• China's combined wind and solar installed capacity is projected to exceed 1.8 TW by the end of 2025.
• Renewables are expected to represent 47.3% of the total capacity, surpassing thermal power by approximately 300 GW.
• Solar accounts for 30.8% of the installed capacity, but its actual electricity generation share is lower (~14%) due to intermittency and capacity factors.
• China's massive renewable deployment creates competitive advantages through:
  • Lower costs
  • Industrial learning
  • Supplier clustering
  • Export potential for manufacturers

China’s renewable buildout hit another milestone (opens in a new tab): combined wind and solar installed capacity exceeded 1.8 terawatts (1,840 GW) for the first time, according to China’s National Energy Administration and reporting by People’s Daily. By end-2025, China’s total installed generation capacity reached 3.89 TW (+16.1% YoY), with solar at 1.20 TW (+35.4%) and wind at 0.64 TW (+22.9%). Wind+solar now represent 47.3% of installed capacity, and the report says they exceed thermal capacity by roughly 300 GW—a symbolic threshold, even if it does not translate one-for-one into electricity output.

Solar’s Real Share of “Powering China”

Installed capacity is not the same as electricity produced. Solar’s capacity share is about 30.8% (1.20/3.89), but solar’s generation share is materially lower because sunlight is intermittent and capacity factors are lower than those of dispatchable plants.

Independent generation datasets suggest solar’s share of electricity has nonetheless surged—Ember analysis indicates solar reached roughly 14% of China’s electricity mix in June 2025, and wind+solar hit record monthly levels.

Why This Could Become a Competitive Advantage

Scale becomes an advantage when it turns into lower unit costs, faster iteration, and industrial learning. China’s massive deployment fuels demand for turbines, inverters, grid equipment, storage, and upstream inputs—including rare earth permanent magnets used in many wind turbines.

Over time, this can produce compounding benefits: denser supplier clusters, more standardized components, greater EPC experience, and a larger home market that absorbs early production runs. That “learning laboratory” effect can eventually translate into cheaper, faster, more bankable projects—and a tougher competitive environment for Western manufacturers, developers, and even grid technology vendors.

Disclaimer: This news item originates from People’s Daily, a Chinese state-affiliated outlet. Figures and framing should be verified independently and interpreted alongside power-generation data, grid integration, curtailment, and regional dispatch realities.

• The European Union proposes a Strategic Partnership Roadmap with the U.S. on critical minerals.
• The aim is to reduce dependence on Chinese supply through:
  • Joint sourcing
  • Price-support mechanisms
  • Coordinated trade tools
  • Shared stockpiling within three months
• This proposal addresses market design by focusing on:
  • Pricing mechanisms
  • Premium markets
  • Standards-based trade
• The recognition that rare earth bottlenecks exist in processing, refining, and qualification rather than extraction alone.
• Success depends on whether diplomatic coordination leads to actual midstream refining capacity and bankable offtakes.
• Emphasis on avoiding mere memoranda, stockpiles, or price floors that don't create processing infrastructure.

Is the European Union proposing a critical minerals partnership with the United States, separating credible policy advances from familiar diplomatic optimism? What’s new here? What’s recycled, and why midstream realities—not memoranda—will decide whether this effort alters rare earth supply chains.  Rare Earth Exchanges™ reports that the European Union will likely pitch the U.S. on a new critical minerals partnership aimed at reducing dependence on Chinese supply. What will be inherent in such a deal? Joint sourcing?  Price support? Stockpiles? And what about shared rules? It sounds ambitious—but similar efforts have failed before. Whether this one matters depends on execution, not potential headlines in the days to come.

What’s Actually on the Table

According to officials familiar with the talks, the European Union is ready to sign a memorandum of understanding with the United States to develop a “Strategic Partnership Roadmap” on critical minerals within three months. Negotiators hope to conclude talks within 30 days, alongside a broader U.S.-led push with allied nations. Rare Earth Exchanges has repeatedly reported that traditional allies of “the West” would need to form tight alliances to overcome China’s predominance in the supply chain.

As cited in The Japan Times (opens in a new tab) a potential proposal could include joint sourcing projects, price-support mechanisms, coordinated trade tools (such as price floors and offtake agreements), shared stockpiling, and exemptions from each other’s export controls. It also calls for coordinated responses to market manipulation and oversupply—code words for shielding Western producers from cheaper Chinese material.

What’s New—and What Isn’t

The novelty lies less in intent than in scope. Previous efforts focused on mining. This proposal gestures toward market design—pricing mechanisms, premium markets, and standards-based trade. That’s directionally correct: rare earth bottlenecks live in processing, refining, and qualification, not just extraction.

What’s familiar is the optimism. Multiple U.S. administrations and EU initiatives have promised diversification “within months,” only to collide with permitting delays, capital costs, and Chinese midstream dominance. Officials themselves acknowledge skepticism that a substantive deal can be finalized quickly.

The Political Subtext Investors Shouldn’t Miss

The memorandum reportedly includes language on respecting territorial integrity—an unusual insertion linked to recent tensions after President Trump floated the idea of acquiring Greenland, a territory of the EU member state Denmark. This highlights a recurring challenge: mineral diplomacy is now inseparable from geopolitics.

Meanwhile, Washington’s launch of a $12 billion critical-mineral stockpile echoes the EU's interest in buffering against supply shocks. Stockpiles can buy time—but they do not create refining capacity.

Why This Matters for Rare Earth Supply Chains

The proposal correctly identifies the problem—dependence on Chinese material—but risks repeating an old mistake: treating coordination as capacity. Without aligned standards, shared qualifications, bankable offtakes, and real midstream investment, price floors and memoranda won’t move molecules.

REEx Takeaway: This effort shows smarter thinking—markets, not mines—but success hinges on whether rules translate into refineries. We’ll learn more this week.

• China installed a 20-MW offshore wind turbine in Fujian—the largest in real marine conditions—with fully domestic components, proprietary blade designs, and 20%+ weight reduction that lowers foundation costs.
• Advanced AI-driven forecasting and failure prediction by companies like Envision Energy deliver ~8% higher generation and 20%+ better wind-farm economics across harsh environments.
• Despite leading global wind deployment, China's electricity mix remains ~60% coal-dependent, giving it strategic control over clean-energy manufacturing and rare-earth magnets while maintaining thermal baseload.

China is signaling a new phase in wind power: bigger offshore machines, deeper domestic sourcing, and more AI-driven reliability. A Feb. 3, 2026 report carried by the China Rare Earth Industry Association from People's Daily highlights the installation of a 20-MW offshore turbine in Fujian, described as the largest single unit yet installed in real marine conditions. The report says key components are fully domestically sourced, blades use proprietary airfoil designs, and lightweight engineering cuts per-MW weight by over 20%, lowering installation difficulty and foundation costs—claims that underscore China’s push to industrialize the entire clean-energy stack.

Bigger Turbines, Smarter Software

Beyond size, the article emphasizes “smart and reliable” wind across the lifecycle. It cites carbon-fiber blade progress and highlights Envision Energy using weather/energy models to improve forecasting and predict failures earlier—reported gains include ~8% higher generation and 20%+ better wind-farm economics. It also points to expansion into harsh environments: high-altitude Tibet, floating offshore platforms, and wind-to-hydrogen/ammonia/methanol integration. These are meaningful signals of China’s scale advantage and its ability to blend manufacturing with digital operations.

Reality Check: China’s Power Still Leans Heavily on Coal

Investors should keep the energy denominator in view. In China’s electricity mix, coal still supplies about ~60% of generation, while renewables are roughly ~35%, with nuclear and natural gas playing smaller roles; oil is negligible in power generation. In other words, China can lead the world in wind and remain coal-anchored—because grid stability, industrial demand, and provincial energy security still favor thermal baseload. Recent reporting also notes that “thermal power” (mostly coal) only began showing signs of annual decline in 2025, underscoring how gradual the transition remains.

Why This Matters for the West

Wind is not just “green power.” It is a rare-earth magnet and advanced materials industry wearing a climate badge. China’s edge comes from combining turbine scale, domestic supply, AI optimization, and downstream manufacturing muscle—advantages that compound even when coal remains dominant. For the U.S. and allies, the strategic risk is clear: China can decarbonize selectively while still controlling the industrial inputs—especially magnets—that the West needs for electrification and defense.

Disclosure & Verification Notice: This item is translated and summarized from Chinese state-owned media (People’s Daily) distributed via an industry association. Performance and market-share claims should be independently verified and may reflect industrial-policy messaging.

• Europe is 100% dependent on China for heavy REEs (dysprosium, terbium) critical for EV motors and wind turbines.
• Major deposits in Sweden, Norway, and Greenland could transform this dependency if developed:
  • Sweden: Norra Kärr, Per Geijer
  • Norway: Fen Complex with 8.8M tonnes REO
  • Greenland: Kvanefjeld, Tanbreez
• Sweden's Norra Kärr contains 51% heavy REEs and could become Europe's first heavy rare earth mine.
• Norway's Fen Complex—Europe's largest REE deposit at 559M tonnes—could supply 20-30% of EU demand by 2030-2035 if permitting advances.
• Economic viability faces challenges:
  • 10-15 year permitting timelines
  • Complex metallurgy
  • Environmental concerns over radioactive by-products
  • High capital costs
• EU policy initiatives and the Critical Raw Materials Act aim to fast-track strategic projects.

Europe is heavily dependent on imports for rare earth elements (REEs) – especially the heavy REEs like dysprosium (Dy), terbium (Tb), europium (Eu), and yttrium (Y) that are critical for high-strength magnets and other advanced technologies. At present, China supplies essentially 100% of the EU’s heavy REE needs, reflecting a major supply risk. Despite rising demand for EV motors, wind turbines, and electronics, there is currently no commercial rare earth mining in Europe. However, geological surveys have identified a number of REE-rich deposits across Europe. Many of these contain significant heavy REE enrichment, offering potential to diversify supply. Below we review the major known heavy rare earth deposits in Europe – focusing on their geology, locations, and what is known about their economic viability, mining status, and production potential.

Sweden: Kiruna’s Per Geijer Deposit

One of the most significant recent discoveries is the Per Geijer deposit (opens in a new tab) near Kiruna in northern Sweden. State-owned miner LKAB (opens in a new tab) announced in 2023 that exploration at Kiruna identified over 1 million tonnes of rare earth oxides (REO) in the Per Geijer orebody. Geologically, this deposit is unusual – the REEs occur in apatite (phosphate mineral) associated with Kiruna-type iron oxide ore. The apatite hosts high concentrations of REEs (locally reaching weight-percent levels) along with secondary minerals like monazite and allanite. While the REE mix skews toward light elements (such as neodymium and praseodymium needed for magnets), the deposit still contains notable heavy REEs as by-products. LKAB estimates that Per Geijer’s REO resource could satisfy a “large part of the EU’s future demand” for rare-earth magnets.

In terms of development, Kiruna’s REE deposit remains at an early stage. State-owned LKAB has begun preliminary mine planning (including driving an exploration drift 700 m deep toward the deposit) and aims to apply for an exploitation concession in 2023. However, environmental permitting in Sweden is lengthy – LKAB projects it could take 10–15 years before mining and REE production can begin. If brought to production, Per Geijer could become Europe’s first major rare earth mine, producing REEs (including some heavy REEs like Dy, Tb in minor quantities) as by-products of iron ore and phosphate extraction.

Sweden: Norra Kärr Heavy REE Deposit

Another Swedish deposit of strategic importance is Norra Kärr, (opens in a new tab) located in southern Sweden near Gränna. Norra Kärr is a small Mesoproterozoic alkaline nepheline syenite intrusion enriched in zirconium and REEs, with the unusual mineral eudialyte as the main REE-bearing phase.

Norra Kärr, Sweden

Crucially, about 51% of its rare earth oxide content is heavy REEs – making it one of the richest heavy REE deposits in Europe. A NI 43-101 compliant resource estimates 41.6 million tonnes at 0.57% TREO (total REO), containing substantial dysprosium and terbium output potential. In fact, projections suggest an annual production of ~248 tonnes of Dy oxide and 36 tonnes of Tb oxide over Norra Kärr’s first 26 years, which could significantly bolster Europe’s heavy REE supply.

 Despite its high strategic value, Norra Kärr has faced permitting delays. The deposit was first identified by the Swedish Geological Survey over a century ago, and declared a site of National Interest in 2011 due to its importance for Sweden and the EU. Junior miner Leading Edge Materials has been advancing the project, but mining licenses have been slow due to environmental court challenges (the site is near a sensitive lake and Natura 2000 areas). As of late 2025, the company submitted supplementary information for its mining lease application, and authorities are reviewing it. If approved and developed with modern processing (eudialyte concentrate production and REE separation), Norra Kärr could become Europe’s first heavy rare earth mine, providing a long-term source of Dy, Tb, and other critical heavy REEs.

Asidefrom Norra Kärr, Sweden hosts other REEoccurrences: for example, the Olserum project (opens in a new tab) (also in southern Sweden) is a smaller deposit with an estimated 4.5 Mt at 0.6% TREO and a high proportion of heavy REEs (notably Dy/Tb). Sweden’s classic iron mines (Kiruna, Malmberget) and historical Bastnäs district (opens in a new tab) also contain REEs (indeed, many rare elements like yttrium, erbium, holmium were first discovered in Sweden), but those were not developed for REE extraction in the past. Today, Sweden’s combination of large REE resources in Kiruna and heavy-enriched deposits like Norra Kärr and Olserum positions it as a potential cornerstone of European REE supply once mining permits are secured.

Norway: Fen Carbonatite Complex

Norway has emerged with a record-breaking rare earth deposit at the Fen Complex in Telemark, about 150 km southwest of Oslo. The Fen Complex (opens in a new tab) is a Proterozoic carbonatite–alkaline intrusive complex long known for niobium; recent exploration by the company Rare Earths Norway (opens in a new tab) has confirmed it also hosts an enormous REE resource. In June 2024, a maiden JORC-compliant resource was announced for Fen: 559 million tonnes grading 1.57% TREO, containing about 8.8 million tonnes of rare earth oxides. This makes Fen the largest known REE deposit in continental Europe by a wide margin.

The Fen Complex, Norway

Within this resource, roughly 1.5 million tonnes are magnet-related rare earths (the Nd, Pr, Dy, Tb crucial for EV motors and wind turbine magnets). The geology of Fen is similar to large carbonatite deposits elsewhere (like Bayan Obo in China): REEs are concentrated in carbonatite and associated minerals (bastnäsite, monazite, etc.), and the distribution is LREE-rich but with significant heavy REE in the form of yttrium and others present in the ore.

While Fen’s size and grade are impressive – potentially capable of meeting a large share of Europe’s demand – its development is still at an early stage. The deposit extends deep underground (the current resource goes down to –468 m, with mineralization open to ~–1000 m). Mining will likely require underground methods; Rare Earths Norway is investigating methods to exploit Fen with minimal environmental impact.

