• Orion Critical Mineral Consortium proposes acquiring 40% of Glencore's Mutanda and KCC operations in DRC, valued at approximately $9 billion, securing U.S. access to copper and cobalt without operational control.
• The two mines produced 247.8 kt of copper and 33.5 kt of cobalt in 2025, representing strategic leverage over DRC's 70% share of global cobalt supply through offtake rights rather than ownership.
• Orion CMC's $1.8 billion platform, backed by U.S. DFC and ADQ, signals a shift in industrial policy—deploying equity stakes and contractual control to rewire critical mineral supply chains.

Glencore (opens in a new tab) and the Orion Critical Mineral Consortium (opens in a new tab) have entered into a non-binding Memorandum of Understanding that could materially reshape Western access to copper and cobalt from Central Africa.

Under the proposal, Orion CMC would acquire a 40% stake in Glencore’s interests in MutandaMining (opens in a new tab) and KamotoCopper Company (opens in a new tab), implying a combined enterprise value of approximately $9 billion. The United States is moving closer to the source of critical minerals—not by nationalizing assets, but by buying influence and offtake rights.

What’s Firm—and What’s Still Contingent

Established facts:

• The MoU is explicitly non-binding and subject to due diligence, definitive documentation, and regulatory approvals.
• Orion CMC would gain non-executive board representation and the right to directits proportional share of production to nominated buyers, consistentwith the U.S.–DRC Strategic Partnership Agreement.
• Operational control remains with Glencore, preserving continuity and existing management systems.

Still unresolved:

• Final valuation mechanics, governance details, and transaction timing.
• Any increase beyond the proposed 40% interest.

This distinction matters. Investors should treat the announcement as strategic intent, not execution.

Why These Assets Matter

Mutanda and KCC are not peripheral holdings. In 2025, the two operations produced a combined ~247.8 kt of copper and ~33.5 kt of cobalt, placing them among the most consequential copper–cobalt complexes outside China.

Cobalt is the strategic fulcrum. The Democratic Republic of Congo supplies roughly 70% of global cobalt, and Glencore remains the largest Western producer. By securing offtake influence rather than operating control, Washington is pursuing a capital-light, leverage-heavy approach—anchoring supply without assuming mine-operator risk.

Power Without a Flag

Orion CMC—established in October 2025 and led by Orion Resource Partners, with participation from the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation—signals a shift in industrial policy tools. Rather than relying on subsidies alone, the U.S. is deploying equity stakes, governance rights, and contractual offtake control.

This reflects a broader pattern: sovereignty through contracts and capital, not flags and ownership.

REEx Takeaway

A big, exciting deal, but of course, there is execution risk. The proposal signals seriousness and scale, yet its impact depends on closing conditions and long-term discipline.

If consummated, the transaction would strengthen U.S. and allied access to copper and cobalt while reinforcing Glencore’s position as the West’s anchor producer in the DRC. It is not a rare earth story. It is a critical-minerals power play—and a template worth watching.

Investor Profile

OrionCritical Mineral Consortium (Orion CMC) was formed in October 2025 as a $1.8 billion, U.S.-backed investment platform designed to strengthen American economic competitiveness and national security by securing critical mineral supply chains. Led by Orion Resource Partners in partnership with the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation, and supported by matching capital from ADQ (state-owned sovereign investment and holding company of the Government of Abu Dhabi) the consortium brings together government-backed capital and private-sector mining expertise. With an initial $1.8 billion committed and a stated target of $5 billion, Orion CMC is structured to mobilize capital rapidly into critical minerals that underpin advanced manufacturing, defense, energy transition, data centers, and AI infrastructure.

Strategically, Orion CMC prioritizes existing or near-term producing assets over long-dated frontier exploration, aiming to close the gap between geopolitical urgency and industrial timelines. The consortium focuses on investing in mining and processing assets, managing offtake, developing domestic and allied-country processing capacity, and scaling cost-effective mineral technologies across emerging and established markets.

Positioned as a bridge between resource-rich jurisdictions and Western industrial demand, Orion CMC represents a shift toward sovereignty through capital, governance, and offtake control, rather than state ownership—marking one of the most consequential public–private efforts to rewire critical mineral supply chains in favor of the United States and its allies.

Source: Glencore / Orion CMC joint announcement, 3 Feb 2026.

• China Minmetals and CATL met in January to expand strategic cooperation.
• The collaboration aims to link state-backed resource security with the world's largest battery manufacturer.
• The goal is to integrate upstream minerals with downstream manufacturing.
• Minmetals emphasized its national mandate to safeguard critical mineral supplies.
• CATL highlighted technology innovation amid global supply chain restructuring in the new-energy sector.
• The engagement signals China's cohesive industrial strategy to secure battery supply chains.
• This presents challenges for U.S. and European efforts to diversify away from Chinese mineral dependencies.

Senior executives from China Minmetals Corporation (opens in a new tab) and Contemporary Amperex Technology Co. Limited (CATL) (opens in a new tab) met in Ningde, Fujian, in late January to discuss expanding strategic cooperation—an engagement that highlights China’s ongoing effort to more tightly integrate upstream mineral resources with downstream battery and new-energy manufacturing.

From Dialogue to Systematic Cooperation

The meeting brought together Zhu Kebing, Deputy Party Secretary, Chairman, and General Manager of China Minmetals, and CATL founder and CEO Robin Zeng, along with senior executives from both sides. According to the official readout, discussions focused on building a more structured, long-term cooperation framework spanning resource development, industrial coordination, and green (low-carbon) development—language that in the Chinese policy context typically implies tighter operational and strategic integration over time.

China Minmetals’ National Mandate

Zhu framed China Minmetals’ role in explicitly national terms, reiterating the group’s mission of “serving the country through mining” and safeguarding China’s supply and security of critical metal and mineral resources. He emphasized Minmetals’ ambition to strengthen competitiveness across the entire mining and metals value chain, from resources to downstream services. Zhu also highlighted the company’s positioning as a “national team” for resource security and a key service provider for China’s “Two-New” agenda—generally understood to refer to emerging industries and new development models. Minmetals now operates across six major business segments, including mining, metallurgical engineering, technology, trade and logistics, financial capital, and real estate.

CATL’s View: Technology First, Supply Chains in Flux

For CATL, Zeng underscored that core technological innovation remains the company’s primary growth engine, while noting that global industrial and supply chains are undergoing profound structural change. He pointed to the rapid expansion of the new-energy sector and said closer alignment with China Minmetals could help both companies capture opportunities during this phase of accelerated industry growth.

Why This Matters for the U.S. and Europe

The significance of this development lies less in any single announced project—none were disclosed—and more in the signal it sends. The meeting reinforces a broader Chinese industrial strategy: linking state-backed resource giants directly with globally dominant battery manufacturers to secure critical minerals, improve coordination, and reduce exposure to geopolitical or trade disruptions. For U.S. and European policymakers seeking to diversify battery and critical-mineral supply chains away from China, this type of upstream–downstream alignment illustrates the scale, cohesion, and long-term orientation of China’s approach.

Company Profiles

China Minmetals Corporation

China Minmetals is one of China’s largest state-owned mining and metals groups, with operations spanning mineral exploration, mining, smelting, engineering, trading, and finance. It plays a central role in China’s strategy to secure supplies of critical minerals and metals across domestic and overseas assets.

 Contemporary Amperex Technology Co. Limited (CATL)

CATL is the world’s largest manufacturer of lithium-ion batteries for electric vehicles and energy storage systems. Headquartered in Ningde, Fujian, the company is a cornerstone of China’s new-energy industry and a major supplier to global automakers.

Disclaimer: This news item is translated and summarized from reporting by media affiliated with a Chinese state-owned entity. The information has not been independently verified and should be confirmed through independent sources before being used for investment, policy, or strategic decision-making.

• The Trump administration is inviting industry interest in deep-sea mining for polymetallic nodules in Northern Mariana Islands and American Samoa.
• The goal is to secure critical minerals like nickel, cobalt, copper, and manganese for national security.
• BOEM's information-gathering phase is ongoing and does not yet constitute approval.
• Unresolved environmental concerns include sediment plumes, fisheries impacts, and ecosystem effects.
• There are active scientific debates surrounding these environmental concerns.
• Guam, Northern Marianas, and American Samoa are unified in opposition to the mining initiative.
• The territories are preparing legal challenges, which could introduce significant permitting and timeline risks.
• Despite the opposition, there is geopolitical urgency driving the initiative.

The Trump administration is reviving plans to explore deep-sea mining in U.S. Pacific territories—specifically the Northern Mariana Islands and American Samoa—by inviting industry interest, speeding reviews, and expanding seabed mapping, arguing the move is needed to secure critical minerals for national security and advanced manufacturing. Reporting by Pacific Beat of ABC details (opens in a new tab) the process: an information request from the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management (opens in a new tab) (BOEM), streamlined environmental steps by  National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (opens in a new tab) (NOAA), and new surveys. What’s clear is the intent; what’s not is consent, science, or timing. No leases have been granted yet—and opposition across Pacific territories is unified, raising legal and schedule risk.

The Case the Coverage Gets Right

The minerals targeted—polymetallic nodules containing nickel, cobalt, copper, and manganese—are genuinely strategic for batteries, defense platforms, and grid infrastructure. It’s also accurate, as reported (opens in a new tab) by ABC, that the U.S. is not a member of the UN-affiliated International Seabed Authority, meaning Washington is pursuing a domestic path rather than the ISA framework. Pacific territories host critical U.S. military assets, which explains the geopolitical urgency. The core premise—over-reliance on China for critical minerals is a vulnerability—is widely accepted across allied capitals.

Where the Brakes Matter

The Australian media narrative leans toward inevitability; the facts do not. BOEM emphasizes that this phase is information-gathering, not approval. Environmental uncertainties remain unresolved: sediment plumes, fisheries impacts, and contested findings (including claims about oxygen generation by nodules) are active scientific debates, not settled conclusions. Crucially, Guam, the Northern Marianas, and American Samoa are aligned in opposition and are preparing legal challenges, introducing real permitting and timeline risk.

Rare Earths: Adjacent, Not the Target

Deep-sea nodules are not rare-earth deposits. Their relevance to rare earth supply chains is indirect—these are battery metals, not neodymium, dysprosium, or terbium. The strategic parallel, however, is instructive: once again, policymakers are discovering that markets alone may not deliver resilient supply fast enough when security is at stake.

The Frame REEx has been pressed since 2024

Since late 2024, Rare Earth Exchanges™ has argued for coordinated allied industrial policy—price mechanisms, stockpiles, talent/workforce development, downstream subsidies, shared infrastructure—at a scale not seen since WWII. Whether for seabed minerals or rare earth refining (especially heavy rare earth separation), outcomes will hinge on execution: durable rules, public consent, and science-based guardrails. Security premiums may emerge—but only if policy earns legitimacy.

Source: Pacific Beat (ABC), Lucy Cooper & Doug Dingwall, January 31, 2026.

• Industry leaders like Attero are urging India's Finance Minister to treat critical mineral recycling as core infrastructure in Union Budget 2026.
• Recycling is being considered as a strategic economic necessity due to heavy import dependence for lithium, cobalt, and rare earths.
• Attero's ₹150-crore expansion includes five new facilities, such as e-waste plants and an R&D hub.
• The transition from pilot to early industrial scale indicates recycling's growing importance, despite it being more of a complementary hedge than a substitute for mining in the near term.
• As global powers tighten control over upstream rare earth assets, India aims to reduce exposure to external shocks through recycling.
• Challenges persist around feedstock aggregation, yields, and price volatility in the recycling sector.

As India heads into Union Budget 2026, a familiar hope resurfaces: that critical mineral recycling will finally be treated not as an environmental afterthought, but as core industrial infrastructure. Industry voices—most prominently Attero (opens in a new tab) (Rare Earth Exchanges™ interviewed CEO Nitin Gupta (opens in a new tab))—are urging Finance Minister Nirmala Sitharaman (opens in a new tab) to hardwire recycling, rare earth processing, and advanced materials recovery into India’s economic strategy. The ask is ambitious. The implications for global rare earth supply chains are non-trivial.

Where the Argument Is Solid Ground

On fundamentals, the case is credible as cited in TheWeek (opens in a new tab). India remains heavily import-dependent for lithium, cobalt, nickel, and rare earth elements—inputs essential to EVs, grid storage, electronics, and defense. Recycling does offer a partial hedge against that exposure. E-waste, spent batteries, and industrial scrap are real secondary resource pools, not theoretical ones. Estimates of ~3.8 million tonnes of annual e-waste align with international datasets, and the rise in formal processing due to stricter Extended Producer Responsibility (EPR) enforcement is well documented.

Attero’s recent ₹150-crore ($16.4m USD) expansion—covering e-waste plants, copper recycling, and an R&D hub—signals that capital is already moving, not merely lobbying. This supports the claim that recycling is transitioning from pilot phase to early industrial scale. Rare Earth Exchanges was impressed with CEO Gupta’s vision and progress (opens in a new tab).

 Nitin Gupta: A Big Vision for India and ROW

Source: LinkedIn

The Leap of Faith Hidden in the Pitch

Still, several assumptions deserve scrutiny. Recycling is framed as a near-term lever for “material security,” yeteven proponents concede it will not substitute mining anytime soon. Volumes recoverable from batteries and e-waste remain modest relative to projected demand growth, especially for magnet rare earths. Fiscal incentives may improve margins, but they do not solve feedstock aggregation, technology yield losses, or price volatility—structural challenges the article underplays.

There is also an implicit optimism that budgetary recognition alone will unlock long-term capital. In reality, recycling economics hinge on stable policy, enforcement, and commodity cycles. Labeling recycling as “core infrastructure” helps—but does not guarantee bankable returns.

What This Signals for the Rare Earth Supply Chain

What’s notable is not that India wants recycling—it’s when and why. As the U.S., EU, and China all tighten control over upstream and midstream assets, India is positioning recycling as a strategic pressure valve. Even incremental domestic recovery reduces exposure to external shocks and price spikes. For global markets, this points to a future where secondary supply plays a larger—but still complementary—role.

