Highlights

• China dominates 85-90% of global rare earth processing and magnet manufacturing.
• Australia remains the only credible commercial-scale non-Chinese source today.
• Deep-sea mining in the Pacific Islands is not a near-term solution due to:
  • Environmental opposition
  • Unresolved international law
  • Multi-decade timelines
• U.S. vulnerability cannot be solved by mining access alone—the real chokepoint is midstream processing:
  • Separation
  • Refining
  • Metallization
  • Magnet manufacturing

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A recent article in The National Interest claims that U.S. critical mineral security now “depends” on the South Pacific. Written by Heritage Foundation analysts Allen Zhang and Miles Pollard, the piece is confident, urgent, and aligned with Washington’s evolving security mindset. It is also only partially grounded in supply-chain reality—and that gap matters for investors and policymakers alike.

On the Money

The fundamentals are sound. China dominates rare earth processing, controlling roughly 85–90% of global separation capacity and an even larger share of magnet manufacturing. That leverage is most acute in heavy rare earths—notably dysprosium and terbium—where non-Chinese alternatives remain scarce, slow to scale, and capital-intensive.

The article is also correct that Australia is pivotal. With large reserves and a proven producer in Lynas Rare Earths, Australia remains the only credible commercial-scale, non-Chinese source of separated rare earth oxides today. Recent U.S.–Australia coordination on financing and foreign investment screening represents tangible, real-world diversification—not rhetoric.

These points reflect a broad consensus among serious supply-chain analysts.

Where Ambition Outruns Evidence

The narrative strains when it turns to deep-sea mining in the Pacific Islands as a near-term solution. Polymetallic nodules may be geologically abundant, but they are not commercially or politically ready. Environmental opposition, unresolved international law under the International Seabed Authority, unproven processing routes, and multi-decade timelines make seabed mining a long-term option—not a fix for today’s rare earth or cobalt bottlenecks.

The oft-cited claim that Pacific seabed resources are “worth up to $20 trillion” is speculative and unhelpful. In-situ estimates are not recoverable, permitted, or financeable supply—a distinction investors ignore at their peril.

The Missing Middle: Where Power Really Resides

Most notably, the article underplays the midstream chokepoint. Mining access—on land or seabed—does not solve U.S. vulnerability unless paired with separation, refining, metallization, and magnet manufacturing. China’s leverage lies less in geology than in decades of vertically integrated processing.

Suggestions that raw nodules or concentrates can simply flow to refineries in Canada, Finland, or Australia gloss over permitting risk, chemical constraints, capital scarcity, and workforce bottlenecks. This is not a plug-and-play system.

Reading the Source—and the Moment

The authors write from a national security lens, not an industrial execution one. That explains the urgency—and the optimism toward state-led, aspirational solutions. The intent is to spur action. The execution pathway is far less certain.

Final Take

The South Pacific may play a role in future mineral supply. But the near-term battle will be decided on land, in processing plants, and in magnets—not on the ocean floor. Investors and policymakers should separate strategic ambition from industrial reality.

Citation: Zhang, A.; Pollard, M. Why U.S. Critical Mineral Security Depends on the South Pacific (opens in a new tab). The National Interest, Dec. 30, 2025.

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