The discovery has drawn support from European raw materials initiatives: EIT RawMaterials (opens in a new tab) and the European Raw Materials Alliance (opens in a new tab) (ERMA) have backed the project as a pillar of a secure EU REE supply chain. With an inferred resource now defined, the next steps include detailed feasibility studies, environmental assessments, and permits.

If successfully developed, the Fen mine could supply an estimated 20–30% of Europe’s rare earth demand by 2030–2035. Importantly, it would also yield some heavy REEs(though the majority of output by volume would be light REEs likecerium, lanthanum, neodymium). As ERMA’s CEO noted, projects like Fen are “world-class” opportunities that could transform Europe’s rare earth self-sufficiency if fast-tracked.

Greenland (Denmark): Kvanefjeld and Tanbreez

Politically linked to Europe via Denmark, Greenland holds two of the world’s most significant rare earth deposits in the Ilímaussaq complex of south Greenland. The first is Kvanefjeld (Kuannersuit), (opens in a new tab) a giant layered peralkaline intrusion known for its unique geology and size. Kvanefjeld’s ore is hosted in lujavrite (an agpaitic nepheline syenite) and enriched in both light and heavy rare earths – rare minerals like steenstrupine and eudialyte contain not only large quantities of neodymium and praseodymium but also notable dysprosium and terbium. Total JORC resources (including neighboring zones) are on the order of 1 billion tonnes at ~1.1% TREO, equating to ~11 million tonnes of REO – one of the largest accumulations globally. This deposit could theoretically produce ~32,000 tonnes of REO per year (about 12–14% of world supply) at full scale. Crucially for heavy REEs, Kvanefjeld’s REE distribution is more balanced than many giant deposits: it has a higher share of mid-to-heavy REEs compared to typical light-REE-rich projects. In other words, alongside abundant Nd-Pr for magnets, it contains sizable Dy and Tb resources – metals critical for high-temperature magnets in wind turbines and EVs.

Greenland Rare Earth Deposits

Despite advanced studies (a feasibility and environmental impact assessment were completed by the mid-2010s), Kvanefjeld’s development is currently stalled. The project faces strong environmental and political opposition in Greenland, largely due to its significant uranium content (the ore contains ~300 ppm U₃O₈, making uranium a co-product). Greenland’s government instated a uranium mining ban in 2021, which directly impacted Kvanefjeld. The owner company (Energy Transition Minerals, formerly Greenland Minerals) is now in legal arbitration with Greenland/Denmark over its license. Thus, while Kvanefjeld could be a game-changer for Europe’s rare earth supply (including heavy REEs), its economic viability is on hold pending regulatory resolution and social license to operate.

Adjacent to Kvanefjeld is the Tanbreez (Kringlerne) deposit (opens in a new tab), another huge REE resource in the Ilímaussaq complex. Tanbreez contains extensive eudialyte-rich zones with very low uranium content, focusing on rare earths, zirconium, and tantalum. This project (held by a private company) has reportedly received an exploitation license from Greenland’s authorities, since it avoids the uranium issues that plague Kvanefjeld. Tanbreez’s total REE resource is likewise massive (on the order of billions of tonnes of rock, with multi-million tonnes of REO) and is enriched in heavy rare earth elements due to the eudialyte mineralogy. If Tanbreez proceeds to development under its

U.S.-backed ownership, it could become a major non-Chinese source of heavy REEs for Western markets. Both Greenland projects underscore that substantial heavy REE reserves exist within greater Europe, although geopolitical and environmental factors will determine if they can contribute to supply.

Finland: Sokli and Other Deposits

Finland has several REE-bearing deposits, though none in production yet. The most notable is the Sokli carbonatite complex i (opens in a new tab)n northern Finland (part of the Devonian Kola alkaline province). Sokli contains a large phosphate (apatite) deposit with notable enrichment in niobium, tantalum, and rare earths. Drilling has revealed late-stage carbonatite veins at Sokli with high REE grades of 0.5–1.8% TREO in places. The REE mineralization at Sokli is dominated by light REE minerals (ancylite-(Ce), bastnäsite-(Ce), monazite) and strontium-rich apatite, indicating a light-REE-rich profile. Heavy REEs are less abundant there, but some yttrium and others occur in accessory phases. The Sokli deposit was studied as a source of fertilizer phosphorus by Yara, and though mining plans were put on hold, there is potential to extract REEs as a by-product of any future phosphate operation.

Historically, Finland was actually one of the only European countries to produce any rare earths: the Korsnäs mine (opens in a new tab) in western Finland (a small Pb-REE deposit) yielded about 36,000 tons of rare-earth–rich concentrate between 1963 and 1972 as a by-product of lead mining. That operation recovered primarily light REEs (lanthanum, cerium) from monazite.

Today, aside from Sokli, Finland has other minor prospects – e.g., the Katajakangas occurrence (a Nb-Y-REE enriched granite with an estimated 0.46 Mt resource containing yttrium and heavy REEs). While these are relatively small, they demonstrate the presence of heavy REEs (yttrium, gadolinium, etc.) in Finnish bedrock. In summary, Finland’s REE resources are not as large as Sweden’s or Greenland’s, but they could provide a supplemental heavy REE supply in the future, especially if integrated into other mining projects (phosphate, Nb-Ta mining, or even extraction from mine tailings).

Other European REE Occurrences

Beyond the Nordic countries, REE deposits in the rest of Europe tend to be smaller or less developed, but are worth noting for completeness.

In Southern Europe, some alkaline igneous complexes in the Iberian Peninsula (Spain and Portugal) host REE occurrences – for example, the Ordovician peralkaline Galiñeiro complex inGalicia, Spain, has patchy zones with >1% total REE and notableheavy-REE enrichments (with minerals like xenotime, a Y-Dy phosphate). Likewise, small carbonatite dikes in Spain’s Canary Islands (Fuerteventura) contain up to ~0.5–0.7% TREO with a mix of REE phosphates and carbonates. These are geological curiosities at this stage, not economic deposits.

Some placer deposits (alluvial or beach sands) in Europe also concentrate rare-earth-bearing minerals. For instance, in Greece and Serbia, heavy-mineral sands and paleo-placers have been found to contain monazite and xenotime grains.

One example is the Ordovician-aged heavy mineral quartzite in Portugal’s Portalegre area (opens in a new tab), which extends into Spain: it contains disseminated monazite with an estimated resource of 2.4 Mt at 0.46% TREO. Such placers typically yield mixed REEs (monazite being rich in light REEs, xenotime providing yttrium and heavy REEs), but so far none have been mined for REEs in Europe.

Additionally, bauxite deposits and red mud (bauxite processing waste) in the Mediterranean region are known to be enriched in rare earth elements, including some heavy REEs. Research initiatives (like the EU EURARE project) have investigated extracting scandium and REEs from Greek bauxite residue, as one potential secondary source. While promising for the circular economy, these are not primary “deposits” per se and require technological development to be viable.

Finally, it’s worth mentioning as Rare Earth Exchanges™ has reported that in Turkey(which straddles Europe and Asia), a very large rare earth-bearing deposit was reported in 2022 near Eskişehir. Turkish authorities announced a reserve of 694 million tonnes of ore containing rare earth elements, purportedly the world’s second-largest after China. However, the details suggest the ore is of relatively low grade and mostly light REEs; the heavy REE content and economic recoverability remain uncertain. Turkey’s find, if developed, could eventually contribute to Europe’s supply, but as of now, it underscores that significant REE resources (light and heavy) exist on Europe’s periphery.

Economic Viability and Outlook

Developing heavy rare earth deposits in Europe faces both opportunities and challenges. On one hand, the identified deposits (Sweden’s Per Geijer and Norra Kärr, Norway’s Fen, Greenland’s Ilímaussaq deposits, etc.) are of sufficiently large scale and grade to potentially supply a major share of Europe’s REE demand for decades. If even a few of these projects come to fruition, Europe could reduce its near-total dependency on Chinese heavy REEs. For example, the Fen project alone might supply ~30% of Europe’s rare earths and meet a large portion of heavy magnet metal needs by the 2030s. The EU is pushing policy measures (the Critical Raw Materials Act and investment alliances) to expedite such projects. There is also growing interest in downstream processing (separation facilities and magnet manufacturing) so that European mines can feed a full domestic supply chain.

On the other hand, economic and permitting hurdles are significant. Many European REE deposits come with complex metallurgy (e.g., refractory minerals like eudialyte or apatite that require innovative extraction techniques) and sometimes radioactive by-products (thorium or uranium) that raise environmental concerns. Obtaining social license for mining is challenging in countries with strong environmental regulations, as seen with the delays at Norra Kärr and Kvanefjeld. The typical timeline from discovery to production in Europe can exceed 10–15 years, which is at odds with the immediate supply needs. Moreover, capital expenditure to develop these deposits (and associated processing plants) is high, and securing financing may require public-sector support or partnerships, given past volatility in REE prices.

Final Thoughts

Europe does possess notable deposits of heavy rare earth elements across its territory. Sweden and Norway’s recent finds, along with Greenland’s vast resources, could theoretically make Europe a significant producer of both light and heavy rare earths in the future. These deposits cover a range of geological settings – from Scandinavian carbonatites and alkaline complexes to apatite iron ores – and contain the critical heavy REEs needed for high-tech industries. Realizing their potential will depend on successfully navigating the feasibility and permitting processes. Should even a few of these projects reach production, Europe could secure a domestic source of heavy rare earths, improving its economic resilience and supporting the green transition. For now, all eyes are on pilot projects and mining approvals in the coming years, as Europe seeks to turn its geological endowment into a strategic advantage.

Sources: European Commission & ERMA reports; LKAB, Rare Earths Norway and Leading Edge Materials press releases; EuRare project data; WEF and Reuters news analyses, among others.

• Chile released a National Critical Minerals Strategy identifying 14 materials.
• Key materials include:
  • Copper
  • Lithium
  • Molybdenum
  • Rhenium
  • Rare earths
• The strategy aims to diversify beyond copper dependence.
• The target markets are AI, battery, and clean energy sectors globally.
• Minerals are categorized into three tiers based on Chile's market position.
• Tier One minerals where Chile already dominates supply:
  • Copper: 23% global supply
  • Lithium: 20.4% global supply
  • Molybdenum: 14.6% global supply
  • Rhenium: 46.8% global supply
• Chile positions itself as a politically stable alternative to China-dominated supply chains.
• The strategy signals openness to Western partnerships for technology transfer and midstream investment in strategic materials.

Chile, via the Ministry of Mining, has formally released a National Critical Minerals Strategy (opens in a new tab), positioning itself as a long-term, reliable supplier to global markets as demand surges from artificial intelligence, advanced technologies, and the energy transition. The announcement, reported by the Ministry of Mining, marks a notable policy shift for Chile at a politically sensitive moment—just weeks before President Gabriel Boric (opens in a new tab) leaves office.

At its core, the strategy acknowledges a hard reality: Chile’s historic over-reliance on copper is no longer sufficient in a decarbonizing, data-driven global economy. Instead, the country is explicitly pursuing resource diversification to remain central to future industrial supply chains tied to AI infrastructure, batteries, electronics, and clean energy systems.

What’s New—and Why It Matters

Chile has identified 14 critical minerals, a broader and more explicit list than in past policy statements. These include copper, lithium, molybdenum, rhenium, cobalt, rare earth elements, antimony, selenium, tellurium, gold, silver, iron ore, boron, and iodine.

Crucially, the strategy does more than list minerals—it categorizes them by global relevance and domestic capability, offering investors and governments a clearer signal of where Chile intends to compete.

• Tier One (Global Anchors): Copper, lithium, molybdenum, and rhenium. Chile already controls roughly 23% of global copper supply, 20.4% of lithium, 14.6% of molybdenum, and an extraordinary 46.8% of rhenium. These are universally recognized as critical by major economies.
• Tier Two (Strategic Optionality): Cobalt, rare earths, antimony, selenium, and tellurium—materials with little or no current production in Chile, but which are increasingly strategic for AI hardware, semiconductors, and energy systems.
• Tier Three (Value-Chain Upside): Gold, silver, iron ore, boron, and iodine—already produced domestically, with room to move up the global value chain.

Implications for the U.S. and the West

For the United States and its allies, the signal is mixed but important. Chile is not positioning itself as a raw-materials junior partner, but as a stable, politically credible alternative supplier at a time when China dominates refining and processing for many critical minerals. The inclusion of rare earths and AI-relevant materials—despite limited current output—suggests Chile is laying the groundwork for future partnerships, technology transfer, and midstream investment.

If followed by concrete incentives, permitting reform, and downstream build-out, this strategy could reshape Western sourcing options over the next decade.

Source—see Ministry of Mining report (opens in a new tab).

• A 2024 UN report confirms that refining, processing, and recycling—not mining—are the real bottlenecks in critical minerals supply, with China dominating midstream control of lithium, cobalt, and rare earths.
• The Guidebook acknowledges that recycling won't scale until the 2030s and new mining remains essential, despite circular economy advocacy and governance frameworks like UNFC.
• While the report proposes global standards and cooperation, it quietly confirms there are no quick fixes—building diversified supply chains takes decades, not frameworks.

A United Nations report (opens in a new tab) in 2024 explains why minerals like rare earths, lithium, and cobalt are essential for clean energy—and why shortages, geopolitics, and pollution risks make the transition harder than headlines suggest. The report correctly shows that mining alone won’t solve the problem: refining, processing, and recycling are the real bottlenecks, most of which are still dominated by China. While the UN proposes better global standards and cooperation, the report also quietly confirms a harsher truth: there are no quick fixes, and building real supply chains takes decades, not frameworks.

A Youth-Driven UN Intervention

The United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE) published Critical Minerals for the Sustainable Energy Transition: A Guidebook to Support Intergenerational Action, coordinated by Jodi-Ann Wang and Vadim Kuznetsov with contributions from the Resource Management Young Member Group. The report aims to educate a broad audience on the full critical-minerals lifecycle while embedding environmental protection, social equity, and long-term stewardship into energy-transition planning.

The tone is accessible and unusually candid for a UN publication.

Where the Report Is Firmly Grounded

The Guidebook appears accurate and well-sourced on several core points:

• Supply concentration is real and extreme. The report correctly documents that lithium, cobalt, and rare earth supply chains—especially refining—are highly concentrated geographically, with China controlling a dominant share of midstream and downstream processing.
• Midstream matters more than mines. The authors explicitly note that extraction alone does not ensure supply security; chemical separation, refining, and manufacturing capacity are the true chokepoints.
• Recycling will not scale fast enough. The report accurately states that large-scale recycling of EV batteries and clean-energy hardware will not materially relieve supply pressure until the 2030s, due to long product lifespans and thermodynamic losses.
• Primary mining remains unavoidable. Despite strong circular-economy advocacy, the Guidebook acknowledges that metals cannot be recycled indefinitely and that new mining will remain essential.

