• Chinese researchers built a 2,000-sample database and used AI-assisted machine learning to optimize sintered NdFeB permanent magnet production, aiming to reduce iteration costs and development time.
• The team developed an 'intelligent' process framework bridging industry's focus on cost-stability and academia's pursuit of peak performance, including quantum kernel methods for data-efficient modeling.
• This advancement signals China's strengthening manufacturing advantage in magnet processing know-how— a strategic capability as important as raw material access for Western supply chains.

Researchers from the Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS) Computer Network Information Center (opens in a new tab), working with the CAS Ganjiang Innovation Research Institute (opens in a new tab), report progress on using data and artificial intelligence to accelerate process optimization for sintered neodymium-iron-boron (NdFeB) permanent magnets. According to the release, the team built an “industry–academia dual-domain” database containing nearly 2,000 samples and used high-performance computing (HPC)–assisted machine learning to systematically evaluate data-selection strategies in a virtual experimental environment—an approach aimed at reducing the cost and time required for iterative process improvement.

Chinese Academy of Sciences: Computer Network Information Center

The team further claims it quantified a fundamental design tension: industry tends to prioritize cost and stability, while academia tends to optimize for peak performance. To bridge that gap, the researchers propose a continuous, “intelligent” process-iteration framework linking composition–process–performance relationships. They also describe a methodological blueprint for integrating quantum kernel methods into a more data-efficient modeling workflow—an advanced technique that, if validated, could improve prediction performance when high-quality labeled data are limited.

The work was published in npj Computational Materials and supported by major Chinese funding streams, including national key R&D programs, the National Natural Science Foundation of China, and CAS strategic initiatives.

Why this matters as business news

This is not a headline about new mines or new rare earth deposits. It is a signal about manufacturing advantage—the downstream capability that turns materials into magnets at scale. Two updates make the item noteworthy:

1. a structured dataset designed to connect factory constraints with academic optimization, and
2. a clear focus on data efficiency—the practical lever that can reduce scrap, shorten development cycles, and raise yields.

Implications for the U.S. and allies

If these methods translate from “virtual experiments” into real production lines, the impact could be meaningful: faster iteration on sintering and processing parameters can improve consistency, yield, and performance per dollar—the exact operational edge that reinforces China’s dominance in magnet manufacturing know-how. For Western supply chains, the competitive lesson is blunt: processing and process IP can be as strategically important as access to ore.

Limitations and what to watch

This is a progress report, not a full independent validation. The release does not specify the database’s sourcing, representativeness across factories, or whether results were demonstrated in live production. “Quantum kernel” integration is also a methodological claim that can sound bigger than it proves in practice; performance gains and deployment complexity should be assessed in the published paper and, ideally, replicated by third parties.

Disclaimer: This news originates from Chinese state-affiliated institutions/media. The technical claims and any implied manufacturing or performance impacts should be verified through independent sources, replication studies, or corroborating industry disclosures before being treated as established fact.

• Investors are pouring capital into AI and data centers while dramatically underfunding the mines and processing plants that supply the critical minerals these technologies require, creating a dangerous mismatch.
• Mining investment has grown only marginally since 2015 despite soaring AI valuations, and with 10-20 year development timelines, today's underinvestment raises material supply shortage risks in the 2030s.
• Rare earths represent the bottleneck within the bottleneck—essential for EVs, wind turbines, data centers, and defense—yet processing remains highly concentrated as capital favors software over supply chains.

This Rare Earth Exchanges (REEx) analysis reviews “The Paradox of Visibility,” a 2026 white paper from Resource Capital Funds (opens in a new tab), which argues that capital markets are misallocating investment—overfunding artificial intelligence and digital infrastructure while underfunding the critical minerals those systems physically require. We assess what is well supported, where assumptions deserve caution, and why this imbalance matters for rare earth and critical mineral investors.

Overview

A new analysis argues investors are pouring money into AI and data centers while ignoring the mines and processing plants that supply the metals making those technologies work. This mismatch could create shortages, higher prices, and geopolitical risk—especially for rare earth elements.

What the Paper Gets Right

The paper’s central insight is hard to dispute: the digital economy is not abstract—it is material-intensive. AI, hyperscale data centers, electrification, and advanced manufacturing all depend on copper, rare earth elements, lithium, nickel, graphite, aluminum, and silver. These inputs are dictated by physics, not preference.

Resource Capital Funds documents how electricity demand from AI workloads and data centers could more than double by the early 2030s, driving unavoidable demand for copper-heavy grids, rare-earth-based motors, and battery systems—while global mining investment remains well below levels consistent with that growth.

Where the Evidence Is Strongest

The most persuasive section compares financial valuation versus physical investment. While leading AI and compute platforms have seen rapid valuation growth since 2015, capital spending by the world’s largest miners has grown only marginally over the same period.

Given 10–20-year mine development timelines, today’s underinvestment materially raises the risk of supply tightness in the 2030s.

The paper is also clear-eyed about alternatives: recycling, substitution, and efficiency gains help—but cannot resolve near-term deficits within policy-relevant timelines.

Where Investors Should Apply Judgment

The analysis leans toward a structural scarcity narrative. Directionally, that risk is real—but outcomes will vary by commodity, jurisdiction, and project stage. Policy reform, permitting acceleration, or price shocks could change timelines. Investors should read the paper as a risk framework, not a deterministic forecast.

Why This Matters for Rare Earths

Rare earths are the bottleneck within the bottleneck. High-performance magnets underpin EVs, wind turbines, data-center cooling, and defense systems, yet processing and separation remain highly concentrated. If capital continues to favor software over supply, rare earth scarcity will assert itself through price, policy, and geopolitics.

REEx Takeaway: The digital economy may feel weightless—but it runs on metal. A capital that ignores that reality risks funding the future while starving its foundation.

Source: Resource Capital Funds, The Paradox of Visibility (2026)

• Baogang Group's Xinlian Company has built an A-grade intelligent computing center achieving 'independent controllability' for core technologies.
• The computing center serves as foundational infrastructure for the group's steel, rare earth, and mining operations.
• The center is expanding as a regional computing backbone for nearby industrial firms.
• Operational deployments include remote-control mining equipment at Baiyun and AI-powered high-voltage inspection robots.
• Six digital transformation scenarios have been recognized across China's steel industry in 2025.
• This integration of AI and industrial computing represents China's policy-driven effort to create demand through smart and green upgrades.
• The upgrades potentially deliver cost, speed, and resilience advantages difficult for Western supply chains to match without comparable industrial policy.

Xinlian Company, a digital-technology affiliate of Baogang Group, reports progress building industrial computing infrastructure and deploying AI-enabled solutions across mining, power operations, and supply-chain services—another example of China’s accelerating integration of digital systems into heavy industry and strategic materials ecosystems.

In a Feb. 3, 2026, report from Baogang Group–affiliated media (Baogang Daily), Xinlian says Baogang’s Industrial Internet “intelligent computing center” is now built and operating as a foundational asset for the group’s “digital intelligence empowerment” strategy. The center has obtainedan A-grade machine-room certification, completed a self-managed cloud platform migration, and achieved “independent controllability” for core technologies—policy-coded language signaling tighter domestic control over critical digital infrastructure.

Xinlian also reports a deepened strategic cooperation with a well-known domestic e-commerce company, positioning the computing center not only as internal infrastructure for Baogang’s steel and rare earth operations, but also as a regional computing backbone supporting nearby industrial firms.

Operationally, Xinlian says its “one platform, three products” suite underwent multiple upgrades in 2025, with six results selected as typical steel-industry digital transformation scenarios. Examples include remote-control deployment for mining equipment at the Baiyun operation, and a “180” high-voltage switchyard inspection robot that replaces human inspection in high-temperature/high-voltage environments while transmitting data for real-time analysis.

Macro link—greenification + digitization as demand policy

Read this as more than IT modernization. It fits China’s top-down effort to create new demand through “smart” and “green” industrial upgrades—electrification, automation, data centers, and digitally managed infrastructure—partly in response to chronic overcapacity and price pressures in legacy sectors. By converting steel/mining/rare-earth operations into “digital + low-carbon” showcases, Beijing can stimulate domestic equipment demand (robots, sensors, power electronics, motors, magnets) while defending margins through productivity gains—an approach that can indirectly reinforce China’s rare earth and magnet advantage.

Why this matters for the West

This isn’t a single breakthrough; it’s the potential of systematic scaling. China is attempting a hardwiring of AI and industrial computing into the same industrial stack that produces strategic materials. For U.S. and allied supply chains, the threat is not only material control, but digitally optimized cost, speed, and resilience that are difficult to match without comparable industrial policy and deployment cadence.

Disclosure & Verification Notice: This report is translated and summarized from state-owned, Baogang Group–affiliated media (Baogang Daily). Claims reflect official statements and should be independently verified; reported achievements may emphasize policy alignment and strategic signaling as much as commercial performance.

• Chinese researchers developed the first industrial-academic database of nearly 2,000 real NdFeB magnet samples.
• Use of machine learning and active learning optimizes composition faster and cheaper than traditional trial-and-error methods.
• The AI system creates a continuous learning loop that identifies uncertain areas, requests only the most useful data, and retrains.
• This innovation bridges the gap between industry's cost focus and academia's performance goals.
• This breakthrough indicates China is advancing beyond manufacturing scale to algorithmic advantage in rare-earth magnets.
• Rare-earth magnets are a critical chokepoint for U.S. and European electric vehicle and wind turbine supply chains.

Chinese researchers report a major step toward AI-driven manufacturing of high-performance rare-earth magnets, a critical component in electric vehicles and wind turbines, not to mention other major products. By combining nearly 2,000 real industrial magnet samples with advanced machine-learning and “active learning” techniques, the team claims it can optimize magnet composition and processing faster, cheaper, and more reliably than traditional trial-and-error methods. If validated and scaled, this approach could tighten China’s lead in NdFeB magnet manufacturing, a strategic chokepoint for the U.S. andEurope.

What’s New — and Why It Matters

According to a February 2, 2026 announcement from the Computer Network Information Center of the Chinese Academy of Sciences (opens in a new tab), working with the Ganjiang Innovation Institute of the Chinese Academy of Sciences (opens in a new tab), researchers have built what they describe as the first “industrial–academic dual-domain” database for sintered NdFeB magnets. The dataset contains nearly 2,000 samples drawn from real manufacturing environments rather than idealized lab conditions.

Using high-performance computing and multiple machine-learning models (random forests, gradient boosting, and classical and quantum-inspired support vector regression), the team tested how data selection strategies affect prediction accuracy and manufacturing outcomes in a virtual experiment setting.

Reviewing the Materials

The Chinese Society of Rare Earths included an infographic that illustrates an active learning production loop:

• Data preparation: Raw magnet data are cleaned, standardized, and splitinto training, validation, and test sets.
• Model training: Multiple AI models predict magnet performance based on composition and processing parameters.
• Active learning loop: Instead of training once, the system repeatedly selects the most informative new samples, retrains the model, and stops early when gains level off.
• Outcome: Faster convergence on optimal magnet recipes with fewer costly physical experiments.

In simple terms: the AI learns where it is uncertain, asks for only the most useful new data, and improves continuously—cutting time and cost.

Strategic Signal for the West

The study explicitly highlights a tension: industry prioritizes cost and stability, while academia pushes performance limits. The Chinese team claims its framework bridges this gap, offering a scalable path to factory-ready AI optimization. For the U.S. and EU—still struggling to localize NdFeB magnet supply—this signals that China is moving beyond scale alone toward algorithmic manufacturing advantage, potentially widening the competitive moat.

