosted by the Shanghai University (Zhejiang) Institute for High-End Equipment Materials (opens in a new tab) and Shanghai Shuyuan Technology (opens in a new tab), focused on applying rare-earth-alloyed weathering steel to infrastructure exposed to high humidity, corrosion, abrasion, and pollution—conditions that rapidly degrade conventional carbon steel.

Downtown Shanghai

REEx Reflections Downstream

Rare earth innovation in steel makes everyday industrial structures stronger, longer-lasting, and cheaper to maintain. By adding small amounts of rare earth elements to steel, engineers can help it resist rust, cracking, and wear in harsh conditions like heat, moisture, pollution, and heavy use. This means things like bridges, conveyor belts, power towers, solar mounts, and industrial buildings can last much longer without frequent repairs or repainting.

Over time, this lowers maintenance costs, reduces downtime, improves safety, and saves money for companies and governments. Because these steels perform better over their full lifetime—not just on day one—they can replace more expensive alloys and give manufacturers a competitive edge in industries that depend on durable infrastructure.

What’s New Technically

Presenters reported that after more than a decade of development, Chinese researchers have addressed a longstanding manufacturing bottleneck: the low yield and poor controllability of rare-earth additions in steelmaking. According to technical briefings, rare-earth elements can now be stably incorporated at scale, enabling consistent batch production suitable for industrial deployment.

The material improvements cited include:

• Modified inclusion morphology
• Increased grain-boundary energy
• Formation of denser, more protective oxide layers

Together, these changes are reported to improve pitting corrosion resistance, durability, and mechanical performance, extending service life while reducing lifecycle maintenance costs.

From Pilot to Practice

Speakers said rare-earth weathering steel is already deployed in:

• 5G telecommunications towers
• Solar mounting systems
• Highway guardrails
• Bridges
• Industrial steel structures

Field applications in Hebei, Shandong, and Xinjiang suggest the material has moved beyond laboratory validation into early commercial use according to the Chinese Society of Rare Earths.

Why This Matters Beyond Coal

While the immediate focus is coal logistics, the broader implication is materials substitution at scale. Rare-earth-enhanced steels could increasingly displace conventional corrosion-resistant alloys across infrastructure, utilities, transport, and energy systems—particularly where lifecycle economics, rather than upfront material cost, drive procurement decisions.

For Western manufacturers and policymakers, the significance lies less in novelty than in execution. China is not inventing corrosion-resistant steel; it is industrializing incremental metallurgical gains through coordinated R&D, standards development, and deployment. Over time, this approach can translate into cost advantages, export competitiveness, and standards lock-in.

The Bigger Pattern: Owning the Future, Not Just the Mine

Consistent with _Rare Earth Exchanges’_™ reporting, this development reflects a broader strategic shift. China is increasingly leveraging its dominant position across rare-earth supply chains—from mining and separation to downstream processing—coupled with sustained R&D, to drive cross-sector innovation. The objective is not simply to supply inputs, but to shape entire industrial ecosystems.

That strategy now spans defense and advanced materials, electronics and power systems, life sciences instrumentation, and emerging platforms such as humanoid robotics, autonomous systems, and drones—all of which depend on high-performance materials whose properties are tuned at the atomic and nano scale.

Standards First,Markets Follow

Participants acknowledged adoption barriers, including conservative engineering norms and incomplete application standards. The meeting concluded with agreement to accelerate industry standards drafting, full-lifecycle evaluation, and industry–academia collaboration—a familiar sequence in China, where standard-setting often precedes rapid market expansion.

Bottom Line

China is using rare earths not only to dominate magnets and electronics, but to upgrade foundational materials across heavy industry. Rare-earth weathering steel is a small but telling example of a larger playbook: combine resource leverage, applied science, and standards to own future industrial performance, not just today’s supply. Rare Earth Exchanges suggest this is certainly a trend that policymakers in the West should be monitoring.

Disclaimer: This item is translated from reporting by Shanghai University (Zhejiang) Institute for High-End Equipment Materials and affiliated Chinese outlets. As the sources are linked to state-supported institutions, technical claims, performance metrics, and adoption timelines should be independently verified before being relied upon for investment or policy decisions.