These conclusions align with IEA, USGS, and independent industry data.

The Subtle Bias: Governance Over Gravity

The report’s main limitation is not factual error, but institutional optimism. Frameworks such as UNFC and UNRMS are presented as enabling tools for transparency, ESG alignment, and capital allocation. That is directionally correct—but the report sometimes implies that standardization can meaningfully accelerate supply diversification on its own.

What it does not claim—but risks being read as implying—is that governance frameworks substitute for capital intensity, permitting timelines, chemical complexity, or China’s multi-decade industrial head start. They do not.

Why This Report Still Matters

What makes this Guidebook notable is its implicit admission: the clean-energy transition is mineral-intensive, slow to rebalance, and constrained by physical realities. For investors and policymakers, that quiet realism is more important than the aspirational language.

Citation

United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE). Critical Minerals for the Sustainable Energy Transition: A Guidebook to Support Intergenerational Action. Geneva, April 2024.

Critical Minerals Guidebook

• China's combined wind and solar installed capacity surpassed 1.8 terawatts by the end of 2025, overtaking coal-fired power capacity for the first time, with renewables now accounting for 47.3% of total capacity.
• Installed capacity doesn't equal delivered electricity—coal still provides 60-62% of primary energy and remains essential for baseload stability despite renewable growth.
• China's renewable buildout reinforces its dominance across critical supply chains, including permanent magnets, polysilicon, and grid hardware, converting energy transition into strategic mineral leverage.

Are gigawatts becoming a narrative weapon? China’s state media is celebrating a milestone: by the end of 2025, the country’s combined wind and solar installed capacity surpassed 1.8 terawatts, overtaking coal-fired power capacity for the first time if these reports are to be believed.  According to figures released via the China Rare Earth Industry Association and People’s Daily, total power generation capacity reached 3.89 TW, with solar at 1.2 TW (+35.4% YoY) and wind at 640 GW (+22.9% YoY). Renewables now account for 47.3% of total installed capacity.

Some background research suggests the numbers are directionally credible. China has been installing renewable capacity at a scale unmatched globally, aided by aggressive state planning, capital deployment, and vertically integrated supply chains.

But installed capacity is not the same as usable power—and this distinction matters for investors.

Looking Legitimate

China has built the world’s largest and fastest-growing renewable energy system. Annual additions have accelerated dramatically, with new wind and solar installations rising from 100 GW per year four years ago to roughly 400 GW in 2025. Large desert-based projects, offshore wind, and distributed rooftop solar are real, not aspirational.

From a rare earth and critical minerals perspective, this buildout reinforces China’s dominance across permanent magnets (NdPr, Dy, Tb), polysilicon, wafers, turbines, and grid-scale hardware. Every incremental gigawatt strengthens China’s demand gravity—and pricing power—across upstream materials.

What the Coverage Soft-Pedals

What People’s Daily does not emphasize is the capacity factor, curtailment, and grid stress. Installed capacity does not equal delivered electricity. Coal remains indispensable for baseload stability, and China continues permitting new coal plants even as renewables surge.

Coal remains China's dominant energy source, accounting for roughly 60-62% of its primary energy consumption, though this varies slightly by year and source, with recent figures showing it supplying over half of the nation's power, even as renewables rapidly grow. For instance, data from 2023 shows coal making up about 61% of the energy supply and 61.3% of electricity generation, while some reports show its share of power generation dropping to around 53% in mid-2024 due to increased clean energy.

But China seeks more than just green-based energy diversification—more than just decarbonization. The nation’s policies reinforce the move for industrial control. Wind and solar scale lock in long-term demand for rare earth magnets, specialty steels, copper, and grid electronics—nearly all supplied by Chinese-dominated chains.

Reading Between the Lines

The tone emanating from the Chinese press remains triumphalist and selective, typical of state-affiliated media. The data itself is largely sound, but the framing omits system inefficiencies and geopolitical implications. A form of strategic storytelling.

For investors, the takeaway is not “China goes green.” It is this: China continues to work to convert the energy transition into mineral leverage.

Source: People’s Daily, January 29, 2026; China Rare Earth Industry Association. This article originates from Chinese state-affiliated media and should be independently verified.

• Europe's strategic push for minerals independence is real but overstates speed—rare earth supply chains require long lead times, technical expertise, and capital discipline that the continent has historically struggled to deliver.
• While EU enlargement and partnerships with Ukraine and Greenland offer strategic mineral access, execution remains uncertain as political unity doesn't automatically translate into industrial capability or bankable production.
• Until Europe proves it can permit, finance, and operate rare earth projects at scale without relying on China, 'strategic autonomy' remains aspirational rhetoric rather than supply chain reality.

When geopolitical ambition meets the unforgiving physics of supply chains in the era of Great Powers Era 2.0. Europe’s renewed push to become a unified geopolitical heavyweight makes for muscular reading. Emergency summits, talk of “European sovereignty,” accelerated enlargement, and sharper trade tools all signal intent. But beneath the rhetoric, the rare earth and critical minerals story reveals a stubborn truth: power is not declared—it is built, molecule by molecule, mine by mine.

The Parts That Hold Up Under Scrutiny

There is nothing fanciful about the EU’s strategic anxiety. Dependence on China for rare earth elements used in EVs, wind turbines, and defense electronics is real and well-documented. Efforts to diversify—partnerships with Ukraine, Greenland, and internal projects such as a rare-earth processing facility in Estonia—reflect genuine policy shifts. The logic is sound: without secure access to NdPr, Dy, Tb, and separation capacity, “strategic autonomy” remains a slogan.

The recent British media’s account (opens in a new tab) is also correct that enlargement matters economically. A larger single market does increase regulatory gravity and negotiating leverage. From a minerals perspective, Ukraine’s titanium, graphite, and potential rare earth resources are strategically relevant, even if underdeveloped.

Where the Narrative Starts to Float

What the piece overstates is speed and cohesion. Europe is portrayed as if it can simply will a minerals-industrial base into existence. In reality, rare earth supply chains require long lead times, environmental permitting, technical separation expertise, and capital discipline—areas where Europe has historically struggled. Opening a factory is not the same as mastering solvent extraction at scale or securing feedstock outside China’s orbit.

Greenland is treated as a geopolitical prize without sufficient attention to the commercial, environmental, and social constraints that have stalled projects there for years. The minerals exist; bankable production is another matter entirely—frankly, a decade plus away, all things being equal.

The Quiet Bias: Power by Declaration

There is an unmistakable Brussels-centric bias toward institutional solutions—more members, more rules, more coordination—while underplaying execution risk. The assumption that political unity translates cleanly into industrial capability ignores past failures in both defense and materials policy.

Notably absent is any hard comparison to China’s vertically integrated model or the United States’ growing use of price floors, offtake guarantees, and defense-backed financing. Strategy without industrial incentives is aspiration, not competition.

Why This Matters for Rare Earth Investors

The EU’s ambitions are real, but the minerals clock is unforgiving. Until Europe proves it can permit, finance, and operate rare earth projects at scale—without outsourcing risk back to China—“Super Europe” remains a geopolitical concept, not a supply chain reality. And as Rare Earth Exchanges™ recently chronicled with funding totals, the European Continent remains at a distinct disadvantage due to the politics and administrative weight. This could change, but it will take a Sputnik moment followed by vision, strategy, industrial policy, and relentless execution.

Source: reporting by James Crisp and Joe Barnes, The Telegraph, January 26, 2026.

• Energy risk has shifted from fuels to materials: China dominates refining for 19 of 20 strategic minerals with approximately 70% market share, creating a critical bottleneck in the global energy transition despite falling oil and coal prices.
• Refining concentration is the real vulnerability: Countries may mine rare earths, but most must send ores to China for processing, making export controls or disruptions capable of stalling electric vehicles (EVs), renewables, grids, defense, and AI hardware simultaneously.
• Lower energy prices breed dangerous complacency: While fuel costs eased, electricity demand surged from electrification and AI data centers, exposing fragile infrastructure where a single disruption in China's processing sector could halt global energy deployment.

In a January 2026 policy brief (opens in a new tab), Rim Berahab (opens in a new tab), Senior Economist at the Policy Center for the New South in Morocco, delivers a sober warning hidden beneath otherwise calming headlines about falling energy prices. While oil and coal markets softened in 2025 and are projected to ease further in 2026, Berahab’s analysis shows that the real vulnerability in the global energy transition now lies elsewhere—in the extreme concentration of critical mineral refining, particularly rare earth element (REE) processing, overwhelmingly dominated by China.

Rim Berahab, She holds a State Engineering degree from the National Institute of Statistics and Applied Economics (INSEA).

Her core finding is stark but accessible: energy risk has shifted from fuels to materials. Modern energy systems—wind turbines, EV motors, grids, batteries, and increasingly AI data centers—depend on refined minerals more than raw ores. And while many countries mine minerals, very few can process them. China can—and does.

Study Approach: A System-Level Risk Assessment

This is not a geological survey or a mine-by-mine inventory. Berahab uses a macroeconomic and systems-risk framework, synthesizing data from the International Energy Agency, World Bank, and market forecasts to assess where shocks would propagate fastest. She examines price trends, electricity demand growth, grid constraints, AI-driven power loads, and—critically—refining concentration across strategic minerals, including rare earths.

Key Findings: The Processing Bottleneck

Berahab identifies refining as the most concentrated—and dangerous—node in the energy supply chain. According to data cited in the brief, the top three refining countries control roughly 86% of global refined output across key energy-related minerals, and China alone dominates refining for 19 of 20 strategic minerals, averaging about 70% market share.

For rare earths, this means:

• Countries may mine ore, but must still send it to China for separation and refining
• Substitution is extremely limited in the short term
• Export controls or disruptions can ripple simultaneously through EVs, renewables, grids, defense, and AI hardware

In plain terms: rare earth dominance is not about digging—it’s about chemistry, scale, and infrastructure.

Why This Matters Now

A key insight of the paper is counterintuitive**: lower energy prices can breed complacency**. While fuel costs eased, electricity demand surged—driven by electrification and AI data centers—and infrastructure struggled to keep pace. At the same time, mineral supply chains remained tightly concentrated. The result is a fragile system where a single policy move or disruption in China’s processing sector could stall global energy deployment, regardless of how cheap oil or coal becomes.

Implications for Policymakers and Investors

Berahab’s conclusion aligns closely with REEx’s long-standing position:

• Mining diversification alone is insufficient
• Real resilience requires refining, processing, and downstream manufacturing capacity
• Permitting delays, ESG hurdles, and capital intensity mean diversification will be slow

For investors, the signal is clear: projects tied to midstream and downstream capabilities—especially outside China—carry a strategic premium, while mine-only stories remain structurally exposed.

Limitations and Open Questions

The brief is intentionally high-level. It does not model specific rare earth projects, cost curves, or timelines for non-Chinese processing capacity. Its conclusions rely on secondary datasets and system-wide indicators rather than granular project data. Still, the direction of risk is unambiguous—and widely corroborated by industry experience.

REEx Conclusion

Berahab’s important work reinforces a critical truth: the global energy transition is constrained not by ambition or capital, but by industrial concentration. Until rare earth processing is diversified, energy security will remain vulnerable—no matter how many mines are announced or how low oil prices fall.

Citation: Berahab, R. (2026). What 2025–2026 Tells Us About the Future of Global Energy. Policy Brief PB-02/26, Policy Center for the New South.

• Brazil announces National Rare Earth Strategy to leverage its 23% share of global reserves.
• Currently, Brazil produces only ~1% of rare earths due to lack of commercial-scale processing and refining infrastructure.
• The strategy targets Minas Gerais' ionic clay systems.
• Success requires decades of process know-how and state-backed scale that China already possesses.
• True rare earth sovereignty requires downstream capability—separation plants, alloying, and magnet manufacturing—not just mining access.
• This strategy is a serious policy signal but is not yet a supply-chain inflection.

Brazil has announced the early scaffolding of a National Rare Earth Strategy, a move framed as a long-term effort to convert geological promise into industrial power. Through the Ministry of Mines and Energy (MME), Brasília plans to define guidelines, targets, and policy instruments spanning mining, processing, innovation, and the energy transition. The rhetoric is confident. The execution, as ever in rare earths, is where reality intrudes.

From Rock to Revenue—A Familiar Gap

Brazil does indeed sit on a formidable endowment—often cited at ~23% of global rare earth reserves, second only to China. That figure is directionally accurate in a geological sense, particularly for carbonatite and ionic-clay–style systems. What is also accurate—and more important—is that Brazil accounts for ~1% of global production, largely because it lacks commercial-scale separation, refining, and downstream manufacturing. The government’s stated desire to move beyond “primary production” toward processing and value capture aligns with what Rare Earth Exchanges has long emphasized: mines without midstream are leverage without torque.

Minas Gerais: Promise, Not Proof

A piece in BNAmericas (opens in a new tab) correctly highlights Minas Gerais, especially Poços de Caldas, as a focal point. The geology does share similarities with southern China’s ionic clay systems, which host magnet and heavy rare earths. That comparison is reasonable—but incomplete. China’s advantage is not geology alone; it is decades of process know-how, solvent chemistry, environmental tradeoffs, and state-backed scale. Citing similarity without acknowledging this industrial delta risks overselling speed.

Demand Math That Flatters the Narrative

Claims that rare earth demand is growing ~10% annually are broadly consistent with magnet-driven sectors (EVs, wind, defense). The assertion that “eight Colossus-sized projects” are needed by 2028 is illustrative—but speculative. It assumes linear demand growth, flawless permitting, financing, and commissioning, and ignores substitution, recycling, and price elasticity. Investors should treat this as scenario rhetoric, not a forecast.

The Sovereignty Refrain

Statements about “sovereignty over strategic resources” are politically resonant—and increasingly common. They are not, by themselves, misinformation. But they obscure a harder truth: rare earth sovereignty is earned downstream. Without separation plants, alloying capacity, magnet manufacturing, and offtake certainty, Brazil remains exposed to the same chokepoints it seeks to escape.

REEx Takeaway

This is a serious policy signal, not yet a supply-chain inflection. Brazil is late—but not wrong—to recognize that rare earth value lives between the mine and the magnet. The gap between strategy and steel, however, remains wide.

• Official trade data captures only 58,000 tonnes of direct Chinese magnet exports.
• An additional 20,000-40,000 tonnes are embedded in EVs, wind turbines, and electronics, revealing a true global dependence of 80,000-100,000 tonnes annually.
• Ex-China magnet production represents just 16% of global output at 22,800 tpa.
• Even if all announced projects reach 75,100 tpa capacity, they require 22,300 tpa NdPr oxide that non-Chinese separation facilities cannot supply.
• The critical bottleneck is rare-earth oxide separation—especially heavy rare earths (Dy/Tb)—not mining or magnet manufacturing, meaning China's strategic control simply shifts upstream as downstream capacity relocates.