The peer-reviewed results were published in npj Computational Materials and funded by major Chinese state research programs.

Disclaimer: This news item originates from media affiliated with a state-backed Chinese research ecosystem. While technically plausible and published in a reputable journal, all claims should be independently verified before being used for investment or policy decisions.

• Event: 7th Youth Academic Conference
• Organizer: China Rare Earth Society
• Date: May 15-18, 2026
• Location: Nanchang, China
• Tracks:
  • 20 specialized tracks
  • Spans the full rare earth value chain from mining to AI-driven materials design
• Conference Features:
  • Academic exchange
  • Technology transfer
  • Pilot-scale validation
  • Equipment showcases
  • Industry recruitment
• Exhibition: Rare Earth Technology & Instrumentation Exhibition for commercial engagement
• Objective:
  • Systematically cultivate China's next generation of rare earth scientists within an industry-facing framework
  • Contrast with fragmented Western models
  • Potentially widen China's lead in downstream rare earth technologies

The China Rare Earth Society has announced it will host its 7th Youth Academic Conference on May 15–18, 2026, inNanchang, Jiangxi Province, according to a notice released January 29. While framed as an academic event, the scope and structure signal something larger: a coordinated effort to accelerate commercialization, talent circulation, and industry alignment across China’s rare earth ecosystem.

Nanchang, Jiangxi Province

Workforce & Talent Development in Rare Earth Space

The conference is designed to bring together young scientists, engineers, industry technologists, policymakers, and companies working across the full rare earth value chain. Organizers emphasize not only academic exchange but technology transfer, pilot-scale validation, equipment showcases, and industry recruitment—a blend that closely mirrors China’s broader strategy of shortening the distance between laboratory research and industrial deployment.

Notably, the agenda spans 20 specialized tracks, covering rare earth geology, mining, separation and refining, magnetic and electromagnetic materials, catalysts, hydrogen storage, electrochemical energy storage, quantum materials, AI-driven materials design, biomedical applications, advanced ceramics, and rare-earth-based structural alloys. Several sessions explicitly focus on computational design, artificial intelligence, and industrial policy, underscoring Beijing’s push to integrate digital tools with advanced materials science.

A parallel Rare Earth Technology & Instrumentation Exhibition will run alongside the conference, offering companies a platform to display production equipment, analytical instruments, and commercial-ready materials. This exhibition component—and the invitation for enterprises to recruit talent and present applied—reinforces the event’s role as a deal-making and pipeline-building forum, not just an academic meeting.

Why this matters for the U.S. and the West

For Western observers, the key takeaway is structural rather than technical. China is systematically cultivating its next generation of rare earth scientists and engineers inside an industry-facing framework, with explicit pathways from research to pilot testing to commercialization. This contrasts with more fragmented Western models, where academia, startups, and industrial scaling often remain siloed. Rare Earth Exchanges™ has continuously emphasized the key need for talent development and recruitment in the USA and the West.

The breadth of topics—especially magnets, energy storage, hydrogen, AI-enabled materials design, and quantum materials—highlights where China expects rare earths to underpin future strategic industries. Over time, this coordinated talent and commercialization model may further widen China’s lead in downstream rare earth technologies, even if mining diversification advances elsewhere.

Disclaimer: This news item originates from communications issued by a state-affiliated organization and reported through state-linked channels. The information has not been independently verified and should be confirmed through additional sources before being used for investment, policy, or strategic decision-making.

• China's central state-owned enterprises spent RMB 1.1 trillion ($158B) on R&D in 2025, nearing the total U.S. federal R&D budgets and indicating a state-directed innovation push comparable to Western government efforts.
• Strategic emerging industry investment reached $360B in 2025, accounting for 41.8% of total SOE investment, with funds directed towards semiconductors, AI compute clusters, EVs, and advanced equipment to decrease reliance on Western technology chokepoints.
• Central SOEs control $13.7 trillion in assets, with profits up 56.2%, illustrating Beijing's strategy to utilize state-directed capital and industrial scale to transform global supply chains, procurement standards, and downstream pricing power.

China’s state-sector champions just published a “scorecard” designed to signal one thing to global capital: that Beijing’s innovation machine is scaling fast—and it’s being financed like a national security program.

At a State Council press conference on Jan. 28, China’s state assets regulator (SASAC) said centrally controlled state-owned enterprises (SOEs) spent RMB 1.1 trillion on R&D in 2025 (about $158B at ~6.95 RMB/USD). For context, the U.S. federal government’s total R&D request/levels are often cited around the $200B range (depending on definition and fiscal year), while total U.S. economy-wide R&D spending (public + private) is far higher—near $940B in 2023. The implication: China is fielding an SOE-only R&D war chest that begins to rhyme with the U.S. federal-scale effort.

The infographic data above underscores the “bigness” strategy. SASAC says central SOEs ended 2025 with assets exceeding RMB 95 trillion (≈ $13.7T) and an average 6.9% annual asset growth during the “14th Five-Year Plan” period. They reported value added of RMB 51.3 trillion (≈ $7.4T), up 44.6% versus the prior plan period, and total profits of RMB 12.7 trillion (≈ $1.83T), up 56.2%—numbers meant to sell “scale + efficiency,” not just raw industrial heft.

Where is Funds Flowing?

The more market-relevant headline is where the money is going. Central SOEs’ strategic emerging-industry investment reached RMB 2.5 trillion in 2025 (≈ $360B) and accounted for 41.8% of total investment, while strategic emerging-industry revenue exceeded RMB 12 trillion (≈ $1.73T).

This is a direct bid to accelerate domestic control over semiconductors, advanced equipment, EV supply chains, AI, and even quantum—areas where the West has relied on chokepoints and export controls. Plus AI gets special emphasis: China’s “big three” telecom operators reportedly built four “10,000-card” compute clusters to support large-model training—an unmistakable signal that compute, grid power, and hardware supply chains are being orchestrated top-down.

For the U.S. and allies, the takeaway is less “China innovation is rising” (old news) and more: state-directed demand is being weaponized to lock in future industrial standards, potentially reshaping global procurement, rare earth magnet demand (EVs, robotics, wind), and downstream pricing power.

 Disclaimer: This item is sourced from Chinese state-affiliated media (People’s Daily) and a state-linked industry association. Details should be verified with independent sources before acting on them.

• AI servers require thousands of multilayer ceramic capacitors (MLCCs) per board to stabilize power delivery, pushing these components into unprecedented regimes of sub-0.5 μm dielectric layers and extreme electric-field stress with near-zero failure tolerance.
• Manufacturers increasingly rely on rare-earth dopants (Dy, Y, Ho) to maintain MLCC reliability under DC bias and high temperature, quietly tying AI infrastructure performance to China's ~90% dominance in rare-earth separation and refining.
• Oxygen-vacancy accumulation in ultra-thin dielectrics has emerged as the dominant reliability threat for AI-grade MLCCs, requiring automotive-level validation rigor and elevating passive components from invisible parts to strategic supply-chain chokepoints.

Jung Rag Yoon of Samwha Capacitor’s R&D Center (Yongin, Korea), together with collaborators Seok No Seo (Samwha), Min-Woo Ha (Myongji University), and Moon-Taek Cho (Daewon University College), examine a critical but largely invisible constraint on modern AI infrastructure: multilayer ceramic capacitors (MLCCs)—the sand-grain-sized components that stabilize power delivery in GPUs and data-center power systems.

In their January 2026 review published in the Journal of Electrical and Electronic Materials, the authors argue that AI servers are forcing MLCC technology into an unprecedented regime of extreme miniaturization (sub-0.5 μm dielectric layers), elevated electric-field stress, and near-zero-tolerance failure requirements.

To maintain performance under these conditions, manufacturers increasingly rely on rare-earth-doped BaTiO₃ dielectrics (notably Dy, Y, and Ho) to stabilize capacitance under DC bias and high temperature. That materials solution, however, quietly ties next-generation AI reliability to a geopolitical reality: China’s dominant position in rare-earth separation and refining, particularly for mid- and heavy-rare-earth supply chains.

Google Data Center

Why MLCCs Matter to AI (A Lay Explanation That Investors Should Not Skip)

An MLCC functions as a local energy buffer and high-frequency noise suppressor on a circuit board. AI accelerators draw power in abrupt, microsecond-scale bursts. Without rapid local charge delivery, voltagessag, electrical noise spikes, and systems destabilize. This is why asingle AI accelerator board can incorporate thousands to tens of thousands of MLCCs, and why power-integrity engineering has become a first-order design constraint in data centers. The review underscores a clear trend across the supply chain: AI servers consume far more MLCCs than conventional servers, and demand is rising sharply as compute density and power draw continue to climb.

Multilayer Ceramic Capacitors (MLCCs)

Study Methods and What This Paper Actually Is

This publication is a technical review, not a single-laboratory experimental study. The authors synthesize peer-reviewed research, industry practice, and reliability frameworks across four domains:

• Materials engineering: BaTiO₃ particle size control, grain-boundary behavior, and core–shell dielectric microstructures
• Additives and dopants: rare-earth elements and multivalent oxides used to suppress defects and stabilize dielectric response
• Manufacturing processes: slurry dispersion → tapecasting → electrode printing → lamination → reducing-atmosphere sintering → controlled re-oxidation
• Reliability physics and testing: HALT, TSDC analysis, Weibull lifetime modeling, and the emerging “tipping-point” framework tied to oxygen-vacancy accumulation

As a review, its value lies in consolidating technical consensus and highlighting where failure modes are emerging as MLCCs shrink and AI duty cycles intensify.

Key Findings: MLCC Technology Has Entered a New Stress Regime

1. Ultra-thin dielectrics (<0.5 μm) raise the stakes

Shrinking dielectric layers increases volumetric capacitance but simultaneously amplifies electric-field intensity and defect sensitivity. At these scales, a single weak interface or vacancy cluster can become a catastrophic failure path.

2. DC bias “steals” capacitance—core–shell designs try to steal it back

Under sustained DC bias, BaTiO₃-based MLCCs can lose a substantial fraction of effective capacitance. The review highlights core–shell grain architectures that redistribute field stress and preserve dielectric response across temperature and voltage ranges.

3. Oxygen vacancies become the dominant reliability threat in base-metal electrode MLCC

The shift to Ni/Cu internal electrodes requires sintering in reducing atmospheres, which promotes oxygen-vacancy formation. Over time, these vacancies migrate, accumulate, and degrade insulation resistance, eventually forming conductive paths.

4. AI reliability expectations are converging on “ppm-level failure or else.”

AI data centers operate continuously. A single capacitor failure can disable a board, server, or rack. The paper argues that AI-grade MLCCs are approaching automotive-level documentation and validation rigor, but under a distinct stress profile dominated by electrical transients rather than mechanical shock.

Where Rare Earths Enter the “Passive Component” Story

The strategic takeaway is subtle but important: rare-earth dopants are becoming reliability enablers, not performance luxuries. Elements such as Dy, Ho, and Y suppress abnormal grain growth, regulate oxygen-vacancy behavior, reduce dielectric loss, and stabilize capacitance under extreme operating conditions. In short, rare earths are embedded in the power plumbing of AI, not just in motors and magnets.

The Controversial Intersection: AI Reliability Meets Processing Concentration

While the review itself is technical and Korea-centric, its implications intersect directly with geopolitics:

• The International Energy Agency and other bodies note that China’s dominance is more pronounced in rare-earth separation and refining than in upstream mining, with processing shares commonly cited around ~90% for several categories.
• Security and industrial-policy analysts describe this as structural leverage, particularly for mid- and heavy-rare-earth oxides used in advanced materials.
• Recentexport-control actions covering selected rare-earth categories reinforce that availability is shaped as much by policy as by geology.