The story is not hype, but it is to some extent aspirational. Recycling will not replace mines based on REEx simulations. It may, however, decide who bends least when supply chains tighten. And that certainly matters.

Attero Flagship Facility: Roorkee, Uttarakhand

Source: Business India

Profile

Attero Recycling Pvt. Ltd. is India’s leading e-waste and lithium-ion battery recycler, founded in 2008 by Nitin Gupta and Rohan Gupta, and widely regarded as the country’s largest formal processor of complex electronic waste and end-of-life batteries. The company operates an “urban mining” model built on proprietary hydrometallurgical processes and AI-enabled sorting to recover lithium, cobalt, nickel, copper, precious metals, and an emerging slate of rare earth elements, with claimed recovery efficiencies often exceeding 98%. Headquartered around its flagship facility in Roorkee, Uttarakhand, Attero spans formal e-waste collection, battery recycling, and critical-metal recovery, tightly aligned with India’s Extended Producer Responsibility (EPR) regime. While Attero has raised undisclosed private capital over its lifecycle (the company has not published a consolidated funding total), it has recently announced a ₹150-crore (≈ US $16 million) expansion to build out five new facilities—including e-waste plants in Pune, Bengaluru, and Faridabad, a copper recycling plant in Rajasthan, and an R&D Centre of Excellence in Greater Noida—aimed at scaling national recycling capacity and advancing rare-earth and advanced-materials recovery.

This expansion positions Attero as a central player in India’s National Critical Mineral Mission, even as challenges around feedstock aggregation, scale, and downstream integration remain inherent to recycling-led supply-chain strategies.

Source: Reporting by Nitin SJ Asariparambil, The Week (Jan 31, 2026)

• ReElement Technologies achieved a breakthrough by producing >99.9% pure samarium from recycled feedstock, a critical capability for defense-grade SmCo magnets that remains scarce outside China.
• The company secured $200 million in strategic equity funding from Transition Equity Partners and launched the world's first utility token for critical minerals traceability with SAGINT.
• ReElement's Marion, Indiana Supersite advances U.S. midstream refining capacity while Electrified Materials Corporation began shipping end-of-life lithium-ion batteries for circular supply chains.

Noblesville, Indiana-based ReElement Technologies (opens in a new tab) opened 2026 with a series of operational and strategic milestones that underscore its growing role in rebuilding domestic and allied refining capacity for rare earths and critical minerals, according to a January update from CEO Mark Jensen (opens in a new tab).

Rare Earth Refining in America’s Midwest

Most notably, ReElement achieved a refining breakthrough by producing >99.9% pure samarium from customer-provided recycled feedstock—a critical step toward reliable SmCo magnet-grade materials used in defense and advanced industrial applications where high heat tolerance is essential. Samarium refining at this purity level remains scarce outside China, making the result commercially and strategically significant.

The company also announced a traceability milestone with SAGINT, minting what itdescribes as the world’s first utility token for criticalminerals, starting with neodymium oxide. The system is designed to enable tamper-resistant provenance, auditability, and DFARS-ready compliance, directly addressing one of the U.S. defense supply chain’s most persistent blind spots. Jensen informed Rare Earth Exchanges™ in a critique of one of our more critical articles that this token is of vital importance for defense-related customers.

Note on the topic of no U.S. price floors, Jensen went on the record online that none are needed for competitors such as ReElement.

On the capital front, ReElement secured a $200 million strategic equity facility from Transition Equity Partners to accelerate commercial deployment, anchored by its Marion, Indiana, Supersite. The funding materially strengthens the company’s ability to scale its multi-mineral, multi-feedstock refining platform at a time when U.S. policymakers are prioritizing onshore processing capacity.

 ReElement’s momentum was reinforced by a high-level site visit from Indiana Governor Mike Braun (opens in a new tab) and Secretary of Commerce David J. Adams (opens in a new tab), signaling growing state-level alignment with federal critical mineral and defense supply chain objectives.

Finally, through affiliate Electrified Materials Corporation (opens in a new tab), the company commenced shipments of end-of-life lithium-ion batteries, advancing a circular, U.S.-based battery materials supply chain.

ReElement executives will engage global partners and media at Mining Indaba (Feb. 9–12, Cape Town).

Rare EarthExchanges has reported that ReElement Technologies represents one of the key emerging mine-to-magnet supply chains in the USA. In this company’s case, they focus on the midstream—recycling and refining—the true bottleneck in the West.

• South Dakota hosts 15 federally designated critical minerals including lithium, graphite, and tungsten in the Black Hills, but none are rare earth elements, despite headlines conflating the two supply chains.
• Exploration interest is growing, but geologists caution that mineral presence doesn't equal economic viability; commercial production requires proven grade, recovery rates, permitting, and downstream buyers.
• Unlike Wyoming's Bear Lodge rare earth project with domestic separation capabilities, South Dakota lacks midstream processing infrastructure, highlighting that strategic independence requires more than just mining.

South Dakota is back in the critical minerals conversation—but not in the way many headlines imply. As global demand rises and geopolitical tension with China (and now Greenland) sharpens, the state is seeing renewed exploration interest across critical minerals—not rare earth elements (REEs). That distinction matters.

What the Geology Actually Says

The reporting (opens in a new tab) via KOTA is accurate on the facts. South Dakota hosts 15 federally designated critical minerals, including lithium, graphite, manganese, niobium, tantalum, tungsten, and vanadium, concentrated largely in the Black Hills and parts of central South Dakota. None are rare earth elements. These minerals matter for batteries, alloys, defense systems, and industrial manufacturing—but they sit in different supply chains than NdPr-based permanent magnets.

Geologists are right to be cautious. Pegmatites may contain lithium or tantalum, but their presence is not economic. Exploration is still early-stage. No commercial-scale production has been demonstrated, and monetization depends on grade, recovery rates, permitting, and downstream buyers.

Where the Narrative Overreaches

The article implicitly links South Dakota’s exploration debate to the rare earth supply crisis. That’s where clarity slips. Critical minerals are not interchangeable. Lithium and graphite shortages do not solve the rare earth magnet dependence. Nor does local mining automatically translate into supply-chain control.

This is the core REEx lesson: rocks are upstream; power is midstream. Separation, refining, alloying, and component manufacturing—not just extraction—determine strategic value. On those layers, China still dominates.

Wyoming Shows the Difference

The contrast with neighboring Wyoming is instructive. Rare Element Resources is advancing a genuine rare earth project at Bear Lodge, paired with a domestic separation demonstration plant in Upton. That is a supply-chain play, not just a mining story. It’s why NdPr matters—and why the comparison to Beijing is not rhetorical.

South Dakota, by contrast, is still debating whether lithium should even be regulated as hard-rock mining.

The Real Stakes

Environmental concerns are legitimate, especially given the Black Hills’ water constraints and legacy Superfund sites. But so is the strategic backdrop. The risk is not mining per se—it is confusing exploration with independence.

South Dakota may yet become relevant in batteries or specialty metals. But it is not a rare earth solution, and headlines should not imply otherwise.

Source: South Dakota News Watch / KOTA, January 29, 2026

• Ellen MacArthur Foundation's January 2026 report reveals that circular economy strategies can reduce EV battery material demand and environmental harm.
• The strategies cannot dismantle China's near-monopoly over critical mineral processing without deliberate investments in ex-China refining capacity.
• The study identifies a critical gap: recycling helps in the long-term but won't meaningfully offset primary supply dependence before 2035.
• Batteries recycled in Europe or North America may still rely on Chinese processing infrastructure.
• The report challenges the narrative that recycling alone equals supply-chain security.
• Resilience requires coordinated industrial policy, including regional processing hubs, standardized battery passports, and allied capital alignment.

A major January 2026 report led by Wen-Yu Weng (opens in a new tab), Executive Lead for Critical Minerals at the Ellen MacArthur Foundation, delivers a sweeping diagnosis of the electric-vehicle (EV) battery supply chain—and an uncomfortable conclusion for policymakers. Titled Leading the Charge: Turning Risk into Reward with a Circular Economy for EV Batteries and Critical Minerals (opens in a new tab), the study argues that while circular economy strategies can dramatically reduce risk, cost, and environmental harm, they do not by themselves dismantle China’s near-monopoly over rare earth and critical mineral processing.

Drawing on 15 years of research and collaboration with automakers, battery manufacturers, recyclers, logistics providers, policymakers, and investors, the report reframes EV batteries as strategic material assets and calls for system-level redesign rather than incremental fixes. Leading the Charge - Jan 2026

Study Scope and Methods

The Foundation did not conduct new mineral surveys or market forecasts. Instead, it synthesized existing global data from the IEA, UNEP, World Bank, and industry case studies, combined with direct engagement across the EV battery value chain. The framework centers on five “circular loops” (intensive use, life extension, second life, high-quality recycling, and data governance) and three decision layers (product design, business models, and system-level policy). The goal: identify where value leaks, where risks accumulate, and where interventions actually scale.

Key Findings

The report confirms several realities that REEx readers will recognize:

• Material intensity is exploding. A typical EV contains over 200 kg of critical minerals—six times more than a combustion vehicle. Demand for lithium, nickel, cobalt, graphite, and rare earth-adjacent inputs is rising far faster than new supply can be responsibly developed.
• Processing, not mining, is the choke point. Mining occurs across dozens of countries, but refining and chemical processing remain geographically concentrated—overwhelmingly in China. Circularity reduces how much material is needed, but it does not automatically relocate where that material is refined.
• Recycling helps—but later. Before 2035, most recycled feedstock comes from manufacturing scrap, not end-of-life EVs. This creates a timing gap: recycling cannot meaningfully offset primary supply or processing dominance in the near term.
• Design decisions lock in dependence. Battery architectures optimized for performance (cell-to-pack, cell-to-chassis) often sacrifice repairability and recyclability, reinforcing reliance on centralized processing hubs.

The China Processing Question

The most consequential implication is what the report does not overclaim. Circular economy strategies can cut mineral demand, dampen price volatility, and reduce environmental harm—but they do not inherently break China’s control over midstream processing, especially for rare earths and battery-grade materials. Without deliberate investment in ex-China refining, separation, and chemical conversion capacity, circular flows risk being “re-routed” back through the same dominant processors.

In plain terms: a battery recycled in Europe or North America may still rely on Chinese processing expertise, equipment, or intermediate chemicals.

Implications for Investors and Policymakers

The study quietly challenges a popular Western narrative—that recycling alone equals supply-chain security. Instead, it suggests resilience requires coordinated industrial policy, including regional processing hubs, standardized battery passports, long-term offtake contracts, and capital alignment across allies. Circularity lowers risk; it does not substitute for strategy.

Limitations and Contested Ground

The report is intentionally non-quantitative and avoids scenario modeling. Critics may argue it underplays geopolitical coercion risks or overestimates the speed at which circular business models can scale. Others will note that rare earth elements, while adjacent to EV supply chains, are less directly addressed than lithium-ion battery metals. These gaps matter—but they do not invalidate the central warning.

REEx Takeaway

Leading the Charge is not anti-China, nor is it naïve about markets. Its core message aligns with REEx analysis: material efficiency without processing sovereignty is a half-solution. Circularity is necessary. It is not sufficient.

Citation

Ellen MacArthur Foundation (2026). Leading the Charge: Turning Risk into Reward with a Circular Economy for EV Batteries and Critical Minerals

Leading the Charge - Jan 20

• China introduces comprehensive regulations for EV battery recycling as waste batteries are expected to exceed 1 million tons annually by 2030.
• Regulations impose extended producer responsibility on manufacturers and require nationwide recycling networks.
• A national digital ID system will track each battery from manufacturing through recycling, enabling real-time oversight.
• Chinese recyclers already achieve 99.6% recovery rates for nickel, cobalt, and manganese.
• New rules prohibit repurposed EV batteries in applications like e-bikes.
• Vehicles are required to be scrapped with batteries intact.
• The regulations strengthen China's control over critical mineral recovery as a strategic 'urban mine.

China has unveiled sweeping new rules to govern the recycling and reuse of electric vehicle (EV) power batteries, signaling a decisive move to systematize and formalize critical mineral recovery, industrial safety, and supply-chain oversight as battery retirements accelerate. The measures were announced January 16 at a joint press conference held by the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology (opens in a new tab) (MIIT), alongside the Ministry of Ecology and Environment and the State Administration for Market Regulation (opens in a new tab).

Background

The new “Interim Measures for the Management of Recycling and Comprehensive Utilization of Waste Power Batteries from New Energy Vehicles” arrive as China’s EV market reaches industrial scale. Officials disclosed that China produced and sold more than 16.5 million EVs in 2025, representing nearly 48% of all new vehicle sales. As a result, regulators say China is entering a “large-scale battery retirement phase,” with waste power batteries expected to exceed 1 million tons annually by 2030.

The rules significantly strengthen state oversight across the entire battery lifecycle. Most notably, they impose extended producer responsibility on battery makers and automakers, requiring them to build nationwide recycling networks, ensure compliant transfer of retired batteries, and share technical disassembly data. New energy vehicles must generally be scrapped together with their power batteries—closing long-standing loopholes that allowed batteries to leak into informal or unsafe channels—while battery-swapping models are carved out for separate regulatory treatment.

Updates

A major institutional upgrade is the introduction of a national digital ID system for EV batteries. Each battery pack will carry a unique digital identity, enabling full lifecycle tracking—from manufacturing and installation to repair, recycling, and material recovery. Regulators describe this as a core enforcement breakthrough, replacing earlier, weaker traceability rules with real-time, data-driven supervision.

For the West and the United States, the implications are strategic.

China is reinforcing its grip on battery recycling as an “urban mine,” ensuring lithium, nickel, cobalt, and manganese are systematically recovered and reused domestically. Officials reported that leading Chinese recyclers already achieve 99.6% recovery rates for nickel, cobalt, and manganese, and 96.5% for lithium, levels described as internationally advanced. China has also moved to allow imports of recycled lithium-ion black mass, bringing in roughly 28,000 tons worth RMB 1.26 billion by the end of 2025.