For years, governments and markets have relied on a deceptively simple statistic to assess rare-earth risk: China exports roughly 58,000 tonnes of NdFeB magnets per year. This figure is routinely cited as a proxy for global dependence on Chinese magnet supply.

The assumption is wrong.

Analysis from REEx Insights™ Magnet Rankings and Capacity Database shows that magnet trade data captures only a visible fraction of China’s true control over global magnet supply. The larger dependency sits upstream and inside finished goods — hidden from trade statistics, yet central to the energy transition.

Two Magnet Supply Chains — Only One Is Counted

There are two distinct magnet supply channels:

1. Direct magnet exports

Finished NdFeB magnets shipped overseas

→ ~58,000 tonnes per year (visible in customs data)

2. Embedded magnets in exported products

Magnets manufactured in China, integrated into EVs, wind turbines, motors, electronics, and industrial equipment — then shipped overseas as finished goods

Only the first category appears in official trade statistics.

The second isstructurally invisible.

This mirrors earlier blind spots in semiconductors, batteries, and solar polysilicon, where dependence was underestimated because critical components were embedded in finished products and crossed borders.

The Hidden Volume: Embedded Magnets

Using capacity-derived modeling that links downstream manufacturing output to magnet intensity, REEx estimates that 20,000–40,000 tonnes of magnets per year are embedded in Chinese exports.

This range reflects uncertainty in product mix and magnet loading, but the order of magnitude is robust:

• EVs alone typically contain 2–5 kg of NdFeB magnets per vehicle
• China exports millions of EVs annually
• Wind turbines, industrial motors, HVAC systems, robotics, and consumer electronics add substantial additional demand

Independent academic and industry analyses increasingly converge on tens of thousands of tonnes per year of embedded magnet flows.

Key point: this is existing demand, not speculative growth.

The Real Number That Matters

When direct exports and embedded magnets arecombined, the true volume of magnets already consumed outsideChina is closer to:

Approximately 80,000–100,000 tonnes per year. This demand does not disappear if manufacturing relocates. It simply reappears as ex-China magnet demand.

Every EV, turbine, or motor no longer assembled in China requires its magnets to be sourced elsewhere — immediately and at scale.

Current Production Reality

According to the REEx Magnet Rankings:

• China magnet production: ~120,500 tpa
• Ex-China magnet production: ~22,800 tpa

Ex-China accounts for ~16% of global NdFeB magnet output.

This is a functioning industry — but a small one, sized for niche programs, not global electrification.

The Chemistry Behind the Bottleneck

REEx links magnet capacity directly to rare-earth inputs using industry-standard assumptions:

• ~30% of magnet mass is rare earths
• ~98–99.5% NdPr
• ~0.5–2.0% Dy/Tb

At current ex-China magnet output levels, this implies annual consumption of roughly:

• **~**6,800 tonnes total REO
• ~6,770 tpa NdPr
• ~68 tpa Dy/Tb

Enough for limited EV programs and defense supply chains — not for mass deployment.

Planned Expansion — and the Problem It Exposes

If all announced ex-China magnet projects were fully funded, permitted, and vertically integrated, total ex-China capacity could reach ~75,100 tpa.

That would imply oxide demand of approximately:

• ~22,300 tpa NdPr oxide
• ~225 tpa Dy/Tb oxide

On paper, this could replace direct Chinese magnet exports.

In practice, it exposes the real constraint.

Processing, Not Mining, Is the Choke Point

Mining is not the bottleneck.

Magnets are not the bottleneck.

Separation is.

Rare-earth concentrates must be refined into ultra-high-purity oxides before they can become metals, alloys, and magnets. This stage is:

• capital-intensive
• chemically complex
• environmentally sensitive
• slow to scale

REEx tracking shows:

• Very few ex-China separation plants operate at a meaningful scale
• Heavy rare-earth (Dy/Tb) separation capacity outside China is minimal
• No public disclosures indicate ex-China HREE processing volumes anywhere near those implied by magnet localization ambitions

The bottleneck simply moves upstream — preserving China’s leverage even as downstream capacity grows.

What the REEx Insights™ Rankings Ultimately Show

• Magnet export data dramatically understates real dependence
• 80,000–100,000 tonnes of magnets are already consumed outside China each year
• Ex-China magnet manufacturing can expand — oxide processing cannot keep pace
• HREE separation is the critical strategic bottleneck, and China has effectively monopolized
• Supply-chain risk shifts upstream, not away

The magnet supply gap is not disappearing.

It is being hidden — and postponed.

Why This Matters Now

As governments mandate EV reshoring, wind localization, and defense supply-chain security, today’s embedded dependence becomes tomorrow’s visible shortage.

The policy failure is not a lack of intent.

It is a misunderstanding of where control actually resides.

REEx data makes that reality unavoidable.

• World Bank paper by Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala positions Africa as a necessary pillar for global economic resilience.
• Africa holds 30% of the world's mineral reserves, including 15% of rare earths.
• Africa accounts for less than 3% of global trade.
• Africa's bottleneck isn't geology but value addition and infrastructure.
• Trade costs in Africa run 37% higher than global averages.
• Slow AfCFTA implementation blocks regional value chain development.
• For critical mineral investors, Africa can diversify global supply chains only if:
  • Capital pairs with permitting certainty.
  • Infrastructure delivery is secured.
  • Credible local partnerships are formed.
• Investment in Africa is not optional, but not turnkey either.

A new World Bank Policy Research Working Paper, authored by Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala, makes a bold claim: Africa is no longer a peripheral player in global supply chains but a necessary pillar of future economic and strategic resilience. Delivered as the 2025 Mattei Lecture and published in January 2026, the paper argues that overdependence on a handful of regions—China for critical minerals, East Asia for semiconductors, and the U.S. for demand—has made the global economy fragile and weaponizable.

From a Rare Earth Exchanges™ perspective, the framing is notable. Africa is presented not merely as resource-rich, but as systemically underutilized—holding nearly 30% of the world’s known mineral reserves (15% of rare earth elements), including rare earths, yet accounting for less than 3% of global goods trade. The bottleneck is not geology; it is value addition, infrastructure, and policy execution.

From Extraction to Leverage: The Value-Addition Gap

The paper accuratelydiagnoses Africa’s central challenge: exports remain overwhelmingly commodity-based, with minimal downstream processing. High trade costs—up to 37% higher than global averages for manufactured goods—and slow implementation of the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) continue to block regional value chains.

Where the paper is strongest is its linkage between critical minerals and global resilience. Okonjo-Iweala explicitly notes that if African rare earth and critical mineral value chains had been developed earlier, recent Chinese export controls would have triggered far less alarm. That observation aligns with hard lessons now being learned in Washington, Brussels, and Tokyo.

What’s Real—and What’s Aspirational

What holds up under scrutiny:

• Africa’s demographic advantage is real: the working-age population is projected to reach 1.6 billion by 2050.
• Select projects already validate the thesis, including Malawi’s Songwe Hill rare earth project backed by the U.S. DFC and designated strategic by the EU.
• Infrastructure gains like the Lobito Corridor show logistics can materially improve when execution occurs.

Where caution is warranted:

• The paper leans heavily on “potential” while underweighting execution risk, including various challenges at a country-to-country level.
• Governance variability, security concerns, and capital discipline are acknowledged but softened.
• Europe’s proposed “modernized Mattei formula” is compelling rhetorically, yet remains largely unproven at scale.

Why This Matters for Rare Earth Supply Chains

For rare earth and critical mineral investors, the message is clear: Africa is not optional—but it is not turnkey. The continent can diversify global supply chains only if capital is paired with permitting certainty, infrastructure delivery, and credible local partnerships. Without that, Africa risks remaining a strategic talking point rather than a functional alternative.

The paper is best read not as a forecast, but as a policy challenge to the West:resilience requires building new nodes, not just reshoring oldones.

Source: World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 11295, African Trade and Investment for Global Resilience (opens in a new tab) (January 2026).

Disclaimer: This analysis is based on a World Bank working paper reflecting the author’s views, not necessarily official institutional positions.

• Copper has shifted from an industrial commodity to a strategic bottleneck due to electrification, grid expansion, and data centers driving structural demand.
• New copper supply faces challenges such as permitting delays, capital expenditure inflation, and declining ore grades.
• The industry faces a massive supply gap: approximately 700 million tonnes of copper needed in 18 years, requiring six new Tier-1 mines annually. However, the sector struggles to deliver even one due to physical and political constraints.
• Copper shortage threatens rare earth supply chains since all REE processing facilities, magnet factories, and EV infrastructure depend on copper wiring.
• This situation makes copper the enabling constraint that can throttle ex-China rare earth buildouts.

Copper has quietly crossed a line—from background industrial input to front-line strategic constraint. The claim circulating online that “copper is no longer an industrial metal — it is a strategic bottleneck” may read like provocation, but it reflects a real shift investors can no longer afford to ignore. Electrification, grid expansion, and data-center buildouts are copper-hungry, long-cycle, and politically protected, locking demand into place just as supply growth slows. The formulation, popularized by global investor Anthony Blumberg (opens in a new tab), lands not as clickbait but as a warning shot for capital markets now confronting physical limits, not just price cycles.

First, is copper a critical mineral?

Yes, it is. Copper is officially designated as a critical mineral by the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) as of its 2025 list, recognizing its vital role in the U.S. economy, national security, and especially in clean energy technologies like electric vehicles, power grids, and data centers, despite its abundance in the U.S.. The inclusion signifies potential supply chain risks and guides federal efforts to secure domestic sourcing and processing. 

The Friedland Thesis: A Reckoning With Time, Permits, and Physics

Blumberg points to Robert Friedland’s Future Minerals Forum (opens in a new tab) messaging: ~700 million tonnes of copper needed in ~18 years, and “six Tier-1 copper mines per year” to meet demand—when the industry struggles to deliver even one. The core logic holds: permitting timelines, capex inflation, declining grades, water/power constraints, and community opposition make new supply structurally slow.

What Holds Up Under Scrutiny—and What’s Rhetorical

Solid as a rock**:** copper demand is being pulled by grids, electrification, and now AI-linked data center buildouts; credible reporting shows copper is increasingly treated as infrastructure-critical rather than purely cyclical.

What’s more slogan than spreadsheet: “six Tier-1 mines every year” and “only a doubling of price fixes supply” are directional, not precise forecasting. They compress uncertainty into memorable numbers—useful for urgency, risky for valuation models. Also, “40% of new supply consumed by grids and data infrastructure” can be true in spirit while varying materially by definition, timeframe, and scenario assumptions.

Why Rare Earth Investors Should Care: Copper Is the Gatekeeper Metal

Rare earths (NdPr, Dy/Tb) power motors and magnets, but copper wires the entire system—mines, refineries, separation plants, magnet factories, EV charging, and grid interconnects. A copper squeeze can delay “ex-China” REE buildouts even when REE feedstock exists, because substations, transformers, and power upgrades become the pacing item. In other words, copper is the enabling constraint that can quietly throttle the rare earth supply chain.                                                                                                                                                     

Citation: Blumberg LinkedIn post; corroborating context from Reuters and Ivanhoe Mines/Future Minerals Forum materials.

• China reported record trade of $6.3 trillion in 2025, up 3.8% year-over-year.
• High-tech exports surged 13.2%.
• Green energy equipment exports, including wind turbines, increased by 65.9%.
• Belt and Road countries now represent 51.9% of China's total trade.
• Diversification has shifted focus away from U.S./EU markets towards ASEAN, Africa, Latin America, and Central Asia.
• China has achieved its ninth consecutive year of trade growth despite ongoing trade tensions and tariffs.
• Efforts to decouple have not slowed China's pivot toward AI, robotics, and clean-energy supply chains.

China’s State Council Information Office held a press conference on January 15, 2026, releasing official 2025 full-year trade data. Despite what Beijing described as a “complex and severe external environment,” China reported total goods trade of RMB 45.47 trillion (≈USD $6.3 trillion), up 3.8% year-over-year, setting a new historical record.

Exports rose 6.1%, while imports grew 0.5%, with growth accelerating in the second half of the year. Officials emphasized that China has now recorded nine consecutive years of trade growth, the longest uninterrupted expansion since joining the WTO.

Several themes were repeatedly stressed

• Structural upgrade of exports toward high-technology, green energy, and advanced manufacturing
• Rapid diversification away from U.S./EU reliance toward ASEAN, Africa, Latin America, Central Asia, and Belt and Road partners
• China is becoming a net exporter of industrial robots, a notable milestone
• Strong growth in AI-related trade, including robotics, optical modules, power equipment, data-center infrastructure, and energy storage
• Resilience of private Chinese firms, now accounting for 57.3% of total trade, reinforces Beijing’s narrative of market vitality

On geopolitics, officials acknowledged trade frictions with the U.S. and EU but framed them as manageable and temporary. China-U.S. trade totaled RMB 4.01 trillion (≈USD $560B), while China-EU trade reached RMB 5.93 trillion (≈USD $830B), up 6%. Beijing emphasized “mutual dependence” and warned against politicizing supply chains.

Of particular relevance to Western economies, Chinese officials openly stated that China would import more high-tech goods if export controls were relaxed, a direct signal aimed at U.S. semiconductor and advanced technology restrictions.

Why This Is Business-News-Worthy for the West

1. China is moving up the value chain faster than many expected.

High-tech exports grew 13.2%, green energy equipment surged (wind turbines +65.9% to Europe), and China now exports more industrial robots than it imports.

2. Supply-chain leverage is broadening, not shrinking.

China’s trade with Belt and Road countries now represents 51.9% of total trade, reducing Western leverage while expanding Chinese influence across emerging markets.

3. AI and energy infrastructure are the new trade accelerants.

Robotics, data-center equipment, storage batteries, transformers, and AI-enabled devices are now core export drivers—directly intersecting with U.S. national security and industrial policy concerns.

4. Tariffs haven’t derailed China’s trade machine.

Despite trade wars and slowing global growth, China hit record volumes, signaling that decoupling is proving harder than anticipated.

BottomLine

China closed 2025 with record-breaking trade, accelerating its pivot toward advanced manufacturing, AI, green energy, and South-South trade corridors. For the U.S. and Europe, the data underscore a sobering reality: China is not retreating—it is re-engineering its global trade footprint, with implications for industrial competitiveness, critical minerals demand, clean-energy supply chains, and geopolitical leverage.

Disclaimer: This news item is derived from Chinese state-affiliated media and official government statements. All figures and claims should be independently verified using non-Chinese primary sources.