REEx takeaway

Even when used in small dopant fractions, AI-scale deployment requires high-purity, process-qualified, and highly consistent inputs. That is precisely where processing concentration matters most. When refining is the bottleneck, small quantities can still be strategically decisive.

Limitations and What Readers Should Not Over-Interpret

• This is a review, not a new dataset. It consolidates knownmechanisms rather than establishing novel causal claims.
• Industry authorship matters. With the lead author based at a capacitor manufacturer, the paper naturally emphasizes manufacturable solutions and may underweight alternative architectures or substitution pathways.
• “China monopoly” is context-specific. Dominance is strongest in separation and refining; upstream mining and certain downstream manufacturing steps are more geographically distributed.
• Substitution is slow. Although alternatives are being explored (as acknowledged in funding disclosures), reliability qualification cycles, cost, and yield constraints limit near-term displacement.

Implications for Investors, Policymakers, and the AI Supply Chain

• AI scaling is a passive-component story. GPUs draw attention; MLCCs keep systems alive. Expect capacitor qualification, failure analytics, and supply assurance to become board-level procurement issues.
• Rare-earth strategy must extend beyond magnets. Ceramic dielectrics and passive components are an underappreciated demand vector.
• Processing chokepoints remain the center of gravity. Concentrated refining capacity means even the most advanced AI hardware inherits upstream vulnerabilities—even when rare earths appear only as dopants.

Yoon, J. R., Seo, S. N., Ha, M.-W., & Cho, M.-T. (2026). Multilayer ceramic capacitors for AI servers and data centers: Challenges, reliability issues, and future technology directions. Journal of Electrical and Electronic Materials, 39(1), 34–51. https://doi.org/10.4313/JEEM.2026.39.1.5 (opens in a new tab)

• China granted a record 972,000 invention patents in 2025, with 43.1% classified as high-value, signaling a strategic shift from quantity to quality in IP development across AI, electric vehicles, and green energy sectors.
• Patent commercialization is accelerating: 54% of corporate invention patents are now industrialized, licensing rose 13.7% year-over-year, and IP exports jumped 23.1% as China pushes higher-value services trade.
• China is eliminating government subsidies for patent filings to curb low-quality applications and has established 99 overseas IP dispute platforms, helping companies avoid an estimated $380M in losses in 2025.

China granted 972,000 invention patents in 2025, a record level that Chinese officials say reflects a decisive shift away from quantity toward higher-quality, commercially relevant intellectual property. Rare Earth Exchanges™ has warned the West that China’s accelerating its rare earth element-related downstream patents across myriad sectors from electronic vehicles and humanoids to green energy, materials science and defense. According to data released at a State Council press briefing and published by People’s Daily, China now holds 5.32 million active domestic invention patents, with artificial intelligence–related patents ranking among the highest globally.

The announcement, citing the China National Intellectual Property Administration (opens in a new tab), highlights rapid growth in patents tied to AI, computer technologies, medical technologies, and information-management systems—areas that overlap directly with sectors where the U.S. and Europe are competing for technological leadership. Officials emphasized that 43.1% of China’s active invention patents now qualify as “high-value”, a metric that includes technical complexity, market relevance, and legal stability. This share has risen steadily and now totals 2.29 million high-value patents.

Innovation remains geographically concentrated. Where? The Yangtze River Delta, Beijing–Tianjin–Hebei corridor, and Guangdong province together account for roughly two-thirds of China’s active invention patents, underscoring how regional industrial clusters continue to drive China’s technology output.

Key Innovation Zones in China

From a commercialization standpoint, Chinese officials reported meaningful gains. Patent licensing and transfers rose 13.7% year-over-year, while the industrialization rate of corporate invention patents reached 54%, a key metric signaling whether patents are actually being used in products and services. Intellectual-property royalty trade also expanded, with IP exports up 23.1%, supporting China’s push to grow higher-value services trade alongside manufacturing.

Some Trends

One notable policy shift may resonate with foreign observers: Chinese regulators say they will fully eliminate government subsidies tied to patent filing or approval, aiming to curb low-quality, subsidy-driven patent inflation. Universities and research institutes are being required to adopt pre-filing evaluation systems to block weak patent applications before submission—an implicit acknowledgment of long-standing Western criticism that China’s patent totals overstated real innovation.

China is also strengthening its overseas IP defense infrastructure. Authorities report 99 foreign IP dispute-response platforms and sector-specific mechanisms for industries such as automotive and solar, claiming that these efforts helped companies avoid or recover an estimated ¥2.75 billion ($380M) in losses in 2025 from overseas IP disputes and trademark squatting.

Why this matters for the U.S. and the West

The data suggests China is moving beyond headline patent counts toward systematic commercialization and legal defensibility, particularly in AI and advanced technologies. If sustained, this trend could narrow the innovation-quality gap with Western firms, complicate technology-transfer controls, and intensify competition in global IP-driven markets—from AI software to clean energy and medical tech.

Disclaimer: This news item originates from Chinese state-affiliated media, including People’s Daily, and cites data released by government authorities. The information should be independently verified through non-Chinese or third-party sources before being relied upon for investment, policy, or strategic decision-making.

• New global study reveals China's dominance over rare earth processing creates systemic financial risk for AI-driven fintech industries, not just manufacturing concerns.
• Rising rare earth prices—amplified by geopolitical shocks like the Russia-Ukraine war—directly suppress fintech productivity over time, with few substitutes available.
• Financial hedges like inflation-linked bonds provide only temporary relief; true resilience requires diversifying rare earth processing capacity beyond China's control.

A new global study led by Md. Monirul Islam (opens in a new tab) along with Faroque Ahmed, both with University of Dhaka, Abdulla Al Mahmud, Sakarya University, and Muhammad Shahbaz, Beijing Institute of Technology, delivers a clear warning for policymakers, investors, and technology leaders (opens in a new tab): China’s dominance over rare earth processing is no longer just a manufacturing risk—it is now a systemic financial risk for AI-driven fintech industries worldwide.

Drawing on high-frequency global data from 2020–2023, the authors show that rising rare earth prices—amplified by geopolitical shocks such as the Russia–Ukraine war—directly suppress fintech productivity over time, while inflation-linked sovereign bonds can partially cushion short-term damage. The study’s central message is simple but unsettling: as AI finance grows, it becomes increasingly hostage to rare earth supply chains controlled far upstream—and largely outside market discipline.

Study Design: Following the Shockwaves, Not the Averages

Rather than relying on traditional “average effect” models, the researchers use quantile-based econometric tools—cross-quantilograms, recursive cross-quantilograms, and quantile vector autoregression (QVAR). In plain English, this means they track how shocks behave during extremes: market crashes, price spikes, and geopolitical crises, not just calm periods.

The dataset spans daily global indicators, including:

• Rare earth import prices
• Metallic mineral prices (e.g., copper, nickel)
• Sovereign inflation-linked bonds
• Russia–Ukraine geopolitical risk indices
• A global index of AI-driven fintech output, covering hardware, software, and AI-as-a-service infrastructure

This approach allows the authors to answer a crucial question often ignored in policy debates: What happens to AI-finance when things go wrong?

Key Findings: Rare Earths Bite Harder Than Investors Expect

The results are striking and highly relevant to the rare earth supply chain:

1. Rare earth prices suppress fintech output over time.

When rare earth prices rise—especially during prolonged or stressed market conditions—AI-driven fintech productivity falls. This reflects higher costs for chips, servers, data centers, and AI hardware that fintech platforms depend on. Unlike bulk metals, rare earths have few substitutes and highly concentrated processing—primarily in China.

2. Metallic minerals matter less than rare earths.

Base metals show mixed or weak effects on fintech output. This underscores a key REEx point: not all minerals carry equal strategic weight. Rare earths sit at the critical choke point.

3. Geopolitics magnifies the damage.

Russia–Ukraine geopolitical risk consistently dampens fintech output, particularly in bearish markets. These shocks propagate through energy prices, inflation, and—critically—mineral supply chains already stretched by concentration.

4. Inflation-linked sovereign bonds offer a short-term buffer.

Sovereign inflation-linked bonds help stabilize fintech investment during inflationary spikes, acting as a temporary financial shock absorber. However, their protective effect fades over longer horizons and does not resolve underlying material dependency.

Where China Enters the Picture

While the study does not name China repeatedly, the implication is unmistakable. Rare-earth price volatility is not random—it reflects structural concentration in processing and refining, with China dominating global capacity. When geopolitical stress rises, or export controls tighten, prices spike, and AI-fintech sectors—far downstream—pay the price.

In effect, China’s rare earth processing monopoly becomes a hidden tax on global digital finance.

Implications: This Is No Longer Just a Mining Story

For investors and governments, the message is direct:

• AI-driven fintech is now a resource-dependent industry, not a purely digital one
• Financial hedges (like inflation-linked bonds) help, but cannot substitute for supply-chain resilience
• Diversifying rare earth processing—not just mining—is essential to protect future financial innovation

This reinforces a core REEx thesis: control over processing equals control over value, stability, and strategic leverage.

Limitations and Contested Areas

The study is global and macro-level. It does not model individual countries’ processing capacity, firm-level supply contracts, or alternative hedges such as green bonds. Quantile methods also reveal correlation under stress, not direct causality. Future work could integrate country-specific rare earth refining data and explicit China-centric supply constraints.

Still, the direction of risk is unambiguous.

REEx Conclusion

This research reframes rare earths as financial infrastructure, not just industrial inputs. As AI-driven fintech scales, its exposure to China-centric rare earth processing grows—quietly but powerfully. Without decisive action on processing diversification, tomorrow’s digital finance may remain built on an increasingly fragile foundation.

Citation: Islam, M.M., Ahmed, F., Al Mahmud, A., & Shahbaz, M. (2025/2026). Rare Earth Prices, Geopolitical Risk, and AI-Driven Fintech Output: Evidence from Quantile Spillover Analysis.

• China declares its basic research has entered a '0-to-1 breakthrough phase' in 2025, shifting from incremental advances to first-of-their-kind scientific achievements including thorium-to-uranium fuel conversion and the Zuchongzhi-3 quantum computing prototype.
• Basic research spending reached a historic 7.08% of total R&D investment, supported by over 70 large-scale national research facilities and a deliberate policy architecture embedding foundational science into five-year planning with enterprise participation.
• China is building a durable pipeline from basic science to applied technology across various sectors such as nuclear energy, quantum computing, advanced materials, aerospace, and biotechnology.
• Institutionalizing first-principles innovation as a pillar of long-term geopolitical competitiveness.

China’s Ministry of Science and Technology and the China Rare Earth Industry Association report that China’s basic research ecosystem entered a decisive “0-to-1 breakthrough phase in 2025,” marking a shift from incremental advances to first-of-their-kind scientific results.  China is claiming it has moved from improving existing technologies to creating fundamentally new ones. The announcement highlights record funding levels, major scientific firsts, and expanding national research infrastructure—developments with long-term implications for global technology competition.

According to the report, basic research spending reached 7.08% of total R&D investment, the highest share in China’s history. This sustained funding push is now translating into measurable outcomes across nuclear energy, quantum computing, life sciences, space science, and particle physics—fields that underpin future industrial and defense capabilities.