The measures also draw a firm line against unsafe downstream uses. The concept of “second-life” or tiered utilization is removed, and repurposed EV batteries are prohibited in applications such as electric bicycles—tightening quality control and shrinking gray-market activity.

Final Thoughts

In short, Beijing is turning EV battery recycling into a regulated, traceable, nationally strategic industry, strengthening China’s long-term advantage in critical minerals and low-carbon manufacturing—while raising the bar for Western competitors still working to build comparable recycling systems.

Disclaimer: This news item originates from media associated with Chinese state-owned or state-affiliated entities. Information should be independently verified by an external source.

• New University of Texas study maps 2024 production flows for six critical battery metals.
• Study reveals China controls most critical midstream processing stages despite geographically diverse mining operations.
• Herfindahl-Hirschman Index analysis shows lithium, nickel, cobalt, and manganese supply chains heavily funnel toward Chinese refinement hubs.
• Chinese control of midstream stages creates significant geopolitical vulnerabilities.
• Study concludes that supply-chain independence requires parallel investment in processing infrastructure.
• Investment is needed not just in new mines, as China's advantage lies in controlling where raw materials become usable products.

A focus on a key critical mineral and the processing challenge.  A new open-access study published in Commodities, January 2026, by Ramsha Akhter, Sisira Reddy Palli, Mithilesh Walanjuwani, and senior author Erick C. Jones Jr. of the University of Texas at Arlington (opens in a new tab) offers one of the clearest, data-driven snapshots yet of who controls the world’s lithium-ion battery metals—andwhere the real vulnerabilities lie. Drawing on U.S. Geological Surveydata, company filings, and Bloomberg datasets, the researchers map 2024 production flows for six critical materials—lithium, cobalt, nickel, manganese, copper, and aluminum—from mine to primary processing. Their central finding is stark and highly relevant for investors and policymakers alike: while mining is often geographically diverse, processing is not—and China dominates the most critical midstream stages.

How the Study Was Done

Rather than modeling the future, the authors focus on what is happening now. They reconciled national production statistics with company-level disclosures to build a harmonized dataset showing which corporations mine which metals, in which countries, and where that material is sent for initial processing. To quantify concentration, they used the Herfindahl–Hirschman Index (opens in a new tab) (HHI), a standard economic tool that measures how competitive—or monopolized—a market really is. This approach allows apples-to-apples comparisons across metals and across countries.

What the Maps Reveal

The results overturn a common misconception. Copper and aluminum look relatively healthy: mining and processing are spread across many countries and companies, making these supply chains more resilient.

But the picture darkens quickly for battery-critical metals.

• Lithium and nickel show moderate diversity at the mine level, but a sharp funneling toward Chinese processing hubs for conversion into battery-grade chemicals.
• Cobalt and manganese are far more concentrated, with cobalt extraction overwhelmingly tied to theDemocratic Republic of the Congo and processing heavily concentrated inChina.
• In several cases, national HHIs approach monopoly levels, meaning one country or one firm effectively controls supply.

The practical takeaway: Much like rare earth elements, even if new mines open outside China, much of the world still sends its ore to China to be refined. That gives Beijing—and a small group of vertically integrated firms—outsized leverage over prices, availability, and downstream industries such as EVs, grid storage, and defense electronics.

Why This Matters for Rare Earths and Battery Supply Chains

Although the paper focuses on battery metals rather than rare earth elements per se, the lesson translates directly. China’s advantage is not just geology—it is processing infrastructure, industrial clustering, and corporate integration. The same dynamic that governs lithium hydroxide, nickel sulfate, and cobalt chemicals also governs rare earth separation and magnet production. Control the midstream, and you control the system.

For the U.S. and its allies, this means supply-chain risk does not disappear simply by approving new mines. Without parallel investment in refining, chemical processing, and precursor manufacturing, upstream diversification offers only limited protection.

Implications—and the Hard Choices Ahead

The authors suggest a practical policy typology. For already diverse metals like copper and aluminum, the goal should be reinforcement and efficiency. For lithium and nickel, the priority is redistributing processing capacity away from a single dominant hub. For highly concentrated materials like cobalt and manganese, recycling, substitution, and strategic stockpiles may be more realistic than trying to out-mine incumbents.

Limitations and Controversies

The study is transparent about its constraints. Some company data are incomplete, USGS figures can lag, and country allocations rely on evidence-weighted assumptions rather than full mine-by-mine disclosure. Still, because market concentration is driven by the largest players, these limitations are unlikely to change the core conclusion. The controversial implication—that Western industrial policy has underestimated the power of the midstream—may be uncomfortable, but it is difficult to refute.

Bottom Line

This paper delivers a clear message for a lay reader: China’s dominance in critical minerals is less about owning every mine and more about controlling where raw materials becomeusable products. Until that changes, claims of supply-chain independenceremain more aspirational than real.

Citation: Akhter, R.; Palli, S.R.; Walanjuwani, M.; Jones, E.C. Jr. Mapping the Supply Chain of Lithium-Ion Battery Metals from Mine to Primary Processing by Country and Corporation. Commodities, 2026, 5(1), 2. https://doi.org/10.3390/commodities5010002 (opens in a new tab)

• Canada's PM Mark Carney proposes rolling back 100% tariffs on Chinese EVs in exchange for agricultural access, marking a major policy reversal and first prime ministerial visit to Beijing since 2017.
• The deepening trade ties with China threaten Canada's strategic role as a trusted upstream supplier in allied critical minerals and rare earth supply chains, potentially reinforcing Beijing's downstream dominance.
• Ottawa's tariff détente lacks finalized agreements and safeguards for strategic sectors, risking Canada's leverage in non-Chinese supply chains for short-term relief from U.S. tariff pressure.

Canada’s sudden warming toward Beijing, framed by Prime Minister Mark Carney (opens in a new tab) as a “new strategic partnership,” is being sold as pragmatic diversification amid tariff pressure from Washington. Reported by NBC News (opens in a new tab), the visit to Beijing marks the first by a Canadian prime minister since 2017 and comes as Ottawa faces renewed U.S. tariffs and rhetorical threats. In geopolitical terms, the move is understandable. In rare earth and critical minerals terms, it is combustible.

The Hard Facts Beneath the Headlines

What’s solid: Canada is heavily exposed to the U.S. market—roughly three-quarters of manufactured exports flow south—while China remains its second-largest trading partner. Carney’s proposal to roll back Canada’s 100% tariff on Chinese EVs in exchange for agricultural access is a clear policy reversal from 2024. Visa-free travel and a “preliminary” tariff-reduction framework were also announced following meetings with Xi Jinping.

What’s not yet proven: a finalized trade agreement, durable enforcement mechanisms, or safeguards for strategic sectors. These omissions matter—especially for minerals.

The Rare Earth Subtext No One Wants to Say Aloud

Canada is not just a farm exporter. It is a potential upstream ally in non-Chinese rare-earth, battery, and critical-mineral supply chains—an ambition shared with the United States and allies. Deepening trade dependence on China while negotiating access to EVs risks reinforcing Beijing’s downstream dominance precisely as Western governments try to diversify away from it.

For investors, this is the quiet alarm: tariff détente can translate into leverage in magnets, batteries, and materials. China’s playbook often couples market access with industrial positioning. Ottawa’s shift, if not ring-fenced, could dilute Canada’s role as a trusted supplier in allied critical-minerals strategies.

Media Framing vs. Strategic Reality

NBC’s framing leans sympathetic to Ottawa’s predicament, portraying Beijing as the “more predictable” partner. That is debatable. China’s record on trade retaliation, export controls, and rules-based compliance is uneven. Presenting diversification as value-neutral understates risk—and glosses over the strategic asymmetry in rare earths, where China still controls most refining and magnet capacity.

Bottom Line for Rare Earth Watchers

Canada may be diversifying trade. It may also be drifting strategically. For rare earth and critical minerals markets, the story isn’t tariffs—it’s whether Canada safeguards its role in non-Chinese supply chains or trades leverage for short-term relief.

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• China's MIIT unveiled its 15th Five-Year Plan for electric vehicles, marking 2026 as a strategic inflection year with focus on:
  • Solid-state batteries
  • Autonomous driving
  • Supply-chain self-reliance
• During the 14th Five-Year Plan:
  • China's NEV market expanded 3.6×
  • Battery costs fell 30%
  • The country became the world's largest auto exporter
• New policy priorities include:
  • Strengthening core component production
  • Expanding domestic EV demand
  • Tightening market oversight
  • Guiding overseas industrial expansion

China’s top industrial regulators have formally kicked off the next phase of the country’s electric vehicle (EV) and intelligent vehicle strategy—signaling continued state-backed acceleration in technologies that directly affect global auto, battery, and critical minerals markets.

On January 13, Li Lecheng (opens in a new tab), China’s Minister of Industry and Information Technology, chaired the 2026 Annual Working Meeting of the Inter-Ministerial Joint Conference on the Development of Energy-Saving and New Energy Vehicles in Beijing, according to a notice published (opens in a new tab) by the China Rare Earth Industry Association, citing the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology (MIIT).

Targeted Aim

The meeting reviewed progress under China’s 14th Five-Year Plan (2021–2025) and laid out priorities for the 15th Five-Year Plan, including a draft roadmap titled the “Intelligent Connected New Energy Vehicle Industry Development Plan.” The tone was confident—and strategic.

What Changed—and Why It Matters

Chinese officials reported that during the 14th Five-Year Plan period:

• China’s new energy vehicle market expanded 3.6×
• China became the world’s largest automobile exporter
• Lithium-ion battery cell costs fell 30%
• Battery lifespan increased 40%
• Charging speeds more than tripled

These gains reinforce China’s cost and scale advantage across EV supply chains—particularly in batteries, power electronics, and downstream integration.

2026: The Inflection Year

Officials emphasized that 2026 marks the first year of the 15th Five-Year Plan, describing the EV sector as entering a “period of major strategic opportunity.” Key policy priorities include:

• Strengthening supply-chain self-reliance, with new initiatives targeting core components, basic materials, and industrial software
• Accelerating breakthroughs in all-solid-state batteries and advanced autonomous driving
• Expanding domestic demand, including vehicle trade-in programs and large-scale deployment of electric heavy trucks
• Tightening market oversight, with enhanced price monitoring, cost investigations, quality enforcement, and industry standards
• Guiding overseas expansion, encouraging Chinese firms to invest abroad in an “orderly and secure” manner while managing technology and investment risks

Implications for the West

For U.S. and European policymakers and investors, the message is clear: China is not slowing its EV push—it is institutionalizing it. The explicit focus on solid-state batteries, supply-chain control, and overseas industrial (layout) signals sustained pressure on Western automakers, battery producers, and critical minerals strategies.

This meeting confirms that EVs remain a core pillar of China’s industrial policy, with implications for lithium, rare earths, graphite, power semiconductors, and global automotive competition.

Disclaimer: This news item originates from reporting by Chinese state-affiliated entities. Information should be independently verified.

• Scientific Reports retracted a 2024 study claiming lithium exploration contaminated Serbia's Jadar Valley, citing methodological shortcomings including lack of baseline data and failure to account for a 2014 arsenic tailings spill from a nearby mine.
• Independent peer review found the study's limited sampling and shallow groundwater data insufficient to establish causation, noting that boron, lithium, and arsenic occur naturally or from legacy mining in the region.
• The retraction undermines scientific claims used by activists opposing Rio Tinto's project and highlights the critical need for robust environmental baselines as Western nations accelerate lithium development for supply chain independence.

Scientific Reports, published by Nature Portfolio (opens in a new tab), has retracted a 2024 paper that claimed lithium exploration activity caused environmental contamination in western Serbia’s Jadar Valley, the site of a proposed lithium project associated with Rio Tinto.

The journal said the retraction was based on methodological shortcomings, not fraud or data fabrication. Editors concluded the study overstated causal claims, lacked pre-exploration environmental baseline data, and failed to adequately account for a documented 2014 tailings spill from the nearby Stolice mine that released arsenic-contaminated waste into the same watershed.

Post-publication peer review found that while the underlying measurements were technically sound, they were insufficient to establish that current lithium exploration—rather than historical mining activity, natural geochemistry, or flood-related redistribution—caused the observed conditions. The authors were invited to revise and resubmit the paper, but the journal proceeded with retraction. Several authors disagreed with the decision, while others did not respond to editorial correspondence.

The move aligns with an independent technical critique published by Canadian geoscientists, who argued that the original study’s limited sampling density, lack of temporal context, and reliance on shallow groundwater data made it impossible to link contamination to exploration drilling. The critique noted that boron and lithium occur naturally in the Jadar basin and that elevated arsenic levels were more consistent with legacy flood-borne tailings than recent groundwater leakage.

The retraction weakens a scientific reference that has been widely cited by activist groups and some policymakers opposing lithium development in Serbia. It comes as the United States and European Union seek to expand domestic and allied lithium supply chains to reduce dependence on China.

For investors and regulators, the case underscores the importance of robust environmental baselines in permitting and ESG assessments.

Without them, environmental claims can be difficult to validate yet still influence regulatory, legal, and political outcomes. As Western governments accelerate critical-minerals development, the Jadar episode highlights the growing scrutiny of how environmental science is interpreted and applied in high-stakes resource projects.

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• China is shifting from resource extraction to downstream innovation, focusing on rare earth materials science, process patents, and technology integration rather than just mining tonnage.
• Recent breakthroughs in rare-earth MXenes for energy storage, magnetic separation processes, and luminescent crystals position China to control how rare earths are engineered into future technologies.
• Organizations like Shanghai Association for Rare Earth orchestrate ecosystem-wide R&D translation and patent activity, threatening Western competitiveness even if supply security is achieved.