• New peer-reviewed study reveals Brazil ranks 5th globally in ion-adsorption clay research.
• Brazil has 24 active IAC projects converting science into operational mines like Serra Verde.
• These projects could reshape global rare earth supply chains.
• Ion-adsorption clays account for over 95% of the world's heavy rare earth production.
• They use lower-carbon ion-exchange leaching, offering a more sustainable alternative to traditional hard rock mining methods.
• Brazil's alignment of mineral development with UN Sustainable Development Goals positions it as the most viable non-Chinese pathway for ethical, resilient rare earth supply.
• The country plays a crucial role amid growing Western demand for supply chain diversification.

In a major contribution to the global rare earth discourse, a new peer-reviewed study led by Anna Beatriz Gomes Tetzner and her team at the Institute of Geosciences, University of Campinas (UNICAMP) (opens in a new tab), presents compelling evidence that Brazil is rapidly emerging as a critical hub in the global shift toward sustainable rare earth element (REE) supply. Published in the Journal of the Geological Survey of Brazil, the study maps global research trends in REEs—specifically ion-adsorption clay (IAC) deposits—and analyzes their alignment with the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). The key takeaway? Brazil is uniquely positioned to challenge China’s dominance by leveraging both geological potential and policy alignment.

Study Methods: Connecting the Science to the Sustainability Agenda

The researchers performed a bibliometric and systematic review of global scientific literature from 1973 to 2024 using Scopus and Web of Science databases. The final portfolio included 811 peer-reviewed studies, analyzed via VOSviewer to cluster research themes and trace co-occurring terms like “ion-adsorption clay,” “sustainability,” and “REE recovery.” The team also surveyed 37 active REE projects in Brazil, 24 of which focus on IACs, cross-referencing technical data and government reports.

Key Findings: A Field Matures—And Brazil Rises

• Scientific interest in IACs exploded after 2015—marking the launch of the SDGs—with 91.5% of all IAC-related publications occurring in the past decade.
• China leads in publications, but Brazil now ranks 5th globally, ahead of major players like Canada, Russia, and the UK.
• Brazil is not just publishing—it’s building. Projects like Serra Verde (operational), Caldeira, and Colossus in Poços de Caldas are converting research into reality

Crucially, IACs account for over 95% of the world’s production of heavy REEs—like dysprosium and terbium—used in high-performance magnets. Unlike hard rock mining, IACs allow extraction via ion-exchange leaching with brine solutions, a less intensive process with a lower carbon footprint. The study finds this method aligns better with SDGs on clean energy (SDG 7), water management (SDG 6), and sustainable industry (SDG 9)

Implications: A New Rare Earth Map?

For a Western audience, the significance is hard to overstate. As China continues to dominate REE separation and export policy, Brazil may offer the most viable non-Chinese pathway to scale up sustainable heavy REE supply. The study also documents a surge in public-private partnerships and international investment in Brazil’s IAC deposits—indicating growing trust in the country’s regulatory and scientific infrastructure.

Limitations and Controversies

The study acknowledges that IACs are not inherently sustainable; their environmental footprint depends on how they are mined. Historical IAC extraction in China led to severe land and water degradation. Without proper safeguards, Brazilian projects risk repeating those mistakes. Furthermore, lifecycle assessments (LCAs) reveal that radioactivity and chemical waste in the leaching stage remain challenges.

Conclusion: Brazil’s Strategic Moment

This study underscores a pivotal shift in the global rare earth narrative. No longer just a China story, the future of REE supply may hinge on how countries like Brazil deploy science, policy, and sustainability together. By aligning mineral development with the 2030 Agenda, Brazil is not only challenging market concentration—it’s redefining what ethical, resilient resource extraction looks like.

Source: Tetzner,A. B. G. et al. (2026). Rare Earth Elements, Sustainability, and Ion-Adsorption Clay: A Bibliometric Study on Global Trends and Brazil’s Prominence. Journal of the Geological Survey of Brazil, Vol. 9, No. 1. DOI: https://doi.org/10.29396/jgsb.2026.v9.n1.2 (opens in a new tab)

This summary is based on a pre-proof version of the study and may be subject to minor changes upon final publication. Readers are encouraged to consult the final version for citation or policy use.

© 2025 Rare Earth Exchanges™ – Accelerating Transparency, Accuracy, and Insight Across the Rare Earth & Critical Minerals Supply Chain.

• EY's 2025 report confirms China controls approximately 70% of rare earth mining but dominates over 90% of separation/refining and 94% of permanent magnet production, which is the real supply chain chokepoint.
• Demand for rare earth magnets will grow 9% annually through 2035 for electric vehicles (EVs), wind power, and defense.
• New processing facilities take 5-10 years to establish, which is far slower than market optimism suggests.
• Europe and Central Asia hold resource potential but lack processing capacity—only two EU facilities exist—indicating that having ore alone cannot deliver supply chain independence from Chinese leverage.

In a report (opens in a new tab) late last year by Ernst & Young (opens in a new tab) (EY)—led by its Regional Energy Center team and partners across Europe and Central Asia—the team comes to a stark conclusion Rare Earth Exchanges™ chronicles on a daily basis: the world’s rare earth vulnerability is not about mining scarcity, but processing dominance. Titled Rare earths: hidden leverage beneath the surface, the paper synthesizes government data, trade flows, and policy timelines to show how China’s control of separation, refining, and magnet manufacturing has become a powerful lever over global industry. Demand for rare earth magnets is projected to grow roughly 9% annually over the next decade, driven by EVs, wind power, defense, and data centers—precisely where supply is most concentrated.

How EY Built the Case (and What It Looked At)

EY draws on USGS, IEA, customs data, and policy analysis to map the entire rare earth value chain—from geology to magnets. The study distinguishes light vs. heavy rare earths, explains why REEs are geologically common but economically difficult to extract, and tracks production growth (global mine output reached ~390,000 tonnes in 2024, tripling since 2017). Crucially, the analysis goes beyond mines to the chokepoints that matter: separation, refining, and sintered permanent magnets.

The Core Finding: The Monopoly Is Downstream

China accounts for ~70% of global REE mining, but its grip tightens dramatically downstream—over 90% of separation/refining and ~94% of sintered permanent magnet production. These magnets sit inside EV drivetrains, wind turbines, industrial motors, AI data centers, and defense systems. EY documents how Beijing has formalized this leverage via export controls since 2020, expanding in 2025 to include multiple medium and heavy REEs and, critically, processing technologies—even extending extraterritorial rules to products containing trace Chinese-origin material.

Markets React—Then Remember the Cycle

Supply anxiety has moved markets before. EY notes a 175% rally in a representative basket of REE equities through October 2025—outpacing Big Oil and Big Tech—echoing a similar surge in 2021 that later reversed. The paper’s reminder is timely: price spikes do not equal supply chains. New mines can take 8–10 years; new refineries ~5 years.

Europe, Central Asia, and the Long Detour

EY surveys alternatives—Sweden (Per Geijer), Norway (Fen), Finland (Sokli), Central Asia, and beyond—finding meaningful resource potential but limited processing capacity. Europe currently hosts only two operational REE processing facilities, underscoring why ore alone does not deliver independence. Recycling and “urban mining” may help (EU targets 25% recycling by 2030), but cannot replace primary supply in the near term.

Where the Paper Is Solid—and Where It Softens the Edge

What holds: the data on downstream concentration, export controls, and timelines is consistent with independent sources and lived industry reality.

Where optimism creeps in: the scale and speed at which new projects can displace Chinese processing may be overstated, a trend we often observe in Western media and among analysts. Capital intensity, permitting, environmental liabilities (radioactive byproducts), and workforce constraints are acknowledged—but their drag is likely greater than the paper implies.

And EY does not claim imminent decoupling; it also warns of structural dependence.

Implications for Investors and Policymakers

The lesson is blunt, delivered by a global consultancy: diversification without processing is theater. Real resilience demands separation chemistry, magnet manufacturing, and policy coordination—not just mines. Until then, China’s “hidden leverage” remains visible, actionable, and costly.

Citation: Ernst & Young (EY), Rare earths: hidden leverage beneath the surface (opens in a new tab), November 2025.

© 2025 Rare Earth Exchanges™ – Accelerating Transparency, Accuracy, and Insight Across the Rare Earth & Critical Minerals Supply Chain.

• Greenland holds significant rare earth deposits capable of supplying up to 25% of global demand.
• Projects like Kvanefjeld remain stalled due to political, environmental, and regulatory challenges, including concerns about uranium co-occurrence.
• Europe's delayed engagement with Greenland exposes a critical weakness: without downstream processing capacity for separation, metallization, and magnet production, new mines risk becoming stranded assets.
• The real bottleneck isn't geology but execution—resource abundance without industrial infrastructure and coordinated policy is merely strategic theater, not supply chain security.

A recent analysis (opens in a new tab) by POLITICO Europe delivers an uncomfortable truth for the Continent: Greenland’s rare earth potential has been well known for years, yet largely left idle. Now, as geopolitics harden and Washington’s rhetoric sharpens, that long neglect looks less like caution and more like strategic drift.

Beneath Greenland’s ice sit meaningful deposits of neodymium and praseodymium—magnet metals critical to wind turbines, electric vehicles, and defense systems. The headline claim that Greenland could supply up to 25% of global rare earth demand is directionally plausible in resource terms, but misleading if read as a near-term supply reality. As Rare Earth Exchanges™ often cites, resources are not production. Ore is not a magnet.

The Mine That Became a Mirror

The stalled Kvanefjeld project illustrates the bind. Backed by Energy Transition Minerals, the deposit is real, the geology proven. What stopped it was not ignorance, but politics: uranium co-occurrence, environmental opposition, legal challenges, and regulatory uncertainty after Greenland assumed control of its resources.

POLITICO is accurate in diagnosing the bottleneck. Even strategically vital projects fail without aligned governance, capital patience, and social license. Europe did not “miss” Greenland so much as fail to build the institutional machinery required to develop it.

Where the Narrative Overreaches

The piece leans counterfactual urgency: If only Europe had acted sooner. That framing flattens reality. Mining in Greenland is among the most complex undertakings on earth—remote geography, tiny population, minimal infrastructure, and strict environmental rules, including a uranium ban that directly complicates rare earth extraction.

Invoking U.S. threats to “take Greenland by force” heightens drama but drifts into speculative geopolitics. It serves the story’s tension, not supply-chain clarity. Investors should separate strategic anxiety from operational feasibility.

What’s Actually Notable for the Rare Earth Chain

The real signal is not Greenland’s size—it is Europe’s timing. Only after 2023 did Brussels begin formal engagement through MOUs and the Critical Raw Materials Act. That delay matters because rare earth power sits downstream: separation chemistry, metallization, and magnets.

Greenland, if developed, would still require processing pathways largely absent in Europe today. Without midstream capacity, new mines risk becoming stranded assets or feeding someone else’s supply chain.

The Rare Earth Exchanges View

Greenland exposes a broader lesson: resource abundance without industrial follow-through is strategic theater. Europe’s challenge is not geology. It is execution, coordination, and time.

The ice is melting. The window is not.

• Bolivia hosts 31 of 38 US-classified critical minerals including antimony, niobium, and lithium (21M tonnes), but most remain geological resources rather than proven reserves.
• New state institutions created in 2022-2024 are advancing REE exploration at key sites like Cerro Manomó and Rincón del Tigre, though no commercial mine yet operates.
• Bolivia favors state-led partnerships with non-Western players, awarding China's CATLCMOC a $1B+ lithium deal while courting Europe as a future strategic minerals supplier.

Bolivia—long celebrated for silver, tin, and now lithium—is steadily emerging as one of South America’s most intriguing frontiers for rare earth elements (REEs) and other critical minerals. While no commercial REE mine is yet operating, the past 15 years have laid meaningful groundwork: geological mapping, targeted exploration, new institutions ,and growing international interest. The result is a country still early in the curve—but positioned for a potentially transformational decade ahead.

From Geological Promise to Active Exploration

Bolivia’s REE story gained traction around 2010–2011 during the global push to diversify supply beyond China. Early studies and foreign prospecting—particularly in southern Bolivia—flagged notable rare earth occurrences. Since then, Bolivia’s Geological Service (SERGEOMIN) (opens in a new tab) and state miner COMIBOL have significantly expanded the map.

Key exploration zones now span Cochabamba, Potosí, and Santa Cruz, with standout prospects including Cerro Manomó and Rincón del Tigre in eastern Bolivia. Hundreds of positive samples from these areas indicate the presence of rare earths alongside strategic metals such as niobium, nickel, cobalt, chromium, and thorium. Additional work at San Javier (Santa Cruz) has targeted a diverse suite of technology metals—rubidium, cesium, tantalum, tungsten, and REEs, including lanthanum, neodymium, and europium.

Importantly, Bolivia has moved beyond ad hoc exploration. In 2022, it created a Vice Ministry of Technological Minerals and Rare Earth Elements, followed in 2024 by COMIBOL’s National Directorate for Technological Minerals & REEs. Dedicated field campaigns are now focused on quantifying resources and moving prospects toward feasibility. Results are still pending, but the institutional architecture is firmly in place.

A Country Rich in Resources—Not Yet Reserves

Bolivian officials are candid: most REE and critical mineral occurrences remain classified as geological resources, not proven economic reserves. That distinction matters. Rare earths are technically complex to extract and refine, requiring capital, processing know-how, and stable long-term investment frameworks.

Still, the scale of opportunity is striking. Former mining officials note that Bolivia hosts 31 of the 38 minerals classified as “critical” by the United States, spanning antimony, bismuth, niobium, REEs, and battery metals. The challenge is not geology—it is execution.

Partners, Politics, and Strategic Alignment

Geopolitics looms large. Bolivia’s resource strategy has favored state-led, sovereign partnerships, often tilting toward non-Western players. The clearest example is lithium. Holding an estimated 21 million tonnes of lithium resources—among the world’s largest—Bolivia selected a Chinese consortium (opens in a new tab) (CATL–CMOC) in 2023 to invest over $1 billion in direct lithium extraction plants, each targeting 25,000 tonnes per year of lithium carbonate.

This decision sidelined U.S. bidders but underscored Bolivia’s preference for partners willing to accept strong state participation. At the same time, La Paz has actively courted European interest, positioning Bolivia as a future supplier of strategic minerals for the energy transition. Chinese firms are already entrenched across Bolivian mining—from gold to iron ore—bringing both capital and controversy, particularly around environmental and Indigenous impacts. These dynamics will almost certainly shape any future REE development.

Beyond REEs: A Broad Critical Minerals Platform

Rare earths are only part of the picture. Bolivia is a global heavyweight in antimony reserves, historically significant in tungsten and bismuth, and increasingly prospective in nickel and cobalt—notably at Rincón del Tigre, long considered a world-class laterite system. Major base-metal projects continue to reveal valuable by-products, reinforcing Bolivia’s reputation as a multi-mineral jurisdiction.