Among the most consequential breakthroughs:

• The world’s first successful thorium-to-uranium fuel conversion in a molten salt reactor, demonstrating the technical feasibility of thorium-based nuclear power—an area closely watched by U.S. energy and national-security planners.
• The “Zuchongzhi-3” quantum computing prototype, which reportedly set a new global performance benchmark.
• New discoveries using China’s “Big Science Facilities,” including rare pulsar systems identified by the FAST radio telescope and record-precision neutrino measurements at the Jiangmen Neutrino Experiment.

China now operates or is building more than 70 large-scale national research facilities, placing it among the world’s leaders in scientific infrastructure. These platforms are accelerating original discoveries and allowing China to probe physical extremes—from deep space to subatomic particles—at scale.

Beyond the science, the article underscores a deliberate policy architecture. China’s leadership has embedded basic research into national five-year planning, reinforced long-term funding mechanisms, revised science-foundation rules to favor original research, and created incentives for enterprises to participate directly in foundational science. Regional governments, including Shanghai and Beijing, are now co-funding corporate-led basic research.

For audiences in the West, the significance is strategic rather than immediate. This signals that China is building a durable pipeline from basic science to applied technology, strengthening its position in next-generation energy systems, advanced materials (including rare earths), quantum technologies, aerospace, and biotechnology. While many outcomes remain years from commercialization, the systemic scale, funding stability, and coordination described here contrast sharply with more fragmented U.S. and European research models.

In short, China is not just catching up—it is institutionalizing first-principles innovation as a pillar of long-term industrial and geopolitical competitiveness.

Disclaimer: This news item originates from China Rare Earth Industry Association, publications associated with state-owned or state-aligned entities. The information presented should be independently verified before forming business, investment, or policy conclusions.

• China's MIIT reports major industrial gains:
  • 26.7% growth in integrated circuits
  • 28% jump in industrial robots
  • 16.49 million NEV sales as the country pushes technological self-sufficiency across critical sectors
• China now holds 42% of global 5G standard-essential patents and has launched phase two 6G technical trials, signaling intent to shape next-generation telecommunications standards ahead of Western frameworks.
• MIIT outlined aggressive expansion plans including:
  • Quantum computing breakthroughs
  • Brain-computer interfaces beyond healthcare
  • Government-backed investment funds to accelerate the commercialization of future technologies, including advanced materials and computing

China’s top industrial regulator has sent a clear message: the country is moving faster—and more deliberately—to lock in leadership across next-generation communications, advanced manufacturing, and frontier technologies. At a State Council press briefing, senior officials from the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology (MIIT) outlined tangible progress in 2025 and previewed an aggressive roadmap for the next planning cycle.

According to Vice Minister Zhang Yunming, MIIT is pushing deeper integration between scientific research and industrial deployment. Several long-running bottlenecks are reported to have eased. China claims breakthroughs in ultra-large tunnel boring machines and heavy-duty gas turbines—equipment categories historically dominated by Western suppliers. Artificial intelligence is described as a major driver of industrial growth, while early-stage 6G research has completed its first technical testing phase, generating more than 300 key technology reserves.

Hard output numbers were emphasized. Value-added growth in integrated circuits rose 26.7% year-on-year, while electronic specialty materials increased nearly 24%. Industrial robot production jumped 28%. New-energy vehicle sales reached 16.49 million units, up 28.2%, reinforcing China’s scale advantage in EV manufacturing. Investment growth was strongest in aerospace and aviation equipment, both posting double-digit gains.

MIIT’s telecom division added that China now accounts for 42% of declared global 5G standard-essential patents, and that phase two of 6G technical trials has already begun—a notable signal that China intends to shape standards early, before Western consensus frameworks fully coalesce.

Perhaps most striking for U.S. and European audiences was the breadth of “future technologies” cited as internationally competitive: permanent magnet materials, advanced power batteries, perovskite materials, high-speed networking, advanced computing, blockchain, and emerging software platforms. Officials also highlighted claimed milestones in quantum computing, asserting that both superconducting and photonic quantum systems have demonstrated “quantum advantage” on specific tasks. Brain-computer interface technologies are described as expanding beyond healthcare into education and industrial use.

Looking ahead to the next five-year period, MIIT pledged expanded state guidance, larger government-backed investment funds, national demonstration zones for emerging industries, and “challenge-based” funding mechanisms to accelerate commercialization.

Why this matters to the West

The update underscores China’s intent to control not just manufacturing scale, but standards, enabling materials, and foundational infrastructure—from magnets and chips to 6G networks and quantum systems. For U.S. and allied policymakers, the message is less about slogans and more about execution speed.

Source: State Council press briefing; reporting by Xinhua and domestic financial media.

Disclaimer: This news originates from Chinese state-owned or state-affiliated media. All claims should be independently verified.

• Aclara Resources partners with Argonne National Laboratory to build an AI-powered digital twin for heavy rare earth (HREE) solvent extraction, targeting one of the most complex bottlenecks in the non-Chinese supply chain.
• The collaboration aims to compress decades of tacit process knowledge held by China by combining Aclara's pilot-scale data with Argonne's SolventX modeling platform and high-performance computing capabilities.
• While digital twins can reduce scale-up risk and improve recovery consistency, success depends on years of iterative learning and cannot eliminate the brutal realities of solvent degradation, feed variability, and commercial uptime challenges.

Aclara Resources’ newly announced (opens in a new tab) CRADA with Argonne National Laboratory (opens in a new tab) is not a press-release curiosity—it is a signal. By pairing Aclara’s proprietary pilot-scale data with Argonne’s SolventX modeling platform and AI expertise, the company aims to build a high-fidelity digital twin for heavy rare earth (HREE) solvent extraction, one of the most complex bottlenecks in the global rare earth supply chain.

This is not about dashboards or buzzwords. It is about whether non-Chinese operators can reliably separate dysprosium, terbium, and other scarce HREEs at scale, with predictable recovery, cost control, and operational resilience.

What Holds Water—and What Doesn’t Leak

Several elements of this announcement are firmly grounded in known reality. Argonne is a legitimate heavyweight in advanced computing, process modeling, and materials science. Its use of high-performance computing to simulate lanthanide separation chemistry is well documented. Likewise, Aclara’s focus on ionic clay deposits in Brazil and Chile aligns with the global truth that most economically relevant HREEs come from such ores—not from hard rock.

Digital twins are also a proven industrial tool in chemicals, refining, and advanced manufacturing. Applying them to rare earth solvent extraction—an error-prone, capital-intensive process—makes technical sense. If executed well, this can reduce scale-up risk, shorten commissioning timelines, and improve recovery consistency.

The Poetry of Promise

Where the language stretches is in the timeline and certainty. Phrases like “accelerate industrial ramp-up” and “predictive control” imply a level of maturity that typically takes years of iteration. Digital twins do not eliminate chemical complexity; they learn it—slowly, expensively, and only as good as the data fed into them.

There is also a subtle optimism bias embedded in the narrative: that modeling prowess can substitute for the brutal realities of solvent degradation, feed variability, and commercial uptime. It cannot. It can only help manage them.

Why This Matters More Than It Sounds

This partnership is notable not because it guarantees success, but because it reflects how U.S.-aligned rare earth strategies are evolving. The era of “build a plant and hope” is over. The new competition with China is being fought in process intelligence, learning curves, and operational repeatability.

China’s advantage is not just scale—it is decades of tacit process knowledge. Aclara’s bet, with Argonne, is that AI-enabled digital infrastructure can compress that learning curve. That is ambitious. It is also necessary.

• India and Japan launched an AI Dialogue and Joint Working Group on Critical Minerals.
• The initiative aims to coordinate on technology, security, and supply-chain resilience amid China's rare earth dominance.
• The bilateral initiative signals strategic intent to cooperate on sourcing, recycling, and downstream technologies.
• The initiative combines Japan's technical expertise with India's demand growth.
• The announcement lacks crucial investment details, including:
  • Mineral priorities
  • Processing plans
  • Private sector involvement
  • Capital commitments
  • Timelines
• The initiative is viewed as geopolitical signaling rather than actionable supply chain progress.

India and Japan have announced the launch of an Artificial Intelligence (AI) Dialogue and a Joint Working Group (JWG) on Critical Minerals, according to a January 17, 2026 report by ANI. The move fits a broader Indo-Pacific narrative of democratic allies coordinating on technology, security, andsupply-chain resilience. For rare earth investors, however, this isstrategic alignment—not operational progress.

At a high level, the announcement is directionally sound. Both countries depend heavily on imported critical minerals and share concerns about China’s dominance in rare earth mining, processing, and magnet manufacturing. A formal JWG signals intent to cooperate on sourcing, recycling, and downstream technologies—areas where Japan brings technical depth and India offers long-term demand growth.

Japan has experience diversifying rare earth supply chains post-2010; India has publicly committed to building domestic critical mineral capacity; and bilateral frameworks are increasingly favored over multilateral efforts. All true. All important. None is immediately investable.

Rare Earth Exchanges™ suggests that the ANI report provides no detail on which minerals are prioritized, whether processing and separation are included, if private companies are involved, or whether capital, offtakes, or timelines exist. Without these specifics, the initiative functions more as geopolitical signaling than a roadmap for new supply.

The quiet bias is diplomatic optimism—treating dialogue as progress. For investors, the risk is mistaking alignment for execution.

Source: ANI News, January 17, 2026

© 2026 Rare Earth Exchanges™ – Accelerating Transparency, Accuracy, and Insight Across the Rare Earth & Critical Minerals Supply Chain.

• Phoenix Tailings joins Massachusetts AI Coalition, positioning AI as an operational lever in rare earth metal production rather than just branding.
• The focus is on real process improvements in yield, impurity control, and energy efficiency.
• The company's approach aligns with federal priorities for domestic critical minerals production and ex-China supply chains.
• Key execution questions remain around scale, cost competitiveness, and demonstrated impact versus Chinese refiners.
• This signals a significant trend: AI being applied to hard-tech re-industrialization in metallurgy and chemistry.
• Marginal gains in fragile, capital-intensive processes can compound to create game-changing supply chain outcomes.

Going from code to crucible. When Phoenix Tailings (opens in a new tab) announces it is a founding member of the Massachusetts AI Coalition, the headline is not about networking. It is about intent. Rare earth supply chains do not fail for lack of white papers. They fail in furnaces, solvent loops, impurity control, and throughput optimization. Phoenix’s claim—that AI can be deployed in real, physical rare earth metal production—lands in the hard part of the economy, where slogans usually die, but could lead to game-changing outcomes if delivered.

The company positions AI not as a branding layer but as an operational lever inside next-generation refining. That distinction matters.

Nicholas Myers, CEO & Co-Founder---crucible and code to transform America’s supply chain

A Trend Not to Ignore

Several elements of this announcement align with known realities:

• AI as process optimization: In rare-earth separation and metal production, AI can credibly improve yield, impurity control, predictive maintenance, and energy efficiency. These are real pain points, not speculative use cases.
• Domestic industrial focus: Phoenix’s emphasis on rebuilding U.S. industrial capacity tracks with federal priorities around critical minerals, national security, and ex-China supply chains. Rare Earth Exchanges™ has spoken with its leadership in a recent interview (opens in a new tab). The group is making impressive strides.
• Ecosystem proximity: Phoenix’s Cambridge origins place it near applied research talent, not just software startups—an advantage when AI must interface with chemistry, metallurgy, and hardware.

This is not a claim about replacing chemistry with algorithms. It is about augmenting fragile, capital-intensive processes where marginal gains compound quickly.

Conservatively Optimistic

The announcement does lean into coalition prestige—listing firms like WHOOP, (opens in a new tab) DraftKings (opens in a new tab), and Wayfair (opens in a new tab). These are impressive brands, and they also do not validate metallurgical execution.