From the mine to the molecule is the mantra the West must now understand, internalize, and respond to—quickly and intelligently. Why?  For example, Rare Earth Exchanges™ report on a cluster of recent ACS Publications papers—many authored or amplified by China-based research institutions and industry networks—offers a revealing snapshot of how China is racing downstream to secure advantage in rare earth materials science, process know-how, and intellectual property, far beyond mining and refining.

For U.S. investors and policymakers, this should be part of a real wake-up call: the next phase of competition is not about tonnage. It is about how rare earths are engineered, processed, and embedded into future technologies.

These studies are highly technical on the surface, but together they translate into a simple strategic message: China wants to control how rare earths are used—not just where they come from, and how they are processed, plus the magnet, assembly, and other component outputs. Few in the Western media understand this enough to report the topic.

Breakthrough #1: Rare-Earth MXenes for Energy Storage

One paper reports the synthesis of 2D MXene nanosheets derived from a rare-earth-containing precursor, (Mo₂/₃Er₁/₃)₂AlC. In plain terms, this research explores ultra-thin, highly conductive materials with potential relevance to batteries, supercapacitors, and fast-charging systems.

Why it matters

• MXenes are actively researched worldwide for next-generation energy storage, EVs, grid buffering, and advanced electronics.
• Introducing erbium (Er) places rare-earth functionality directly into emerging nanomaterials.
• The study maps synthesis pathways, bottlenecks, and failure modes—exactly the kind of process insight that later becomes patentable industrial IP.

Even where the experiment exposes limitations (such as impurity formation reducing performance), it still advances learning on how these materials might be industrialized more efficiently.

Breakthrough #2: Magnetic Separation—Turning Chemistry into Cost Control

Another study systematically characterizes the magnetic behavior of rare-earth hydroxides, oxalates, and organophosphate compounds commonly encountered in separation circuits.

Translation for non-scientists: This work helps engineers design more selective, lower-energy separation processes, potentially reducing reliance on expensive and environmentally intensive chemical steps.

Why it matters

• Separation—not mining—is the true choke point in rare-earth supply chains.
• Understanding magnetophoretic behavior enables process optimization and cost advantages.
• This foundational data underpins future patents that can lock in margins and operational dominance.

Breakthrough #3: Redefining Rare-Earth “Electronegativity”

A third paper refines how electronegativity values for rare-earth elements are calculated using spectroscopic data. While academic in tone, this work feeds directly into alloy design, catalysts, magnets, and semiconductor materials modeling. In effect, it contributes to a more precise design toolkit for rare-earth-enabled products—fertile ground for proprietary materials IP.

Breakthrough #4: Luminescent and Magnetic Crystals

The synthesis of quaternary rare-earth crystals with tunable magnetic and photoluminescent properties points toward lasers, sensors, photonics, and defense-relevant optics. These are high-value, export-sensitive technologies, not bulk commodities.

Shanghai Skyline

An Institutional Engine: Shanghai Association for Rare Earth

Behind this research momentum sit organizations like the Shanghai Association for Rare Earth (opens in a new tab) (SHARE)—a government-aligned industry body that connects universities, laboratories, manufacturers, and policymakers.

SHARE’s role is not mining advocacy. It is ecosystem orchestration: accelerating R&D translation, supporting standards, coordinating patent activity, and enabling commercialization. This is how China moves from resource dominance to technology dominance, aligned with its “Two Rare Earth Base” strategy and downstream industrial policy.

Rare Earth Exchanges Takeaway

The West still talks primarily about mines, and now, in a reactionary way, refineries and magnet production. China increasingly focuses on downstream innovation, refining control, and patent accumulation—while preserving for as long as possible its midstream monopoly. It’s a race to own the future.

These papers show a country racing to embed rare earths into future-defining technologies—energy storage, electronics, magnets, and photonics—while owning the underlying IP. Once those patents are locked, supply security alone—or even coercive diplomacy—will not restore competitiveness.

For the U.S. and its allies, the challenge is no longer just digging and refining faster. It is inventing faster, patenting earlier, and industrializing smarter.

Disclaimer: Some research and industry amplification discussed here is promoted by China-based institutions and associations operating within a heavily state-influenced environment. Claims and implications should be independently evaluated, always.

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• Metalex Africa's $1.41M USTDA-funded feasibility study aims to expand Kazozu Mine output by 25,000 metric tons of copper-cobalt concentrates, testing whether Western firms can re-enter upstream mining in systems shaped by Chinese capital.
• Zambia anchors 70-75% of export earnings in copper and holds strategic cobalt deposits, positioning itself as a cornerstone jurisdiction for energy transition minerals despite limited rare earth production capabilities.
• China controls 70-80% of global cobalt refining and dominates Zambian processing infrastructure, but US firms have an opening to secure transparent, ESG-aligned upstream assets and diversify critical mineral supply chains.

Zambia sits at a strategic hinge in the global energy transition. Long known for copper, increasingly relevant for cobalt, and quietly prospective for a wider slate of critical minerals, the country is becoming a proving ground for whether Western firms can re-enter upstream mining in a system long shaped by Chinese capital, processing, and offtake. The Metalex Cobalt and Copper Production Expansion is not just a project—it is a test case.

A Project Designed for Scale—and Scrutiny

Metalex Africa Zambia Limited (opens in a new tab) has launched a U.S.-backed request for proposals (opens in a new tab) via the U.S. Trade and Development Agency (USTDA) (opens in a new tab) to advance a full bankable feasibility study for expanding operations at the Kazozu Mine in northwestern Zambia. Funded by a $1.41 million grant from the U.S. Trade and Development Agency, the study spans exploration, metallurgy, processing design, energy supply, logistics, ESG and climate resilience, offtake strategy, and financing.

The goal is to increase output by up to ~25,000 metric tons of copper–cobalt concentrates—an important distinction. This is upstream material, not refined metal. In today’s supply-chain politics, that distinction defines both the opportunity and the constraint.

Metalex, a Zambia-based operator with U.S. incorporation and African operations, represents the kind of hybrid firm U.S. policy increasingly favors: commercially driven, locally embedded, but aligned with Western transparency, financing, and governance norms.

Zambia Beyond Copper: What’s Real, What’s Early

Zambia is not a rare earth heavyweight—and claims otherwise should be treated skeptically. But it does host a credible portfolio of critical minerals beyond copper and cobalt:

• Manganese: Commercial deposits, particularly in Luapula and Central Provinces, with production largely in raw ore or simple concentrates.
• Nickel: Produced mainly as a copper byproduct; volumes are modest but real.
• Lithium: Pegmatite-hosted discoveries in southern Zambia (Choma Belt). Promising, but still early-stage.
• Graphite: Flake graphite occurrences in eastern Zambia; exploration to early development.
• Tantalum/Niobium (coltan): Artisanal to exploration-stage occurrences; not yet an export pillar.
• Rare Earth Elements: Carbonatite-linked prospects such as Nkombwa Hill show geological interest, but no defined reserves or operating REE mines.

The nuance matters: Zambia’s strategic value today lies in base metals and battery inputs, not magnet-grade rare earth separation.

Why Copper and Cobalt Still Anchor the Story

Copper remains Zambia’s economic backbone, accounting for roughly 70–75% of export earnings. Globally, it is indispensable to electrification—EVs, grids, renewables, data centers—and demand is projected to rise sharply through the 2030s.

Cobalt, meanwhile, is smaller in volume but outsized in strategic importance. Used in lithium-ion batteries, aerospace alloys, and defense applications, it is produced in Zambia as a byproduct of copper, lowering geological risk. Together with the DRC, Zambia sits atop the world’s most important cobalt-bearing belt.

In short: copper pays the bills; cobalt shapes geopolitics.

China’s Position: Not Absolute Control, but Structural Advantage

China’s presence in Zambia is deep, durable, and often misunderstood. Chinese firms do not own “everything,” but they shape the system.

• Major mining and smelting assets are operated or financed by Chinese state-linked companies, especially on the Copperbelt.
• Chinese-backed processors dominate intermediate stages—concentrates, blister copper, cobalt intermediates.
• Historically, much Zambian cobalt has flowed into China-dominated global refining chains, where China controls roughly 70–80% of cobalt chemical refining worldwide.

This is influence through processing, offtake, and finance, not just mine ownership. Zambia is now attempting to retain more value domestically—including cobalt sulfate refining—but China remains the incumbent processor of scale.

Why U.S. Firms Can’t Sit This Out

For U.S. companies, Zambia offers something rare: scale without fragility. Compared with many resource jurisdictions, it has a relatively stable legal framework, a long mining history, and an explicit desire to diversify partners beyond China.

Strategically, Zambia aligns with U.S. priorities to:

• Secure copper for electrification and other uses.
• Diversify cobalt supply outside single-country dependence.
• Build transparent, ESG-aligned upstream assets.
• Lay groundwork for future non-Chinese refining and offtake.

Projects like Metalex matter not because they instantly displace China—they won’t—but because they re-anchor Western participation upstream, create bankable assets, and reopen pathways for alternative processing and offtake over time.

The Takeaway

Zambia is not the next rare earth superpower. It is something more concrete—and more useful: a cornerstone copper–cobalt jurisdiction at the heart of the energy transition. China remains deeply embedded, especially in processing, but the door is open—deliberately—for U.S. firms willing to engage early, seriously, and commercially.

Metalex’s USTDA-backed expansion is exactly the kind of project where that engagement can begin. See the RFP (opens in a new tab).

© 2026 Rare Earth Exchanges™ – Accelerating Transparency, Accuracy, and Insight Across the Rare Earth & Critical Minerals Supply Chain.

• NIO produced its one-millionth EV in January 2026.
• NIO delivered 326,000 vehicles in 2025, marking a 46.9% year-over-year increase.
• NIO is likely to achieve its first quarterly profit in Q4 2025 as vehicle margins reach 18%.
• China controls 60% of rare earth mining, 90% of refining, and 85% of global lithium-ion battery production.
• This control provides China with strategic leverage over EV supply chains, allowing Beijing to influence Western automakers.
• NIO's success is a reflection of state-backed industrial policy.
• China's EV sector faces challenges such as overproduction, price wars, and export tensions.
• The capacity in China's EV sector is outpacing demand, risking systemic oversupply and trade friction internationally.

NIO’s (opens in a new tab) one-millionth vehicle (a new ES8 electric SUV) rolls off the line in Hefei, Anhui Province on Jan. 6, 2026. The milestone underscores China's rapid progress in electric vehicle manufacturing.

NIO ET5

NIO is a leading Chinese premium electric vehicle (EV) manufacturer, founded in 2014, known for its smart EVs, innovative battery-swapping technology (Power Swap Stations), and strong user community, offering SUVs and sedans with advanced tech, plus services like home charging and mobile charging vans, aiming for sustainable mobility with brands like ONVO and Firefly for different markets. 

NIO Hits One Million – Driving Toward Profitability

Chinese electric vehicle maker NIO celebrated (opens in a new tab) a major milestone as its one-millionth mass-produced EV rolled off the assembly line in Hefei on January 6, 2026. Founder and CEO William Li (Li Bin) hailed it as “a new starting point,” marking NIO’s entry into a third phase focused on high-quality growth. The company’s journey—from its first ES8 SUV in 2018 to a multi-brand strategy spanning the premium NIO marque, the mid-range ONVO (formerly “Ledo”), and the entry-level Firefly—reflects the breakneck pace of China’s EV sector. NIO delivered 326,000 vehicles in 2025, a record high and a 46.9% jump year-on-year, and it is targeting 40–50% annual growth going forward.

This scale is beginning to translate into financial improvements. After years of heavy investment, Li Bin expressed confidence (opens in a new tab) that NIO achieved its first quarterly profit in Q4 2025. Higher-margin models like the new ES8 boosted vehicle gross margin to an estimated 18% in Q4 (up from 13% in Q3) – likely enough to turn a net profit. “We lost 2.7 billion yuan in Q3,” Li noted (opens in a new tab), but surging deliveries of a more profitable product mix mean “there is a possibility of profitability” in Q4.

Final audited results are pending, but analysts concur that NIO likely hit its non-GAAP breakeven target in the quarter. This financial milestone would validate NIO’s strategy of scaling up and cutting costs, and it underscores how far China’s EV champions have come in challenging Western rivals. (By comparison, Li pointed out that an American competitor – Tesla – has produced over 9 million EVs to date, suggesting plenty of room for Chinese brands to catch up.)

Industrial Policy Driven by the State

NIO’s rise has been enabled by a tightly coordinated domestic ecosystem rather than company execution alone. All one million NIO vehicles have been produced in Anhui province, where the Hefei municipal government provided early financial and industrial support during the company’s most capital-intensive years. Since its inception, NIO has invested more than ¥65 billion (≈$10 billion) in R&D across batteries, autonomous driving, and vehicle software, and another ¥18 billion in building charging and battery-swap infrastructure, now totaling more than 8,500 stations nationwide.

In late 2025, NIO deepened this model by signing a five-year strategic partnership with CATL to co-develop long-life batteries, battery-swap technologies, and shared standards. The takeaway for Western observers is clear: NIO’s success is not simply corporate—it reflects China’s deliberate strategy to control the EV value chain from ground to grid.

The Supply Chain

That strategy begins upstream. Electric vehicles depend on lithium for batteries and rare earth elements—especially neodymium, dysprosium, and terbium—for electric motors. China spent decades securing dominance in these materials.

Today, it controls roughly 60% of global rare-earth mining and more than 90% of refining capacity. Even more strategically, Chinese firms produce over 90% of neodymium-iron-boron (NdFeB) magnets, the critical component inside EV motors, wind turbines, and advanced defense systems. This dominance was not accidental; it reflects forty years of state-backed investment, environmental tradeoffs, and deliberate underpricing to eliminate foreign competitors.

A Strategic Moat

The result is a powerful strategic moat. China’s grip on rare earths gives it pricing power and leverage across industries central to the energy transition and national security. This leverage is no longer theoretical. In 2025, Beijing tightened export controls on certain rare earths, magnet technologies, and battery-grade metals—signaling its ability to constrain global supply chains if geopolitical tensions escalate. Western automakers and governments now face the reality that most “green” and high-tech supply chains—from EVs to aerospace—run through China.