The cautionary tale is Mallku Khota (opens in a new tab)—a vast silver–indium resource nationalized in 2012 after social unrest. While still undeveloped, it illustrates both Bolivia’s extraordinary endowment and the importance of social license and legal clarity.

Outlook: A Decade of Opportunity

As of the start of 2026, Bolivia’s rare earth ambitions are aspirational but definitely credible. The country has mapped its resources, built institutions, and aligned its strategy with surging global demand for EVs, renewables, and advanced electronics. If Bolivia can pair its mineral wealth with investment-friendly frameworks, modern processing technology, and durable community agreements, it could emerge within 10–15 years as a meaningful supplier of rare earths and critical materials.

The upside is compelling: diversification of global REE supply, new industrial revenue streams, and a fresh chapter in Bolivia’s mining history. The next phase will determine whether Bolivia converts promise into production—but the trajectory is unmistakably upward.

• The Kazakhstan-EU Gateway is a Brussels-based non-governmental platform launched in 2023.
• Its purpose is to strengthen EU-Kazakhstan cooperation on energy, critical raw materials, and transport corridors through policy coordination rather than funding.
• The flagship Kazakhstan-EU Weekly Briefing tracks EU legislative developments, such as the Critical Raw Materials Act and CBAM.
• It helps Kazakh stakeholders navigate Brussels regulations and align with Europe's diversification strategy.
• While it primarily provides information flow and agenda-setting rather than bankable projects, the Gateway addresses a key implementation bottleneck.
• The platform translates EU frameworks into actionable intelligence for Central Asian partners.

In a crowded field of grand connectivity slogans, the Kazakhstan‑EU Gateway has taken a quieter—but potentially consequential—path. Headquartered in Brussels, the Gateway is a non-governmental platform designed to strengthen ties between Kazakhstan and the European Union at a moment when energy security, critical raw materials, and transport corridors have moved to the top of Europe’s strategic agenda.

What Is the Kazakhstan–EU Gateway?

At its core, the Gateway is a policy and dialogue hub. Founded just last year, it convenes EU officials, Kazakh institutions, investors, analysts, and civil society to translate broad political agreements into operational cooperation.

Unlike formal EU instruments, it does not fund infrastructure or sign treaties. Its value lies in coordination, visibility, and agenda-setting—helping both sides understand how EU frameworks such as Global Gateway, the Critical Raw Materials Act (CRMA), and CBAM intersect with Kazakhstan’s economic reforms.

Why It Matters Now

Europe’s push to diversify away from Russia and reduce over-dependence on China has elevated Central Asia’s role. Kazakhstan sits at the center of this shift: it is a major energy supplier, a growing source of critical minerals, and a linchpin of the Trans-Caspian “Middle Corridor (opens in a new tab).” What has been missing is a sustained Brussels-based interface that tracks EU decision-making in real time and feeds that intelligence back to Kazakh stakeholders. The Gateway aims to fill that gap.

What Has It Achieved So Far?

One of the Gateway’s most tangible outputs is its Kazakhstan–EU Weekly Briefing, which synthesizes EU legislative, trade, energy, and infrastructure developments through a Kazakhstan-relevant lens. Recent briefings highlight:

• EU progress on the Connecting Europe Facility (CEF) 2028–2034, signaling long-term support for cross-border transport with third countries.
• Operational gains along the Middle Corridor, including rising container throughput at Baku Port.
• Kazakhstan’s expanding critical raw materials base, with over 700 new exploration licenses issued and increased investment by Eurasian Resources Group.
• EU trade and climate policy shifts, including a tougher Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) and implications for Kazakh exporters.

These briefings do not announce projects—but they shape expectations, flag regulatory risks, and help investors and policymakers align timelines.

Vision, Goals, and Stated Objectives

The Gateway’s stated vision is to foster long-lasting partnerships grounded in cooperation, innovation, and sustainable development across Europe and Central Asia. Practically, this translates into:

• Improving policy literacy between Brussels and Astana
• Supporting regulatory alignment with EU standards
• Elevating Kazakhstan’s role in connectivity and critical minerals discussions
• Creating a neutral forum where public and private actors can engage early, before projects stall

What Has It Delivered—and What It Hasn’t

The Gateway has delivered information flow, agenda coherence, and access. It has not yet delivered bankable projects, binding agreements, or funding commitments. That limitation is structural, not accidental: it is an enabler, not an executing authority.

The Bottom Line

The Kazakhstan–EU Gateway is not a silver bullet. But in a policy environment where implementation—not ambition—is the bottleneck, its role as a Brussels-based translator between EU machinery and Central Asian realities may prove more valuable than splashier initiatives. For Europe’s critical minerals and connectivity strategy, bridges like this often matter most before the concrete is poured.

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• Meteoric Resources (ASX:MEI) receives a non-binding Letter of Support from Export Finance Australia for up to US$50M in indicative financing for its Caldeira Rare Earth Project in Brazil, contingent on Australian engineering content.
• Caldeira ranks 11th globally in the HREE project database, strategically critical as China controls ~98% of heavy rare earth processing capacity essential for EV motors, wind turbines, and defense systems.
• While the EFA support and prior US$250M US EXIM letter of interest signal financing momentum, investors must await binding term sheets, completed feasibility studies, and confirmed offtake agreements before treating this as committed capital.

Meteoric Resources NL (opens in a new tab) (ASX:MEI) reports a non-binding, conditional Letter of Support from Export Finance Australia (EFA (opens in a new tab)) for indicative financing up to US$50 million to advance its Caldeira Rare Earth Project in Brazil (opens in a new tab), with the proposed funding linked to using Australian engineering / EPCM / contractor content. The company frames this as supply-chain collaboration between Australia and Brazil—worth noting, but investors should treat the update as process progress, not money in the bank.

An Important Asset

Meteoric’s 11th-place ranking in Rare Earth Exchanges’ Heavy Rare Earth Element (HREE) project database is strategically important because HREEs—not light rare earths—are the true choke point in the global magnet supply chain. Elements such as dysprosium and terbium are essential for high-temperature permanent magnets used in EV drivetrains, wind turbines, defense systems, and advanced electronics, yet China controls an estimated ~98% of global HREE processing capacity, with primary feedstock still concentrated in Southern China and Myanmar.

This geographic and technical concentration exposes Western supply chains to acute geopolitical, environmental, and regulatory risk—illustrated by repeated disruptions from Myanmar border closures, Chinese export controls, and tightening environmental enforcement. As a result, any credible, scalable, non-Chinese HREE feedstock source immediately carries outsized strategic value, even at the development stage.

Meteoric’s ranking signals that Caldeira is not merely another rare earth project, but a potential upstream pressure-release valve in a system where downstream diversification (separation, metal, magnet-making) is structurally constrained by upstream HREE scarcity. For investors and policymakers alike, this is why HREE projects are assessed differently—and why rankings focused on heavy rare earth exposure matter far more than headline TREO grades alone.

Latest Updates

This sits alongside Meteoric’s previously disclosed US$250 million U.S. EXIM “letter of interest” (opens in a new tab) (also non-binding), described by the company as potential cornerstone funding if approved.

What’s Verified

The EFA support is explicitly non-binding and conditional, and therefore not committed capital, but it certainly demonstrates momentum for further financing options. The EXIM item is likewise presented as a letter of interest—a pathway, not a facility.

Meteoric’s effort needs to lead to actual financing, supported by a DFS/BFS, binding term sheets, covenants, and offtake.

Critical Questions Investors Should Ask Now

• What are the conditions precedent for EFA support (Australian content thresholds, permitting milestones, security package)?
• Is the US$50M contemplated as project finance debt, corporate debt, or contractor-tied financing, and where does it rank in seniority?
• What is the downstream plan (separation, product spec, qualification,) and what offtakes are binding versus “discussions”?
• How are Brazil execution risks (permitting sequence, logistics, FX) reflected in capex/opex claims?

Stock Check: Fundamentals + Technicals

As of Jan 7, 2026, MEI traded around A$0.18–0.19 via Yahoo Finance with an intraday market cap shown near A$489M, and a 52-week range ~A$0.057–0.260—high volatility consistent with a pre-revenue development story driven by milestones.

REEx Takeaway

If accurate—and it appears to be—this EFA letter is a credible signal of allied engagement.

For the U.S. and ex-China to rebuild rare earth supply chains, investors demand binding financing, enforceable offtakes, and downstream processing realities.

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• A peer-reviewed study shows energy prices and equity market volatility systematically precede and influence strategic metals pricing, with materials acting as price-takers rather than price-makers in global finance.
• China's 80-90% control of global rare earth separation and refining converts macroeconomic shocks into structural supply vulnerabilities, as financial contagion moves in days while alternative processing capacity takes years to build.
• Geopolitical coercion in resource-rich states like Venezuela may worsen supply-chain fragility rather than improve it, as regime pressure often disrupts infrastructure and accelerates adversarial trade flows benefiting China.

A new peer-reviewed study by Arkadiusz Orzechowski, an economist at the SGH Warsaw School of Economics, offers a clear and timely reminder that rare earth–linked materials may not trade in a vacuum. Published in the Warsaw Forum of Economic Sociology, the author examines directional relationships between the returns of lead and zinc, WTI crude oil, and the EURO STOXX 50 equity index.

While the study is financial rather than geological, its findings reinforce a critical strategic reality: because China dominates rare earth processing, shocks in energy or financial markets can rapidly transmit into strategic materials pricing—often beyond the control of producing nations or consuming industries.

What the Study Set Out to Do—In Plain Language

Markets frequently move together, but correlation alone does not reveal causation. Orzechowski’s goal was to determine whether changes in one market systematically precede and help predict changes in another. To do this, he employed Granger causality (opens in a new tab), a standard econometric technique used to identify temporal lead–lag relationships in financial data.

Although the study analyzes lead and zinc—metals often grouped with strategic materials in financial datasets rather than rare earth oxides themselves—the relevance to rare earths is practical and direct. Most investors, manufacturers, and policymakers encounter rare earth risk through prices, indices, contracts, and downstream components, not mine-site geology.

Study Methods: How the Analysis Works

The paper uses Vector Autoregression (VAR) models, which allow multiple variables—metal returns, oil prices, and equity indices—to influence each other dynamically without pre-assigning a single driver.

Two tools are central to the analysis:

• Impulse Response Functions (IRFs): Trace how a shock in one market (such as oil prices) affects others over time.
• Forecast Error Variance Decomposition (FEVD): Estimates how much of future price movement in one asset is explained by shocks originating elsewhere.

Put simply, the study asks whether metals “listen” more to oil markets, equity markets, or their own past behavior.

Financial Markets Matter—A Lot

Several patterns emerge that are relevant beyond academia:

Why This Matters for Rare Earths—and China’s Processing Dominance

While neodymium, dysprosium, and terbium are not modeled directly, the implications could be considered a possibility:

• China controls roughly 80–90% of global rare earth separation and refining.
  As a result, energy shocks, financial volatility, or policy actions affecting China can propagate through global supply chains far faster than new mining or processing capacity can be brought online elsewhere.
• Financialization amplifies exposure.
  As rare earth risk is increasingly embedded in indices, ETFs, and long-term contracts, market stress can magnify supply insecurity even without immediate physical shortages.
• Industrial policy faces a timing mismatch.
  Alternative processing capacity takes years to build; financial contagion moves in days or weeks.

In effect, China’s processing dominance converts macroeconomic volatility into a structural vulnerability for Western industries, according to this Poland-based author.

Limitations and Points of Caution

The study is explicit about its constraints:

• Not rare earth oxides directly.
  Lead and zinc serve as financial proxies, not perfect substitutes for rare earth markets. Note that the rare earth element market is controlled by China, thinly traded outside of China. Although Rare Earth Exchanges now chronicles the emergence of an ex-China market.
• Statistical causality is not political intent.
  Granger causality identifies predictive sequencing, not deliberate policy action.
• China’s role is inferred, not modeled.
  The paper does not directly analyze Chinese export controls or industrial policy.

These limitations warrant caution—but they do not negate the broader warning.

Conclusion: An Early-Warning Signal, Not a Prediction

Orzechowski’s study does not forecast a rare earth crisis. It explains why one could escalate quickly. When strategic materials are tightly coupled to energy and financial markets—and when processing is highly concentrated—volatility becomes systemic. For governments seeking supply-chain resilience, the implication is unmistakable: diversification must extend beyond mining into processing, and it must accelerate.

Rare Earth Exchanges Editorial: Venezuela, Coercive Power, and the Next Supply-Chain Shock

The findings arrive amid intensifying geopolitical pressure on resource-rich states such as Venezuela—pressure often framed around oil but inseparable from broader mineral strategy. Venezuela sits atop not only vast hydrocarbon reserves but also coltan, rare earth-bearing minerals, and strategic metals flowing through opaque supply routes.

History suggests that regime pressure, sanctions, or externally driven leadership change—whether achieved through economic coercion, political isolation, or force—rarely stabilizes commodity supply chains. Instead, such actions often fracture governance, disrupt infrastructure, and accelerate informal or adversarial trade flows—frequently benefiting China, not constraining it.

If the United States or its allies were to pursue escalation aimed at regime change in Venezuela, would the downstream effect likely be greater supply volatility, deeper Chinese leverage, and higher costs for Western manufacturers? Or would relief be within sight?

According to this study at least, financial and energy shocks propagate fastest where processing is monopolized elsewhere.

Strategic minerals policy cannot be built on coercion alone. Without domestic and allied processing capacity, pressure campaigns risk backfiring—turning geopolitical ambition into supply-chain fragility.  Critical mineral and rare earth industrial policy continues to be a pressing issue in North America, Europe, and parts of Asia outside of China.

Citation: Orzechowski, A. (2025). Commodity and Financial Market Linkages: Granger Causality Insights from Rare Earths, Crude Oil, and Equities. Warsaw Forum of Economic Sociology, Vol. 16, No. 32.

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• The rare earth magnet market is facing a structural crisis.
• Demand from electric vehicles (EVs) and wind power could exceed 40% of global consumption by 2030.
• China controls 95% of the critical heavy rare earth processing needed for high-performance magnets, creating a severe geopolitical vulnerability.
• Achieving 50% ex-China magnet supply by 2027 has less than a 10% probability due to heavy rare earth processing bottlenecks.
• The most likely outcome is only 15-25% diversification and persistent shortages through the end of the decade.
• The constraint isn't just mining—it involves decades of integrated expertise in separation, processing, and precision customization that China has built.
• The West cannot replicate this expertise quickly, meaning that a stable ex-China heavy rare earth supply won't materialize until 2031-2035 at the earliest.