What remains unproven—at least publicly—is:

• The scale at which Phoenix’s AI-enabled processes operate today. We know they are capable of producing a couple of hundred tons, and that’s going to grow exponentially with a high degree of confidence.
• The cost curve impact relative to Chinese refiners (no investor can ignore this)
• Whether AI meaningfully shortens commissioning timelines or merely optimizes steady-state operations

These are execution questions, not red flags—but investors should separate directional credibility from industrial proof, always.

Why This Matters for the Rare Earth Supply Chain

What makes this news notable is not the coalition itself. It is the framing: AI as a tool for hard-tech re-industrialization, not ad targeting or logistics dashboards. If rare earth independence is to be achieved, it will come from companies willing to merge software discipline with chemical reality.

Phoenix Tailings is signaling it understands that boundary—and is willing to operate on the uncomfortable side of it. And we believe they have the intellectual capacity and drive to transcend the challenges over time.

© 2026 Rare Earth Exchanges™ – Accelerating Transparency, Accuracy, and Insight Across the Rare Earth & Critical Minerals Supply Chain.

• Chinese scientists developed the first single-molecule structure capable of emitting circularly polarized light in two different colors, combining europium with flexible tin-oxygen clusters.
• The breakthrough achieves high asymmetry factor (0.031) CPL performance critical for next-gen displays, optical encryption, AR/VR, and photonic computing applications.
• This advance signals China's strategic shift from rare-earth mining dominance to high-value photonics IP and functional materials—a potential technology chokepoint.

Researchers at the Fujian Institute of Research on the Structure of Matter, Chinese Academy of Sciences (opens in a new tab) have achieved a new breakthrough in chiral metal–organic cluster (MOC)materials. Metal–organic clusters (MOCs), valued for theirprecisely tunable structures and optical properties, have become an important molecular platform for the development of circularly polarized luminescence (CPL) materials. Among various MOC systems, organotin–oxygen clusters stand out due to their flexible coordination modes and strong structural adaptability, making them especially promising for constructing chiral architectures.

Rare Earth Exchanges Summary

Researchers at the Fujian-based research center have developed (opens in a new tab) a new advanced light-emitting material that can control light in ways not previously possible, creating tiny molecular structures capable of emitting “twisted” light—known as circularly polarized light—in two different colors from the same material. Circularly polarized light is critical for modern technologies ranging from high-end displays and anti-counterfeiting features to secure communications, augmented reality, and photonic computing, yet until now it typically required complex systems or multiple materials to achieve strong, controllable performance.

Fujian Institute of Research on the Structure of Matter, Chinese Academy of Sciences

The breakthrough comes from combining organic molecules with the rare-earth element europium, prized for its sharp and precise light emission, and embedding it into a flexible molecular structure that can change color depending on how it is stimulated while maintaining tight control over the direction of the light’s twist. This marks the first demonstration of dual-color twisted-light emission from a single molecular structure and could ultimately enable simpler, more efficient designs for next-generation screens, security markings, and optical communication systems.

Strategically, the work also underscores how China is moving beyond rare-earth mining into high-value rare-earth technologies, where intellectual property, advanced materials design, and manufacturing standards are as important as access to raw materials.

Detailed Summary

By introducing lanthanide ions—specifically europium (Eu³⁺)—into the tin–oxygen cluster core, researchers combine the cluster’s structural adaptability with the lanthanide’s characteristic sharp-line optical emissions, enabling fine control over circularly polarized luminescence (CPL) performance.

The research team precisely assembled axially chiral BINOL-derived phosphonate ligands with europium–tin metal centers, successfully constructing two pairs of well-defined chiral enantiomers, Sn₂EuL₂-R/S and Sn₂EuL₄-R/S. These clusters integrate ligand-based broadband fluorescence with ligand-sensitized europium sharp-line emission within a single structure.

As a result, the materials exhibit excitation-wavelength-dependent dynamic color switching. Notably, they display strong CPL signals in both the near-ultraviolet and visible regions, with an asymmetry factor reaching 0.031 in the visible range. This represents the first demonstration of dual-wavelength CPL emission within a single cluster system.

The work establishes a new design paradigm for chiral luminescent clusters and provides a molecular platform for future applications in optical encryption, secure communications, and polarized display technologies.

Why This Matters: Business & Strategic Implications

This is not incremental lab science — it is a materials-level capability jump.

Key breakthroughs

• First single-cluster system to deliver dual-wavelength circularly polarized luminescence
• High CPL asymmetry factor (0.031), meaningful for real-world device integration
• Combines organic photophysics with rare-earth (Eu) sharp-line emission in one controllable platform

Why Western industry should care

• CPL materials are critical for next-generation displays, anti-counterfeiting, optical encryption, AR/VR, and photonic chips
• Rare-earth–enabled photonics is an emerging chokepoint — and China is advancing both upstream materials control and downstream functional materials science
• This work strengthens China’s position in rare-earth–enabled optical IP, not just mining and refining

Strategic signal

As Rare Earth Exchanges™ chronicles, China is moving beyond supply dominance into high-value rare-earth functional materials, where intellectual property, device integration, and standards matter more than tonnage.

Disclaimer

This news item originates from Chinese state-affiliated research media. The findings should be independently verified through peer-reviewed publications and third-party scientific validation.

© 2026 Rare Earth Exchanges™ – Accelerating Transparency, Accuracy, and Insight Across the Rare Earth & Critical Minerals Supply Chain

• Nvidia and Palantir's extreme valuations—trading at 24-46× and 400-480× earnings respectively—reflect inflated AI expectations that conflate infrastructure buildout with actual revenue generation and profitability.
• Michael Burry's thesis centers on the dangerous gap between unprecedented hyperscaler capex spending ($530B projected for 2026) and unproven AI monetization, compounded by tightening capital markets and extended accounting practices.
• While markets price a frictionless AI future, physical constraints—including critical mineral supply chains, grid capacity, Chinese competitive advantages in applications, and geopolitical risks—remain systematically underpriced.

Rare Earth Exchanges™ (REEx) exists to translate the world’s most strategic supply chains into investor-grade reality—combining accessibility, transparency, and insight. That mission is shaped in party by downstream demand tied to artificial intelligence. The same hyperscaler capital-expenditure surge powering GPU demand is also accelerating requirements for energy infrastructure, advanced materials, precision manufacturing, robotics, and defense-grade electronics—systems that ultimately depend on critical minerals and rare earth elements at multiple choke points.

Yet markets are beginning to behave as if this demand curve is both infinite and risk-free. Valuations across “AI-adjacent” winners are inflating far faster than underlying cash flows, while the physical side of the equation—permitting timelines, grid constraints, processing bottlenecks, geopolitics, and China’s embedded leverage—remains stubbornly real. In effect, investors are pricing a seamless AI future while discounting the hard constraints of the mineral-to-magnet-to-machine economy. That disconnect sits at the heart of today’s AI trade—and the growing risk embedded within it.

The AI EquitySurge: Extraordinary Gains, Fragile Assumptions

Few would dispute that NVIDIA and Palantir Technologies have enjoyed historic stock runs fueled by artificial-intelligence enthusiasm. Nvidia briefly crossed a $5 trillion market capitalization in 2025. Palantir surged past $400 billion. These figures are extraordinary—and increasingly difficult to reconcile with economic gravity.

Palantir is the clearer valuation outlier. With under $4 billion in annual revenue, the company trades at over 100× price-to-sales, 400× trailing earnings, and roughly 480× EV/EBITDA. These multiples exceed even the peak valuations of Cisco Systems or Amazon during the dot-com bubble. They imply decades of flawless execution, uninterrupted government spending, and minimal competitive erosion—conditions that history shows are rarely sustained.

Nvidia’s valuation is more internally coherent, but still fragile. The company is immensely profitable, generating nearly $100 billion in net income and more than $50 billion in free cash flow, with operating margins north of 60%. At roughly 46× trailing earnings and 24× forward earnings, Nvidia is expensive but defensible if current AI demand persists. The risk is not business quality—it is cycle risk. Nvidia’s results reflect an unprecedented hyperscaler capex surge. Any normalization in spending could compress margins and multiples quickly.

Michael Burry’s Core Warning: Infrastructure Is Not Demand

This is where Michael Burry’s critique becomes essential. The hedge fund investor, famous for identifying the U.S. housing bubble ahead of the 2008 crisis, Burry argues that today’s AI boom shows familiar signs of mania: assets treated as if they “can’t go down,” justified by narratives claiming valuation rules no longer apply.

Recent capital-spending data reinforces his concern. Big Tech spent approximately $61 billion on data centers last year alone. According to Goldman Sachs, global AI investment is projected to rise from roughly $400 billion to nearly $530 billion in 2026. Hyperscalers have increased AI capex by more than 60% in each of the past two years, with another ~30% increase planned.

The structural problem is funding. This expansion is unfolding in a tightening capital environment, not an era of zero-cost money. The U.S. Treasury alone must refinance roughly $8 trillion in debt, sending a wave of bond issuance into global markets just as corporate borrowing needs are peaking. Capital is no longer free, and AI infrastructure is among the most capital-intensive investments in modern history.

Burry’s central insight is that markets are conflating front-loaded infrastructure buildouts with durable end-user demand. Data centers are being built first; monetization is expected later—perhaps. If AI revenues fail to scale proportionally, today’s orders risk becoming tomorrow’s overcapacity.

Accounting practices may further cloud the picture. Extended depreciation schedules smooth near-term earnings, making returns appear stronger than the underlying economics justify. This is not fraud—but it is a distortion.

The Monetization Gap—and Why China Matters

A critical follow-on question is whether AI can be monetized fast enough, particularly in the United States. American technology leaders have built world-class frontier models, but many still lack scalable, cash-generating applications (in the pure AI space). Subscription chatbots have limits. The number of users willing to pay $20–$50 per month indefinitely is finite.

Investors, increasingly, are no longer rewarding capex alone; they want demonstrable returns.

China, by contrast, appears to be advancing more rapidly into the applications phase of AI adoption. Chinese AI firms benefit from:

• Cheaper capital
• Abundant and lower-cost power
• Lower operating costs
• Application-first system design

Beijing-backed AI investment is expected to exceed $70 billion this year, while power demand for Chinese data centers rose 25% last year. Export controls have forced Chinese developers to innovate around hardware constraints, resulting—according to multiple analysts—in more efficient models capable of running on less advanced chips. If sustained, this trend could pressure Nvidia’s long-term pricing power at the margin.

This matters because frontier models are increasingly commoditized. Applications capture value. China recognizes this dynamic—and may be moving faster in translating AI capability into economic output. But as we have also reported, the Chinese face their own over-production crises.

Palantir’s Structural Risks: Politics and Dilution

Palantir carries additional vulnerabilities that amplify valuation risk. A significant share of its revenue derives from U.S. government contracts—lucrative, but politically contingent. In Q1 2025 alone, Palantir booked $373 million from U.S. government clients, up more than 40% year-over-year. That growth depends as much on policy priorities as on market demand.

Burry has described this dependence bluntly as a form of “welfare.” Whether one agrees with the phrasing or not, the underlying risk is real: fiscal restraint rhetoric tends to resurface quickly when debt pressures intensify.

Insider enrichment compounds the concern. Palantir’s stock-based compensation exceeded $690 million in 2024, outpacing net income. Five billionaires emerged from a company generating less than $4 billion in annual revenue—an almost unprecedented ratio. Dilution rewards insiders while transferring risk to public shareholders, a pattern that historically appears closer to valuation peaks than beginnings.