Crucially, China seeks to monetize control at every stage. Secure access to critical minerals has enabled world-leading midstream and downstream industries. Chinese firms supply over half of global EV batteries, and China produces roughly 85% of the world’s lithium-ion batteries. This vertical integration allows China to capture outsized value, while Western automakers increasingly resemble assemblers dependent on Chinese inputs.

Meta Plan?

China’s ambition extends further downstream into finance. Policy documents reviewed by _Rare Earth Exchanges_™ show that Beijing views critical minerals as strategic anchors for shaping future trade and monetary systems. In 2025, this vision took tangible form when Ant Group, China’s central bank, and the state-owned China Rare Earth Group launched a pilot rare-earth-backed digital currency, pegged to the yuan and settled via blockchain. The implication is profound: as China supplies the majority of rare earths, it can increasingly compel buyers to transact in RMB, accelerating currency internationalization and weakening dollar dominance.

Emerging Crises

NIO’s one-millionth vehicle milestone is impressive—but it also highlights a mounting surplus and overproduction crisis across China’s EV sector. Capacity expansion, fueled by state subsidies, local-government backing, and vertically integrated supply chains, has outpaced both domestic demand growth and sustainable export absorption.

Dozens of Chinese EV makers are now competing in a market where price wars, inventory buildup, and margin compression are intensifying, even as production lines keep running to preserve employment and amortize sunk capital. Companies like NIO may be approaching breakeven, but sector-wide profitability remains fragile, with excess output increasingly pushed into foreign markets at aggressive pricing—triggering trade friction in Europe and North America.

Compared with Tesla, which has globalized demand alongside capacity, China’s model risks turning industrial success into systemic oversupply, forcing consolidation at home while exporting deflationary pressure abroad. In short, China’s EV triumph is now colliding with the hard limits of demand, pricing power, and geopolitics—an imbalance that markets, not milestones, will ultimately resolve.

Bottom Line

For investors and policymakers, NIO’s one-millionth vehicle is more than a corporate milestone. It is a visible marker of a broader Chinese strategy that links resource control, industrial dominance, infrastructure scale, and digital finance into a single system of leverage. Each EV rolling out of Hefei carries not just a battery—but a blueprint.

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• Parliamentary report urges tighter ministry coordination to advance India's self-reliance in lithium, graphite, cobalt, and rare earths under Atmanirbhar Bharat.
• Administrative bottlenecks, not geology, slow India's progress; faster approvals and predictable policy would attract capital and reduce execution risk.
• Coordination alone won't suffice—India needs sustained funding, midstream processing capacity, environmental credibility, and global partnerships to compete with China's decades-long dominance.

A recent parliamentary committee report, summarized by The Hindu BusinessLine (opens in a new tab), urges tighter coordination across ministries to advance India’s self-reliance in lithium, graphite, cobalt, and rare earths under the Atmanirbhar Bharat (opens in a new tab) banner.

The premise resonates: fragmented governance slows projects, delays permitting, and blunts capital deployment. For a country seeking strategic autonomy in energy transition and defense inputs, alignment across mining, environment, power, industry, and finance is table stakes.

What Makes Sense: Fix the State Before Fixing the Supply Chain

The call for “seamless coordination” is grounded. India’s bottlenecks are not merely geological; they are administrative and institutional. Faster approvals, predictable policy, and clear ownership of outcomes would reduce execution risk and attract private capital. This is especially relevant where midstream processing—separation, refining, and metallization—demands long lead times, environmental clarity, and reliable offtake.

Where It Overreaches: Self-Reliance as a Shortcut

The rhetoric risks overselling speed. China’s dominance in rare earth processing was built over decades with subsidies, losses, and integrated demand. India’s reserves and talent are real, but self-reliance does not equal self-sufficiency—especially not quickly. Without explicit plans for solvent extraction capacity, waste handling, skills, and downstream demand (magnets, alloys), coordination alone won’t close the gap.

The Subtle Bias: Policy Confidence vs. Market Reality

Parliamentary optimism tends to emphasize intent over economics. Global markets will judge on cost curves, yields, and reliability. Absent price support, anchor customers, or allied offtakes, projects may stall despite coordination. The report underplays recycling, substitution, and alliances—critical levers to de-risk timelines.

Bottom Line

India’s diagnosis is correct: coordination matters. The prescription is incomplete. Success will hinge on sustained funding, midstream build-out, environmental credibility, and global partnerships—not slogans.

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• China will lower import tariffs on 935 products in 2026, including recycled lithium-ion battery materials, while maintaining export tariffs on 107 strategic resources.
• This is a calculated move to secure critical inputs rather than broad trade liberalization.
• The tariff reductions create asymmetric advantages by making China the global destination for recycled battery materials.
• This move potentially undermines Western efforts to localize battery recycling and close domestic supply loops.
• China's selective tariff policy focuses on easing imports it needs while preserving export controls.
• China is expanding 24 Free Trade Agreement (FTA) arrangements as part of this strategy.
• This fine-tuned trade management aims to fortify China's downstream manufacturing dominance as geopolitical competition intensifies.

A Reuters report this week notes that China will lower import tariffs on 935 products beginning in 2026, including recycled “black powder” used in lithium-ion battery production, as well as select medical devices and diagnostics. On the surface, the move appears technocratic and pro-trade. For critical minerals markets, however, it raises several questions that Reuters does not address.

First, why recycled battery materials, and why now?

Lowering tariffs on black powder—a key intermediate in battery recycling—suggests Beijing is prioritizing feedstock security for its downstream battery and EV complex. China already dominates global battery manufacturing; easing imports of recycled inputs may be a way to backfill supply constraints, stabilize costs, or arbitrage Western recycling shortfalls, rather than a simple environmental gesture.

Second, who benefits—and who doesn’t?

Tariff relief applies only to imports into China. That asymmetry could reinforce China’s role as the global sink for recycled materials, while Western recyclers and automakers still face higher costs and fragmented infrastructure at home. If recycled intermediates flow more easily into China, does that undermine U.S. and EU efforts to localize battery recycling and close domestic materials loops?

Third, what’s missing from the list?

Reuters notes resource-based commodities broadly, but provides no detail on whether rare earth concentrates, oxides, or magnet inputs are included—or deliberately excluded. Rare Earth Exchanges offers links via the Chinese government below.

Finally, how does this fit with geopolitics?

The timing—amid U.S. and EU industrial policy aimed at reshoring batteries, EVs, and critical minerals—invites scrutiny. Tariff reductions may be less about openness and more about fortifying China’s downstream manufacturing advantage as global competition intensifies.

In short, this policy tweak looks small, but the signal is larger: China is fine-tuning trade tools to secure inputs where it needs them most, while keeping leverage over higher-value stages of the supply chain. Investors and policymakers should watch closely which materials qualify—and which remain off limits.

China’s 2026 Tariff Adjustment Plan (opens in a new tab) (Effective January 1, 2026)

Rare Earth Exchanges reviewed China’s 2026 tariff adjustment framework, studying how it will manage import duties, export tariffs, quota regimes, and preferential trade rates beginning January 1, 2026. The plan reflects fine-tuned trade management rather than broad liberalization, with selective easing on inputs China wants and continued controls on strategically sensitive exports.

1. Provisional Import Tariffs

China will apply temporarily reduced import tariff rates to 935 products, excluding tariff-quota goods. These provisional rates are lower than standard WTO most-favored-nation (MFN) rates, signaling targeted cost relief for selected imports deemed economically or strategically useful.

2. Tariff-Rate Quotas (TRQs)

Tariff-quota management will continue unchanged for eight categories, including wheat.

• For urea, compound fertilizer, and diammonium phosphate, in-quota imports will retain a 1% provisional tariff.
• Certain volumes of out-of-quota cotton imports will continue to face sliding-scale tariffs, preserving protection while allowing calibrated flexibility.

3. Export Tariffs

China will maintain export tariffs on 107 products, including ferrochrome and other resource-related materials.

• 68 of these items will continue under temporary export tariff rates, underscoring China’s ongoing use of export duties as a resource-management and industrial-policy tool.

4. Tariff Classification Adjustments

China will revise parts of its tariff schedule and annotations:

• Total national tariff subheadings adjusted to 8,972
• National tariff notes adjusted to 201
  

  These changes often affect how specific materials are classified, with downstream implications for compliance, cost, and trade flows.

5. Free Trade Agreement (FTA) Rates

China will continue applying preferential tariff rates under 24 FTAs and trade arrangements with 34 partners.

• Further tariff reductions will occur under FTAs with countries such as New Zealand, South Korea, Australia, Switzerland, Pakistan, and under RCEP.
• Previously completed tariff reductions under FTAs with ASEAN, Chile, Singapore, Georgia, Iceland, Costa Rica, and others will remain in force.

6. Special Preferential Tariffs for Developing Countries

• 43 least-developed countries will continue to receive zero-tariff treatment on 100% of tariff lines (quota goods receive zero tariffs only within quota limits).
• Additional preferential rates will apply to selected imports from Bangladesh, Laos, Cambodia, and Myanmar under Asia-Pacific trade arrangements.

Strategic Takeaway for the U.S. and Allies

This plan reinforces a familiar pattern: China selectively lowers tariffs on inputs it needs, preserves export controls on strategic resources, and uses FTAs to anchor regional supply chains. It is incremental, targeted, and strategic, not a shift toward across-the-board trade openness.

See Appendix 1: Provisional Tariff Rate Table for Imported Goods.pdf ; (opens in a new tab) Appendix (opens in a new tab)

https://gss.mof.gov.cn/gzdt/zhengcefabu/202512/P020251229510521217364.pdf (opens in a new tab)

Disclaimer: This press release is based on reporting and policy statements originating from Chinese government and state-linked sources as reported by Reuters. All details should be independently verified before drawing investment or policy conclusions.

© 2025 Rare Earth Exchanges™ – Accelerating Transparency, Accuracy, and Insight Across the Rare Earth & Critical Minerals Supply Chain.

• China dominates processing and refining of 19 out of 20 strategic minerals with an average market share of ~70%, creating supply chain vulnerabilities far beyond mining.
• Key minerals impacted by China's dominance include:
  • Graphite: 90% battery-grade production.
  • Lithium: 70% refining capacity.
  • Cobalt: Dominated through the DRC-to-China pipeline.
  • High-purity manganese.
  • Tungsten: 80% production.
• Trump's 2025 industrial policy pivot includes:
  • Section 232 investigation on processed critical minerals.
  • Emergency powers to boost domestic production.
  • 5 million DOE funding.
  • Allied frameworks like the $8.5 billion Australia pipeline.
  • $7.4 billion Tennessee smelter with 40% DoD equity stake.
• Western vulnerability arises from dependence on Chinese refining capacity for materials essential to:
  • EV batteries.
  • Semiconductors.
  • Aerospace.
  • Defense manufacturing.
• Recent export controls on graphite, gallium, germanium, and antimony demonstrate Beijing's willingness to weaponize this advantage.

China’s most durable leverage over Western industry is not always in mining. It is in processing and refining—the chokepoint where ore becomes usable material, where quality is controlled, and where supply chains can be throttled quietly. The International Energy Agency (IEA) put it bluntly in 2025 (opens in a new tab): China is the leading refiner for 19 of 20 strategic minerals it tracks, with an average market share around 70%.

Exclude rare earths and the pattern still holds.

Five minerals—graphite, lithium, cobalt, high-purity manganese, and tungsten—sit at the center of EV batteries, aerospace alloys, semiconductors (indirectly through hardware and tooling supply chains), and modern defense manufacturing. In 2025, Beijing again demonstrated it is willing to operationalize these advantages through export controls and licensing friction, reinforcing the reality that the “energy transition” and the “arsenal economy” share the same hidden dependency: Chinese processing capacity.

What follows is the updated, accuracy-hardened version of your piece—same thrust, sharper numbers, stronger sourcing.

1) Graphite: The EV Anode Chokepoint

Graphite (opens in a new tab) is the largest single component by weight in most lithium-ion batteries. The U.S. produces effectively no natural graphite and has limited domestic capability to convert graphite into the battery-grade anode materials EV supply chains require. China dominates both upstream and midstream: USGS data show licensing delays tied to China’s graphite export controls reduced spherical graphite exports in 2024 versus 2023—an early warning of how fast this valve can tighten.

Where it’s mined: China remains the dominant producer, with additional production in places like Mozambique, Brazil, Madagascar and others. But the strategic point is that much non-Chinese ore still routes through China for purification, shaping, and coating—steps that turn a commodity into a battery input.

What it’s used for: EV battery anodes, fuel cells, refractories and steelmaking, lubricants, and nuclear applications. If battery-grade graphite flows are disrupted, the immediate effect is not academic: anode production stalls, and EV cell factories downstream idle.

Accuracy update: Use USGS data for the export-control impact and keep the “~90% battery-grade processing” line as an industry estimate, not a courtroom fact.

2) Lithium: Refining, Not Rocks, Is the Point of Control

Lithium is the backbone of rechargeable storage. The West hears “lithium” and pictures mines; Beijing built the advantage in conversion chemistry—turning spodumene and brines into battery-grade carbonate and hydroxide. The IEA and Reuters reporting consistently describe China as the dominant processing hub, commonly cited at around ~70% of global lithium processing, depending on definition and year.

Where it’s mined: The big sources remain Australia (hard-rock spodumene) and the Lithium Triangle (Chile/Argentina/Bolivia brines), plus growing supply from Africa and China. The supply chain vulnerability is that a material can be mined outside China and still be strategically dependent because it must be refined into battery chemicals—often in China.

What it’s used for: EV and grid batteries; consumer electronics; smaller uses in alloys and industrial chemistry. Battery demand dominates.

2025 policy signal: The Trump administration’s emphasis shifted from vague “mining independence” rhetoric toward measures aimed at the processing bottleneck (opens in a new tab)—the stage where China’s advantage is most entrenched.