The rare earth magnet market is growing like a classic industrial megatrend—then behaving like a geopolitical fault line. In 2024, the market was roughly $19–20 billion, with consensus forecasts pointing toward ~8% CAGR through 2030. The demand story is straightforward: EVs, wind power, industrial automation, and high-tech electronics are magnet-hungry, and they’re scaling fast. By 2030, EVs and wind alone could exceed 40% of global rare earth magnet demand, up from roughly 17% today. That is the clean-energy transition in material form.

The supply story is the opposite of straightforward.

It is concentrated, brittle, and increasingly politicized. China controls roughly 70–80% of mining, 85–90% of processing, and an estimated ~95% of heavy rare earth (HRE) supply—especially dysprosium (Dy) and terbium (Tb). Those two elements are not “nice to have.” For high-temperature neodymium magnets—the grades that keep EV motors and large wind generators performing under heat and stress—Dy/Tb is the difference between reliability and failure.

This is why the next five years are unlikely to deliver equilibrium in the West. They are more likely to deliver tight supply, volatile pricing, episodic shortages, and policy-driven shocks, even as Western governments and manufacturers try to build alternatives. The dominant risk is not demand. The dominant risk is execution failure under time pressure, in an industry where time is the one variable you can’t buy.

Magnets are Not a Commodity Substitute

Rare-earth permanent magnets are not an interchangeable part. They are a performance anchor. They translate electricity into motion with a combination of torque density, efficiency, and compactness that alternatives often can’t match without painful tradeoffs. Yes, there are substitutes—ferrite magnets, induction motors, switched reluctance designs—but each comes with a bill: more weight, more volume, more cooling, more control complexity, more energy loss, and often more design time.

That design time matters. In defense platforms, grid systems, and automotive production lines, changing a motor architecture is not a weekend tweak. It includes validation cycles, thermal modeling, durability testing, supplier requalification, and regulatory certification. In the real world, “substitute” often means “available later.”

Magnet Types, Where’s the Concentrated Risk

NdFeB (Neodymium-Iron-Boron) magnets

The industrial backbone. EV traction motors, wind turbines, robotics, medical systems, and consumer electronics. They dominate the market because they deliver the most magnetic performance per unit size.

But the highest-performing NdFeB grades are also the most exposed. When heat rises, coercivity falls. That’s where Dy and Tb enter. Heavy rare earths stabilize performance at elevated temperatures, allowing magnets to hold their field in harsh duty cycles. The more the world electrifies transport and expands wind, the more the world quietly commits itself to heavy rare earth availability.

SmCo (Samarium-Cobalt) magnets

They sit in a different lane—more expensive, brittle, lower strength at room temperature, but superb at high temperature and corrosion resistance. SmCo is the magnet of aerospace, defense, and extreme environments, and crucially, it is Dy/Tb-free. In a constrained world, SmCo becomes a pressure relief valve. It does not become a mass-market replacement for EVs or wind. It’s insurance, not a substitute.

Bonded NdFeB magnets

Useful in small motors and sensors because they’re moldable and cheap relative to machined sintered magnets—but they are not central to the EV/wind bottleneck. They are not where the crisis will break first.

The Supply Chain Problem: Not “Mining.” It is Integration

China’s control is not simply “they mine more.” It’s that China built a vertically integrated system: separation, metalmaking, alloying, sintering, machining, coating, magnetization, tooling, and manufacturing know-how. Replicating that is hard in normal times. It becomes extremely hard under a compressed timeline, while environmental permitting, workforce constraints, and equipment bottlenecks all converge.

In other words: a mine is not a magnet. And a magnet plant without feedstock and alloying capability is a stranded asset. The market is now learning that the hard way.

Heavy Rare Earth Constraints

A critical constraint must be stated more plainly: the bottleneck is not only heavy rare earth availability, but heavy rare earth feedstock and processing know-how. Even with substantial investment—such as MP Materials’ downstream ambitions—this problem will not be resolved in a couple of years. Heavy rare earth separation is among the most technically demanding chemical processes in the critical minerals value chain, requiring ultra-precise solvent extraction, stable reagent systems, and highly experienced operators. China built this capability over decades through trial, error, and scale.

And they now control over 95% of the world’s processing of heavy rare earth separation/processing capacity. That learning curve cannot be compressed easily. As a result, probability-weighted outcomes point to fragile pilot output before 2028–2029 and genuinely stable, scalable ex-China heavy rare earth supply no earlier than the early-to-mid-2030s, barring an extraordinary and unforeseen breakthrough.

What About Mass Customization?

There is also a second, widely overlooked bottleneck: downstream magnet customization. Magnets are not sold as generic blocks; they are application-specific components requiring precision milling, multi-layer nickel or epoxy coating, tight-tolerance grinding, and exact magnetization profiles. EV OEMs, Tier-1 auto suppliers, drone manufacturers, and defense contractors are not equipped to perform these steps themselves at scale.

And the emerging magnet manufacturers are just coming online and at least some of them will operate with a handful of templates.

At present, no domestic U.S. entity currently offers this at scale and across the full range of bespoke EV/aerospace/defense specs, with consistent yield and qualification history. This means that even where ex-China magnet material exists, it often cannot be converted into deployable components domestically.

Closing this gap is possible—but not speculative. Downstream finishing capacity will only be built against a large, credible, multi-year book of orders, not policy rhetoric or pilot programs. Precision magnet finishing is capital-intensive, yield-sensitive, and customer-specific. It requires confidence in sustained volumes, stable specifications, and price support for non-China supply. This is where demand aggregation—particularly anchored by DoD, grid resilience, aerospace, and select civilian platforms—becomes decisive. And this brings us back to a far more comprehensive industrial policy need.

Until such order books exist, ex-China magnet supply will remain partial, fragile, and shock-prone, reinforcing the conclusion that the rare earth magnet market is entering a period of managed instability rather than true diversification through the end of the decade.

Export Controls Proved the Crisis can be Administrative

Between 2023 and 2025, China’s export licensing regime provided a rare, real-world stress test. Exports fell sharply (including reported collapses in certain months), and the downstream consequences were immediate: production pauses, supplier “panic,” and triage. The key lesson was brutal in its simplicity: A temporary policy suspension doesn’t eliminate that risk. It proves that policy can move faster than industry can respond.

DoD Framing: Not Only EV Story—But Readiness

For the U.S. Department of Defense, rare earth magnets are not an input. They are a dependency embedded across the force. They show up in precision-guided munitions, aircraft actuators, radar systems, satellites, drones, naval propulsion subsystems, electronic warfare, and secure communications. The U.S. and allies can debate “energy transition” timelines.

They cannot debate operational readiness.

From a national security lens, the magnet market has three uncomfortable truths:

1. A single external actor holds disproportionate leverage over a critical enabling technology.
2. Heavy rare earths are the sharpest lever because they gate high-temperature performance. And they too are controlled by China for at least the short to intermediate term.
3. Substitution pathways are slow, and the platforms that matter most have the longest redesign cycles.

This is why any credible strategy must assume a world where civilian demand growth collides with defense priority, and defense wins. Not because it’s efficient—because it’s inevitable.

Scenario Table: Probability-weighted ex-China Availability by 2027

“50% ex-China magnet supply by 2027” is a powerful target. It is also, on the current evidence, a low-probability outcome—mostly because heavy rare earth constraints are not solved by light rare earth (NdPr) supply.

2027 ex-China magnet availability (probability-weighted)

* Defined here as the share of non-China demand that can be supplied without China-origin finished magnet

**Assumption: “Meeting demand” in the 2027 scenario table means covering the at-risk non-China supply stream currently met by China’s magnet exports (~58k t in 2024), scaled to ~60–80k t by 2027; with a 33% REEx buffer, this implies ~80–110k t/year of ex-China nameplate-equivalent capacity by 2027.”

Bottom line: By 2027, the most likely world is partial diversification—enough to matter, not nearly enough to stabilize. This runs contrary to many of the forecasts we read coming out of Washington, DC, industry, investors, and media.

What if China Constrains HREs?

If China intentionally—or incidentally, through policy friction—constrains Dy/Tb availability even more, the system responds quickly and violently.

Within months, ex-China production of high-performance NdFeB is choked. EV motor and wind generator supply chains enter triage. Defense and grid stability applications get priority allocations. Civilian auto programs face delays or forced redesigns. Prices don’t rise linearly; they gap upward.

Shock table: “China holds back heavies” outcomes

The mitigation list is real—but it is slow. Recycling helps, but not at crisis scale before 2030. SmCo helps in niches. Motor redesign (e.g. non-REE magnets) helps eventually, but redesign is measured in years.

Timeline Table: ex-China HRE Supply Becomes Truly Stable

Here is the probability-weighted timeline that treats “stable supply” as something stronger than “pilot output”:

*these are estimates.  A number of factors could impact positively or negatively.

This is the hard truth: based on our holistic understanding of the challenges, the heavy rare earth problem extends beyond a five-year forecast horizon, barring some dramatic, unforeseen intervention.

What Can Go Wrong with Execution

Execution risk here is not abstract. It has a shape.

Strategic Takeaway: Risk isn’t a Bug—Risk is the Feature

The rare earth magnet market is not moving toward stability. It is moving toward a new normal: managed instability according to Rare Earth Exchanges™ assessment.

From 2026 to 2030, demand growth will keep climbing. Diversification will proceed, but based on our assessment, more slowly than what is commonly proclaimed. Some good companies have either moved into productive mode or are in various stages of building out capability. This is the good news in America and beyond.

Yet heavy rare earths remain a key structural constraint. China retains decisive leverage. The probability-weighted outcome is not collapse, but repeated stress events, where supply tightens, pricing spikes, and downstream sectors scramble.

This is why DoD framing matters: the highest-value systems will be protected, and the rest of the market will absorb the shock. Planning assumptions built on smooth execution will more than likely break down according to our assessments. Strategies built for delay, rationing, and policy shocks will likely hold.

By 2030, we will still be in trouble—just less trouble than today.

That isn’t pessimism. It’s risk-adjusted realism.

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• New Energy Policy study analyzes 30 years of data showing US-China geopolitical tensions cause non-linear effects on energy markets—temporarily boosting production but raising long-term prices and creating volatile consumption patterns.
• Research uses wavelet-based quantile econometrics to reveal how trade wars and strategic rivalry act as systemic shocks across different time horizons, with effects amplified during major crises like COVID-19 and Russia-Ukraine conflict.
• Energy price volatility from sustained US-China tensions reinforces China's rare earth processing dominance, as integrated state-backed capacity better absorbs geopolitical shocks than fragmented Western strategies.

A new peer-reviewed investigation (opens in a new tab) in Energy Policy (February 2026) led by Chen Chen (opens in a new tab) of Fuzhou University of International Studies and Trade, China with collaborators Khadim Hussain, Kunming University of Science and Technology, China and Shakir Hussain University of Sargodha, Pakistan, provides one of the most granular looks yet at how U.S.–China geopolitical tensions (USCT) reshape the U.S. energy system.

Using nearly three decades of monthly data, the authors show that trade wars and strategic rivalry exert non-linear, time-dependent effects on U.S. energy production, consumption, and prices—effects that ultimately feed back into critical minerals demand and China’s processing dominance.

Chen Chen, Associate Professor, Fuzhou University of International Studies and Trade

In plain terms, rising U.S.–China tensions don’t push America’s energy system in a single direction—they shake it unevenly over time. Analyzing nearly 30 years of monthly data, the researchers show that trade wars and strategic rivalry can temporarily boost U.S. energy production, but over longer periods, they tend to raise energy prices and create unstable consumption patterns, especially during major crises like COVID-19 or the Russia–Ukraine war.

So Rare Earth Exchanges™ suggests, according to these authors’ work and assessment, geopolitical stress acts like a series of jolts: short-term disruptions followed by longer-term cost pressure. This matters beyond oil and gas because volatile energy prices and policy uncertainty shape investment in mining and manufacturing, including rare earths and other critical minerals.

The study suggests these conditions favor countries with integrated, state-backed processing capacity—reinforcing China’s advantage in rare earth processing—while leaving countries with fragmented energy and minerals strategies more exposed. The takeaway for policymakers and investors is simple: energy security, geopolitics, and critical minerals supply chains are tightly linked, and ignoring that connection increases vulnerability.

How the Study Works

Rather than simple averages, the authors deploy wavelet-based quantile econometrics—tools that examine how shocks behave across time horizons (short, medium, long) and market conditions (normal vs. extreme).

They combine four advanced techniques to capture causality and asymmetry, analyzing U.S. data from January 1997 to September 2024. This approach allows them to ask not just whether U.S.–China tensions matter, but when, how, and under what conditions they matter most.

Key Findings

• Energy production responds unevenly. U.S.–China tensions can boost short-term U.S. energy output (as domestic producers respond to risk and policy signals), but effects become mixed over longer horizons.
• Prices rise with prolonged tension. Medium- and long-term energy prices show a predominantly positive response to sustained U.S.–China rivalry, even when short-term prices dip.
• Consumption is volatile, not linear. Energy use shifts depending on the intensity of tensions and broader crises (trade war escalation, COVID-19, Russia–Ukraine conflict).
• Geopolitics multiplies risk. The authors frame USCT as part of a broader “polycrisis,” where trade, security, climate, and energy shocks amplify one another.

Why This Matters for Rare Earths and Critical Minerals

While the paper focuses on energy, the implications extend directly to rare earth elements (REEs). Energy price volatility and policy uncertainty shape investment cycles in mining, processing, and manufacturing. When U.S.–China tensions persist, the study suggests higher long-run energy prices and unstable demand signals—conditions that favor countries with integrated, state-supported processing capacity.

That reality reinforces China’s advantage. China’s dominance in rare earth processing and separation—not just mining—means it can better absorb energy price shocks and geopolitical risk. For Western economies, fragmented energy and minerals strategies remain a structural vulnerability.

Limitations and Contested Terrain

This is a highly technical econometric study, not a direct analysis of rare earth supply chains. It does not quantify mineral flows or processing capacity. Its conclusions depend on model assumptions and historical data, meaning future policy shifts or technological breakthroughs could alter outcomes. Still, the consistency across multiple methods strengthens confidence in the central message: geopolitics matters, but not in simple ways.

Bottom Line

U.S.–China tensions are no longer background noise—they are a systemic force shaping energy prices, production decisions, and downstream critical minerals demand. For rare earth investors and policymakers, the lesson is clear: energy security, geopolitical risk, and processing dominance are inseparable. Ignoring that linkage leaves supply chains exposed.