Valuation Gravity Still Applies

Burry’s long-dated put options, expiring in 2027, are not calls for imminent collapse. They reflect patience. For a meaningful payoff, Nvidia might need to fall by ~40% and Palantir by ~70%. Those numbers sound extreme—until history intervenes. Cisco lost more than 80% of its value after 2000. Amazon fell nearly 90% before rebuilding.

To be clear: AI is very real, and its expansion is influencing critical minerals markets—from grid metals and energy systems to magnet demand and defense electronics. Nvidia is a genuine industrial champion. Palantir builds powerful software used by governments and enterprises. But great companies can still be poor investments at the wrong price.

A sober review of current financial data supports Burry’s core thesis: these stocks are priced for perfection in a world that rarely delivers it.

Burry is not betting against AI.

He is betting against unpriced risk—excess leverage, fragile monetization, geopolitical competition, and capital cycles that always turn.

History suggests that is rarely a foolish wager.

REEx Bottom Line

• AI infrastructure does not equal AI profits
• Capex not equal to monetization
• Narratives not equal to cash flows
• Valuation always matters—eventually

The emperor of AI is not naked.

But he is overdressed—and the market is starting to notice.

©!-- /wp:paragraph -->

• The NYT investigation accurately traces China's six-decade engineered rise to rare-earth control, but understates the decisive factor: processing and separation chemistry, not mining, is the true source of geopolitical power.
• China's monopoly on ultrapure dysprosium processing for AI chips—produced at a single Wuxi refinery—represents specification-grade control that takes years of iterative chemistry to replicate, not just emergency subsidies.
• Western industrial policy gaps, environmental regulations, and short-term ROI demands hollowed out U.S. separation and magnet capacity decades before Xi weaponized rare earths—a conclusion mainstream media largely avoids stating directly.

The New York Times published (opens in a new tab) a sweeping year-end investigation by Keith Bradsher on December 31, 2025, tracing China’s six-decade rise to rare-earth dominance—from Deng Xiaoping’s early interest in Baotou to Xi Jinping’s modern export controls. It is richly reported, historically grounded, and largely accurate. But for investors and policymakers in the rare-earth supply chain, the piece still understates the decisive factor: processing, not mining, is the true source of power.

The Long Game China Actually Played

The article correctly shows that China’s advantage was engineered, not accidental. Military funding, state planning, tolerance for pollution, and sustained investment in separation chemistry created a domestic ecosystem that others abandoned. The account of Xu Guangxian’s solvent-extraction breakthrough, later industrialized at scale, aligns with established technical history. Likewise, the Magnequench episode is accurately portrayed as a pivotal transfer of magnet-making know-how that the U.S. never replaced.

Where the Story Sharpens — and Where It Softens

The Times is right to frame rare earths as a geoeconomic weapon, especially after China’s 2010 Japan embargo and the 2025 dysprosium export halt. But it leans too heavily on headline concentration numbers (e.g., “90% control”) without separating ore, separation, metals, alloys, and magnets—each with different competitive realities. China does not “own” rare earths geologically; it owns the middle of the value chain, where capital intensity, tacit knowledge, and regulatory friction keep rivals out.

The Dysprosium Detail That Matters

The reporting on the Wuxi refinery—the world’s sole producer of ultrapure dysprosium for advanced AI chips—is the most important revelation. This is not about volume; it’s about specification-grade control. Investors should note: breakthroughs here take years of iterative chemistry, not emergency subsidies. When Beijing restricts exports or equipment, it is protecting process knowledge, not just the product.

What’s Implied, Not Said

The article gestures at Western neglect—closed programs, lost expertise—but stops short of the uncomfortable conclusion: industrial policy gaps, not Chinese malice, created today’s chokepoints. Environmental rules, short-term ROI demands, and offshoring hollowed out separation and magnet capacity long before Xi weaponized it. 

Why have elite media institutions given American political and corporate elites a pass over the past few decades?

Bottom Line for REEx Readers

The New York Times gets the history right and the warning mostly right. What it still underplays is that rare-earth leverage lives in processing mastery and human capital, not in mines. Why does mainstream media continue to parrot the same incomplete policy direction? Until the U.S. and its allies rebuild separation chemistry, metallization, and magnet ecosystems—at commercial scale—rare earths will remain strategic pressure points, not commodities.

Source: Bradsher, K. (2025). Inside China’s Six-Decade Campaign to Dominate Rare Earths. The New York Times.

©!-- /wp:paragraph -->

• The US has formed Pax Silica—a geopolitical coalition including Australia, Japan, South Korea, and others—to control mine-to-AI and mine-to-military supply chains of critical minerals, excluding Europe from this strategic bloc.
• Trump's administration is deploying state-directed industrial policies—guaranteed prices, public capital, fast-tracked permits—mirroring China's approach while Europe remains committed to slow, market-driven processes.
• Europe risks losing relevance in the AI and defense economy as it's caught between US and Chinese industrial statecraft, unable to compete with coordinated vertical supply chain control from mine to finished products.

The global battle for critical raw materials (CRMs) has entered a new and uncomfortable phase. According to Professor Peter Tom Jones (opens in a new tab), Director of the Institute for Sustainable Metals and Minerals at KU Leuven, the United States—under President Donald Trump—has quietly assembled what amounts to a new geopolitical bloc: a “Pax Silica” coalition designed to lock down mine-to-AI and mine-to-military supply chains in direct response to China’s dominance in critical minerals and technology export controls.

Rare Earth Exchanges™ has called for the need for multi-national collaboration, and previously reported on this Pax Silica alignment, which now includes the United States, Australia, Japan, South Korea, the Netherlands, Israel, the United Arab Emirates, Singapore, and the United Kingdom—a seemingly eclectic group unified by one strategic reality: control of the materials that power AI, semiconductors, surveillance systems, and advanced weapons platforms.

Europe, Jones argues bluntly via Belgium news VRT NWS (opens in a new tab),  is not part of this club. It is becoming collateral damage. Although Rare Earth Exchanges suggests Europe is about to become more aggressive.

From Green Transition to War Economy

The metals at stake are not abstract. They include gallium, germanium, indium, rare earth elements used in precision magnets, and lithium—materials Europe once hoped to prioritize for electric vehicles, renewables, and clean energy systems.

That vision is being displaced.

“Trump is not interested in rare earths for electric cars,” Jones explains. “He needs them for F-35s, missiles, and AI-driven military systems.”

In other words, Europe’s green-transition mineral strategy is being hijacked by a U.S. security-first industrial policy, while China continues to weaponize its own dominance through export restrictions and price discipline.

The result: Europe is squeezed between two state-directed superpowers playing a game it refuses to acknowledge.

Trump the “Resource Marxist”

Jones’ most provocative claim has drawn attention across Europe: Trump, on critical minerals, is behaving like a Marxist.

Not rhetorically—but structurally.

The U.S. is now:

• Directing supply chains from the state, at least in some ways.
• Guaranteeing minimum prices far above market levels, for at least some companies.
• Semi-nationalizing strategic firms (well, at least taking minority equity interests in select companies).
• Flooding projects with public capital, much of it requiring matching loans
• Fast-tracking permits and overruling local resistance

These are precisely the tools Europe criticizes in China—yet Washington is now deploying them unapologetically.

Europe, by contrast, remains committed to open markets, slow permitting, fragmented governance, and legalistic process. The asymmetry is fatal.

Football vs. Karate Rules

Jones’ metaphor is devastatingly accurate:

Europe is playing football. The U.S. and China are playing rugby and karate—on the same field.

The EU has no shortage of strategies—RESourceEU, Critical Raw Materials Acts, recycling mandates, diversification agreements with Canada, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Australia. On paper, Europe understands the problem.

In practice:

• Mining permits take years or decades
• Refining capacity is stalled by energy prices and regulation
• Recycling projects face local opposition and legal paralysis
• Capital deployment is slow, cautious, and fragmented
• Member states operate in isolated silos

Meanwhile,  China, and increasing at least partially the U.S,  coordinate vertically—from mine to magnet to missile—with speed Europe cannot match.

Europe’s Structural Handicap

Professor Jones does not sugarcoat Europe’s position:

• Limited financial firepower
• High energy costs
• Slow and contested permitting
• Weak central coordination
• Ideological attachment to market purity

This is not moral failure—it is strategic naïveté.

By refusing to choose between industrial sovereignty and procedural orthodoxy, Europe risks losing both.

Rare Earth Exchanges™ Perspective

Rare Earth Exchanges™ has consistently warned that processing—not mining—decides power in the rare earth economy. Pax Silica is proof.

This is not just about materials. It is about:

• Who controls AI
• Who controls military supply chains
• Who sets prices
• Who absorbs risk
• Who moves first

Trump’s America has decided. China decided years ago.

Europe is still drafting frameworks.

Final Takeaway

Pax Silica is not an alliance of values. It is an alliance of materials, machines, and military logic.

If Europe continues to insist on playing by yesterday’s rules in a world governed by industrial statecraft, it will not just lose the critical minerals race—it will lose relevance in the AI and defense economy that defines the next half-century.

Rare Earth Exchanges™ will continue to track who controls the real choke points—and who is left watching from the sidelines.

Rare Earth Exchanges™ – Independent intelligence on critical minerals, geopolitics, and industrial power.

• The Trump administration is preparing to sign Pax Silica, a coalition framework with Singapore, Australia, Japan, South Korea, and Israel to counter China's 85-90% control of rare earth processing and advanced technology supply chains.
• The declaration correctly identifies processing, separation, and magnet-making as critical choke points—not just mining—recognizing that minerals, manufacturing, and compute power are inseparable in the AI era.
• While the strategic framing marks a shift toward treating rare earths as economic security infrastructure, success depends on binding funding mechanisms and offtake guarantees rather than summit diplomacy alone.

According to Politico, the Trump administration is preparing to sign the Pax Silica declaration, a new coalition framework aimed at countering China’s dominance across rare earths, critical minerals, and advanced technologies. The initial participants—Singapore, Australia, Japan, South Korea, and Israel—are not accidental. They sit at key junctions of processing, manufacturing, defense technology, and logistics. The ambition is large: to do for the AI era what the G7 once did for industrial capitalism.

Rare Earth Exchanges™ has been writing that tight international alliances are of paramount importance.

On paper, the declaration frames rare earth access and technology security as inseparable. That diagnosis is correct. Rare earth elements underpin magnets, sensors, power electronics, and defense systems that enable AI hardware, robotics, and quantum-adjacent technologies. In that sense, Pax Silica reflects a more mature understanding of how minerals, manufacturing, and compute power intersect.

What Rings True—and Why It Matters

The administration’s concern about China’s near-monopoly is not rhetorical. China still controls roughly 85–90% of rare earth separation, dominates downstream magnet production, and has repeatedly demonstrated its willingness to use export controls as leverage. Australia and Japan already have real rare earth and magnet exposure; South Korea and Singapore anchor advanced manufacturing and trade; Israel brings dual-use tech depth. This is a rational starting set.

Equally accurate is the focus on processing and logistics, not just mining. Any coalition that ignores separation, alloying, and magnet-making is theater. Pax Silica, at least rhetorically, acknowledges the choke points that matter.

Where the Language Runs Ahead of Reality

Calling this “a game-changer” deserves scrutiny. Declarations do not build separation plants. Export-control alignment does not create a heavy rare-earth supply. And blocking China’s Belt and Road via coordinated investment screening is far easier said than executed—especially when several signatories maintain deep commercial ties with Beijing.