3) Cobalt: The Congo-to-China Pipeline

Cobalt illustrates how Chinese control can extend far beyond Chinese territory. According to USGS, Congo (Kinshasa) accounted for an estimated 76% of global cobalt mine production in 2024, and the supply chain reality is that much of that feed moves through Chinese refiners.

Where it’s mined: Primarily the DRC Copperbelt, plus by-product cobalt from nickel operations in Indonesia and elsewhere. But the key dependency is the processing step: cobalt concentrate and intermediate products commonly flow to China, where the conversion into battery chemicals and metal is scaled.

What it’s used for: Battery cathodes (especially NCM/NCA chemistries), plus superalloys for jet engines and turbines, catalysts, and specialty applications. Cobalt is also a defense-relevant metal because it shows up in materials where heat tolerance and strength matter.

Why it matters now: Even as battery makers reduce cobalt intensity, the absolute demand remains large, and the supply chain remains brittle. A disruption in refined cobalt availability translates quickly into cathode constraints—not years later, but in procurement cycles.

4) High-Purity Manganese: The Quiet Battery Bottleneck

Bulk manganese is abundant; battery-grade, high-purity manganese is not. This is a critical distinction. High-purity manganese sulfate and electrolytic manganese metal (EMM) are specialty products, and China dominates these processing routes in most market analyses—commonly described as extremely concentrated. Keep the “up to ~90%” framing explicitly tied to high-purity/battery-grade forms, not global manganese ore.

Where it’s mined: Large ore sources include South Africa, Australia, Gabon, and Brazil. China imports ore and upgrades it through energy-intensive refining into high-purity products.

What it’s used for: Steelmaking (the largest end-use), and increasingly battery cathodes as high-manganese chemistries advance to reduce reliance on cobalt and manage cost. The Western bet on “cobalt thrift” often implies more manganese, which can inadvertently deepen another Chinese processing dependency.

5) Tungsten: Defense Manufacturing’s Hard-Metal Dependency

Tungsten is the old-school strategic mineral that never stopped being strategic. USGS notes tungsten concentrate production outside China remained around 20% of global production in 2024—implying China’s dominance near ~80%.

Where it’s mined: China’s tungsten districts (notably Jiangxi) dwarf most peers. Other producers exist (e.g., in parts of Europe and Asia), but scale and processing remain concentrated.

What it’s used for: Tungsten carbide cutting tools, aerospace and industrial tooling, and defense applications including hard-metal components and munitions-related supply chains. In 2025, China expanded export controls to include tungsten and other items, underscoring that supply security here is not theoretical.

What Trump Actually Did in 2025: Industrial Policy, Sharpened

Two moves matter because they target _processing dependency_—the central weakness.

Section 232 on processed critical minerals (April 15, 2025)

Trump signed an order directing Commerce to investigate whether imports of processed critical minerals and derivative products impair national security—explicitly citing foreign overcapacity, price distortion, and export restrictions as tools of leverage. This is the policy architecture for tariffs, quotas, or other restrictions if the investigation supports action.

Emergency-powers push to boost domestic production (March 20, 2025)

Reuters reported Trump invoked emergency powers aimed at increasing U.S. production of critical minerals as part of efforts to offset China’s control of the sector.

The “critical minerals list” expands (2025)

The final 2025 USGS critical minerals list (opens in a new tab) expanded to 60 minerals, adding items such as copper and phosphate—an acknowledgment that modern industrial resilience is about systems, not a short list of celebrity commodities.

Money and muscle: DOE funding + allied frameworks

DOE announced (opens in a new tab) $355 million in late 2025 funding opportunities to expand domestic production of critical minerals and materials, including recovery from industrial and coal byproducts—useful, but not yet the scale of a wartime buildout.

Internationally, Trump and Australia signed a critical minerals framework, with Reuters describing an $8.5 billion project pipeline, plus near-term financing steps including $2.2 billion in EXIM Bank letters of interest and a broader pledge of at least $2 billion in joint investment.

Finally, the U.S. signaled (opens in a new tab) it will take equity-like positions to secure capacity: Reuters reported a planned $7.4B Tennessee critical minerals smelter where the U.S. Department of Defense would hold 40% of the venture.

How Vulnerable Are the U.S. and Allies?

The vulnerability is not simply “we import minerals.” It’s that the West’s industrial base is increasingly built on materials refined elsewhere, often by a geopolitical rival with demonstrated willingness to use trade tools as a strategy.

• The IEA’s headline finding—China as leading refiner for 19 of 20 minerals analyzed—means “friendshoring” without processing buildout is often an illusion.
• Export controls aren’t hypothetical. China’s December 2024 ban on exports of gallium, germanium, and antimony to the U.S. (and tightening on graphite) showed how quickly policy can translate into industrial stress.
• USGS data on graphite export licensing delays and export declines in 2024 demonstrate that even “soft controls” (permits, paperwork, product definitions) can function like a throttle.

The allied position is only marginally better. Europe and Japan can diversify mines; they still compete for the same limited non-Chinese refining capacity. In a tight market, everyone discovers the same unpleasant truth: mines are geography; refining is power.

The Bottom Line

America’s critical minerals problem in 2025 is no longer an “awareness” problem. It is a timeline and capacity problem.

Trump’s 2025 actions—Section 232 targeting processed minerals, emergency-powers language to boost supply, expanded critical-minerals designation, allied financing frameworks, and equity-like government participation—signal a real pivot toward industrial policy.  As Rare Earth Exchanges™ has argued about rare earth element supply chains, however, not nearly enough.

The physics of the supply chain do not care about press releases. Graphite purification plants, lithium chemical refineries, battery-grade manganese processing, and tungsten supply diversification are hard, capital-intensive, permit-sensitive builds.

Until those facilities exist at scale, the U.S. and its allies remain living on a narrow ledge: technologically advanced, militarily active, and materially dependent—not on rare earths alone, but on a deeper set of elements and minerals where China’s near-monopoly is less visible and, arguably, more dangerous.

© 2025 Rare Earth Exchanges™ – Accelerating Transparency, Accuracy, and Insight Across the Rare Earth & Critical Minerals Supply Chain.

• NASA and USGS are utilizing high-altitude AVIRIS-3 sensor technology to map lithium, cobalt, and other battery minerals across 366,000 square miles of the American West since 2023.
• Spectral detection accelerates upstream discovery but does not guarantee reserves—drilling, refining capacity, and permitting remain the real bottlenecks in achieving mineral independence.
• While remote sensing speeds exploration and reduces foreign dependence risks, true supply chain independence requires years of midstream refining build-out and downstream manufacturing investment.

NASA is flying at 60,000 feet over the American West, scanning deserts for the minerals that power EVs, smartphones, and semiconductors. The mission—run jointly with the U.S. Geological Survey—uses a new sensor, AVIRIS-5, mounted on a high-altitude ER-2 aircraft. The instrument reads minerals by their spectral fingerprints, detecting how specific wavelengths of light reflect off the surface.

This isn’t sci-fi. It’s remote sensing repurposed from planetary science—technology once aimed at Mars and Pluto—now pointed at Nevada, Utah, and beyond.

What’s Solid Science—and What Isn’t

The reporting is accurate on the technology and scope. Since 2023, the survey has mapped ~366,000 square miles, targeting lithium, cobalt, graphite, and titanium—materials central to batteries and clean energy. AVIRIS-5 can rapidly identify surface mineralization and guide ground exploration more efficiently than traditional methods.

But here’s the guardrail investors should note: spectral detection does not equal to reserves. These surveys flag where to look, not what can be mined profitably. They do not replace drilling, metallurgical testing, permitting, or community consent. The article implies urgency—and that’s fair—but it risks blurring discovery with development.

Why This Matters for the Rare Earth Supply Chain

What’s notable is where this effort sits in the chain. Remote sensing accelerates upstream discovery, helping the U.S. diversify away from foreign sources. Yet the real chokepoints for rare earths remain midstream refining and downstream manufacturing, not mapping. Finding lithium or rare earth indications from the air doesn’t solve separation capacity, skills shortages, or environmental approvals.

The White House’s 2025 Executive Order framing mineral dependence as a national security issue aligns with this survey—but mapping is the first mile, not the finish line.

Geo News frames the mission as “breaking foreign reliance.” That’s aspirational, not guaranteed. Discovery helps. The reality as Rare Earth Exchanges™ repeats, Independence requires years of capital, refining build-out, and offtake certainty. The article is enthusiastic; the reality is sequential.

The REEx take

NASA’s mineral hunt is a smart, science-driven upgrade to exploration. It speeds discovery and de-risks early stages. But it does not shortcut the hard work that follows. For rare earths, the decisive battles are still fought in refineries, not at 60,000 feet.

Citation: Geo News, Dec 25, 2025; NASA–USGS GEMx program.

© 2025 Rare Earth Exchanges™ – Accelerating Transparency, Accuracy, and Insight Across the Rare Earth & Critical Minerals Supply Chain.

• New study reveals Arabian Peninsula's untapped potential for copper, lithium, and cobalt could help diversify global critical minerals supply chains currently dominated by China's 80% processing control.
• Research emphasizes that mining alone won't break supply chain dependence—China's dominance is industrial (refining/processing), not geological, requiring downstream investment beyond extraction.
• Saudi Arabia and Oman could become strategically important supplementary sources if exploration, processing capacity, and governance gaps are addressed through sustained industrial policy and capital.

In a wide-ranging review published in The Extractive Industries and Society (June 2026), lead author Muhammad Zaka Emad (opens in a new tab) of King Fahd University of Petroleum and Minerals (opens in a new tab), together with collaborators from regional and international institutions, examines whether the Arabian Peninsula could play a meaningful role in diversifying global critical mineral supply chains currently dominated by China.

Drawing on geological data, supply-risk analysis, and sustainability frameworks, the authors conclude that the Arabian Shield—spanning Saudi Arabia and Oman—hosts substantial untapped potential for copper, lithium, cobalt, nickel, phosphates, and associated critical minerals. While the study does not claim the region can replace China’s processing monopoly, it argues the Middle East could become a strategically important supplementary pillar if exploration, processing, and governance gaps are addressed.

Why Critical Minerals Matter—and Why Supply Chains Are Fragile

Critical minerals are essential inputs for electric vehicles, wind turbines, semiconductors, defense systems, and modern electronics. Demand is rising sharply as countries pursue energy-transition goals. The problem, as the study underscores, is concentration: more than 70% of global cobalt mining occurs in the Democratic Republic of Congo, while China controls roughly 80% of rare earth processing and a majority share of global critical-mineral refining capacity.

For lay readers, this means that even when minerals are mined elsewhere, they are often sent to China for chemical separation and refining—the most technically complex and strategically sensitive steps. This imbalance creates geopolitical, economic, and national-security risks.

Study Methods: A Broad Review, Not a New Discovery Campaign

This paper is a review article, not a field-drilling or feasibility study. The authors synthesize existing geological surveys, production statistics, policy documents, and sustainability case studies, combining:

• Global supply-risk assessments
• Geological analysis of the Arabian Shield (a Precambrian formation rich in metallic minerals)
• Case examples such as Saudi Arabia’s Ma’aden phosphate operations
• Policy frameworks including Saudi Vision 2030 and Oman’s mining strategy
• Emerging exploration tools such as AI-assisted remote sensing

The goal is to assess strategic potential, not to quantify near-term production volumes.

Key Findings: Opportunity Exists—but Mostly Upstream

The authors identify several important trends:

• The Arabian Peninsula hosts mineralized systems comparable to other major mining regions, particularly for copper, phosphates, and battery-related metals.
• Relative political stability and capital availability reduce some risks seen in higher-volatility jurisdictions.
• Government-led diversification efforts aim to reduce reliance on hydrocarbons and position mining as a “third pillar” of economic growth.
• Advanced exploration technologies could accelerate discovery while reducing environmental disturbance.

However, the paper implicitly reinforces a critical reality: most of the region’s potential lies upstream. Mining alone does not resolve supply-chain dependence if processing and refining remain external.

The China Question: Monopoly by Processing, Not Mining

One of the study’s most consequential acknowledgments—though not its central focus—is that China’s dominance is industrial, not geological. China built decades of chemical processing capacity, tolerated environmental costs, and absorbed losses that market-driven systems typically reject.

The Arabian Peninsula, as described, could diversify where minerals are sourced, but without large-scale investment in separation, refining, and downstream manufacturing, China’s midstream leverage remains intact. This distinction is crucial and often lost in public discourse.

Implications: Strategic Optionality, Not a Silver Bullet

If developed responsibly, the Arabian Peninsula could:

• Provide alternative sources of key minerals
• Reduce over-reliance on high-risk jurisdictions
• Align mining growth with ESG and circular-economy principles
• Attract Western and Asian partners seeking supply diversification

But the study also implies that realizing this vision would require industrial policy, workforce development, and sustained capital, not geology alone—points Rare Earth Exchanges™ often raises. And this is especially so with the announcement of the U.S. Pentagon joint venture with state-owned Ma’aden, along with a partnership with U.S.-based MP Materials.

Limitations and Open Questions

Several limitations deserve attention:

• The paper does not provide project-level economics or timelines.
• Processing and refining capacity is discussed conceptually, not operationally.
• ESG alignment is aspirational and dependent on enforcement, not policy statements alone.
• Geopolitical trade-offs and export-control dynamics are not fully explored.

In short, this is a strategic survey, not an execution roadmap.

Potential Without Power Is Not Security

This study contributes valuable context to the global critical minerals debate. It correctly identifies the Arabian Peninsula as an underexplored and geopolitically relevant region with long-term promise. But it also—perhaps unintentionally—reinforces a core truth: diversifying mining without rebuilding processing does not break China’s grip.

The Arabian Peninsula may become part of the solution—but only if upstream opportunity is matched by downstream ambition.

Citation: Emad, M.Z. et al. Global trends and untapped potential of critical minerals for a sustainable future in the Arabian Peninsula. The Extractive Industries and Society, Volume 26, June 2026, Article 101840. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.exis.2025.101840 (opens in a new tab)

© 2025 Rare Earth Exchanges™ – Accelerating Transparency, Accuracy, and Insight Across the Rare Earth & Critical Minerals Supply Chain.