Citation: Chen, C., Hussain, K., & Hussain, S. (2026). From trade wars to energy markets: An examination of how US-China tensions reshape the US energy market using a wavelet quantile-on-quantile approach. Energy Policy, 209(A), 114937. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2025.114937 (opens in a new tab)

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• IIT Kanpur researchers deliver a TRL-mapped review of REE recycling from waste magnets, batteries, and phosphors, showing less than 1% is currently recovered despite massive end-of-life potential.
• Green separation chemistries—DES, MOFs, and ionic liquids—are advancing, but the study warns most still need scale, cost, and toxicity validation before industrial deployment.
• Recycling alone won't break China's rare earth chokehold; the West must simultaneously build midstream separation and refining infrastructure to turn waste into strategic feedstock.

Ankur Srivastava (opens in a new tab), joined by Prof. Amarendra Kumar Singh (opens in a new tab) and Assistant Professor Arunabh Meshram (opens in a new tab) at the Department of Materials Science & Engineering, India Institute of Technology (IIT) Kanpur (opens in a new tab), has delivered a timely, hard-nosed review of how rare earth elements (REEs) can be recovered from waste—magnets, lamp phosphors, NiMH batteries, and tailings—rather than dug anew from the ground.

Published in the Journal of Environmental Chemical Engineering, the paper argues that the most realistic near-term lever for supply-chain resilience is recycling end-of-life products, paired with maturing “greener” separation chemistries. In plain terms: if China controls the refinery gate, the West may need to build a new entrance—through waste streams.

Study Methods: A “Map” of the Recycling Battlefield

This is a comprehensive review, not a single laboratory breakthrough. The authors synthesize literature (2000–2025, emphasizing 2015–2025) across hydrometallurgy, pyrometallurgy, adsorption, membranes, solvent systems, ionic liquids, deep eutectic solvents (DES), and emerging frameworks such as metal-organic frameworks (MOFs). A standout feature is their use of Technology Readiness Levels (TRLs) to classify which methods are still lab curiosities versus industrially deployable—then they tie that maturity to real-world companies and countries where adoption is actually occurring.

Key Findings: The Real Prize Is Separation, Not Scrap

1. The world wastes rare earths at scale.

The authors reinforce a grim baseline: less than 1% of rare earths from end-of-life products are currently recycled—an old statistic, but still widely cited in the literature and industry.

2. “Green” chemistry is moving from promise to toolkit.

They highlight DES and MOFs as routes to more selective extraction with potentially lower energy use and reduced conventional solvent burdens; ionic liquids also appear as a pathway to tighter separations with lower solvent demand in some flowsheets.

3. TRL reality check: not everything is ready.

Their TRL framing implicitly tells investors what to bet on: today’s credible pathways tend to be hydrometallurgy + proven separation, while newer media (DES/MOFs) often need scale, stability, toxicity, and cost validation before they can carry national-security expectations.

Implications: Recycling Helps—but China Still Owns the Gate

Recycling is not a magic wand. It reduces dependence on primary mining, but the hardest work remains: separation and refining to specification. That’s precisely where China’s dominance is most structural, and where export licensing friction can ripple through global industries. The IEA has warned that delays or denials in licensing for rare earth magnets can threaten revenues, competitiveness, and jobs across industrial value chains.

Europe is attempting to hard-code resilience targets into law—benchmarks include 25% recycling capacity by 2030 for strategic raw materials broadly, and policy discussions have also targeted recycling coverage for permanent magnets.

The Srivastava team’s message fits this moment: waste streams are a strategic feedstock, but only if the West builds the chemical and industrial machinery to process them.

Limitations and Controversies

• Review paper, not new data: conclusions depend on the quality of underlying studies and assumptions.
• TRLs can be subjective: “maturity” varies by feedstock, regulation, and local economics.
• Green solvents aren’t automatically green: some ionic liquids and novel media face unresolved toxicity, life-cycle, and cost questions before industrial rollout.
• Supply-chain narrative risk: policymakers may overinterpret recycling potential without simultaneously funding the midstream (separation, metals, alloys).

Conclusion

This review does something rare: it doesn’t just celebrate recycling—it triages it. The authors show where REE recovery from waste is real, where it is hype, and where it could become a strategic wedge against China’s processing chokehold. The takeaway for REEx readers is blunt: a circular economy for rare earths is possible—but only if nations treat separation know-how as critical infrastructure, not a science project.

Citation

Srivastava, A., Singh, A.K., & Meshram, A. Underlying advances in rare earth elements recovery from waste: A comprehensive review (opens in a new tab). Journal of Environmental Chemical Engineering (2026) 120957. DOI: 10.1016/j.jece.2025.120957 (opens in a new tab).

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• Rare earth processing concentrates naturally occurring uranium and thorium into waste streams that trigger strict NORM/TENORM regulations, requiring:
  • Engineered containment
  • Long-term monitoring
  • Financial assurance
• These requirements directly increase capex, opex, and permitting timelines.
• Regulatory frameworks vary dramatically by jurisdiction:
  • The U.S. 0.25% exemption doesn't cover waste
  • Canada delegates disposal to provinces
  • Malaysia shows waste can become political volatility
  • Greenland's uranium ban can stop projects entirely
• Monazite-heavy deposits face:
  • Higher regulatory complexity
  • Capital intensity compared to low-radioactivity ionic clays
• Making residue management plans and disposal pathways critical bankability factors for investors evaluating rare earth projects.

Rare earths are marketed as “clean-energy metals,” but many deposits come with a less photogenic companion: naturally occurring uranium (U) and thorium (Th). The challenge isn’t that these radionuclides exist—it’s that mining and processing can concentrate them into residues that cross legal thresholds and trigger licensing, engineered containment, monitoring, and long-tail liability. In regulatory terms, the make-or-break question is blunt: when U/Th ends up concentrated in waste streams, what does the law force you to do next?

The moment “trace” becomes “regulated.”

A useful mental model is simple: geology sets the risk; processing amplifies it. Certain REE minerals—especially monazite (and often xenotime)—commonly carry higher Th/U than many bastnäsite-dominant carbonatites. Mineral sands circuits that separate monazite can generate radioactive concentrates and Th/ Th/U-bearing residues, even when the final REE product is comparatively clean.

Then comes the accelerator: cracking, leaching, purification, and solvent extraction. These steps separate REEs, but they also tend to partition Th/U (and decay products) into filter cakes, sludges, tailings, and leach solutions. That’s why regulators care about Naturally Occurring Radioactive Materials (opens in a new tab) (NORM)/ Technologically Enhanced Naturally Occurring Radioactive Materials (opens in a new tab) (TENORM)—the “enhancement” is often the flowsheet itself.

From an operator standpoint, the exposure pathways are predictable: dust control (alpha-bearing particulates), water/leachate management, and tailings impoundment integrity. From an investor standpoint, those same pathways map directly onto REEx scoring logic: more radiation complexity usually means harder licensing, higher capex/opex, longer permitting tails, and bigger closure obligations—a direct hit to “Mineralogy—Impurities” and “ESG—Environmental.”

The global baseline: “contain, control, and pay for the endgame.”

Across most jurisdictions, the regulatory spine looks familiar, even if thresholds and agencies differ:

• Characterize radionuclides in ore, intermediates, residues, and effluent (with defensible QA/QC).
• License/permit operations when thresholds are exceeded.
• Control pathways (dust/air, water, worker dose; radon where relevant).
• Engineer storage/disposal (lined repositories, caps, leachate controls, stability).
• Fund long-term stewardship (closure plans, monitoring, financial assurance).

The International Atomic Energy Agency (opens in a new tab)(IAEA) guidance broadly supports a “contain and control”approach for radioactive residues: isolate them from the biosphere and manage them over the timescales the hazard persists.

What changes—country to country—is whether the system is single-window or fragmented, whether disposal pathways are mature, and whether politics can abruptly rewrite “permission to operate.”

The jurisdictions that matter (and what they really signal)

United States: the 0.25% line is not a get-out-of-jail card

In the U.S., the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) “source material” framework matters when thorium/uranium concentrations cross key triggers—and there is a well-known exemption for rare earth metals/compounds/products containing ≤0.25% by weight U/Th (or combination).  Commonly referred to in NRC regulations as ‘unimportant quantities of source material’ (opens in a new tab) under 10 CFR Part 40).

But the nuance is crucial: NRC guidance (opens in a new tab) has long emphasized that this exemption applies to certain rare earth products and does not apply to incoming ore or waste streams—meaning residues can still force stricter handling or disposal. Environmental pathways (air/water/tailings) also commonly route through state agencies plus federal regimes depending on project specifics.

Investor takeaway: U.S. projects can be financeable, but “low thorium” marketing doesn’t eliminate regulatory friction—especially once you model waste volumes, residue classification, and closure.

Canada: provinces hold the keys to disposal

Canada often sounds “straightforward” until you follow the waste. Canada is explicit (opens in a new tab) that handling/disposal of NORM within Canada is regulated by provinces/territories, while transport/import/export must follow CNSC requirements.  That means the hardest part—where the waste goes, under what conditions, and who signs off—can be provincial and locally political, not just technical. Social license and indigenous consultation can become schedule-critical, even when geology is strong.

Investor takeaway: Canada isn’t one regulatory environment; it’s a federation of them. “Location” scoring should reflect province-level realism, not just country flags.

Brazil: a nuclear lens layered onto mining reality

Brazil’s framework is widely described as graded by activity concentration, with tighter requirements as radioactivity rises (radiation protection programs, monitoring, and stricter waste controls). Even if REEs are the primary commodity, Th/U pushes projects into a dual world: conventional mining permitting plus CNEN-linked radiological rules—while tailings governance remains sensitive nationally.

Investor takeaway: Monazite-heavy flowsheets can become capital-intensive quickly. Brazil can be a contender, but the “waste endgame” must be bankable from day one.

Chile: world-class tailings discipline, case-by-case radiological oversight

Chile’s comparative advantage is not just geology—it’s a mature culture of tailings engineering and permitting. For REEs, radiological handling is typically case-by-case, driven by characterization, environmental approvals, and any permissions needed around radioactive substances or transport.

Chile’s ionic-clay narrative—“little to no radioactivity”—can be a real advantage if independently validated because it reduces both technical and political exposure.

Investor takeaway: Chile may reward “clean” deposits, but if radioactivity shows up later in residues, public perception can turn fast even in a strong engineering jurisdiction.

Australia: strict but investable

Australia is often the template for “strict but financeable.” The anchor reference is ARPANSA’s Radiation Protection Series No. 9 (RPS 9) (opens in a new tab) for radiation protection and radioactive waste management in mining and mineral processing.

States implement via mining/environment and radiation regulators; serious radiation and residue plans are expected in approvals and closure design.

Investor takeaway: Australia doesn’t ban the problem; it prices it in. Credible engineered containment and closure planning can clear the bar—at a cost.

Malaysia: Lynas shows how “waste” becomes politics

Malaysia is the global case study because it hosts the most scrutinized ex-China REE processing operation. Legally, Malaysia’s Atomic Energy Licensing Act (opens in a new tab) requires authorization for the disposal of radioactive waste.

Politically, Malaysia has shown that licensing can become rolling conditionality. Reuters has reported (opens in a new tab) that Malaysia amended Lynas’ operating license to allow importing NORM-bearing raw materials and processing until March 2026, amid ongoing scrutiny of residue handling (including the government’s “thorium extraction” framing).

Malaysia also illustrates the federal–state reality: national licensing authority exists, but land-use decisions for siting are politically sensitive and practically require state alignment. The IAEA’s public review remains foundational in how Malaysia framed risk.

Investor takeaway: Malaysia proves radioactive residue can be less of a technical risk than a legitimacy risk. “Location” scoring should reflect that volatility.

China: unusually direct statutory duty—build the repository

China’s statutory language is explicit (opens in a new tab): its law on prevention/control of radioactive pollution requires tailings repositories for tailings from the exploitation of uranium/thorium and associated radioactive minerals, with monitoring/reporting obligations.

Investor takeaway: China’s rulebook supports tight control; investors still price enforcement consistency and transparency. As always, enforcement consistency, transparency, and broader political considerations materially affect investor risk assessment in this nation.

Indonesia: big monazite opportunity, disposal still maturing

Indonesia’s REE thesis often points to monazite in tin-tailings. BAPETEN rules commonly cited as Regulation No. 16/2013 (opens in a new tab) address radiation safety in TENORM storage, and IAEA-linked materials discuss implementation and remaining gaps. This framework is discussed in IAEA conference proceedings (opens in a new tab) on the implementation of NORM regulation in Indonesia.

A persistent issue: policy has historically focused on temporary storage, while final disposal frameworks remain under development or split across institutions.

Investor takeaway: upside is real, but the bankability hurdle is the radioactive residue endgame.

Vietnam: building a governed rare earth state

Vietnam has moved toward tighter state-directed control. Rare Earth Exchanges reported that on Dec. 11, 2025, Vietnam approved revisions restricting exports of refined rare earths and reaffirming the ban on ore exports, aiming to build domestic processing and a modern industrial ecosystem.

Investor takeaway: governance is tightening; timelines may lengthen; early monetization may be constrained by policy.

Greenland/Denmark: the outlier where radioactivity can stop the project

Greenland’s uranium policy (opens in a new tab) has been widely reported as banning development above 100 ppm uranium, impacting Kvanefjeld-type REE deposits; it remains politically contested with legal dispute overhang.

Investor takeaway: Greenland shows the extreme: the regulatory answer can be “don’t produce it.” Location risk can be binary.

Some implications for REEx rankings

If you want one sentence to anchor the scoring model: radioactivity is the impurity that drags permitting, capex, and politics into the same room.

• Monazite/xenotime-heavy projects should be treated as regulatory-capex intensive unless the residue plan is already bankable and permitted.
• Low-radioactivity clays can score better—but only if residue chemistry and monitoring plans are validated and disclosed.
• The highest risk isn’t whether a country has laws; it’s whether the jurisdiction has credible disposal pathways, institutions that execute, and political durability (Malaysia/Greenland are the cautionary bookends).

Disclaimer (Legal / Regulatory)

Rare Earth Exchanges™ provides news, analysis, and investor-oriented commentary for informational purposes only. Nothing in this article should be construed as legal advice, regulatory advice, environmental compliance guidance, or a substitute for professional counsel. Rare earth and critical mineral projects—especially those involving naturally occurring radioactive materials (NORM/TENORM)—are governed by jurisdiction-specific laws, permits, licensing requirements, and enforcement practices that can change rapidly and vary by region, agency, and project design. Readers and project stakeholders should consult qualified legal counsel, permitting and licensing specialists, radiological experts, and environmental compliance professionals in the relevant jurisdiction(s) before making decisions or taking action.

REEx’s mission is to help accelerate the emergence, dynamism, and success of ex-China rare earth element—and by extension critical mineral—supply chains, supporting a more balanced, resilient, and transparent global materials ecosystem.

© 2025 Rare Earth Exchanges™ – Accelerating Transparency, Accuracy, and Insight Across the Rare Earth & Critical Minerals Supply Chain.