There is also an embedded optimism that AI-era cooperation will naturally cohere. History suggests otherwise. The West has struggled to align timelines, capital discipline, and permitting even within its own borders. Without binding funding mechanisms and long-term offtake guarantees, Pax Silica risks becoming a policy signaling exercise, not an industrial one.

The Signal Beneath the Summit

Still, this matters. What’s notable is not the rhetoric—it’s the shift in framing. Rare earths are no longer treated as a mining problem but as an economic security system. If Pax Silica evolves from summit diplomacy into contract-backed infrastructure, it could mark a genuine inflection point. If not, China’s advantage remains intact—quietly, efficiently, and undeterred.

© 2025 Rare Earth Exchanges™ – Accelerating Transparency, Accuracy, and Insight Across the Rare Earth & Critical Minerals Supply Chain.

• China is building strategic dominance through rare earth R&D and patents in:
  • Recycling
  • Solid-state batteries
  • Advanced solar
  • Thermoelectrics
  • Quantum materials
• Breakthrough research includes:
  • Magnetic zeolite 'sponges' that recycle magnet waste into high-grade feedstock
  • Lanthanum-based solid-state battery electrolytes
  • Samarium-doped perovskite solar cells hitting 24.66% efficiency
• Even if the West funds new mines, owning the upstream IP for enabling chemistry and manufacturing processes keeps strategic dependency firmly in China's control.

China is quietly wiring the future of rare earths not just through mines and refineries, but through R&D and patents. The Shanghai Rare Earth Association continues to spotlight (opens in a new tab) clusters of ACS-published studies that show where Beijing thinks the next decade of value will be created: recycling, solid-state batteries, advanced solar, thermoelectrics, and quantum materials. For Rare Earth Exchanges readers, this could represent a roadmap for tomorrow’s demand—and tomorrow’s dependency.

Researchers first report a magnetic zeolite “sponge” built entirely from waste: Bayan Obo tailings and coal gangue. By tuning roasting and hydrothermal conditions, theysynthesize NaA zeolite that selectively pulls neodymium and praseodymiumout of Nd–Fe–B electroplating wastewater. The material hits saturated loadings of 350 mg/g (Nd³⁺) and 156 mg/g (Pr³⁺), maintains over 89% efficiency after five cycles, and preferentially adsorbs REEs over toxic Cr³⁺. In plain English: China is learning to turn magnet-plant effluent and mine waste into a high-grade secondary rare earth feedstock—closing the loop and lowering its marginal cost of magnet supply.

A second paper drills into lanthanum oxychloride (LaOCl) solid solutions as halide-ion conductors for next-generation solid-state batteries. By engineering chloride vacancies and using X-ray excited optical luminescence as a defect “radar,” the team ties vacancy concentration directly to anion conductivity, achieving on the order of 10⁻⁵ S/cm at 300 °C. The work doesn’t just produce a promising ceramic electrolyte candidate—it delivers a powerful diagnostic toolkit for defect tuning in rare-earth-based energymaterials.

On the energy-conversion front, Chinese researchers demonstrate samarium-doped hybrid perovskite solar cells where Sm³⁺ partially substitutes Pb²⁺. At around 5% Sm³⁺, devices hit 24.66% power-conversion efficiency and retain ≥90% of that output after 1,000 hours in humid air, unencapsulated. That’s a serious push toward bankable perovskites built on lanthanide chemistry—linking rare earths not just to EV motors, but to rooftop and utility-scale solar.

Finally, two structure–property studies push rare earths into the thermoelectric and quantum materials arena.

In AgErTe₂, researchers show a perfectly ordered crystal with glass-like ultralow thermal conductivity, driven by hidden local distortions, Ag off-centering, and “rattling” phonon modes—a blueprint for rare-earth thermoelectrics and thermal-barrier coatings without alloying. In Cu-intercalated CuYbSe₂, they track a temperature-driven structural transition near 258 K with Cu-vacancy ordering and a frustrated triangular rare-earth lattice, a platform for exotic magnetism and unconventional transport.

Why does REEx track this? Because this is how China seeks to own the upstream IP behind magnet recycling, solid-state batteries, high-efficiency solar, heat-management materials, and quantum devices. Mines can be funded in the West—but if the enabling chemistry and patents sit in Shanghai and Baotou, strategic dependency simply moves one rung down the value chain.

Disclaimer: This news originates from media linked to Chinese state-owned or state-affiliated entities. All information should be independently verified.

© 2025 Rare Earth Exchanges™ – Accelerating Transparency, Accuracy, and Insight Across the Rare Earth & Critical Minerals Supply Chain.

• China is building strategic dominance through rare earth R&D and patents in:
  • Recycling
  • Solid-state batteries
  • Advanced solar
  • Thermoelectrics
  • Quantum materials
• Breakthrough research includes:
  • Magnetic zeolite 'sponges' that recycle magnet waste into high-grade feedstock
  • Lanthanum-based solid-state battery electrolytes
  • Samarium-doped perovskite solar cells hitting 24.66% efficiency
• Even if the West funds new mines, owning the upstream IP for enabling chemistry and manufacturing processes keeps strategic dependency firmly in China's control.

China is quietly wiring the future of rare earths not just through mines and refineries, but through R&D and patents. The Shanghai Rare Earth Association continues to spotlight (opens in a new tab) clusters of ACS-published studies that show where Beijing thinks the next decade of value will be created: recycling, solid-state batteries, advanced solar, thermoelectrics, and quantum materials. For Rare Earth Exchanges readers, this could represent a roadmap for tomorrow’s demand—and tomorrow’s dependency.

Researchers first report a magnetic zeolite “sponge” built entirely from waste: Bayan Obo tailings and coal gangue. By tuning roasting and hydrothermal conditions, theysynthesize NaA zeolite that selectively pulls neodymium and praseodymiumout of Nd–Fe–B electroplating wastewater. The material hits saturated loadings of 350 mg/g (Nd³⁺) and 156 mg/g (Pr³⁺), maintains over 89% efficiency after five cycles, and preferentially adsorbs REEs over toxic Cr³⁺. In plain English: China is learning to turn magnet-plant effluent and mine waste into a high-grade secondary rare earth feedstock—closing the loop and lowering its marginal cost of magnet supply.

A second paper drills into lanthanum oxychloride (LaOCl) solid solutions as halide-ion conductors for next-generation solid-state batteries. By engineering chloride vacancies and using X-ray excited optical luminescence as a defect “radar,” the team ties vacancy concentration directly to anion conductivity, achieving on the order of 10⁻⁵ S/cm at 300 °C. The work doesn’t just produce a promising ceramic electrolyte candidate—it delivers a powerful diagnostic toolkit for defect tuning in rare-earth-based energymaterials.

On the energy-conversion front, Chinese researchers demonstrate samarium-doped hybrid perovskite solar cells where Sm³⁺ partially substitutes Pb²⁺. At around 5% Sm³⁺, devices hit 24.66% power-conversion efficiency and retain ≥90% of that output after 1,000 hours in humid air, unencapsulated. That’s a serious push toward bankable perovskites built on lanthanide chemistry—linking rare earths not just to EV motors, but to rooftop and utility-scale solar.

Finally, two structure–property studies push rare earths into the thermoelectric and quantum materials arena.

In AgErTe₂, researchers show a perfectly ordered crystal with glass-like ultralow thermal conductivity, driven by hidden local distortions, Ag off-centering, and “rattling” phonon modes—a blueprint for rare-earth thermoelectrics and thermal-barrier coatings without alloying. In Cu-intercalated CuYbSe₂, they track a temperature-driven structural transition near 258 K with Cu-vacancy ordering and a frustrated triangular rare-earth lattice, a platform for exotic magnetism and unconventional transport.

Why does REEx track this? Because this is how China seeks to own the upstream IP behind magnet recycling, solid-state batteries, high-efficiency solar, heat-management materials, and quantum devices. Mines can be funded in the West—but if the enabling chemistry and patents sit in Shanghai and Baotou, strategic dependency simply moves one rung down the value chain.

Disclaimer: This news originates from media linked to Chinese state-owned or state-affiliated entities. All information should be independently verified.

© 2025 Rare Earth Exchanges™ – Accelerating Transparency, Accuracy, and Insight Across the Rare Earth & Critical Minerals Supply Chain.

• China inducted 195 new academicians into CAS and CAE to serve national strategic needs and advance technological self-reliance in AI, quantum, and advanced materials.
• Quantum physicist Peng Chengzhi and rare earth expert Li Jun pledged to align research with China's urgent priorities, emphasizing rare earth processing dominance and industrial application.
• The selection signals China's whole-of-nation approach to compete globally in quantum computing, semiconductors, and critical minerals supply chains.

China inducted 195 new academicians into its two most influential scientific bodies—the Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS) and the Chinese Academy of Engineering (CAE)—with a clear public message: scientific research must directly serve national strategic needs and accelerate China’s technological self-reliance.

At a ceremony in Beijing, CAS President Hou Jianguo told new members that the title is “a mission, not just an honor,” and urged them to help China achieve high-level independence in science and technology—language that aligns with Beijing’s push to reduce dependence on Western tech and strengthen its domestic innovation ecosystem.

CAE President Li Xiaohong emphasized that this year’s selection prioritized scientists who support China’s strategic goals, especially the development of what Beijing calls “new quality productive forces”—the country’s umbrella term for advanced sectors such as AI, quantum, new energy, advanced materials, and next-generation manufacturing.

One of the more notable voices was Peng Chengzhi, a CAS academician specializing in quantum physics and quantum information. He framed the appointment as “a national trust,” promising to align his research with China’s most urgent strategic needs—an important signal as China races the U.S. and EU for leadership in quantum computing, secure communication, and advanced sensing.

But the strongest geopolitical signal came from Li Jun, a CAS academician and chemistry professor at Tsinghua University. He described rare earth elements as the “vitamins of industry”, essential to renewable energy, aerospace, and semiconductor sectors. Li called for turning China’s rare earth resource advantage into “industrial technological prowess,” urging theoretical scientists to solve real industrial bottlenecks. This mirrors Beijing’s long-running strategy: not just mining rare earths, but dominating the value-added steps—processing, alloys, magnets, and applications that anchor global supply chains.

Hu Hailan, a leading neuroscientist at Zhejiang University, highlighted the human-centric mission of life sciences, while industry technologist Huang Xianbo (Kingfa) stressed the need to commercialize scientific breakthroughs more quickly—an area where China aims to close the gap with the U.S. and Europe.

In total, CAS and CAE added 144 new Chinese members and 51 international members, a significant expansion of China’s elite scientific corps. For Western observers, this cohort’s explicit alignment with national strategic priorities reinforces China’s whole-of-nation approach to competing in quantum, semiconductors, advanced materials, and rare earth applications.

Disclaimer

This news item is translated from Chinese state-owned media (China Daily (opens in a new tab)). All information should be independently verified.

© 2025 Rare Earth Exchanges™ – Accelerating Transparency, Accuracy, and Insight Across the Rare Earth & Critical Minerals Supply Chain.

• China inducted 195 new academicians into CAS and CAE to serve national strategic needs and advance technological self-reliance in AI, quantum, and advanced materials.
• Quantum physicist Peng Chengzhi and rare earth expert Li Jun pledged to align research with China's urgent priorities, emphasizing rare earth processing dominance and industrial application.
• The selection signals China's whole-of-nation approach to compete globally in quantum computing, semiconductors, and critical minerals supply chains.