• China dominates 70-95% of critical minerals processing, including:
  • 90%+ of graphite
  • 94% of permanent magnets
  • 85-95% of battery materials
• This creates severe supply chain vulnerabilities for Western industries such as electric vehicles (EVs), semiconductors, and defense systems.
• Beijing is leveraging this control by imposing export bans on:
  • Gallium
  • Germanium
  • Tungsten
  • Graphite
• These actions are causing immediate production halts and price spikes that threaten U.S. chip manufacturing, EV production, and military hardware.
• The hidden strategic value of these minerals lies downstream, as cheap raw ore is transformed into multimillion-dollar products like magnets, batteries, and semiconductors. This effectively means China holds the switch to entire Western industries worth billions in economic value.

China today sits astride the global supply of many critical minerals – not just at the mine mouth, but across processing, refining and final manufacturing. In fact, the International Energy Agency (IEA) reports that for 19 of 20 key strategic minerals, China is the world’s leading refiner, with an average market share of 70%. In sectors like batteries and magnets, that dominance is far more extreme.

China processes over 90% of the world’s graphite (used in lithium-ion battery anodes) according to the U.S. Energy Information Administration (opens in a new tab) (EIA), supplies 94% of permanent rare-earth magnets, and in some battery materials segments has 95%+ market share. Such concentration creates “multiple points of vulnerability” for everything from electric vehicles to national defense. As one analyst bluntly puts it, Chinese firms now control the “mineral arteries” of the modern economy (opens in a new tab) – from the Congo’s cobalt to Myanmar’s rare earths – through a web of investments, loans and export policies.

Minerals Under Beijing’s 80%+ Thumbs

The chokepoints are real. In supply-chain terms (production and processing), China effectively monopolizes the following critical minerals:

So China’s dominance of the battery supply chain is extreme. For instance, it controls roughly 95% of key cathode precursor and LFP cathode production. It also makes ~85% of all battery anode materials per EIA. The nation refines over 90% of battery-grade graphite. In short, virtually every high-performance battery in the world depends on Chinese-refined materials.

As Rare Earth Exchanges™ reports frequently, China now makes about 94% of all sintered NdFeB permanent magnets – the strongest magnets used in everything from EV motors and wind turbines to guidance systems. (By contrast, two decades ago, China only supplied ~50% of these magnets.) In effect, U.S. and allied industries that rely on these magnets (automotive, aerospace, military hardware) are 94%-dependent on China.

China also dominates many related critical supplies. It refines roughly 73% of the world’s cobalt and 68% of its nickel; it produces over 90% of semiconductor-grade germanium and gallium (with new export bans on those materials to the U.S. as cited by Reuters (opens in a new tab) last year); and, by recent government report, it “controls” 85% of battery cathode precursors, 97% of anode active material, 85% of anode and 70% of cathode production globally.

The upshot: Chinese firms or state proxies have locked down the vast majority of these supply chains. Washington and its allies have essentially outsourced EVs, chips, and even missiles to Beijing. (By contrast, Europe reports (opens in a new tab) that China supplies 100% of its heavy rare earths and nearly all other “advanced metal” needs.) Japan also learned this lesson the hard way in 2010: it was ~90% dependent on China for rare earths, a gap it has since only partially closed.

The Hidden Strategic Value of Raw Ore

It gets worse. The market price of these raw minerals woefully understates their true value. As Rare Earth Exchanges explains, most of the economic worth lies downstream, in the high-tech products they enable. A ton of NdPr ore may sell for a few thousand dollars, but a finished NdFeB magnet (made from that ore) can be worth millions in cars, motors, and missiles. Likewise, cheap graphite or gallium feedstock is turned into multibillion-dollar battery packs or semiconductor chips. In effect, the “enhanced value” of these materials is hidden in the final systems – yet China captures it all. In practice, if Beijing clamps down on exports, the true value (for example in EVs or defense systems) simply vanishes from the U.S. and its allies.

Put bluntly: the nation that supplies 90%+ of a critical mineral isn’t just selling ore – it’s holding the switch to entire industries. That switch is effectively in Chinese hands today. No one can build an F-35 fighter, a high-end data center, or a modern submarine without the magnets, semiconductors, and batteries made possible by these “obscure” elements. But because these minerals trade cheaply, traditional markets ignore the fact that their economic worth is many times greater. As one analyst notes via REEx, a strong permanent magnet is “worth exponentially more” than the raw ore it contains – meaning Western factories building EVs or wind turbines are trading on Chinese goodwill.

Weaponizing the Supply Chain

China’s leverage isn’t hypothetical. Beijing has begun to weaponize these choke points through export controls and bans. In late 2024, it quietly slashed export quotas and tightened licensing on graphite and tungsten, two minerals critical for batteries and defense steel. The result was immediate: U.S. manufacturers scrambled for alternatives as prices spiked. As cited above, by December 2024, China went further – banning exports of gallium, germanium, and antimony to the United States. Gallium and germanium are semiconductor workhorses, and China already refines ~99% of global gallium. Suddenly, U.S. chipmakers face a near-total cutoff of these inputs. The same month, new rules halted virtually all U.S. imports of graphite and tungsten products. These steps demonstrate Beijing’s strategy: use resource dependency to extract concessions.

China has already tested this power. In 2010, it famously embargoed rare earth exports to Japan over a political spat – a move that helped force Japan to diversify, as we have reported in REEx. More recently (April 2025), China slapped strict controls on heavy rare earths and magnets, causing Western automakers to idle EV production and driving European magnet prices to 6× the Chinese level. These are not one-off warnings. The IEA reports China is now expanding export curbs to entire battery supply chains (including LFP cathodes, anodes, and even EV battery packs).

If these controls hold, the impact will be chilling. Many factories overseas lack any buffer. For example, as of late 2024, the U.S. had received zero gallium or germanium shipments, despite being a top-five market, as cited by Reuters (opens in a new tab) last year.

Meanwhile, China now accounts for 98.8% of global refined gallium and 59% of refined germanium. In battery supply chains, delays in graphite or precursor shipments could drive prices through the roof and stall EV rollouts (just as Rare Earth magnets did earlier this year). In short, every major U.S. and allied industry – from electric cars and solar power to fighter jets and radar systems – now has critical inputs tied to Chinese policy.

Consequences: Chips, EVs, and National Security

The fallout of China’s dominion would be immense. U.S. industry insiders warn that cutting off these minerals would grind production to a halt. Without tungsten, many guided missiles and armor-penetrating shells could not be made; without gallium and germanium, advanced chips for F-35 fighters or AI centers would be impossible; without graphite and cathode materials, electric vehicles and grid storage batteries would dry up.

The automotive and energy sectors have already reported panic-buying magnets and battery materials. The European Union, alarmed by recent export threats, is rushing to fund new rare-earth and critical mineral projects, although not as fast as America’s efforts. Japan, which once got nearly 90% of its rare earths from China, spent a decade cutting that to ~60% by diversifying sources. Those are the kind of aggressive measures that the U.S. and others must now not only contemplate, but execute.

For policymakers and investors, the message is clear and urgent: China’s chokehold on raw materials is no longer academic. The hidden “value” trapped in these minerals – the value of cutting-edge products, technologies, and defense capabilities – will only remain if supply chains are hardened now. Otherwise, billions in downstream value could evaporate overnight as Beijing flips a switch. This vulnerability should be a wake-up call: high-tech militaries and economies cannot afford to let a rival control the raw ingredients of their future.

© 2025 Rare Earth Exchanges™ – Accelerating Transparency, Accuracy, and Insight Across the Rare Earth & Critical Minerals Supply Chain.

• A 2025 study analyzes Iran's push to build domestic rare earth and lithium industries as part of its 'resistance economy' doctrine, linking critical minerals to energy sovereignty and survival under sanctions.
• Despite pilot-scale successes, Iran faces two structural barriers:
  • China's monopoly over processing capacity
  • U.S. sanctions that restrict access to equipment, capital, and technology needed for industrial scaling
• The research reveals a strategic paradox—Iran may need Chinese investment and expertise to scale its critical minerals sector, potentially trading import dependency for Chinese control over its value chain.

A 2025 study (opens in a new tab) by Ilya D. Baskakov (opens in a new tab), junior research fellow at the Institute of Scientific Information for Social Sciences of the Russian Academy of Sciences (INION RAN), argues that Iran’s push to build rare earth metals and lithium industries is becoming a core national-security project—tied to energy sovereignty, high-tech development, and survival under sanctions. Published in Outlines of Global Transformations: Politics, Economics, Law (Vol. 18, No. 3), the paper traces Iran’s early exploration and pilot-scale efforts, then tests a hard reality: China’s dominance over rare earth processing and the continued impact of U.S. sanctions may determine whether Iran’s ambitions become a real industrial base or remain a strategic aspiration.

Why This Matters, in Plain English

Rare earths and lithium are not abstract “mining” stories. They are key inputs for modern life: electric motors, wind turbines, electronics, batteries, aerospace components, and advanced defense systems. But “having the rocks” is not enough. The strategic bottleneck is processing—turning ore or concentrates into usable oxides, metals, alloys, and eventually magnets and battery chemicals.

Baskakov’s study highlights a core constraint shaping Iran’s options: China has built a dominant position in global rare earth supply chains—especially processing—making most countries dependent on Chinese capacity even when minerals are mined elsewhere. Iran’s development path, the author argues, is further complicated by sanctions that restrict financing, equipment, and technology imports.

Study Methods: What Baskakov Did

This is a qualitative political-economy study. Baskakov synthesizes Iranian policy concepts (“resistance economy”), trade statistics, public reporting on projects and pilot initiatives, and prior academic literature. He tracks the evolution of Iran’s rare earth and lithium sectors from the mid-2010s through early 2024, with attention to three forces:

1. domestic scientific and technical capacity,
2. opportunities for international partnership, and
3. U.S. sanctions pressure on Iran’s mining and metallurgical industries.

Key Findings: Iran’s Progress and the Roadblocks

1) Iran’s policy framework is designed for self-sufficiency.

Baskakov frames Iran’s industrial strategy through the doctrine of the “resistance economy,” launched in the 2010s to reduce vulnerability to external pressure. In this view, rare earths and lithium are not just commodities—they are inputs required to build an innovation economy, reduce dependence on oil revenues, and keep strategic industries functioning under sanctions.

2) Iran has made visible steps—but mostly at an early scale.

The study compiles multiple indications of progress: exploration campaigns, pilot projects, and announcements of successful extraction and concentrate production. Iran has reportedly produced a 99%-pure “mischmetal” alloy in 2016 (a mix of rare earth elements used for alloys and manufacturing), launched pilot extraction projects, and pursued recovery from iron ore, phosphates, and industrial residues. The paper also notes Iran’s ongoing reliance on imported rare earths, historically sourced through partners including China, the UAE, and Turkey.

3) China’s processing monopoly defines the playing field.

A central theme—highly relevant to REEx readers—is that processing and value-added steps are where power concentrates. Baskakov emphasizes that China’s cost advantages and industrial scale helped it dominate rare earth value chains. Even if Iran expands extraction, it will still face the question: can it process competitively, under sanctions, without becoming dependent on Chinese technology and investment?

4) Sanctions pressure remains a structural constraint.

Baskakov details how U.S. sanctions targeting metals, mining, manufacturing, and related sectors constrain Iran’s access to modern equipment, capital, and international partnerships. The paper argues that sanctions don’t just reduce exports; they slow industrial learning and the creation of durable processing infrastructure.

Implications: What This Means for Investors and Policymakers

For Iran, the strategic logic is clear: if access to critical materials is securitized globally, then domestic supply and processing become national security tools. For the global supply chain, Iran’s case reinforces a broader point: China’s dominance in processing means many “new” resource stories are not true diversification unless they build downstream capacity outside China.

If Iran succeeds, it could become a regional critical minerals node linking Eurasian markets. If it fails, it will remain a price-taker—dependent on external processors and vulnerable to sanctions shocks.

Limitations and Controversial Issues

The study relies heavily on public statements, reported project milestones, and secondary sources rather than audited industrial production data. Some resource claims—particularly lithium reserve estimates—remain contested and may require independent verification of grade, concentration, and economic recoverability. A second controversy is strategic: Iran may need Chinese investment and know-how to scale, which could trade one dependency (imports) for another (Chinese processing and capital)—a tension the paper implicitly surfaces.

Conclusion

Baskakov’s paper is best read as a strategic map of Iran’s intentions and constraints, not proof of imminent industrial-scale output. Iran’s rare earth and lithium ambitions align with its “resistance economy” doctrine and its drive for energy and technological sovereignty. But China’s processing dominance and U.S. sanctions pressure form a tight corridor: Iran can move forward, yet scaling competitively will likely require outside technology and capital, raising uncomfortable questions about who ultimately controls the value chain.

Citation: Baskakov, I. D. (2025). Development of Rare Earth Metals and Lithium Industries in Iran as a Factor of National Energy and Technological Security. Outlines of Global Transformations: Politics, Economics, Law, Vol. 18, No. 3, pp. 150–165. DOI: 10.31249/kgt/2025.03.09.

© 2025 Rare Earth Exchanges™ – Accelerating Transparency, Accuracy, and Insight Across the Rare Earth & Critical Minerals Supply Chain.

• New Tearline report uses satellite imagery to document expansion of Chinese-owned cobalt and copper mines in DRC's Lualaba Province.
• Reveals increased on-site processing capacity at Sicomines, TFM, and Kisanfu operations.
• Analysis shows China is strengthening its battery-metal supply chain dominance by expanding processing infrastructure—not just extraction.
• Reduces dependency on third-party refiners and increases control over EV and grid materials.
• The report, published by NGA's Tearline Project with Yale researchers, highlights how infrastructure upgrades and processing expansion give China greater pricing power and system control over critical minerals supply chains.

A new Tearline investigative report (opens in a new tab) written by Prince Osaji with Luca Girodon, Keith Pemberton, Mateo Bodon, and Ty Kushi (Yale University) argues that Chinese-owned or Chinese-majority-controlled mining operations in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) are not merely extracting more cobalt and copper—they are expanding on-site processing and logistics capacity in ways that could further tighten China’s grip on global battery-metal supply chains.

Using satellite imagery analysis alongside production and ownership research, the authors focus on three major sites in Lualaba Province—Sicomines, Tenke Fungurume (TFM), and Kisanfu—and conclude the pattern is consistent: more equipment, more infrastructure, more throughput, and more processing on site, strengthening China’s position in the materials that power EVs, grid buildouts, and increasingly AI-era electrification.

Study Methods—What Tearline Did

Tearline’s team uses open-source Google Earth imagery and commercial Maxar satellite images to track visible changes over time—new buildings, new haul roads, expanded tailings storage facilities, newly paved trucking areas, added processing equipment, and signs of higher operational tempo. They then pair those visuals with background research (ownership stakes, production figures, political disputes, and selected third-party reporting) to interpret what the physical changes likely mean: more ore moving, more material processed, and greater export-ready volumes.

This matters because satellite imagery doesn’t “prove” production—but it does reveal industrial scaling in places where direct transparency is often limited.

Key Findings—What’s Changing at the Mines

Sicomines (opens in a new tab) (owned by China Railway Group Limited): The report highlights new or expanded packaging and trucking areas, plus the addition of what the authors interpret as a leaching tank and related conveyors—signaling increased or upgraded processing capacity. It also notes expanding drainage pools and increased equipment footprints that suggest higher activity levels.

Tenke Fungurume (TFM): (opens in a new tab) Tearline points to visible growth in logistics and equipment management areas, new warehouse-like structures, and tailings pond dynamics consistent with an active processing and waste-management circuit. The report ties the physical expansion to CMOC’s stated expansion ambitions and to known royalty disputes that temporarily halted exports.

Kisanfu (opens in a new tab) (China Molybdenum Co., Ltd.): The report flags construction of multiple circular thickeners, possible conveyor systems, expanded tailings facilities, new basins and drainage features, and expanding waste rock dumps—signals consistent with more material being processed and larger waste-handling requirements.

Why This Matters—The “Processing Monopoly” Angle

Rare Earth Exchanges™ has repeatedly reported that China’s advantage is not simply access to ore. It is system control: extraction, processing, plus downstream manufacturing scale. Rare earth elements are the clearest example—China dominates separation, refining, and magnet value chains—but the same playbook appears to be unfolding in battery metals.

If Chinese-controlled mines in the DRC expand on-site processing, they reduce dependency on third-party refiners and shorten the chain between ore and exportable intermediates (such as copper cathode and cobalt products). That strengthens China’s ability to influence availability, pricing power, and reliability—even when the upstream resource is located outside China.

Controversial Issues Raised

Tearline places heavy emphasis on human rights and labor risks, noting persistent concerns around artisanal mining, coercion, discrimination, and hazardous conditions. It also highlights governance and deal-structure controversies—especially whether infrastructure-for-minerals agreements delivered what was promised and whether the DRC captured fair value.

What is the Tearline Project

Tearline.mil is the public website for the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency's (NGA) Tearline Project, a congressionally-supported platform that publishes unclassified open-source intelligence (OSINT) from academics and non-profits, using satellite imagery and data to create in-depth reports on strategic, economic, and humanitarian topics for the public, government, and intelligence community. It serves as an outreach effort, providing transparency and actionable intelligence, especially on China's activities and global issues, countering malign influence and informing decision-makers.

Citation: Osaji, P., Girodon, L., Pemberton, K., Bodon, M., & Kushi, T. (2025). Democratic Republic of Congo: Expansion of Chinese-Owned Cobalt and Copper Mines in the Lualaba Province. Tearline (Tearline Original). https://doi.org/10.63836/pxvc-010m (opens in a new tab)

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• Monash University study finds China and the US are structurally incentivized to stockpile EV battery minerals, while Japan and South Korea are better positioned for recycling—a divergence reshaping global critical-minerals power dynamics.
• Research shows stockpiling reinforces China's processing dominance, with China projected to account for the largest share of global battery-mineral stockpiling needs through 2040, particularly for graphite and nickel.
• Study challenges the narrative that recycling alone can quickly solve mineral insecurity, revealing it cannot fully substitute for mining or stockpiling until the 2030s when large volumes of spent EV batteries become available.

A new academic study (opens in a new tab) led by Dr. Yitian Wang of Monash University’s Department of Economics, co-authored with Dr. Joaquin Vespignani (University of Tasmania / Australian National University) and Professor Russell Smyth (Monash Business School), offers a stark assessment of how major economies are responding to growing insecurity in electric-vehicle (EV) battery mineral supply chains.

Published as Stockpiling or Recycling? Country-Specific Strategies for EV Battery Mineral Security, the paper concludes that China and the United States are structurally incentivized to rely on strategic mineral stockpiling, while Japan and South Korea are better positioned to stabilize supply through recycling—a divergence with profound implications for global critical-minerals power dynamics.

What the Study Asked—and Why It Matters

As EV adoption accelerates, demand for battery minerals—lithium, cobalt, nickel, manganese, graphite, and copper—is rising far faster than new mines can be built. The authors ask a deceptively simple question: when mineral supply is risky and slow to develop, should countries protect themselves by stockpiling raw materials or by investing in recycling?

The answer, according to the study, depends not just on geology, but on non-technical risk—political instability, regulation, permitting delays, community opposition, and geopolitics. These risks inflate financing costs, delay projects, and amplify price volatility long before a single ton of ore is produced.

How the Researchers Did It

The team combined three major tools:

• Investment risk scoring, using the Fraser Institute’s Investment Attractiveness Index to quantify mining risk across jurisdictions.
• Reserve concentration analysis, weighting those risks by where global mineral reserves are actually located.
• Economic modeling, comparing the cost of holding mineral stockpiles against the risk and cost of supply disruptions, then benchmarking those costs against recycling feasibility.

The result is a practical framework showing, country by country and mineral by mineral, which strategy—stockpiling or recycling—is cheaper and more effective over time.

Key Findings—Who Stockpiles, Who Recycles

The conclusions are striking:

• China and the United States fall clearly into the stockpiling-advantaged category. Their large geographic size, dispersed populations, and high logistics costs make recycling comparatively expensive—at least until large volumes of end-of-life batteries emerge in the 2030s.
• Japan and South Korea are consistently recycling-advantaged, thanks to dense populations, concentrated industrial hubs, and efficient collection systems.
• Europe sits in between, with mixed outcomes: stockpiling favors nickel and graphite, while recycling is more viable for cobalt, manganese, and copper.

Crucially, the study indicates that China would account for the largest modeled share of global battery-mineral stockpiling needs through 2040, particularly for graphite and nickel—two materials where China already dominates refining and processing.

Why This Reinforces China’s Processing Advantage

While the paper focuses on EV battery minerals rather than rare earth elements directly, the structural logic is transferable. Stockpiling favors countries that already control processing infrastructure, because raw materials only become strategically useful once refined.

Rare Earth Exchanges™ has consistently reported that China’s true advantage lies not just in mining, but in system-level integration—from upstream supply through processing to manufacturing. This study shows how stockpiling acts as a force multiplier for that dominance, buffering supply shocks while keeping downstream factories running.

Controversial Implications—and Strategic Trade-Offs

The study challenges a popular policy narrative: that recycling alone can quickly solve mineral insecurity. The authors show that for most countries, recycling cannot fully substitute for mining or stockpiling until the 2030s, when large volumes of spent EV batteries become available.

This raises uncomfortable questions about whether stockpiling entrenches incumbent powers, delays diversification, or turns critical minerals into strategic financial assets rather than market commodities.

Key Limitations

The authors are explicit about constraints. The model assumes today’s battery chemistries; recycling costs depend on collection efficiency and logistics; and the analysis focuses on economic optimization, not environmental or social outcomes.

REEx Conclusion

This study is rigorous, sobering, and strategically revealing. It shows that stockpiling is not a temporary patch—it is a deliberate, long-term strategy for mineral power, particularly for countries like China that already dominate processing.

For Western policymakers and investors, the message is clear: without parallel investment in processing and recycling capacity, stockpiling alone risks reinforcing the very monopolies it seeks to hedge against.

Source: Wang, Y., Vespignani, J., & Smyth, R. Stockpiling or Recycling? Country-Specific Strategies for EV Battery Mineral Security. Monash University / ANU / University of Tasmania.

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• Chinese researchers identified four new lithium-beryllium prospective zones in Xinjiang by applying modern compositional data analysis to more than 34,000 legacy stream-sediment samples.
• The study demonstrates how existing datasets can accelerate critical mineral discovery without requiring new large-scale surveys.
• China's strategic advantage in critical minerals extends beyond mining to efficient, data-driven exploration using element ratio analysis (Li+Be)/(La+Y+Nb+Zr) to prioritize targets faster compared to Western jurisdictions.
• Western jurisdictions are often constrained by fragmented datasets and slow permitting processes.
• This research highlights a growing asymmetry: While the West debates mine permitting, China digitally compresses the exploration cycle.
• China's strategy reinforces its integrated upstream-to-downstream dominance across discovery, processing, and manufacturing of critical minerals.

A new peer-reviewed study led by Dr. Jingjing Gong of Key Laboratory of Geochemical Exploration, Ministry of Nature Resources and Institute of Geophysical and Geochemical Exploration, Chinese Academy of Geological Sciences and colleagues published in Applied Geochemistry (January 2026), demonstrates how China is identifying new lithium (Li) and beryllium (Be) prospects in Southern Xinjiang by re-analyzing decades-old regional geochemical survey data using modern analytical techniques.

Working with collaborators from regional geological surveys and national research programs, the team shows that China does not necessarily need new, large-scale reconnaissance campaigns to expand its critical mineral pipeline—it can extract new strategic value from legacy datasets. The study delineates four previously overlooked prospective zones for Li–Be mineralization, reinforcing China’s long-term approach to securing upstream critical mineral optionality that feeds an already dominant downstream processing system.

Study Design and Methods—Explained Simply

China has conducted nationwide regional geochemical surveys since the late 1970s under the Regional Geochemistry–National Reconnaissance (RGNR) program, collecting hundreds of thousands of stream-sediment samples across vast and often remote terrain. Much of this data was originally analyzed using older statistical methods that can miss subtle but economically meaningful mineralization signals.

In this study, the authors revisited more than 34,000 stream-sediment samples from Southern Xinjiang—a geologically complex region spanning the Western Kunlun and Altun Mountains. Rather than evaluating single elements in isolation, the team applied compositional data analysis (CoDA) and robust principal component analysis (RPCA), combined with GIS-based spatial mapping.

In plain terms:

• They analyzed relationships between elements, not just absolute concentrations.
• They distinguished geochemical signatures linked to Li–Be pegmatite mineralization from background rock chemistry.
• They used element ratios—specifically (Li + Be)/(La + Y + Nb + Zr)—to reliably highlight mineralized zones.

This approach helps reduce “noise” that can obscure real targets in conventional anomaly maps.

Key Findings—What the Study Shows

The analysis revealed two distinct geochemical associations:

• Lithium–Beryllium–Boron (Li–Be–B), closely linked to pegmatite-type rare metal deposits.
• Lanthanum–Yttrium–Niobium–Zirconium (La–Y–Nb–Zr), representing background geochemistry tied to acidic rock formations.

By comparing these associations, the researchers produced anomaly maps that:

• Correctly align with known Li–Be deposits, including Dahongliutan.
• Identify four new high-potential prospective areas previously overlooked using traditional methods.

The core takeaway is methodological but strategically important: China can prioritize new exploration targets more efficiently by reprocessing existing data before committing to expensive drilling campaigns.

Why This Matters—Beyond the Science

While this is a technical geochemistry paper, its implications extend well beyond academia.

Rare Earth Exchanges has consistently reported that China’s structural advantage lies not only in mining, but in integration across discovery, processing, and manufacturing scale. This study illustrates how that system is reinforced:

• Faster identification of upstream resources feeds a processing and refining ecosystem that China already controls.
• Improved targeting lowers exploration risk and capital intensity.
• Data-driven prioritization allows China to move faster than jurisdictions still constrained by fragmented datasets and slow permitting processes.

For Western markets, this highlights a growing asymmetry: while the U.S. and Europe debate how to permit new mines, China is digitally compressing the front end of the exploration cycle.

Implications for the West and Global Supply Chains

• Upstream optionality: China is expanding domestic Li–Be resource options, reducing future import dependence.
• Processing leverage: Even modest new discoveries matter when downstream processing and separation capacity is already concentrated.
• Data advantage: Western countries possess comparable legacy geochemical datasets—but often lack coordinated national strategies to exploit them at scale.

The signal is clear: geology is no longer the primary bottleneck—analytics, coordination, and execution are.

Limitations and Open Questions

The authors note important constraints:

• The study identifies prospective zones, not proven reserves; economic viability still requires drilling and development.
• Xinjiang’s terrain, infrastructure limits, and political sensitivities could affect timelines.
• Results are region-specific and may not directly translate to other geological settings.

The paper also does not address environmental, social, or geopolitical constraints—factors that increasingly determine whether discoveries become supply.

REEx Conclusion

This study is scientifically rigorous and strategically revealing. It shows how China is pairing old data with modern analytics to quietly strengthen its critical mineral position. For Western policymakers and investors, the lesson is not about Xinjiang alone—it is about speed, data, and system-level integration.

China’s dominance in critical mineral processing does not rest on any single mine. It rests on an ecosystem. Research like this shows how deliberately that ecosystem continues to be reinforced.

Source: Gong J. et al., Applied Geochemistry, Vol. 197 (2026), Article 106651

DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.apgeochem.2025.106651 (opens in a new tab)

© 2025 Rare Earth Exchanges™ – Accelerating Transparency, Accuracy, and Insight Across the Rare Earth & Critical Minerals Supply Chain.