China inducted 195 new academicians into its two most influential scientific bodies—the Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS) and the Chinese Academy of Engineering (CAE)—with a clear public message: scientific research must directly serve national strategic needs and accelerate China’s technological self-reliance.

At a ceremony in Beijing, CAS President Hou Jianguo told new members that the title is “a mission, not just an honor,” and urged them to help China achieve high-level independence in science and technology—language that aligns with Beijing’s push to reduce dependence on Western tech and strengthen its domestic innovation ecosystem.

CAE President Li Xiaohong emphasized that this year’s selection prioritized scientists who support China’s strategic goals, especially the development of what Beijing calls “new quality productive forces”—the country’s umbrella term for advanced sectors such as AI, quantum, new energy, advanced materials, and next-generation manufacturing.

One of the more notable voices was Peng Chengzhi, a CAS academician specializing in quantum physics and quantum information. He framed the appointment as “a national trust,” promising to align his research with China’s most urgent strategic needs—an important signal as China races the U.S. and EU for leadership in quantum computing, secure communication, and advanced sensing.

But the strongest geopolitical signal came from Li Jun, a CAS academician and chemistry professor at Tsinghua University. He described rare earth elements as the “vitamins of industry”, essential to renewable energy, aerospace, and semiconductor sectors. Li called for turning China’s rare earth resource advantage into “industrial technological prowess,” urging theoretical scientists to solve real industrial bottlenecks. This mirrors Beijing’s long-running strategy: not just mining rare earths, but dominating the value-added steps—processing, alloys, magnets, and applications that anchor global supply chains.

Hu Hailan, a leading neuroscientist at Zhejiang University, highlighted the human-centric mission of life sciences, while industry technologist Huang Xianbo (Kingfa) stressed the need to commercialize scientific breakthroughs more quickly—an area where China aims to close the gap with the U.S. and Europe.

In total, CAS and CAE added 144 new Chinese members and 51 international members, a significant expansion of China’s elite scientific corps. For Western observers, this cohort’s explicit alignment with national strategic priorities reinforces China’s whole-of-nation approach to competing in quantum, semiconductors, advanced materials, and rare earth applications.

Disclaimer

This news item is translated from Chinese state-owned media (China Daily (opens in a new tab)). All information should be independently verified.

© 2025 Rare Earth Exchanges™ – Accelerating Transparency, Accuracy, and Insight Across the Rare Earth & Critical Minerals Supply Chain.

• Nvidia's $4.5 trillion valuation and 160% annual growth faces skepticism from Michael Burry ($1.1B in puts) and SoftBank's $5.8B exit, signaling potential AI bubble concerns.
• Over $5 trillion in AI infrastructure spending is being financed through bonds, REITs, and structured products, creating systemic risk if demand or execution falters.
• Critical minerals investors should respect bubble risk while focusing on structural demand—AI corrections create temporary air pockets, but electrification and digitalization megatrends remain intact.

Call it whatever suits your temperament—the AI revolution, a productivity supercycle, or just a very shiny, very modern bubble—but the numbers have stopped whispering and started shouting. Nvidia’s market cap now sits around $4.5 trillion, making it not just the most valuable company on Earth but a financial object comparable in size to entire national stock markets. Its three-year average market-cap growth rate—about 160% a year—belongs more to myth than to mature equity markets.

Meanwhile, the skeptics are no longer anonymous Twitter eggs.

Michael “Big Short” Burry’s Scion Asset Management disclosed roughly $1.1 billion in put options tied to Nvidia and Palantir—about $912 million notional against Palantir and $187 million against Nvidia—directly targeting the AI leaders he believes are priced for disappointment. Shortly thereafter, Burry deregistered his fund altogether, effectively slamming the door behindhis warning.

On the other side of the Pacific, SoftBank has sold its entire Nvidia stake for about $5.8 billion, not because Masayoshi Son lost faith in AI, but because he wants even more exposure—plowing capital into OpenAI and other AI platforms instead.  It’s the kind of move that can be read in two ways: savvy capital rotation inside a genuine boom… or a sign that the smartest players believe Nvidia itself is now the air at the top of the souffle, not the batter.

Debt, Data Centers, and the AI Carry Trade

Beneath the stock charts, the AI build-out is very real—and very expensive. JPMorgan’s latest deep dive estimates over $5 trillion will be spent on global data centers, AI hardware, and associated power infrastructure over the next five years, with as much as $1.5 trillion needing to come from investment-grade bond markets alone.

That wall of money is already reshaping credit. Recent reporting via Data Center Dynamics (opens in a new tab) and others reveal that U.S. AI/data-center–linked investment-grade issuance has surged, with roughly $75 billion of deals in just two months—about 5% of all U.S. IG issuance for 2025.

Asset-backed securities tied to data-center leases and digital infrastructure are proliferating. Private credit funds are being pitched as bespoke financiers to hyperscalers. The AI story is no longer just about overheated equities; it is woven into bond indices, structured products, REITs, utilities, and even sovereign power-investment plans.

Burry’s underlying fear—echoed quietly by more sober analysts—is straightforward: AI chips and data centers depreciate at warp speed. If end-demand, power capacity, or regulatory tolerance underwhelm the narrative, you’re left with trillions in sunk capex funded with long-dated debt and only PowerPoint slides to show for it.

Bubble Talk vs. Boring Reality

Some of the online commentary around AI—Nvidia “devouring the U.S. economy,” imminent systemic collapse—is clearly overcooked and should be received with skepticism. Nvidia is not literally consuming entire sectors, but it is priced for near-perfect execution: relentless revenue growth, sustained pricing power, and no serious competitive or regulatory shock.

Likewise, it’s not true as some anti-U.S. promoters (opens in a new tab) allege that AI-related bond issuance suddenly erupted to $130 billion in a matter of weeks; the actual figures are lower and more nuanced. But the direction of travel is not in dispute—AI infrastructure is being financed through every available channel, and the bill is large enough to leave a mark if expectations crack.

The uncomfortable, less viral truth looks like this:

• AI is not a fad. It is already changing code, chip design, logistics, and white-collar workflows.
• But that does not guarantee today’s winners deserve their current valuations, or that today’s capex pace is sustainable. Markets can overpay for real revolutions; ask anyone who bought fiber-optic stocks in 1999.

Defense, Not Drama: How to Invest When Everything Screams “AI”

This is where Rare Earth Exchanges plants a flag: ignore the YouTube apocalypse thumbnails and focus on positioning instead of prophecy.

First, separate the AI theme from the AI tickers. Nvidia, the hyperscalers, and a handful of glamour names may be priced as if every scenario is up-and-to-the-right forever. But the AI ecosystem is wider: power infrastructure, copper, rare-earth permanent magnets, grid hardware, cooling systems, and industrial software are all essential and often trade on more pedestrian multiples. The narrative premium is not evenly distributed.

Second, watch the credit plumbing. When credit spreads for heavy AI spenders widen, or when data-center REITs and utilities start to pay more to roll their debt, that’s the market whispering that the AI carry trade is getting crowded. Equity often listens late; bond investors are the nervous canaries.

Third, demand cash flow, not just “total addressable market” poetry. For AI-exposed names—whether chipmakers, data-center landlords, or software platforms—look at free cash flow after capex. Ask the brutal question: If they were forced to stop building tomorrow, would this still be a good business or just a half-finished monument to hype?

Finally, size positions as if the bubble might burst. Keep AI high-beta stocks as part of a diversified portfolio, not its spine. If you need leverage to make the trade “work,” you’re probably already too close to the edge.

Where Rare Earth and Critical Mineral Investors Actually Fit

For Rare Earth Exchanges readers, there’s an extra layer. AI is hardware and power-hungry. It pulls directly on NdPr magnets, Dy/Tb for high-temperature motors, copper for transmission, high-grade steel, and advanced semiconductor supply chains. A sharp AI correction could trigger a temporary demand air pocket, pressuring some producers. But the structural megatrends—electrification, automation, and digital infrastructure—do not vanish with a lower Nvidia P/E.

That means: don’t chase anything with “AI” in the ticker at any price—but also don’t confuse a correction in AI equities with the death of long-term demand for critical minerals. Focus on well-capitalized, technically credible projects and midstream refiners that can survive a cyclical wobble in data-center capex and still be standing when the next, more rational phase of the AI build-out begins.

In other words: respect the bubble risk, harvest the structural trend, and insist on balance sheets that can outlive the hype cycle.

© 2025 Rare Earth Exchanges™ – Accelerating Transparency, Accuracy, and Insight Across the Rare Earth & Critical Minerals Supply Chain.

• Thai King's Beijing visit showcased China's immersive developmental approach—EVs, AI, rail, and smart farming—masking deeper integration into Chinese-controlled critical mineral and technology supply chains.
• China's charm offensive contrasts sharply with U.S. transactional strategy: while Washington secures MoUs preventing export bans, Beijing offers infrastructure, technology stacks, and long-term market demand.
• China Daily's narrative celebrates bilateral cooperation without addressing technology dependence, data governance risks, or China's rare earth dominance underpinning these 'future industries.'

How about soft power plus hard metals? Recently, Thai King Vajiralongkorn visited Beijing, according to state media (opens in a new tab) China Daily, representing a warmwatercolor of “one family” ties: polar science, smart farming, AI, high-speed rail, EVs, and youth exchanges. It is classic Chinese soft-power storytelling—culture, cooperation, and climate, not cobalt, copper, or rare earths.

But under the diplomatic poetry sits an unmistakable industrial agenda. EVs, AI, satellites, and high-speed rail all consume NdPr magnets, battery metals, sensors, and advanced semiconductors. Deepening China–Thailand integration in these sectors almost certainly implies tighter anchoring of Thai industry to Chinese-controlled supply chains for critical minerals and technology.

Two Playbooks in ASEAN: Charm vs. Contracts

Contrast this with Donald Trump’s recent ASEAN swing, where Washington inked MoUs and trade pledges with Malaysia, Thailand, Japan, and others to diversify critical mineral supply chains away from China. Malaysia, for example, agreed not to ban or impose quotas on exports of critical minerals and rare earth magnets to the U.S., even as it maintains a ban on raw rare earth exports and courts Chinese refinery investment.

The U.S. approach is transactional and defensive: lock in supply, prevent future export controls, and create tariff-mediated incentives. China’s approach, on full display in the China Daily account, is immersive and developmental: railways, AI labs, space projects, smart tractors, and consumer brands like Red Bull’s TCP leaning into “certainty” in China’s market. One offers contracts and tariffs; the other offers infrastructure, technology stacks, and long-term demand.  What’s going to be taken more seriously?

Where the Story Rings True—and Where It Glows

First, what’s credible. China is Thailand’s largest trading partner and top market for Thai agricultural exports; bilateral trade of nearly $114 billion is plausible and directionally consistent with other sources. Chinese EV and tech firms (BYD, Great Wall, Huawei, Xiaomi) really are expanding aggressively into Thailand’s consumer and industrial sectors.

Omitted intentionally or not was the lack of mention of technology dependence, data governance, or strategic leverage that may follow deep integration in AI, rail, and EV supply chains.  Plus, no discussion of how China’s rare-earth dominance underpins many of these “future industries,” or of ASEAN hedging with new U.S. and Japanese critical-minerals deals.

While the China Daily piece is not misinformation, it is a one-sided narrative—a celebration without risk analysis.

Disclaimer: China Daily is an English-language newspaper owned by the Chinese Communist Party, and is widely regarded as a state propaganda outlet; all claims require independent, third-party verification.

© 2025 Rare Earth Exchanges™ –Accelerating Transparency, Accuracy, and Insight Across the RareEarth & Critical Minerals Supply Chain.